

# **Immigration, race & intelligence : The Collapse of the West**

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## Introduction

The Western world is on the brink of collapse. The countries that once established world empires, led scientific breakthroughs, and achieved unheard-of levels of prosperity are now clearly in decline, not as a result of foreign conquest, but rather of their own self-inflicted demographic and cultural collapse. Mass immigration is one ideological force at the core of this decline that have been elevated above criticism. It is presented as moral requirement, as unavoidable advancement, and as the ultimate victory of tolerance over discrimination. But beneath the surface of virtue, there is a more sinister reality: a fractured society, increasing crime rates, cognitive decline, and the breakdown of the very pillars that once distinguished Western civilization.

This paper offers an intransigent analysis of the ways in which diversity dogma is working to systematically destroy the West. It is a cold examination of facts, patterns, and biological facts that our elites won't accept, not a hate-filled polemic. The evidence is overwhelming: low-IQ immigration depletes economies, and multiculturalism erodes social trust. These are observable facts, not opinions, that have been suppressed because they are inconvenient rather than because they are incorrect.

This book's first part addresses the genetic foundation of intelligence and its unequal distribution among racial groups, which is arguably the most taboo topic in contemporary conversations. The establishment has maintained for decades that all groups are cognitively equal and that inequality in performance results only from oppression or "systemic racism." Decades of twin studies, psychometric research, and genomic analysis have all disproved this lie.

In reality, there are notable variations in average cognitive ability because different populations of humans evolved under distinct selective pressures. For instance, on IQ tests, East Asians frequently score better than white people, while sub-Saharan Africans perform noticeably worse, a difference that remains even after taking environmental

factors into consideration. These distinctions are significant because they influence a society's ability to innovate, economic productivity, and civilizational outcomes.

What is the significance of this for immigration policy? Because Western countries are importing dysfunction rather than diversity when they bring in millions of individuals from low-IQ populations. The results, which include rising crime rates, welfare dependency, and the development of unassimilable ethnic enclaves, are documented in the second part of this book. The evidence is obvious: diversity weakens countries rather than makes them stronger.

Western leaders have maintained for years that large-scale immigration is a necessary economic solution to address labor shortages and aging populations. It's a fantasy. In reality, immigrants with low IQs are a net drain on the public coffers, spending far more on social services and welfare than they pay in taxes. They overwhelm infrastructure, lower native worker wages, and accelerate the breakdown of social cohesion.

Even worse, it does not affect the elites who are driving mass immigration. They send their kids to private schools, live in gated communities, and are shielded from the chaos they cause. As a result of a deteriorating social contract, overcrowded schools, and an increase in crime, the working class suffers the most. Not only is the catchphrase "diversity is our strength" incorrect, but it is also a purposeful lie that puts the interests of international capital ahead of the stability of individual countries.

## **Part I — Intelligence, race and IQ**

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One of the most controversial topics in contemporary research is addressed in this section: how genetics influences IQ in different ethnic groups. This part aims to prove that genetics is the main component of intelligence. The two chapters explore the validity of IQ as a marker of intelligence, the genetics linked to intelligence, the disparities between sex and ethnicities in intelligence, while also refuting the mainstream narrative of socio-economic factors possibly explaining the gap.

But first and foremost, I have to define race, as it is a concept I will be using many times in this essay. A race is a group of humans divided into based on physical traits regarded as common among people of shared ancestry who, in the past, if not now, lived together and bred with each other more than with strangers. Given this definition, it is obvious to the reader that human races exist; as all of the 9 genetic clusters of human populations lived apart from each other, didn't breed with other races.

### **Chapter 1 — The genetics of intelligence**

This first chapter provides evidence that intelligence is mainly due to genetics.

## 1.1 — 20+ pieces of evidence that genetics is the main component of IQ

Here we present more than 20 arguments that prove IQ to be strongly shaped by genetics and hereditary traits. For each evidence, we will firstly focus on the assumption that, if IQ wasn't shaped by genetics, we would observe a certain fact, to finally show that we find the exact opposite of that assumption, which essentially means that our premise was false. Basically, we will proceed with a *reductio ad absurdum*.

### *High level of heritability*

Our premise here would be that, if IQ wasn't primarily governed by genetics, the level of heritability of IQ would be close to zero, or at most would be lower than 0.5. However, as seen in **Figure 1.1.1**, the higher the genetic proximity is, the higher the cognitive ability is similar.




Figure 1 - Relation between genetic proximity and cognitive ability similarity

Figure 2 - Relation between genetic proximity and cognitive ability similarity

It can easily be seen that there is a strong relationship between the genetic proximity and the cognitive ability similarity. This alone is enough to prove the genetic component of IQ; however, this doesn't fully refute the premise that IQ isn't primarily governed by genetics. A first way to refute that premise would be to prove that IQ has a heritability higher than 0.7 overall, since that would mean that genetics would explain more than 50% of the variance in IQ ( $r^2 > 0.5$ ). We have three different ways of measuring the heritability of IQ. The first way is to study identical twins who grew up in different environments. In adult twins who grew up in different environments, the average weighted correlation of cognitive ability is 0.75 [1.1.1]. After correcting for reliability of tests, the correlation rises to 0.83. A second way to measure the heritability is to compare the correlation of IQ between identical twins, non-identical twins and simple siblings. According to [1.1.2], monozygotic (identical) twins have an IQ correlated at 0.86, while dizygotic (non-identical) twins of 0.60 and simple siblings of 0.47. Thus, the higher the DNA is shared, the higher the IQ is correlated.

A third method to estimate the heritability of IQ is to check the correlation between the IQ of a biological child and an adopted child in the same family. According to [1.1.2], the correlation is of 0.29. Another way is also to check the difference between the correlation of IQ between a parent and his biological child and an adoptive parent and his adoptive child. Respectively, those correlations are 0.41 and 0.13, which shows that a good chunk of the IQ is directly more inherited from the biological family.

A second refutation of the premise would be to look at the correlation of IQ between adopted siblings at adult age. If other factors such as environment, socio-economic status, education or culture shaped IQ more than genetics did, we would observe a high correlation of IQ between adopted siblings. We already saw that this premise is false in the third method of heritability, however the IQs were at an early age. At the adult age, the correlation of IQ between adopted siblings is of... -0.01 [1.1.3]. Therefore, the premises made are completely false. Across many populations,

especially in adulthood, genetic factors account for the majority of variation in IQ — though environmental factors remain influential.

***Great stability of IQ of races regardless of the environment***

Another piece of evidence that IQ is mainly governed by genetics is that IQ remains stable and constant over decades among races, regardless of the changing environmental conditions. For example, Africans, who have seen their living conditions & environment constantly being improved especially since the decolonization of the 1960s, didn't see their average IQ increase.

**Table 1 : IQ by race**

<b>Race</b>	<b>IQ</b>
Ashkenazi Jews	110
East Asians	105
Europeans	100
Inuit	91
Southeast Asians	87
Native Americans	87
North Africans & South Asians	86
Africans	80
Aboriginal Australians	62

This hierarchy remains strictly unchanged and is evident in all multiracial countries [1.1.4] in almost all social parameters (wages, socio-economic levels, level of crime and offences, prevalence of gifted people, prevalence of mental retardation...).

The following graphs representing IQ over time in selected races / countries are taken from : Conference by J.P. Rushton at American Renaissance “The Heritability of World I.Q Differences” :






Figure 7 : Stability of average IQ overtime




Thus, the premise that, considering that environmental conditions are better off in the 1990s than they were in the 1940s or 1950s, IQ would have naturally increased especially in poor countries if environment was the main component of IQ, is false. This strengthens the hypothesis that genetics is the strongest vector of intelligence.

### ***Brain size***

If IQ wasn't primarily governed by genetics, then traits who are factually speaking highly genetics related wouldn't correlate with IQ. Brain size is highly inheritable [1.1.5] and a high correlation exists between IQ and brain size.



Figure 9 : Cranial capacity vs median IQ among races

Figure 9.4: Median IQ of three populations (Mongoloid, Caucasoid, and Negroid) plotted as a function of the mean cranial capacity in each population. (Regression:  $IQ = 0.262 \times \text{cranial capacity} - 252.6$ ;  $r = 0.998$ .) (After Jensen 1998: 443).

Thus, it's no surprise that the same hierarchy of IQ saw earlier (and that we will develop further later) is reflected in brain sizes :

Table 2 : Brain size (cc) by race

Race/Origin	Mean brain size	IQ	Reference
East Asian	1364	105	Rushton, 2000
Europeans	1347	100	Rushton, 2000
Southeast Asians	1332	90	Smith & Beals, 1990
Pacific Islanders	1317	85	Smith & Beals, 1990
South Asians	1284	87	Smith & Beals, 1990
Bushmen	1270	55	Smith & Beals, 1990
Africans	1211	80	Rushton, 2000
Aboriginal	1178	62	Freedman et al., 1991

### *Studies on mixed people*

If genetics weren't the primary vector of IQ and intelligence, then we wouldn't expect the IQ of mixed people to be practically exactly in between those of the two races that are mixed, since environment would play a role. But that's not the case, in almost every study of IQ of mixed people, the mean IQ is exactly between the IQ of the races mixed. Thus, the premise is false, and this proves that IQ is primarily inherited and genetic :

### Europeans | Hybrids | Africans

**Table 3 : IQs of Europeans, Africans and their Hybrids**

	Location	Age	Test	N	IQ	N	IQ	N	IQ	Reference
1	Brazil	10	SPM	735	95	718	81	223	71	Fernandez, 2001
2	Germany	5-13	WISC	1,099	100	170	94	–	–	Eyferth, 1961
3	South Africa	10-12	AAB	10,000	100	6,196	83	293	65	Fick, 1929
4	South Africa	13	GSAT	746	100	815	86	–	–	Claassen, 1990
5	South Africa	15	SPM	1,056	100	778	80	1,093	74	Owen, 1992
6	USA	17	WISC-R	16	102	55	94	17	85	Weinberg et al., 1992
7	USA	Adult	Otis	–	100	284	91	176	87	Codwell, 1947
8	USA	Adult	Vocab	1,245	100	304	92	146	85	Lynn, 2002
9	USA	Adult	Vocab	10,315	100	116	97	4,271	89	Rowe, 2002
10	Canada	7-12	PP	100	–	46	93	46	78	Tanser, 1941

### *Native-American and European hybrids*

**Table 4 : IQs of Europeans, Amerindians and their Hybrids**

	Location	Age	Test	Europeans		Hybrids		Amerinds		Reference
				N	IQ	N	IQ	N	IQ	
1	Kansas	Adult	OTIS	–	100	536	93	179	67	Hunter & Sommermeir, 1922
2	South Dakota	10-15	OTIS	–	100	68	89	15	86	Fitzgerald & Ludeman, 1925
3	Mexico	7-10	SPM	155	98	571	94	194	83	Lynn et al., 2005

4	Bolivia	6-16	WISC4	–	–	62	94	–	–	Virues-Ortega et al., 2011
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Table 5 : IQs of Aboriginal and European Hybrids

Age	N	Test	g	Reference
10	28	PM	95	Porteus, 1917
5	19	PPVT	79	Teasdale & Katz, 1968
5	19	ITPA	77	Teasdale & Katz, 1968
6-12	13	PPVT	69	De Lacey, 1976, 1971a, 1971b

Table 6 : IQs of Pacific Islander and European Hybrids

Group	N	IQ
European	1000	100
Chinese	2,704	99
European Hawaiian	842	93
Chinese Hawaiian	751	91
Hawaiian	621	81

As seen in all of the tables, the IQ of hybrids **always** lies between those of the original race. Thus, this proves the genetic component and racial base of IQ. We develop this in [5.7](#).

### *Qualitative cerebral differences*

If intelligence wasn't strongly shaped by genetics, we wouldn't observe recurrent qualitative cerebral differences related to intelligence between ethnic groups. However, apart from brain size varying, there are also differences in terms of qualitative cerebral parts between races. The cortex of Africans is, on average, less convoluted. The cortex of Africans is, on average, 15% thinner than that of Europeans. Africans have smaller frontal and occipital lobes and a larger parietal lobe. Africans have a lower proportion of pyramidal neurons than Europeans ("The Science of Human Diversity", Richard Lynn).




Figure 11 : Brain of an Orang-utan, of an Australid and an Europid [1.1.5]

As

Figure 12 : Brain of an Orang-utan, of an Australid and an Europid [1.1.5]

we can

see on the picture above, an Aboriginal from Australia 's brain is far less developed than the one of a European. Several regions of the brain listed on the following table relate to intelligence, and again, those regions are more developed for whites than for Africans :

Figure 13 : Surface (mm<sup>2</sup>) by brain region, African vs EuropeanFigure 14 : Surface (mm<sup>2</sup>) by brain region, African vs European

Brain region (mm <sup>2</sup> )	African Americans	Whites,
Entorhinal cortex, L	392.036 (79.9331)	442.269 (89.4814)
Lateral occipital cortex, L	4432.77 (606.078)	4869.55
Lateral occipital cortex, R	4281.59 (629.353)	4734.67 (607.326)
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex, L	2511.55 (288.722)	2733.41 (318.287)
Precuneus cortex, R	3770.21 (527.036)	4201.71
Superior parietal cortex, L	5080.77 (565.338)	5680.33 (731.003)
Superior parietal cortex, R	5100.62 (558.739)	5704.45 (699.319)

Furthermore, thanks to the cerebral cortex forming folds (gyri and sulci) specific to each racial ancestry [1.1.6], scientists can easily identify one's race thanks to MRI [1.1.7].

### *Studies related to adoption*

If IQ isn't related to genetics, we can expect that children who were adopted in average (white) families, would have an IQ close to the white average, and not have an IQ close to their origins. But that's not true; several studies show that black adoptees in white families still have lower IQ than biological white children. Mixed children adopted by white families have an IQ between the biological children (and adopted children with 2 white biological parents). That is related by the famous Minnesota Transracial Adoption Study. The results are presented in the following table :

**Table 7 : IQs by parents' race, age and adoption status**

<b>Children's background</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>IQ at age 7</b>	<b>IQ at age 17</b>
Non adopted, with two white biological parents	101	110.5	105.5
Adopted, with two white biological parents	16	111.5	101.5
Adopted, with one white and one black biological	55	105.4	93.2
Adopted, Asian or indigenous American parents	12	96.1	91.2
Adopted, with two black biological parents	21	91.4	83.7

### ***Reaction time***

Reaction time (RT) tasks measure the latency between stimulus presentation and motor response, often interpreted as a proxy for central nervous system (CNS) efficiency. There is a significant difference between Europeans, Africans, and East Asians in terms of reaction time. Reaction time is correlated with IQ (we'll discuss that in another section), as both are indicators of central nervous system efficiency. Key findings from the literature include the following: According to [\[1.1.10\]](#), reaction time is correlated at between -0.31 and -0.49 with IQ. Caucasians, on average, react faster to a stimulus [\[1.1.8\]](#) :

**Table 8 : Reaction time, EEG and IQ by race**

	<b>Test</b>	<b>Africans</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>East Asians</b>
<b>1</b>	IQ	68	100	106

2	RT-S	398	371	348
3	RT-C	1,950	1,220	—
4	EEG	534	506	—

Figure 15 : Response time by task and race

Figure 16 : Response time by task and race




Figure 2. Mean response times of 10-year-old Black, White, and East Asian children on the Math Verification Test for Multiplication, Subtraction, and Addition. Redrawn by A. R. Jensen from data in Jensen (1993; Jensen & Whang, 1994). Copyright 2002 by A. R. Jensen. Reprinted with permission.

### *Inspection time*

Inspection time measures the speed of processing visual or auditory information. Inspection time measures correlated to -0.51 with IQ [1.1.9]. Early research has theorized that IT scores are an index of mental speed, and therefore a valid indication of psychometric intelligence (Brand, 1981; Brand & Deary, 1982). Kranzler and Jensen (1989) found a -0.69 corrected correlation between inspection time and performance IQ. According to [1.1.11], inspection time was correlated at -0.74 with fluid intelligence (basically, problem solving) than crystallized intelligence which relies on acquired knowledge. This refutes the critic that pure intelligence, like measured by inspection time, is influenced by cultural deprivation for example. In this type of test, two bars of unequal lengths appear on the screen for a certain time (in milliseconds). The test subjects were then asked which bar was longer, the one on the right or the one on the left. High IQs process visual or auditory information more quickly. They have shorter inspection times. There is a significant difference in terms of inspection time between races :

Figure 17 : Inspection &amp; reaction times by race

Table 2

Mean and standard deviation inspection times (IT), reaction times (RT), and intra-individual variability in milliseconds by race

	Race			
	White	Black	Difference	Effect size <sup>a</sup>
Inspection time	101 (46)	155 (118)	−54.0 *	0.79
IT variability	28.5 (22)	43.1 (36)	−14.6 *	0.57
Reaction time	460 (53)	483 (73)	−23.0 *	0.40
RT variability	71.4 (18)	85.8 (44)	−14.4 *	0.55

Note. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.

<sup>a</sup> Cohen's *d*, using the pooled group standard deviation.

\*  $p < .05$ .

Table 9 : Racial differences in reaction times

*Sample Size, Mean IQ Score, and Reaction Time Measures (in Milliseconds) From Five Countries, and the Reaction Time Correlations with IQ*

Variable	Hong Kong	Japan	Britain	Ireland	South Africa	SD	$r^a$
Sample size	118	110	239	317	350	—	—
IQ scores	113	110	100	89	67	—	—
Simple reaction time	361	348	371	388	398	64	.94*
Choice reaction time	423	433	480	485	489	67	.89*
Odd-man-out reaction time	787	818	898	902	924	187	.96*
Variability of simple reaction time	99	103	90	121	139	32	.83*
Variability of choice reaction time	114	138	110	141	155	30	.73*
Variability of odd-man-out reaction time	269	298	282	328	332	95	.85*

### *European admixture among Afro-Americans*

If genetics & race weren't the main vectors of intelligence, we wouldn't expect cognitive ability and physical traits related to intelligence to be correlated with European admixture. In other words, if a correlation is found between physical traits associated with intelligence, IQ and European admixture among certain populations (Afro-Americans and Americans for example), this would once again strongly strengthen the importance of the racial, genetic component of IQ. The greater the European admixture among African Americans, the higher

- (a) the average brain weight
- (b) the average IQ and the higher
- (c) the polygenic intelligence score

Sources : V. Shibaev et al. (2023) A Genetic Hypothesis for American Race/Ethnic Differences in Mean g: A Reply to Warne (2021) with Fifteen New Empirical Tests Using the ABCD Dataset.

A 1% increase in European ancestry is associated with a 0.78 IQ point gain among self-reported Afro-Americans [1.1.13]. The study also found that this relationship still remained strong even after controlling for socio-economic status. They found a 0.41 correlation between European ancestry and general cognitive ability.




Figure 3. Partial residuals and estimated regression fits for European ancestry in the admixture regression with g as the dependent variable.

a. MTAG-eduPGS




Figure 19 : European ancestry vs PGS & brain

volume


Figure 20 : European ancestry vs PGS & brain

volume



Figure 21 : European ancestry vs cognitive ability in America

Figure 22 : European ancestry vs cognitive ability in America



**Figure 25.** European ancestry and cognitive ability scores for countries and states/districts. Most of the "other non-sovereign" territories are Caribbean islands.

There is also a high correlation between European ancestry % and cognitive ability in American countries [1.1.12]. The overall correlation among these countries between European admixture % and general cognitive ability stands at 0.81, an insane correlation factor.

### *Different musculoskeletal traits*

Racial differences in cranial capacity are correlated with 76 musculoskeletal traits identified in standard works of evolutionary anatomy as being systematically linked to an increase in cranial capacity and intelligence in hominids [1.1.14]. These differences include:

→ Pelvic cross-sectional diameter: Increases in cranial capacity and intelligence were accompanied by an increase in the pelvic cross-sectional diameter, to allow for the passage of the skull at birth. Africans have a significantly smaller pelvic diameter than Europeans (27.4 cm compared to only 24.6 cm for Africans). East Asians have a larger pelvic diameter than Europeans.

→ As a result of a wider pelvis, the femur (the thigh bone) which inserts at the pelvis, became curved because despite a growing pelvis, spacing out the femoral insertions and causing a wider angle for the exit of the two femurs, it was imperative that the knee made a correct junction with the fibula, causing a curvature of the femur. Europeans have a significantly greater femoral curvature than Africans and significantly less than East Asians.

→ As intelligence and cranial capacity increased, skulls became more spherical and deeper. Europeans have significantly more spherical, deeper, and larger brains than Africans.

→ The increase in sphericity therefore reduced protrusions, particularly the mastoid process. Whites have a significantly smaller mastoid process than Blacks.

→ The increase in cranial capacity occurred toward the front of the skull, resulting in a decrease in prognathism and an increase in orthognathism (a flatter face). Europeans have significantly less prognathic and more orthognathic faces than Africans.

***Intelligence is part of a set of evolutionary traits***

East Asians and Africans are at opposite ends of a continuum, with Europeans in an intermediate position, not only on average cognitive test scores and brain size measures, but also on 60 variables including maturation rate, personality, reproduction, and social organization. It seems unlikely that social factors could produce this consistent pattern across such a diverse set of behaviors. This suggests that intelligence is part of a broader evolutionary process with its origins in evolution.

Source : Rushton's contributions to the study of mental ability » Arthur R. Jensen, Personality and Individual Differences, 2012.

**Table 11 : Evolutionary traits by race**

Category	Trait	Africans	Europeans	East Asians
<b>Brain Size</b>	Mean across methods (cm <sup>3</sup> )	1267	1347	1364
	Autopsy data (cm <sup>3</sup> equivalents)	1223	1356	1351
	Endocranial volume (cm <sup>3</sup> )	1268	1362	1415
	External head measures (cm <sup>3</sup> )	1294	1329	1356

	Cortical (billions) neurons	13.185	13.665	13.767
<b>Intelligence</b>	IQ scores	70–85	100	105
	Decision times	Slower	Intermediate	Faster
	Cultural achievements	Lower	Higher	Higher
<b>Muscular–Skeletal Traits</b>	Muscle attachment sites on crania	Largest	Intermediate	Smallest
	Postorbital constriction and temporalis fossae	Largest	Intermediate	Smallest
	Facial prognathism	Most	Intermediate	Least
	Number of teeth	32	30–32	28–30
	Size of molars	Largest	Intermediate	Smallest
	Bi-condylar breadth of mandible	Least	Intermediate	Largest
	Mass of nuchal muscles	Largest	Intermediate	Smallest
	Femoral head size	Smallest	Intermediate	Largest
	Femoral shaft curvature index	76.6	97.0	102.2
	Size of tibial plateau	Smallest	Intermediate	Largest
<b>Maturation Rate</b>	Gestation time	Shorter	Longer	Longer
	Skeletal development	Earlier	Intermediate	Later
	Motor development	Earlier	Intermediate	Later
	Dental development	Earlier	Intermediate	Later
	Age of first intercourse	Earlier	Intermediate	Later
	Age of first pregnancy	Earlier	Intermediate	Later
	Lifespan	Shortest	Intermediate	Longest
<b>Personality</b>	Activity level	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Aggressiveness	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Cautiousness	Lower	Intermediate	Higher
	Dominance	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Impulsivity	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Self-esteem	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Sociability	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
<b>Social Organization</b>	Marital stability	Lower	Intermediate	Higher

	Law abidingness	Lower	Intermediate	Higher
	Mental health	Lower	Intermediate	Higher
	Administrative capacity	Lower	Higher	Higher
<b>Reproductive Effort</b>	Two-egg twinning (per 1000 births)	16	8	4
	Hormone levels	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Size of genitalia	Larger	Intermediate	Smaller
	Secondary characteristics sex	Larger	Intermediate	Smaller
	Intercourse frequencies	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Permissive attitudes	Higher	Intermediate	Lower
	Sexually transmitted diseases	Higher	Intermediate	Lower




Figure 23 : Regression to the mean for height [1.1.]




Figure 13 : Regression to the mean for intelligence

Figure 24 : Regression to the mean for height [1.1.15]

Figure 13 : Regression to the mean for intelligence

### *Regression to the mean*

How can we understand the phenomenon of regression to the mean? Imagine two beans of the same size: Bean A and Bean B. Bean A comes from a breed (=variety) of tall beans. Bean B comes from a breed of short beans. We plant the seeds of Bean A and

Bean B. What do we observe in our offspring? The offspring of Bean A will regress toward its higher racial mean in height: the beans will be taller. The offspring of Bean B will regress toward the racial mean of Bean B, namely, shorter height. This phenomenon is reflected very precisely in terms of IQ and intelligence: consider two couples with an average IQ of 110, one African and one European. The children of the European couple will regress towards the European average of 100: they will have an average IQ of 105. The children of the African couple will regress towards the African average of 80: they will have an average IQ of 95.

This phenomenon of regression to the mean is also observed among those with low IQs: a child of a European couple with an average IQ of 75 will have an IQ of 87.5 (regression towards the average of 100), while a child of an African couple with an average IQ of 75 will have an average IQ of 77.5 (regression towards the average of 80).

→ Signature of the European genotypic average at 100 and the African genotypic average at 80.

Regression towards the mean for intelligence

→ Signature of the genetic causality of intelligence

### ***Inbreeding depression***

If IQ was mainly driven by the environment, inbreeding wouldn't systemically lower it much. We observe a 3.5-point IQ deficit in offspring of first-generation cousin crossbreeds [1.1.16].




Figure 25 : Inbreeding depression vs IQ

Figure 26 : Inbreeding depression vs IQ

Inbreeding increases homozygosity of rare, harmful recessive alleles that disrupt neurodevelopment. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) implicate hundreds of loci in cognitive function, many of which are sensitive to inbreeding effects .

### ***Racial differences in EEG***


Electroencephalography (EEG) measures the electrical activity of the brain. The lower the figure is, the more frequent the waves are, the more electrically active the brain is. In other words, information transmission is faster among intelligent individuals. There is a significant difference in EEG scores between races.

**Table 12 : EEG and IQ by race**

	Test	Africans in Africa	Europeans in Europe
1	IQ	68	105
2	EEG	534	506

### ***Heritability of intelligence increases with age***

This points to the genetic causality of intelligence. If the environment had an impact, its importance should increase with age, but the opposite occurs [1.1.17]. The non-shared environment essentially targets the in-utero environment.



**Figure 27 : Heritability of IQ by age group**

**Figure 28 : Heritability of IQ by age group**

***Racial differences in intellectual maturation paces***

→ (1) The fastest intellectual development among Australian Aborigines and the lowest final intelligence (average IQ of 62)

→ (2) The intellectual development among Africans is slightly slower than among Aborigines and the final intelligence is slightly higher (average IQ of 71)

→ (3) The intellectual development among Europeans is slower than among Africans and the final intelligence is higher (average IQ of 100)

→ (4) The slowest intellectual development among East Asians and the highest final intelligence (average IQ of 105). Africans are ahead of Europeans in their intellectual and motor development until about 30 months (2.5 years), then they catch up and are overtaken.

→ Australian aborigines also have a low IQ (62) and similarly show early infant maturity. They are more advanced than Caucasians in controlling the neck, back, and legs (Freedman, 1974).

→ Slower intellectual development among East Asians and higher final intelligence. European children are ahead of East Asian children (for intellectual and motor development) until about 8 years old.

It's a well-known principle of evolutionary biology that infants of more developed species have a longer childhood in which they depend on their mothers. As soon as baby reptiles hatch from their eggs, they can move and fend for themselves, while monkeys have a few years of maternal dependence. Among the primates, the most primitive are the lemurs, who have 2 years of maternal dependence; macaques are a little more developed and have 4 years of care by the mother; chimpanzees are even more developed and require about 8 years of maternal dependence; and humans are the most developed and have about 14 years of maternal dependence (Lovejoy, 1981, Rushton, 2000, p.205).

J.P. Rushton showed that this principle extends to the three main races of homo sapiens: East Asians have a slower development, a longer period of dependence, and the highest final intelligence; Caucasians (Europeans, South Asians, and North Africans collectively) mature faster, while Sub-Saharan Africans grow fastest, have the shortest period of maternal dependency, and the lowest final intelligence. These differences are present in physical, motor, and mental development. Regarding physical development, Africans typically exhibit greater skeletal maturity at birth, faster dental development in childhood, and faster sexual development, with earlier adolescence (measured by breast development in girls and genital development in boys). Rushton's theory was confirmed by the Japanese anthropologist Kunihiro Kimura (Eiben, 1998).

These differences in the speed of intellectual maturation point again to the genetic causality of racial differences in intelligence, which are part of an evolutionary pattern.

**Table 13 : Differences between the means of South African Black and American White Infants on the Bay Scales of Infant Development, as ds**

<b>AGE (months):</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Mental Development:</b>	0,47	0,64	0	-0,01
<b>Motor Development:</b>	0,94	0,24	0,06	-0,01

**Table 14 : Norms for Taiwan for the Bayley Scales of Infant Development**

<b>AGE</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Mental</b>	-0.88	-0.82	-0.48	-0.23
<b>Motor</b>	-1.06	-0.97	-0.74	-0.27



Figure 29 : Maturation paces by race

<b>Maturity at Birth</b>	<b>Puberty</b>	<b>Intellectual Growth</b>	<b>Adult Intelligence (Mean IQ)</b>	<b>Brain Size (cc)</b>
The highest (1)	The earliest (1)	The shortest (1)	The lowest	400
(2)	(2)	(2)	62	1225

Figure 30 : Maturation paces by race

	(3)	(3)	(3)	71	1282
<b>Europeans</b>	(4)	(4)	(4)	100	1369
<b>East Asians</b>	(5)	(5)	(5)	The highest, 105	1416
	The lowest	The least early	The longest		

Europeans surpass Africans in intelligence at 30 months

East Asians surpass Europeans in intelligence at 8 years

### ***Race differences in intelligence have been constant in the last 10,000 years***

Contemporary IQ differences between races and nations can be identified as early as 10,000 years ago, based on differences in:

cranial capacity

in the ability to make the Neolithic transition from hunting and gathering to sedentary agriculture 8,000 years ago

in the development of early civilizations 6,000 years ago

in the scientific, mathematical, and technological advances of the last 2,500 years

The gaps in intelligence between race is constant since ever data can be estimated [1.1.18]. This essentially proves the socio-economic status component to be of minimal importance for IQ, physical & racial differences dominating much.

### ***Heritable differences***

Here we look at the magnitude of races differences in Raven's progressive matrices items by the heritability of the item. The following table presents the heritability of items 25-36 of the Raven's progressive matrices, measured by certain methods :

**Table 15 : Heritability and environmentality of items of Raven's test**

Item	1 <sup>st</sup> h <sup>2</sup> 2*(MZ-DZ)	2 <sup>nd</sup> h <sup>2</sup> MZr	3 <sup>rd</sup> h <sup>2</sup> 2*DZr	Mean h <sup>2</sup>	Environmentality Σ(MZ1-MZ2)
25	.41	.21	.00	.21	11
26	.00	.00	.00	.00	12
27	.00	.00	.33	.11	15
28	.35	.20	.05	.20	25
29	.00	.15	.69	.28	17
30	.20	.22	.24	.22	23
31	.18	.18	.17	.18	16
32	.69	.35	.00	.35	22
33	.00	.01	.77	.26	33
34	.13	.32	.50	.32	30
35	.00	.11	.26	.12	30
36	.04	.10	.16	.10	25

Heritability is measured by comparing the results of twins, reared apart for 30 to 40 years, (monozygotic & dizygotic) answers at the test, according to the University of Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart. The higher the heritability is, the more genetically influenced the item is. Therefore, if we compute the racial differences in correct answers for each item in relation to the heritability of each item, we can accurately predict whether genetic or environment and culture influence IQ more. If race differences can be predicted by calculated heritability more than calculated environmentality, then race differences in cognitive ability are due more to genetics than they are to environment.

For instance, if we look at the White-Roma differences on these items and compute a scatterplot for each predictor, this is what we find :

**Table 16 : Environmentality and heritability on items of the Raven's progressive matrices**

Item	Mean $h^2$	Environmentality $\Sigma(MZ1-MZ2)$	White twins pass rate (%)	Roma pass rate (%)	Difference (%)
25	.21	11	90	74	16
26	.00	12	94	77	17
27	.11	15	93	74	19
28	.20	25	74	58	16
29	.28	17	86	58	28
30	.22	23	76	40	36
31	.18	16	85	45	40
32	.35	22	69	25	44
33	.26	33	70	47	23
34	.32	30	55	22	33
35	.12	30	38	20	18
36	.10	25	24	7	17




Figure 31 : Environmentality vs difference in IQ

Figure 32 : Environmentality vs difference in IQ

We find  $r = 0.41$ . Same thing for environmentality :




Figure 33 : Heritability vs IQ difference

Figure 34 : Heritability vs IQ difference

This time we find  $r = 0.01$ . This means that heritability is a much better predictive force of racial differences than environment is.

### ***Racial composition predicts intelligence***

Given the racial composition of a country, we can accurately (>90% precision) predict the national IQ. This once again proves that IQ is heavily governed by racial genetics. Here we focus on South American countries as they are the most diverse in terms of racial composition.

Table 17 : Measured IQ vs predicted IQ in Americas

Nations	Measured	Predicted	Racial Composition	Accuracy
Argentina	93	97	85% European, 15% Amerindian	95,70%
Barbados	80	71	80% African, 16% Mulatto, 4%	88,75%
Bermuda	90	85	61% African & Mulatto, 37%	94,44%
Bolivia	87	88	42% Amerindian, 31% Mestizo,	98,85%
Brazil	87	90	53% European, 3% Amerindian,	96,55%
Chile	90	92	92% Mestizo & European, 7%	97,78%
Colombia	84	89	1% Amerindian, 58% Mestizo,	94,05%
Cuba	85	92	12% African, 22% Mulatto, 66%	91,76%
Dominica	67	68	90% African, 6% Mulatto, 4%	98,51%
Dominican	82	84	11% African, 73% Mulatto, 16%	97,56%
Ecuador	88	87	40% Amerindian, 40% Mestizo,	98,86%
Guatemala	79	85	55% Amerindian, 42% Mestizo,	92,41%
Honduras	81	90	90% Mestizo, 7% Amerindian	88,89%
Jamaica	71	71	76% African, 15% Mulatto, 3%	100,00%
Mexico	88	88	30% Amerindian, 60% Mestizo,	100,00%
Paraguay	84	91	3% Amerindian, 90% Mestizo,	91,67%
Puerto Rico	84	93	76% European, 24% African &	89,29%
St. Lucia	62	75	90% African, 6% Mulatto, 3%	79,03%
St. Vincent	71	73	65% African, 23% mixed and	97,18%
Suriname	89	83	10% African, 35% Mulatto, 3%	93,26%
Uruguay	96	96	8% Mestizo, 86% European, 6%	100,00%
Venezuela	84	85	67% Mestizo, 21% European,	98,81%

### *Conclusion*

This first section aimed at proving that genetics & racial differences in development of certain traits were, by far, the main components of intelligence, far ahead of socio-economic status and environmental conditions. In order to show that, I used dozens of indicators that show the high heritability of IQ, the high influence of race on IQ, which all point out to a specific hierarchy of intelligence worldwide. After having analyzed these observable differences, we'll now focus on the genetic factors that contribute to overall intelligence.

## 1.2 — The genes of intelligence

This section will focus on the genetical factors (genes, alleles) that contribute highly to intelligence. We'll verify that the intellectual hierarchy proposed earlier still stands at a genomic level. We'll start this section by showing a few individual genes or alleles heavily related to intelligence, to progressively move on larger samples.

### *CHRM2 gene*

The CHRM2 gene encodes a certain protein called muscarinic acetylcholine receptor M<sub>2</sub>, involved in neuronal excitability, synaptic plasticity, and feedback regulation of acetylcholine release. It is located on 7q31–35. Presence of the A-allele of rs2061174 was associated with a 6.89 increase in PIQ (performance IQ) points, where presence of the T-allele of rs324650 showed an increase of 5.30 IQ points [1.2.1]. According to gnomAD, unsurprisingly, the presence of these alleles verifies the intellectual hierarchy studied earlier :

Table 18 : Prevalence of CHRM2 alleles by race

Prevalence of...	Finnish	Europeans	Africans	East Asian
A-allele of rs2061174	0.779	0.676	0.488	0.362
T-allele of rs324650	0.423	0.468	0.327	0.918

### *DTNBP1*

The DTNBP1 gene is strongly associated with intelligence. Some of its alleles are responsible for big IQ changes [1.2.2]:

Table 19 : Prevalence of DTNBP1 alleles by race

SNP	Common Allele	Uncommon Allele	IQ Change	European Frequency	African Frequency
rs2619539	G	C	+3.5	0.375	0.209
rs2619528	G	A	-6.41	0.191	0.394
rs760761	C	T	-8.02	0.206	0.399
rs2619522	T	G	-7.51	0.199	0.398

### *Case studies*

The following are case SNPs that I couldn't group in categories to make a generality. The beta value represents the estimated effect size, indicating the change in the outcome (e.g., risk of a disease) associated with a one-unit increase in the exposure (e.g., Intelligence), based on genetic data.

**Table 20 : SNP alleles by trait, beta and race**

<b>SNP</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>Trait</b>	<b>Africans</b>	<b>Latinos</b>	<b>Europeans</b>
<b>rs419055</b>	0.437	Antisocial/borderline personality disorder	0.814	0.472	0.311
<b>rs419055</b>	0.303	Mental and behavioral disorders	0.814	0.472	0.311
<b>rs419055</b>	0.284	Personality disorders	0.814	0.472	0.311
<b>rs419055</b>	0.281	Anorexia	0.814	0.472	0.311
<b>rs429358</b>	1.9	Alzheimer's Disease	0.212	0.123	0.153
<b>rs429358</b>	1.49	Dementia	0.212	0.123	0.153
<b>rs429358</b>	1.07	Degenerative diseases of the nervous system	0.212	0.123	0.153
<b>rs429358</b>	1.02	Any dementia	0.212	0.123	0.153
<b>rs111444407</b>	0.114	Bipolar disorder	0.441	0.125	0.138
<b>rs4447398</b>	-0.109	Bipolar disorder	0.601	0.66	0.877
<b>rs1473594</b>	0.337	Disorders of brain	0.816	0.767	0.595
<b>rs2102949</b>	-0.159	Bipolar disorder	0.212	0.673	0.765
<b>rs2283362</b>	0.379	Bipolar disorder	0.543	0.189	0.158
<b>rs2283362</b>	0.139	Substance use	0.543	0.189	0.158
<b>rs13217619</b>	-0.151	Bipolar disorder	0.018	0.025	0.072
<b>rs13217619</b>	-0.108	All anxiety disorders	0.018	0.025	0.072
<b>rs1303327467</b>	-0.382	Psychosis	0.238	0.422	0.394
<b>rs145396517</b>	-0.513	Bipolar	0.002	0.008	0.039
<b>rs62054478</b>	0.336	Psychotic illness	0.474	0.074	0.074

<b>rs62054478</b>	0.159	Acute and transient psychotic disorders	0.474	0.074	0.074
<b>rs1555514</b>	-0.338	Lack of expected normal physiological development	0.049	0.127	0.134

*Some larger samples...*

According to [1.2.3] :

Gene	Allele	Gene effect	Allele frequency by race			$\Delta\sigma$	TTC29	rs17610219	Positive	0.39	0.44	0.61	0.015
			White	Arab	Black								
FOXO6	rs4359027	Positive	0.54	0.46	0.27	0.014	BTN3A1	rs41266839	Positive	0.07	0.00	0.01	0.022
CREB3L4	rs11264743	Negative	0.29	0.34	0.12	-0.015	BTN2A1	rs13195401	Positive	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.022
NUP210L	rs11264875	Negative	0.29	0.32	0.17	-0.014	BTN2A1	rs13195402	Positive	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.021
METTL13	rs2232819	Positive	0.18	0.13	0.04	0.017	BTN2A1	rs13195509	Positive	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.022
LMOD1	rs2820312	Negative	0.31	0.20	0.22	-0.016	BTN2A1	rs3734542	Positive	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.022
ZNF638	rs1804020	Negative	0.24	0.24	0.24	-0.021	BTN2A1	rs3734543	Positive	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.021
ZNF638	rs11542286	Negative	0.06	0.11	0.12	-0.024	BTN1A1	rs35555795	Positive	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.022
ALMS1	rs6546837	Negative	0.23	0.25	0.78	-0.016	OR12D3	rs3749971	Positive	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.025
ALMS1	rs6724782	Negative	0.23	0.24	0.77	-0.016	ZMI22	rs3735478	Positive	0.36	0.19	0.05	0.020
ALMS1	rs6546839	Negative	0.23	0.24	0.77	-0.016	WRN	rs1801195	Positive	0.41	0.37	0.49	0.014
ALMS1	rs2056486	Negative	0.23	0.24	0.76	-0.016	TSNARE1	rs79460462	Positive	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.049
CHST10	rs3828193	Positive	0.50	0.35	0.09	0.019	GPT	rs1063739	Negative	0.48	0.37	0.23	-0.016
GPD2	rs2116665	Positive	0.66	0.74	0.48	0.017	IER5L	rs184457	Positive	0.28	0.27	0.11	0.018
PLCL1	rs1064213	Negative	0.43	0.63	0.28	-0.013	GBF1	rs11191274	Negative	0.14	0.06	0.02	-0.019
TMEM89	rs9834639	Positive	0.08	0.08	0.24	0.025	PPP2R2D	rs34473884	Positive	0.23	0.15	0.10	0.017
SLC26A6	rs13324142	Positive	0.11	0.08	0.16	0.024	NDUFS3	rs2030166	Negative	0.35	0.35	0.17	-0.016
LAMB2	rs34759087	Positive	0.14	0.16	0.02	0.023	MTCH2	rs1064608	Negative	0.42	0.41	0.17	-0.016
CCDC36	rs13068038	Positive	0.11	0.08	0.08	0.031	SERPINC1	rs4926	Negative	0.28	0.26	0.10	-0.016
C3orf62	rs13077498	Positive	0.11	0.08	0.08	0.031	KMT2D	rs55865069	Positive	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.038
BSN	rs34762726	Positive	0.36	0.30	0.27	0.031	AKAP6	rs4647899	Positive	0.29	0.32	0.21	0.015
BSN	rs2005557	Negative	0.48	0.47	0.42	-0.015	DMXL2	rs17524906	Positive	0.19	0.23	0.13	0.016
MST1	rs3197999	Positive	0.35	0.30	0.23	0.029	FAM154B	rs16973457	Positive	0.50	0.54	0.35	0.014
RNF123	rs34823813	Positive	0.10	0.07	0.02	0.031	SPNS1	rs7140	Positive	0.68	0.86	0.91	0.017
CDHR4	rs73079003	Positive	0.18	0.15	0.02	0.022	ARHGAP2	rs12949256	Negative	0.04	0.20	0.06	-0.018
SEMA3F	rs1046956	Positive	0.70	0.67	0.60	0.017	CRHR1	rs16940674	Negative	0.14	0.20	0.04	-0.017
GNL3	rs11177	Positive	0.39	0.40	0.17	0.018	RNF43	rs2526374	Negative	0.34	0.37	0.41	-0.015
GNL3	rs2289247	Positive	0.41	0.45	0.53	0.017	MTMR4	rs3744108	Negative	0.36	0.33	0.28	-0.021
NEK4	rs1029871	Positive	0.39	0.40	0.15	0.019	TEX14	rs6503870	Positive	0.64	0.67	0.71	0.021
ITIH3	rs3617	Positive	0.44	0.46	0.71	0.015	DCC	rs2270951	Negative	0.59	0.44	0.22	-0.020
DHFR1L	rs61739170	Negative	0.27	0.06	0.06	-0.014	MAST3	rs8108738	Positive	0.52	0.44	0.34	0.017
TNIP2	rs2269495	Negative	0.40	0.35	0.13	-0.013	ZNF446	rs882610	Positive	0.28	0.15	0.43	0.016
NCAPG	rs3795243	Negative	0.07	0.15	0.09	-0.026	MZF1	rs3752109	Positive	0.31	0.13	0.09	0.017
ANAPC4	rs34811474	Positive	0.23	0.17	0.04	0.027	DDX27	rs11553387	Positive	0.21	0.14	0.20	0.019
SLC39A8	rs13107325	Negative	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.048	DDX27	rs1130146	Negative	0.41	0.41	0.10	-0.018
							ZNFX1	rs6512577	Positive	0.22	0.14	0.18	0.019
							TRIOBP	rs12628603	Positive	0.59	0.52	0.40	0.013
							TRIOBP	rs9610841	Positive	0.42	0.29	0.18	0.014
TOTAL ( $\mu\Delta\sigma \rightarrow IQ$ )										1.821	1.308	1.038	



Figure 39 : Frequencies of alleles associated with intelligence

Figure 35 : Frequencies of alleles associated with intelligence, positively

				Alleles associated with intelligence				Associated with AS
								by race
					European	Indian	African	
Figure 36 : Frequencies of alleles associated with intelligence, positively				rs2352974	0.48	0.34	<b>0.54</b>	
rs2309812	<b>0.26</b>	0.02	<0.01	rs3384679	0.39	0.58	<b>0.64</b>	
rs34316	<b>0.57</b>	0.48	0.35	rs3128341	0.79	0.74	<b>0.86</b>	
rs1145123	0.50	<b>0.51</b>	0.13	rs6550835	0.33	0.33	<b>0.40</b>	
rs3754970	<b>0.39</b>	0.11	0.11	rs6508220	0.44	0.69	<b>0.72</b>	
rs11932971	<b>0.06</b>	0.03	0.03	rs3740422	<b>0.36</b>	0.07	0.13	
rs62236533	0.09	<b>0.10</b>	0.01	rs1054442	0.37	0.47	<b>0.61</b>	
rs4687625	<b>0.46</b>	0.26	0.18	rs2920940	0.77	0.79	<b>0.91</b>	
rs35760956	0.40	<b>0.60</b>	0.27	rs2239647	0.54	0.63	<b>0.86</b>	
rs4463213	<b>0.52</b>	0.27	0.42	rs66954617	0.63	0.66	<b>0.71</b>	
<b>Average</b>	<b>0.35</b>	0.23	0.16	<b>Average</b>	0.51	0.53	<b>0.64</b>	

Alleles associated with intelligence, negatively

Figure 41 : Frequencies of alleles most predictive of intelligence

Alleles associated with intelligence, negatively

Figure 42 : Frequencies of alleles most predictive of intelligence

rs2388334	<b>0.48</b>	0.33	0.23
rs36162392	<b>0.08</b>	0.04	0.05
rs6778735	0.56	<b>0.61</b>	0.52
rs429479	<b>0.10</b>	0.04	0.03
rs10798879	<b>0.64</b>	0.56	0.39
rs7609050	<b>0.55</b>	0.43	0.33
rs242559	<b>0.80</b>	0.80	0.51
rs7583067	0.22	<b>0.27</b>	0.16

Now there is a pretty obvious pattern : Europeans usually have higher prevalence of alleles associated positively with cognitive ability than Africans, Hispanics and Arabs, and the opposite happens when looking at alleles negatively associated with intelligence. One might say that intelligence is highly polygenic and that my samples aren't enough. However, these samples are the most representative samples as they are always about major alleles in terms of intelligence. Whatsoever, I'll move on to larger samples now.

### *Large sample alleles associated with intelligence*

Each allele has a certain Beta score (z-score increment). When the Beta is positive, the allele has a positive effect on the trait (here, intelligence) and vice versa when it's negative.

Over 700 alleles were considered, with their frequencies among Europeans, Africans, South Asians and Middle Eastern [\[1.2.6\]](#) [\[1.2.7\]](#).

$\mu_w$  is the weighted beta average for each population.

First graph is all alleles including those where  $|\beta| \sim 0$ .

Second graph eliminates those values, only showing variants with significant  $\beta$  (where  $|\beta| > 1$ ).

Third graph only includes positive significant  $\beta$  ( $\beta > 1$ ).

Weighted average beta per allele for significant beta values


Europeans  $\sim 0.64$

Africans  $\sim 0.55$

South Asians  $\sim 0.50$

Middle Eastern  $\sim 0.56$

An average over 315 alleles






Table 21 : Prevalence of alleles associated with cognitive impairment by race

Average prevalence of alleles associated with cognitive impairment [\[1.2.8\]](#)

Europeans	0.367
Middle Eastern	0.401
Asians	0.405
Africans	0.451




Figure 43 : Association of alleles associated with cognitive performance [1.2.9]

Figure 44 : Association of alleles associated with cognitive performance [1.2.9]

### ***GWAS (Genome Wide Association Study)***

The first GWAS study on intelligence (2015) was conducted by D. Piffer and published in the journal *Intelligence*. It examined all the intelligence-enhancing genetic variations discovered to date, highlighted by GWAS (Genome Wide Association Study, which allows the identification of many different genetic variants involved in the same phenotypic trait). The study then assessed racial differences in the frequency of these alleles and showed that they paralleled differences in IQ between populations; in other words, races with higher IQs actually have a higher frequency of intelligence-enhancing alleles in their genetic makeup (table below). AFR for Africans, AMR for Native Americans, ASN for East Asians, EUR for Europeans and SAS for South Asians and North Africans.




Fig. 2. Average frequency of cognitive ability increasing alleles by continental group.

Figure 45 : Average frequency of cognitive ability increasing alleles by race

Figure 46 : Average frequency of cognitive ability increasing alleles by race

Considering all the intelligence-enhancing genetic variants identified in 2015, these alleles are most common in East Asians (mean IQ of 105), followed by Europeans (mean IQ of 100). Native Americans (AMR, mean IQ of 86) and South Asians and North Africans (SAS, mean IQ of 84) have a lower frequency, and sub-Saharan Africans have the lowest frequency of these alleles. The frequency of these intelligence-enhancing genetic variants is therefore consistent with the average intelligence of populations. The study also more precisely estimates the frequencies of these alleles for different countries and demonstrates the close link between the national average IQ and the frequency of these alleles in the population.

D. Piffer's seminal study, "[A review of intelligence GWAS hits: Their relationship to country IQ and the issue of spatial autocorrelation](#)," *Intelligence* 53 (2015) 43–50. Below is a table of educability genetic scores based on over 2,400 allelic variations. These scores are highly correlated with intelligence; they are currently even better estimators of intelligence than purely intellectual scores, as the studies conducted were conducted on larger samples (Plomin, 2018). As can be seen, these educability genetic scores parallel IQ. East Asians

have the highest frequencies of favorable alleles, followed by Europeans. Africans have the lowest frequencies of these alleles.




Figure 47 : Relationship between national IQ and PGS




Figure 48 : Relationship between national IQ and PGS




Figure 49 : EduPGS vs IQ

Figure 50 : EduPGS vs IQ


Figure 2: Correlation between EDU3 PGS and population IQ

Piffer D. (2019) “[Evidence for recent polygenic selection on educational attainment and intelligence inferred from GWAS hits: a replication of previous findings using recent data](#)”

Note again how the average IQ of populations is reflected in the polygenic score. Populations with higher IQs have a higher frequency of intelligence-enhancing alleles.

The GWAS is a strong evidence of higher prevalence of all genes associated with intelligence among populations, as it revealed the average prevalence of every single allele associated with intelligence.

### *The characteristics of the genome of a brilliant individual*



One of the characteristics of the DNA of highly intelligent individuals is a lower frequency of rare mutations. Conversely, schizophrenics and those with the lowest IQs would have a higher frequency of these mutations. Individuals with very high IQs would have advantageous versions of alleles found throughout the intellectual distribution; this is therefore a continuation of the normal distribution, while less intelligent individuals would possess mutations not found in the normal distribution.

Intelligence is a highly genetic and polygenic characteristic. The genome of a highly intelligent individual is characterized by a higher allele density for high intelligence (myopia, more copies of DUF1220, etc.), and a lower allele density for low intelligence.

### *Predicting the IQ based on genome*

Intelligence is a highly genetic and polygenic trait, like height. Many genes are involved, each varying the final result by only a few points (a few tenths of a point) or a few millimeters. A highly intelligent individual will therefore have a favorable version of most of the genes that increase intelligence. More than 1,000 genes involved in intellectual variation have already been identified. It is possible to aggregate the effect of each gene to obtain a polygenic score distributed in a Gaussian manner. Example of the calculation of a polygenic score, based on 10 genes.

**Table 3 A polygenic score for one individual based on ten SNPs**

	Increasing allele	Allele 1	Allele 2	Genotypic score	Correlation with trait	Weighted genotypic score
SNP 1	T	A	T	1	.005	.005
SNP 2	C	G	G	0	.004	.000
SNP 3	A	A	A	2	.003	.006
SNP 4	G	C	G	1	.003	.003
SNP 5	G	C	C	0	.003	.000
SNP 6	T	A	T	1	.002	.002
SNP 7	C	C	G	1	.002	.002
SNP 8	A	A	A	2	.002	.004
SNP 9	A	T	T	0	.001	.000
SNP 10	C	C	G	1	.001	.001
Polygenic score				9		.023

Figure 51 : Polygenic score for one individual based on ten SNPs

Figure 52 : Polygenic score for one individual based on ten SNPs



Genetic analysis is booming. Companies like 23andme can sequence the variable parts of your genome, and others like [www.dna.land](http://www.dna.land) offer to analyze, using the raw data available on 23andme, the gene versions (alleles) you possess for genes involved in general intelligence. From this, they can estimate your "most likely IQ." Currently, only a small portion of these genes have been identified, so the possible estimate is extremely imprecise. Below is an analysis performed by [dna.land](http://dna.land) using 23andme's raw genetic data.


Based on tested variants, your result is:  
**Possible evidence of increased intelligence**

These variants cover only a small fraction of what is thought to be the total genetic contribution to intelligence. Your real traits may vary from this prediction due to remaining unknown genetic effects and environmental factors.

Our confidence\* is:

**Preliminary**

\* How is this determined?



The sequenced individual possesses a favorable version of most of the genes analyzed, increasing general intelligence. Below are the 16 genes considered for the analysis. They account for only a small portion of the total intellectual variance. The other genes are still unknown. Also note: the frequency of these genes varies depending on the individual's race (column 6). The higher intelligence of East Asians, Ashkenazim, or Europeans is primarily due to a higher frequency of intelligence-enhancing alleles in the genome of these populations.


#### Genotype Details

Significant SNPs and their locations, effect alleles, and effect sizes. Some of columns may be empty if they are not reported by publications.

SNP	Chrom	Position	User Alleles	Effect Allele	Frequency (European)	Effect Size	Standard Error	P-value	Gene
rs12744310	1	41773502	C/C	T	21.27%	-0.039	-	4.2e-09	SCMH1(dist=65687) FOXO6(dist=54101)
rs2251499	13	106639856	T/C	T	25.65%	0.037	-	2.74e-10	LINC00343(dist=225711) LINC00460(dist=389055)
rs12928404	16	28847246	T/T	T	65.41%	0.029	-	1.15e-08	ATXN2L
rs16954078	17	46306127	T/T	A	19.38%	-0.037	-	2.84e-08	SKAP1
rs6746731	2	71572917	T/G	T	44.53%	-0.028	-	4.88e-08	ZNF638
rs13010010	2	100852734	T/T	T	38.57%	0.029	-	1.56e-08	LINC01104
rs10191758	2	144263280	A/G	A	62.82%	-0.037	-	3.06e-09	ARHGAP15
rs36093924	22	42538399	C/T	T	46.62%	-0.038	-	2.87e-10	CYP2D7
rs6779302	3	16859710	G/G	T	35.98%	-0.034	-	4.99e-08	DAZL(dist=212704) PLCL2(dist=66742)
rs7646501	3	24079291	A/G	A	74.06%	0.038	-	1.79e-09	NR1D2(dist=57182) LINC00691(dist=62174)
rs41352752	5	88029208	T/T	T	97.42%	-0.095	-	1.35e-08	MEF2C
rs9320913	6	98584733	A/A	A	50.89%	0.033	-	3.79e-11	MIR2113(dist=112238) POU3F2(dist=697847)
rs2490272	6	108895386	T/T	T	56.66%	0.039	-	9.96e-14	FOXO3
rs10236197	7	32291761	C/C	T	65.61%	0.034	-	1.03e-10	PDE1C
rs4728302	7	133630463	C/C	T	57.75%	-0.031	-	2.42e-09	EXOC4
rs11138902	9	72103314	A/A	A	55.27%	0.028	-	4.12e-08	APBA1


With advances in genetics and as new genes involved in intellectual variation are detected, this estimate will become increasingly precise, and the margin of error will shrink. In a few years, it will be possible to estimate an individual's intelligence relatively accurately based on their genome. This will potentially be very useful for preimplantation embryo selection. When a couple wants to have a child, around a hundred (or more) embryos at a very early stage of a few cells will be developed from the father's sperm and the mother's eggs. All of these embryos will be rapidly sequenced, and the one with the highest frequency of intelligence-enhancing alleles will be selected and implanted in the mother's uterus. This procedure will significantly increase intelligence from generation to generation. Below, prediction of GCSE test results (exam taken at 18 years old in England) based on the polygenic score (extract from “Blueprint, how DNA is making us how we are”, R. Plomin, 2018). As an illustration below, height

prediction based on polygenic scores.



**Figure 53 : GCSE score by PGS**


**Figure 54 : GCSE score by PGS**



**Figure 55 : Height by PGS for height**

**Figure 56 : Height by PGS for height**

Below are Robert Plomin's polygenic scores (PGS) for various traits. As can be seen, his high intelligence was predictable by his genes, with a PGS score for “educational achievement” (targeting genes that increase IQ and predispose to certain advantageous personality traits such as “conscientiousness”) at the 94th percentile. His tall height (1.95m) could also be predicted by a PGS score for height at the 90th percentile (not shown on the graph).



[Wu and Zhang \(2011\)](#) found higher levels of population (race) differentiation in genes associated with brain development than genes associated with skin pigmentation:




Figure 57 : Race differentiation of various genes

Figure 58 : Race differentiation of various genes

## Conclusion

Looking at genotypic differences between races only confirmed the intellectual hierarchy I presented earlier. The genome of an individual is an incredibly good predictor of intelligence.

### 1.3 — Racial differences in IQ

In this section, I'll draw a general picture of worldwide IQ differences, by each race and ethnicity. The main source is [\[1.3.1\]](#), but all the references for each dataset will be precised.

### *Europeans*

The average IQ of Europeans in Europe is 97-100. The average IQ is slower in Portugal (94) due to historical admixture with African populations. We can also observe that average IQ in the Balkans is lower (84 in Albania, 93 in Bosnia, 93 in Bulgaria, 92.6 in Greece, 91 in Romania), most probably because of as these areas have been hybridized by continuous gene flow across the Dardanelles Strait. The average cranial capacity in these regions is also lower than in the rest of Europe (1312 cc in Southeast Europe against 1320 cc in rest of Europe).

**Table 22 : IQ of indigenous Europeans**

	COUNTRY	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	REFERENCE
1	Albania	8/15	–	EDUC	84.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
2	Austria	14	67	SPM	98	Moyles & Wolins, 1971
3	Austria	Adults	187	CF	101	Buj, 1981
4	Austria	8/15	–	EDUC	99.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
5	Belgium	7/13	944	CPM	99	Goosens, 1952a
6	Belgium	10/16	920	CF	103	Goosens, 1952b
7	Belgium	Adults	247	CF	99	Buj, 1981
8	Belgium	8/15	–	EDUC	101.6	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
9	Bosnia-Herz	12/16	605	SPM	94	Djapo & Lynn, 2010
10	Bosnia-Herz	8/15	–	EDUC	93.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
11	Britain	Adults	1405	CF	100	Buj, 1981
12	Britain	6/15	3250	SPM	100	Raven et al., 1998
13	Britain	8/15	–	EDUC	99.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
14	Bulgaria	3/18	1153	Binet-	94	Piryov, 1974
15	Bulgaria	3/18	1153	Binet-	93	Piryov, 1974
16	Bulgaria	Adults	215	CF	94	Buj, 1981
17	Bulgaria	11/17	1456	CF	91	Lynn et al., 1998
18	Bulgaria	8/15	–	EDUC	95	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
19	Croatia	13/16	299	SPM	90	Sorokin, 1954
20	Croatia	Adults	525	CF	104	Buj, 1981
21	Croatia	7/14	999	SPM	99	Lugomer & Zarevski, 1997
22	Croatia	8/15	–	EDUC	96.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
23	Czech Rep.	Adults	363	CF	98	Buj, 1981

24	Czech Rep.	5/11	832	CPM	96	Raven et al., 1995
25	Czech Rep.	11	64	SPM	100	Persaud, 1972
26	Czech Rep.	8/15	–	EDUC	100.5	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
27	Denmark	5/11	628	SPM	96	Vejløskov, 1968
28	Denmark	Adults	122	CF	99	Buj, 1981
29	Denmark	8/15	–	EDUC	98.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
30	England	8/15	–	EDUC	100.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
31	Estonia	12/18	2689	SPM	100	Lynn et al., 2002
32	Estonia	7/11	1835	SPM	98	Lynn et al., 2003
33	Estonia	8/15	–	EDUC	102.0	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
34	Finland	7	755	CPM	98	Kyöstio, 1972
35	Finland	Adults	122	CF	99	Buj, 1981
36	Finland	8/15	–	EDUC	104.0	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
37	France	6/9	618	CPM	97	Bourdier, 1964
38	France	6/11	328	CMM	102	Dague et al., 1964
39	France	Adults	1320	CF	94	Buj, 1981
40	France	6/12	670	SPM	102	Raven et al., 2000
41	France	6/16	1120	WISC- CPM	98	Georgas et al., 2003
42	France	9/10	785	CPM	97	Pry & Manderscheid, 1988
43	France	8/15	–	EDUC	99.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
44	Germany	7/11	454	SPM	90	Kurth, 1969
45	Germany	5/7	563	SPM	99	Winkelmann, 1972
46	Germany	11/15	2068	SPM	105	Raven, 1981
47	Germany	11/15	1000	SPM	99	Raven, 1981
48	Germany	Adults	1320	CF	107	Buj, 1981
49	Germany	7	200	CPM	97	Guthke & Al-Zoubi, 1987
50	Germany	6/10	3607	CPM	101	Raven et al., 1995
51	Germany	5/10	980	CPM	97	Raven et al., 1995
52	Germany	14/25	880	SPM	96	Raven et al., 2000
53	Germany	6/16	990	WISC- EDUC	99	Georgas et al., 2003
54	Germany	8/15	–	EDUC	99.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
55	Germany	7/10	205	SPM	100	Jaarsveld et al., 2012
56	Greece	6/11	290	DAM	95	Papavassiliou, 1953
57	Greece	5	30	DAM	93	Georgas & Georgas, 1972
58	Greece	9/14	400	WISC	88	Fatouros, 1972
59	Greece	6/12	227	DAM	97	Georgas & Georgas, 1972
60	Greece	Adults	220	CF	95	Buj, 1981
61	Greece	6/17	731	MAT	89	Petrogiannis et al., 1988
62	Greece	6/16	990	WISC- EDUC	92	Georgas et al., 2003
63	Greece	8/15	–	EDUC	92.0	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

64	Hungary	Adults	260	CF	98	Buj, 1981
65	Hungary	8/15	–	EDUC	99.0	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
66	Hungary	18	7588	SPM+	95	Dobrean et al., 2008
67	Hungary	15	–	EDUC	100.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
68	Iceland	6/16	550	SPM	101	Pind et al., 2003
69	Iceland	8/15	–	EDUC	98.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
70	Ireland	10/13	96	MHE	90	Macnamara, 1964
71	Ireland	6/13	3088	SPM	87	Gill & Byrt, 1973
72	Ireland	Adults	75	CF	97	Buj, 1981
73	Ireland	6/12	1361	SPM	97	O'Connor et al., 1988
74	Ireland	9	191	SPM	87	Lynn & Wilson, 1990
75	Ireland	9/12	2029	SPM	96	Jeffers & Fitzgerald, 2001
76	Ireland	6/12	1361	SPM	93	Carr, 1993
77	Ireland	9/12	2029	SPM	91	Carr, 1993
78	Ireland	23/49	10000	SPM	95	Raven et al., 2000
79	Ireland	8/15	–	EDUC	100.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
80	Ireland	6	200	WPPSI	92	Lynn, 2015
81	Italy	11/16	2432	SPM	103	Tesi & Young, 1962
82	Italy	6/11	700	CPM	95	Galeazzi et al., 1979
83	Italy	Adults	1380	CF	102	Buj, 1981
84	Italy	6/11	476	CPM	103	Prunetti et al., 1985
85	Italy	6/11	459	CPM	99	Prunetti et al., 1985
86	Italy	18	5370	CF	90	Pace & Sprini, 1998
87	Italy	6/11	1384	CPM	95	Belacchi et al., 2008
88	Italy	8/15	–	EDUC	96.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
89	Latvia	8/15	–	EDUC	97.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
90	Liechtenstein	8/15	–	EDUC	101.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
91	Lithuania	6/16	381	WISC-	92	Georgas et al., 2003
92	Lithuania	8/12	1067	CPM	96	Gintilienė & Prunetti, 2005
93	Lithuania	8/15	–	EDUC	97.0	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
94	Luxembourg	8/15	–	EDUC	96.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
95	Macedonia	8/15	–	EDUC	91.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
96	Malta	5	134	CPM	97	Martinelli & Lynn, 2005
97	Malta	8/15	–	EDUC	94.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
98	Moldova	8/15	–	EDUC	93.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
99	Montenegro	15	–	EDUC	87.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
100	Netherlands	Adults	333	CF	107	Buj, 1981
101	Netherlands	5/10	1920	CPM	99	Raven et al., 1995
102	Netherlands	6/12	4032	SPM	101	Raven et al., 1996
103	Netherlands	6/16	1100	WISC-	99	Georgas et al., 2003

104	Netherlands	8/15	–	EDUC	102.0	Meisenberg & Lynn,
105	N. Ireland	7/10	2000	MH	97	Wilson, 1973
106	Norway	Adults	333	CF	100	Buj, 1981
107	Norway	8/15	–	EDUC	97.9	Meisenberg & Lynn,
108	Poland	Adults	15643	SPM	98	Wysocki &
109	Poland	Adults	835	CF	106	Buj, 1981
110	Poland	6/15	4006	SPM	92	Jaworowska &
111	Poland	15/79	660	SPM	92	Raven et al., 2000
112	Poland	5/10	756	CPM	102	Raven, 2008
113	Poland	18	395	SPM+	90	Dobrean et al., 2008
114	Poland	8/15	–	EDUC	99.1	Meisenberg & Lynn,
115	Portugal	Adults	242	CF	101	Buj, 1981
116	Portugal	6/12	807	CPM	88	Simoes, 1989
117	Portugal	8/15	–	EDUC	95.8	Meisenberg & Lynn,
118	Romania	6/10	300	CPM	94	Zahircic et al., 1974
119	Romania	8/15	–	EDUC	90.7	Meisenberg & Lynn,
120	Romania	7/18	1310	SPM+	88	Dobrean et al., 2008
121	Romania	8/15	–	EDUC	92.0	Meisenberg & Lynn,
122	Russia	14/15	432	SPM	97.0	Lynn, 2001
123	Russia	27/55	745	CF	96	Grigorenko &
124	Russia	8/15	–	EDUC	97.8	Meisenberg & Lynn,
125	Russia	2/10	293	Vocab	97.6	Grigoriev et al., 2012
126	Scotland	Adults	90000	SPM	97	Vernon, 1947
127	Scotland	Adults	9000	SPM	97	Vernon, 1947
128	Scotland	8/15	5000	NFER	98	Lynn, 1979
129	Scotland	8/15	–	EDUC	97.4	Meisenberg & Lynn,
130	Serbia	15	76	SPM	89	Moyles & Wolins,
131	Serbia	3/18	447	Binet-	96	Piryov, 1974
132	Serbia	30	608	SPM	88	Rushton & Čvorović,
133	Serbia	4-11	2334	CPM	98	Fajgelj et al., 2010
134	Serbia	8/15	–	EDUC	92.1	Meisenberg & Lynn,
135	Serbia	6	214	CPM	90	Bala et al. 2013
136	Slovakia	9/17	3070	SPM	97	Bazany, 1963
137	Slovakia	5/11	823	CPM	96	Raven et al., 1995
138	Slovakia	11/18	1291	SPM	100	Raven et al., 2000
139	Slovakia	2/7	252	SON-	98	Dockal, 2009
140	Slovakia	8/15	–	EDUC	99.1	Meisenberg & Lynn,
141	Slovenia	6/11	1730	CPM	103	Boben, 2003
142	Slovenia	6/16	1080	WISC-	95	Georgas et al., 2003
143	Slovenia	8/15	1556	SPM	95	Boben, 2003



144	Slovenia	11/17	610	SPM+	96	Boben, 2008
145	Slovenia	13/19	1363	APM	99	Boben, 2008
146	Slovenia	8/15	–	EDUC	101.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
147	Spain	Adults	848	CF	98	Buj, 1981
148	Spain	6/9	854	CPM	97	Raven et al., 1995
149	Spain	11/18	3271	APM	102	Albalade Paz & Díaz et al., 2010
150	Spain	Adults	202	SPM	97	Díaz et al., 2010
151	Spain	16/69	1369	WAIS-	94	Roivainen, 2010
152	Spain	8/15	–	EDUC	97.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
153	Sweden	6/14	1106	WISC-	97	Skandinaviska, 1970
154	Sweden	Adults	205	CF	104	Buj, 1981
155	Sweden	6/16	2231	WISC-	99	Georgas et al., 2003
156	Sweden	8/15	–	EDUC	99.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
157	Switzerland	Adults	163	CF	101	Buj, 1981
158	Switzerland	6/10	200	CPM	101	Raven et al., 1995
159	Switzerland	9/15	246	SPM	104	Spicher, 1993
160	Switzerland	8/15	–	EDUC	99.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
161	Ukraine	14/17	132	SPM	96	Prozorovskaya et al., 2011
162	Ukraine	8/15	–	EDUC	94.9	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

Table 23 : IQs of Europeans outside Europe

	COUNTRY	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	REFERENCE
1	Argentina	9/15	1680	SPM	93	Rimoldi, 1948
2	Argentina	5/11	690	SPM	99	Leibovich de Figueroa, 1998
3	Argentina	5/11	420	CPM	98	Raven et al., 1998
4	Argentina	10	4000	V-R	93	UNESCO, 1998
5	Argentina	14	1740	SPM	102	Raven, 2008
6	Argentina	13/30	1695	SPM	97	Flynn & Rossi-Casé, 2011
7	Argentina	8/15		EDUC	85.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
8	Australia	9/13	35000	Otis	97	McIntyre, 1938
9	Australia	18	6700	SPM	100	Craig, 1974
10	Australia	5/11	693	CPM	98	Reddington & Jackson, 1991
11	Australia	8/17	4000	SPM	100	Raven et al., 2000
12	Australia	6/11	618	CPM	93	Cotton et al., 2005
13	Australia	8/15	–	EDUC	101.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
14	Brazil	9/10	735	SPM	95	Fernandez, 2001
15	Canada	6/10	629	MAT	100	Tamaoka et al., 1993
16	Canada	7/12	313	SPM	97	Raven et al., 1996

17	Canada	6/16	2200	WISC-	100	Priftera et al., 1998
18	Canada	5/17	407	MAT	100	Naglieri & Bardos, 1988
19	Canada	8/15	–	EDUC	101.9	Meisenberg & Lynn,
20	Chile	8/15	–	EDUC	89.5	Meisenberg & Lynn,
21	Colombia	13/16	50	WISC-	95	Árdila et al., 2000
22	Costa Rica	5/16	199	SPM	87	Rindermann et al., 2013
23	Mexico	7/10	155	SPM	98	Lynn et al., 2005
24	N. Zealand	9/15	26000	OTIS	99	Redmond & Davies,
25	N. Zealand	9/17	3108	SPM	101	Reid & Gilmore, 1989
26	N. Zealand	8/9	1692	WISC-	102	Fergusson & Horwood,
27	N. Zealand	8/15	–	EDUC	100.7	Meisenberg & Lynn,
28	S. Africa	15	1056	SPM	94	Owen, 1992
29	USA	11	1000	SB	100	Scottish
30	USA	11	1215	TM	99	Scottish
31	USA	14/18	10000	DAT	101	Lynn et al., 1987b
32	USA	18/70	625	SPM	100	Raven et al., 1996
33	USA	4/14	2097	PPVT	103	Michael, 2003
34	USA	16/80	340	WAIS-	96	Roivainen, 2010
35	USA	8/15	–	EDUC	98.8	Meisenberg & Lynn,
36	Uruguay	12/25	1634	SPM	96	Risso, 1961
37	Uruguay	8/15	–	EDUC	90.4	Meisenberg & Lynn,
38	Zimbabwe	7	265	SB	100	Weyl, 1967a & b

### *Africans*

Sub-Saharan Africans are the indigenous people of sub-Saharan Africa. They must be distinguished from the North Africans of North Africa, the pygmies, and the Bushmen (two distinct minor races).

Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1994) confirmed the distinctive genetic characteristics of Africans in their classification of homo sapiens into ‘genetic clusters’. The most distinctive features of Africans are their very dark skin, dark eyes, broad noses, thick, inverted lips, and woolly hair. Their blood types differ from Europeans with a lower frequency of group A (~27% of Africans compared to ~46% of Europeans) and a higher frequency of group B (~34% of Africans compared to ~14% of Europeans).

Africans in Sub-Saharan African countries have an average IQ of 71. After correcting for undernourishment, Lynn evaluates this figure to be of 80.

**Table 24 : IQs of indigenous Africans**

	COUNTRY	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	REFERENCE
1	Benin	15	–	EDUC	69	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
2	Botswana	17/20	140	SPM	72	Lynn, 2010b
3	Botswana	15	–	EDUC	81.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
4	Burkina	15	–	EDUC	72.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
5	Burundi	15	–	EDUC	76.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
6	Cameroon	Adults	80	CPM	64	Berlioz, 1955
7	Cameroon	15	–	EDUC	78	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
8	Cent.	Adults	1,144	SPM	64	Latouche & Dorneau, 1956
9	Chad	15	–	EDUC	68.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
10	Comoros	15	–	EDUC	71.9	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
11	Congo–	13	88	SPM	73	Nkaya et al., 1994
12	Congo–	Adults	580	SPM	75	Latouche & Dorneau, 1956
13	Congo–	Adults	1,596	SPM	74	Latouche & Dorneau, 1956
14	Congo–	15	–	EDUC	71.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
15	Congo–	6/10	693	CPM	73	Ombredane et al., 1956
16	Congo–	Adults	67	SPM	64	Verhagen, 1956
17	Congo–	17/29	320	SPM	69	Ombredane et al., 1952
18	Congo–	8	50	KAB	67	Boivin & Giordani, 1993
19	Congo–	7/12	95	KAB	68	Boivin et al., 1995
20	Congo–	7/9	130	KAB	65	Giordani et al., 1996
21	Congo–	7/9	139	KAB	61	Conant et al., 1999
22	Congo–	7/9	183	CPM	74	Kashala et al., 2005
23	Eritrea	4/7	148	CPM	85	Wolff et al., 1995
24	Eritrea	11	152	SPM	66	Wolff & Fessada, 1999
25	Ethiopia	5/14	162	CPM	64	Aboud et al., 1991
26	Ethiopia	15	250	SPM	68	Kaniel & Fisherman, 1991
27	Ethiopia	14/16	46	SPM	69	Kozulin, 1998
28	Ethiopia	6/7	29	CPM	86	Tzuriel & Kaufman, 1999
29	Ethiopia	7/11	108	CPM	70	Ayalew, 2005
30	Gabon	15	–	EDUC	77.9	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
31	Gambia	17	579	CPM	64	Jukes et al., 2006
32	Gambia–	17	418	CPM	60	Jukes & Grigorenko, 2010
33	Gambia–	17	114	CPM	60	Jukes & Grigorenko, 2010

34	Ghana	8/15	2,894	SPM	70	Bulley, 1973
35	Ghana	18/30	2,16	SPM	77	Bulley, 1973
36	Ghana	Adults	225	CF	76	Buj, 1981
37	Ghana	15	1,693	CPM	62	Glewwe & Jacoby, 1992
38	Ghana	9/18	1,563	CPM	67	Heady, 2003
39	Ghana	15	–	EDUC	72.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
40	Guinea	5/14	50	AAB	63	Nissen et al., 1935
41	Guinea	Adults	1,144	SPM	70	Faverge & Falmagne, 1962
42	Ivory Coast	7/14	67	Piagetian	71	Dasen & Ngini, 1979
43	Ivory Coast	15	–	EDUC	65	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
44	Kenya	Adults	205	CPM	69	Boissiere et al., 1985
45	Kenya	6/10	1,222	CPM	78	Costenbader & Ngari, 2000
46	Kenya	12/15	85	CPM/MH	67	Sternberg et al., 2001
47	Kenya	7	118	CPM	76	Daley et al., 2003
48	Kenya	7	537	CPM	87	Daley et al., 2003
49	Kenya	6	184	KAB	63	Holding et al., 2004
50	Kenya	6/14	528	CPM	74	Neumann et al., 2007
51	Kenya	15	–	EDUC	81.9	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
52	Kenya	14	851	Various	76	Rindermann, 2012
53	Lesotho	15	–	EDUC	70	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
54	Madagascar	Adults	147	CPM	82	Raveau et al., 1976
55	Madagascar	15	–	EDUC	76	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
56	Malawi	7/14	268	CPM	71	Van der Vijver, 2009
57	Malawi	15	–	EDUC	65.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
58	Mali	9/12	746	CPM	74	Fontaine, 1963
59	Mali	adults	790	SPM	68	Fontaine, 1963
60	Mali	adults	270	SPM	71	Fontaine, 1963
61	Mali	8/85	413	CPM	64	Bellis et al., 1988
62	Mali	15	–	EDUC	69.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
63	Mozambique	20	149	CPM	64	Kendall, 1976
64	Mozambique	15	–	EDUC	76	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
65	Namibia	7/12	116	CPM	72	Veii & Everatt, 2005
66	Namibia	15	–	EDUC	70	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
67	Niger	15	–	EDUC	62.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
68	Nigeria	26	30	DAM	67	Haward & Roland, 1954
69	Nigeria	6/14	480	Leone	70	Ferron, 1965
70	Nigeria	Adults	86	SPM	64	Wober, 1969
71	Nigeria	6/13	375	CPM/PMA	69	Fahrmeier, 1975
72	Nigeria	5/7	150	SPM	87	Okunrotifa, 1976
73	Nigeria	9/10	88	SPM	83	Nwuga, 1977

74	Nigeria	9/10	165	SPM	80	Nwuga, 1977
75	Nigeria	11/12	120	SPM	72	Maqsd, 1980a
76	Nigeria	11/17	98	WISC-R	73	Ani et al., 1998
77	Nigeria	11	402	SPM	69	Jarotimi & Ijadunola, 2007
78	Nigeria	15	–	EDUC	79.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
79	Nigeria	14	413	SPM	70	Hur & Lynn, 2013
80	Nigeria	16	140	SPM	70	Hur & Lynn, 2013
81	Rwanda	5/17	148	Piagetian	76	Laurendeau-Bendavid, 1977
82	Senegal	7/14	559	DAM	67	Bardet, Moreigne & S��n��cal,
83	Senegal	5/12	58	KABC	74	Bo��vin, 2002
84	Senegal	15	–	EDUC	72	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
85	Sierra	Adults	122	CPM	64	Berry, 1966
86	Sierra	Adults	33	CPM	64	Binnie-Dawson, 1984
87	South	10/14	293	AAB	65	Fick, 1929
88	South	12/14	80	KB	68	Dent, 1937
89	South	10/16	532	Non-	72	Fick, 1939
90	South	6/10	1,076	DAM	75	Hunkin, 1950
91	South	8/16	1,008	SPM	75	Notcutt, 1950
92	South	Adults	703	SPM	70	Notcutt, 1950
93	South	10/12	278	NVR	74	Lloyd & Pidgeon, 1961
94	South	25	140	WAIS-R	69	Avenant, 1988
95	South	5/13	415	DAM	75	Richter et al., 1989
96	South	9	350	SPM	67	Lynn & Holmshaw, 1990
97	South	16	1,096	SPM	68	Owen, 1992
98	South	19	711	CPM	71	Vass, 1992
99	South	15/16	1,093	JAT	68	Lynn & Owen, 1994
100	South	13	49	WISC-R	70	Murdoch et al., 1994
101	South	17/20	140	SPM	77	Maqsd, 1997
102	South	43	157	WAIS-R	69	Nell, 2000
103	South	16	17	SPM	68	Sonke, 2000
104	South	8	63	WPPSI/	71	Akande, 2000
105	South	14	152	WCST/WI	65	Skuy et al., 2001
106	South	17	100	WCST/WI	65	Skuy et al., 2001
107	South	30	196	WAIS-3	82	Claassen et al., 2001
108	South	8/10	806	CPM	68	Jinabhai et al., 2004
109	South	11	379	CPM	71	Knoetze et al., 2005
110	South	6/12	1,333	CPM	71	Linstrom, 2008
111	South	9	340	SPM	69	Malda et al., 2010
112	South	15	–	EDUC	72	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
113	South	11	379	CPM	67.5	Bakhiet & Lynn, 2015

114	South Sudan	7/16	291	Various	69	Fahmy, 1964
115	Sudan	9/18	1,006	SPM	67	Khaleefa & Lynn, 2010
116	Swaziland	15	–	EDUC	81.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
117	Tanzania	Adults	179	CPM	60	Boissiere et al., 1985
118	Tanzania	11/13	458	WCST	72	Sternberg et al., 2002
119	Tanzania	15	–	EDUC	80.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
120	Tanzania	16	171	APM	75	Rindermann, 2012
121	Tanzania	14	891	Various	64	Rindermann, 2012
122	Uganda	11	514	DAM	82	Minde & Kantor, 1976
123	Uganda	14	–	SPM	66	Heyneman, 1977
124	Uganda	11	2,019	CPM	73	Heyneman & Jamison, 1980
125	Uganda	15	–	EDUC	74	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
126	Uganda	14	872	Various	76	Rindermann, 2012
127	Zaire	6/30	693	CPM	73	Ombredane et al, 1956
128	Zaire	Adults	67	SPM	82	Verhagen, 1956
129	Zaire	17/29	320	SPM	69	Ombredane et al., 1952
130	Zaire	10/15	222	SPM	68	Laroche, 1959
131	Zaire	8	47	KABC	62	Boivin & Giordani, 1993
132	Zaire	7/12	95	KABC	68	Boivin et al., 1995
133	Zaire	7/9	130	KABC	65	Giordani et al., 1996
134	Zaire	8	183	CPM	74	Kashala et al., 2005
135	Zambia	15	759	SPM	75	MacArthur et al., 1964
136	Zambia	16	292	SPM	75	MacArthur et al., 1964
137	Zambia	Adults	152	SPM	64	Pons, 1974
138	Zambia	Adults	1,011	SPM	80	Pons, 1974
139	Zambia	15	–	EDUC	66.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
140	Zanzibar	15	–	EDUC	74	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
141	Zimbabwe	15	200	SPM	72	Irvine, 1969
142	Zimbabwe	12/14	204	WISC-R	71	Zindi, 1994
143	Zimbabwe	15	–	EDUC	76.2	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

There is a considerable difference between African and European students in African countries in terms of IQ, as seen on the table under :

**Table 25 : IQs of African & European students in African countries**

	COUNTRY	TEST	AFRICANS		EUROPEANS		IQ DIFF	REFERENCE
			N	IQ	N	IQ		
1	Ghana	BD	66	79	—	—	—	Jahoda, 1970
2	S. Africa	APM	40	84	40	103	19	Poortinga, 1971
3	S. Africa	Blox	47	72	50	100	28	Poortinga & Foden, 1975
4	S. Africa	Blox	403	79	197	100	21	Taylor & Radford, 1986
5	S. Africa	WISC-R	63	75	—	—	—	Avenant, 1988
6	S. Africa	SPM	147	100	—	—	—	Zaaiman, 1998
7	S. Africa	SPM	30	77	—	—	—	Grieve & Viljoen, 1998
8	S. Africa	SPM	173	84	136	103	19	Rushton & Skuy, 2000
9	S. Africa	SPM	30	82	30	105	23	Sonke, 2000
10	S. Africa	SPM	70	81	—	—	—	Skuy et al., 2002
11	S. Africa	SPM	198	93	86	106	13	Rushton et al., 2002
12	S. Africa	APM	187	99	67	113	14	Rushton et al., 2003
13	S. Africa	APM	306	103	72	116	15	Rushton et al., 2004
14	S. Africa	SPM	887	95	398	110	15	Rushton, 2008
15	USA	Wonderlic	40	101.7	139	107.3	6.4	Pesta & Poznanski, 2008

Africans in Caribbean countries and in Latin America have the same average IQ (71) as in Sub-saharan countries :

**Table 26 : IQs of Africans in the Caribbeans**

	COUNTRY	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	REFERENCE
1	Barbados	9–15	207	WISC-R	80	Galler et al., 1986
2	Brazil	9	100	DAM	70	Paine et al., 1992
3	Brazil	Adult	88	SPM	64	Paine et al., 1992
4	Brazil	9–10	223	SPM	71	Fernandez, 2001
5	Dominica	3	64	PPVT	67	Wein & Stevenson, 1972
6	Dominica	20-70	67	CPM	67	Meisenberg et al., 2006
7	Dominican Rep	15	—	EDUC	75.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
8	Jamaica	11	1730	MH	72	Manley, 1963
9	Jamaica	11	50	Matrices	75	Vernon, 1969
10	Jamaica	5–12	71	WISC	60	Hertzog et al., 1972
11	Jamaica	10	128	CEFT	75	Bagley et al., 1983
12	Jamaica	15	31	WISC-R	67	Grantham-McGregor et al., 1996
13	Jamaica	25	54	PPVT	60	Grantham-

<b>14</b>	Jamaica	9–10	30	PPVT	71	Simeon & Grantham-
<b>15</b>	Antillies	9-11	97	CPM	87	Van de Vijfeijken et al.,
<b>16</b>	St. Lucia	4	60	PPVT	62	Murray, 1983
<b>17</b>	St.Vincent	8–11	174	CPM	71	Durbrow et al., 2002
<b>18</b>	Trinidad	15	–	EDUC	88	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

In the United States, where Africans can enjoy much better living conditions (much less prevalent undernourishment & poverty), their average IQ rises to 84 :

**Table 27 : IQs of Africans in the United States**

	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>AFRICAN N</b>	<b>EURO. N</b>	<b>TEST</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>REFERENCE</b>
<b>1</b>	1918	Adults	23596	93973	AA&B	83	Yerkes, 1921
<b>2</b>	1927	7/15	129	–	PPT	83	Nissen et al., 1935
<b>3</b>	1928	12	84	–	PPT	67	Nissen et al., 1935
<b>4</b>	1944	Adults	–	–	AGCT	77	Davenport, 1946
<b>5</b>	1964	Adults	–	–	AFQT	77	Karpinos, 1966
<b>6</b>	1916-65	3/6	1,700	–	Various	87	Shuey, 1966
<b>7</b>	1916-65	6/11	7,000	–	Various	85	Shuey, 1966
<b>8</b>	1916-65	6/11	75,050	–	Various	85	Shuey, 1966
<b>9</b>	1916-65	12/18	23,000	–	Various	85	Shuey, 1966
<b>10</b>	1966-80	3/6	–	–	Various	80	Osborne & McGurk, 1982
<b>11</b>	1966-80	6/11	100,000	–	Various	87	Osborne & McGurk, 1982
<b>12</b>	1966-80	12–18	16,000	–	Various	82	Osborne & McGurk, 1982
<b>13</b>	1966	24	7,300	5,733	SRAT	85	Broman et al., 1975
<b>14</b>	1970	4	12,029	9,730	SB	87	Broman et al., 1975
<b>15</b>	1974	7	19,968	18,474	WISC	87	Broman et al., 1975
<b>16</b>	1972	6/16	305	1,870	WISC-R	84	Kaufman & Doppelt, 1976
<b>17</b>	1977	16/74	7,270	16,134	GATB	81	Avolio & Waldman, 1994
<b>18</b>	1977	5/11	456	604	WISC-R	85	Mercer & Lewis, 1984
<b>19</b>	1978	16/74	192	1,664	WAIS-R	85	Reynolds et al., 1987
<b>20</b>	1980	14/22	3,022	6,502	AFQT	82	Hernstein & Murray, 1994
<b>21</b>	1981	2/12	311	1,450	KABC	93	Kaufman & Kaufman, 1983
<b>22</b>	1982	3/18	932	4,519	PPVT	84	Dunn, 1988
<b>23</b>	1984	12/23	210	1,303	SB-4	83	Thorndike et al., 1986
<b>24</b>	1984	3	86	86	SB-LM	86	Montie & Fagan, 1988
<b>25</b>	1985	37	502	3,535	Various	83	Nyborg & Jensen, 2000
<b>26</b>	1989	6/16	338	1,620	WISC-3	85	Prifitera et al., 1998
<b>27</b>	1990	3/4	1134	2071	PPVT	82	Jencks & Phillips, 1998



<b>28</b>	1991	11/93	241	1,547	KAIT	88	Kaufman et al., 1994
<b>29</b>	1991	16/74	7,214	14,503	GATB	81	Avolio & Waldman, 1994
<b>30</b>	1991	6/16	711	776	WISC-R	85	Kramer et al., 1995
<b>31</b>	1993	3	33	33	SB-4	85	Peoples et al., 1995
<b>32</b>	1993	70+	833	5,122	MMSE	85	Zsembik & Peek, 2001
<b>33</b>	1993	Adults	806	5,300	Vocabulary	90	Lynn, 2004
<b>34</b>	1996	76	317	147	WAIS-Sim	87	Manly et al., 1998
<b>35</b>	1998	Adults	2,113	8,751	Literacy	86	Raudenbush & Kasim, 1998
<b>36</b>	1998	5/17	77	77	UNIT	86	Kane, 2007
<b>37</b>	2002	Adults	–	–	SB	88	Dickens & Flynn, 2006
<b>38</b>	2002	6/16s	–	–	WISC	88	Dickens & Flynn, 2006
<b>39</b>	2002	24	–	–	–	92	Flynn, 2007
<b>40</b>	2008	17	–	–	NAEP	81	Rushton & Jensen, 2010
<b>41</b>	2012	Adults	–	–	WAIS-IV	86	Weiss & Saklofske, 2020

It is the same scenario in Europe where Africans have an IQ median of 86 :

**Table 28 : IQs of Africans in Europe**

	<b>Country</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>TEST</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>REFERENCE</b>
<b>1</b>	Netherlands	Children	110	GALO	86	De Jong & van Batenburg, 1984
<b>2</b>	Netherlands	Children	123	RAKIT	84	Resing et al., 1986
<b>3</b>	Netherlands	Children	77	RAKIT	88	Resing et al., 1986
<b>4</b>	Netherlands	Children	138	–	85	De Jong, 1988
<b>5</b>	Netherlands	11	404	CITO	83	Pieke, 1988
<b>6</b>	Netherlands	Adults	535	GATB	85	Te Nijenhuis, 1997
<b>7</b>	Netherlands	Adults	129	GATB	85	Te Nijenhuis, 1997
<b>8</b>	United Kingdom	10	71	SB	88	Houghton, 1966
<b>9</b>	United Kingdom	11	476	VR	82	ILEA, 1967
<b>10</b>	United Kingdom	12-15	174	SPM/MH	88	Bhatnagar, 1970
<b>11</b>	United Kingdom	5-15	61	WISC	89	McFie & Thompson, 1970
<b>12</b>	United Kingdom	11	394	EPVT	86	Halsey, 1972
<b>13</b>	United Kingdom	4-5	9	WPPSI	104	Tizard, 1972
<b>14</b>	United Kingdom	5-10	548	EPVT	86	Payne, 1974
<b>15</b>	United Kingdom	10	143	NV5	73	Yule et al, 1975
<b>16</b>	United Kingdom	10	201	NV5	82	Yule et al, 1975
<b>17</b>	United Kingdom	5-10	548	EPVT	86	Little, 1975
<b>18</b>	United Kingdom	10	66	VR	85	Black Peoples, 1978
<b>19</b>	United Kingdom	7	139	EPVT	78	Phillips, 1979

20	United Kingdom	15	125	Reading	86	Mabey, 1981
21	United Kingdom	12	149	Vocabular	85	Pumfrey, 1983
22	United Kingdom	8-12	205	NFER	87	Scarret al., 1983
23	United Kingdom	10	88	CEFT	90	Bagley et al., 1983
24	United Kingdom	4	106	WPPSI	87	Bjarchford et al., 1985
25	United Kingdom	11	74	NFER	89	Mackintosh & Mascie-Taylor, 1985
26	United Kingdom	10	125	NFER	94	Mackintosh & Mascie-Taylor, 1985
27	United Kingdom	14	250	NFER	88	Maugham & Rutter, 1986
28	United Kingdom	7-15	88	AH	92	West et al., 1992
29	United Kingdom	65-75	248	MMSE	89	Stewart et al., 2002

	AMP (2000/2007)		PIAAC (2012)		SfL (2003)		UKHLS (2012)		MCS (2015)	
	N	M	N	M	N	M	N	M	N	M
White	14440	100.00	8137	100.00	8084	100.00	35143	100.00	9766	100.00
British	6390	100.04			7733	99.96	33308	100.06		
Irish					94	97.28	796	97.78		
Other White	186	98.69			257	102.13	1039	99.19		
Mixed			48	96.82	64	94.31	602	96.19	134	96.51
Carib.-White			21	97.54	20	88.52	242	94.23		
African-White			13	90.11	15	88.76	84	90.49		
Asian-White			14	100.86	15	103.56	150	99.02		
Other-mixed					14	97.44	126	98.50		
Chinese & Other Asian	7	100.61	81	88.43	65	94.33	544	93.84	105	79.45
Chinese			16	92.41	23	100.95	158	100.41	21	89.66
Other Asian			65	87.36	42	90.69	386	91.60	84	76.92
South Asian	133	96.08	243	88.62	254	91.44	2471	90.55	612	84.22
Indian			144	91.07	154	94.38	1145	93.00	205	89.21
Pakistani			72	85.86	81	88.53	811	87.08	299	83.41
Bangladeshi			27	81.50	19	84.15	515	87.08	108	76.98
Black	277	92.68	182	87.32	205	88.56	1428	88.48	415	84.43
Caribbean			73	87.47	104	88.17	630	89.06	152	87.48
African			102	86.61	92	89.15	743	88.20	239	82.55
Other Black			7	96.25	9	86.83	55	87.02	24	83.80
Other			13	86.01	56	96.55	302	91.62	75	80.81
Any other							156	93.68		
Arab			13	86.01			139	89.17		
Gypsy / Traveller							7	94.55		
Other & Mixed	178	98.37								

< In the UK

[1.3.2]

Africans have  
an IQ of 82.55.

Figure 59 : IQ by race in the UK

Figure 60 : IQ by race in the UK

***East Asian***

East Asians are natives from China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Their median IQ is 105

:

**Table 29 : IQs of indigenous East Asians**

	COUNTRY	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	VER	VIS	REFERENCE
1	China	6/16	660	WISC-R	107	–	–	Li et al., 1990
2	China	6/15	5,108	SPM	101	–	–	Lynn, 1991c
3	China	14/15	297	Various	103	–	–	Li et al., 1996
4	China	6/12	269	SPM	104	–	–	Geary et al., 1997
5	China	4	60	Arith	109	–	–	Ginsburg et al., 1997
6	China	6/13	463	DAM	103	–	–	Cox et al., 1998
7	China	6/8	160	SPM	107	–	–	Goa et al., 1998
8	China	17	218	SPM	103	–	–	Geary et al., 1999
9	China	19	218	SPM	113	–	–	Geary et al., 1999
10	China	6/8	300	BTBC-R	107	–	–	Zhou & Boehm, 2001
11	China	5	53	Arith	113	–	–	Siegler & Mu, 2008
12	China	8/15	–	EDUC	111	–	–	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
13	Hong Kong	9/11	1,007	CCT	105	–	–	Godman, 1964
14	Hong Kong	16	5,209	AH4	106	–	–	Vernon, 1982
15	Hong Kong	10	1,000	SPM	109	–	–	Chan & Vernon, 1988
16	Hong Kong	6/13	13,822	SPM	103	–	–	Lynn et al., 1988b
17	Hong Kong	6/15	4,500	SPM	110	–	–	Lynn et al., 1988b
18	Hong Kong	10	197	SPM	108	92	114	Lynn et al., 1988b
19	Hong Kong	9	376	CCF	104	–	–	Lynn et al., 1988a
20	Hong Kong	9	479	SPM	122	–	–	Chan et al., 1991
21	Hong Kong	15	341	APM	120	–	–	Lynn & Chan, 2003
22	Hong Kong	15	–	Math	105	–	–	Weiss, 2007
23	Hong Kong	8/15	–	EDUC	104.4	–	–	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
24	Japan	5/15	1,070	WISC	102	–	102	Lynn, 1977a
25	Japan	35	316	WAIS	102	–	–	Lynn, 1977a
26	Japan	5/10	760	MFFT	107	–	–	Salkind et al., 1978
27	Japan	10	212	Kyoto	106	–	–	Lynn & Dzielhon, 1980
28	Japan	8/11	97	WRAT	108	108	–	Tarnopol, 1980
29	Japan	9	223	CEFT	112	–	112	Bagley et al., 1983
30	Japan	4/9	347	CMMS	107	–	–	Misawa et al., 1984
31	Japan	6/11	480	Various	105	99	111	Stevenson et al., 1985
32	Japan	6/16	1,100	WISC-R	103	100	104	Lynn & Hammen

33	Japan	4/6	600	WPPSI	105	97	109	Lynn & Hammeon
34	Japan	14	2,100	Kyoto	104	103	107	Lynn et al., 1987a
35	Japan	13/15	178	DAT	104	–	114	Lynn et al., 1987b
36	Japan	2/8	548	McCart	103	102	105	Ishikuma et al., 1988
37	Japan	6/12	142	K-ABC	101	99	103	Kaufman et al., 1989
38	Japan	16	175	A/MR/M	113	–	–	Mann et al., 1990
39	Japan	9	444	SPM	110	121	–	Shigehisa & Lynn 1991
40	Japan	5/7	454	CCAT	109	121	109	Takeuchi & Scott 1992
41	Japan	6/12	451	MAT	106	–	–	Tamaoka et al., 1992
42	Japan	14/15	239	Various	103	100	–	Li et al., 1996
43	Japan	6/17	93	Gen Info	105	–	102	Chen et al., 1996
44	Japan	19	72	GMRT	102	–	–	Flaherty, 1997
45	Japan	7/11	60	DAM	102	105	–	Cox et al., 2001
46	Japan	17	1,119	Gen Info	105	105	–	Evans et al., 2002
47	Japan	8/15	–	EDUC	104.4	–	–	Meisenberg & Lynn 2011
48	Japan	18/22	60	MRT	–	–	110	Sakamoto & Spiere 2014
49	Macau	8/15	–	EDUC	101.2	–	–	Meisenberg & Lynn 2011
50	Mongolia	5/14	4,694	SPM	100	–	–	Lynn, 2007a
51	Singapore	13	147	SPM	107	–	–	Lynn, 1977b
52	Singapore	15	459	APM	114	–	–	Lim, 1994
53	Singapore	8/15	–	EDUC	107.5	–	–	Meisenberg & Lynn 2011
54	Singapore	11	662	SPM	114	–	–	Pacheco et al., 2012
55	S Korea	2/12	440	KABC	113	106	120	Moon, 1988
56	S Korea	9	107	SPM	109	98	111	Lynn & Song, 1994
57	S Korea	4	56	Number	103	–	–	Ginsburg et al., 1997
58	S Korea	6/16	2,231	WISC-3	100	98	102	Georgas et al., 2003
59	S Korea	5/10	598	CPM	108	–	–	Raven, 2008
60	S Korea	8/15	–	EDUC	105.3	–	–	Meisenberg & Lynn 2011
61	Taiwan	16	1,290	CF	103	–	–	Rodd, 1959
62	Taiwan	6/8	1,865	CPM	102	–	–	Hsu, 1971
63	Taiwan	9/10	1,384	SPM	110	–	–	Hsu et al., 1973
64	Taiwan	6/7	43,825	CPM	105	–	–	Hsu, 1976
65	Taiwan	8/11	193	WRAT	107	107	–	Tarnopol, 1980
66	Taiwan	6/11	480	Various	104	100	–	Stevenson et al 1985
67	Taiwan	11	50	V/R/S	106	100	110	Vernon, 1987
68	Taiwan	6/8	764	CPM	105	–	–	Rabinowitz et al 1991
69	Taiwan	6/11	169	Info	100	100	–	Chen et al., 1996
70	Taiwan	9/12	2,476	CPM	105	–	–	Lynn, 1997
71	Taiwan	6/15	118	SPM	105	–	–	Lai et al., 2001
72	Taiwan	17	1,469	Info	107	107	–	Evans et al., 2002

<b>73</b>	Taiwan	6/17	6,290	SPM	109	–	–	Lynn et al., 2011a Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011 Lynn, 2008a
<b>74</b>	Taiwan	8/15	–	EDUC	105.3	–	–	
<b>75</b>	Tibet	12/17	80	SPM	92	–	–	

The median IQ of East Asians in America is of 101 :

**Table 30 : IQs of East Asians in USA**

	LOCATI ON	ETHNICITY	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	VER	VIS	REFE RENC E
<b>1</b>	California	Chinese	6/12	97	Binet	97	–	–	Yeung, 1922
<b>2</b>	Hawaii	Chinese	9/13	513	Pintner	99	95	–	Symon ds, 1924
<b>3</b>	National	NE Asian	6/8	67	DAM	101	–	–	Goode nough, 1926b
<b>4</b>	Hawaii	Mixed	12	408	PM	100	–	–	Porteus & Babcoc k, 1926
<b>5</b>	Hawaii	Mixed	7/12	770	PM	103	–	–	Porteus , 1930
<b>6</b>	Honolulu	Chinese	10/14	2704	NV	99	–	–	Smith, 1942
<b>7</b>	Honolulu	Japanese	10/14	3312	NV	101	–	–	Smith, 1942
<b>8</b>	Honolulu	Korean	10/14	509	NV	102	–	–	Smith, 1942
<b>9</b>	National	Japanese	18	669	OSUT	96	96	–	Porteni er, 1947
<b>10</b>	New York	Chinese	6	80	Hunter	103	97	106	Lesser et al., 1965
<b>11</b>	National	NE Asian	6/17	4994	Variou s	100	97	–	Colem an, 1966
<b>12</b>	Hawaii	NE Asian	16	554	SCAT	96	96	–	Stewar t et al., 1967
<b>13</b>	Kauai	Japanese	9/10	253	PMA	98	97	95	Werner et al., 1968

<b>14</b>	Los Angeles	NE Asian	17	390	Various	99	95	–	Flaughter, 1971
<b>15</b>	California	Chinese	11/15	90	Maps	103	–	103	Feldman, 1971
<b>16</b>	National	NE Asian	6/11	32	WISC	101	101	102	United States, 1971
<b>17</b>	National	NE Asian	18	150	Various	98	99	–	Backman, 1972
<b>18</b>	California	Chinese	9	53	WISC	101	91	101	Yee & La Forge, 1974
<b>19</b>	California	Chinese	6/11	478	Various	101	–	–	Jensen & Inouye, 1980
<b>20</b>	National	NE Asian	–	929	Various	99	–	–	Sowell, 1986
<b>21</b>	Hawaii	Japanese	16	4,024	STAS	107	–	–	Brandon et al., 1987
<b>22</b>	California	Chinese	6/11	254	Large-T	101	89	–	Flynn, 1991
<b>23</b>	California	NE Asian	10/12	234	Large-T	110	–	106	Flynn, 1991
<b>24</b>	California	Chinese	10	155	SPM	104	–	–	Jensen & Whang, 1994
<b>25</b>	National	E Asian	14/22	42	AFQT	103	–	–	Herrnstein & Murray, 1994
<b>26</b>	National	Asian	6/17	48	DAB	104	100	105	Lynn, 1996
<b>27</b>	National	E Asian	7	63	WISC	109	–	–	Rushton, 1997
<b>28</b>	National	Asian	5/17	77	UNIT	107	–	105	Kane, 2007
<b>29</b>	National	Asian	3/8	18	PTI	107	–	–	Lynn, 2006a
<b>30</b>	National	E Asian	5/9	40	DAM	114	–	–	Huntsinger et

***Inuits***

Inuits, or Arctic people, are indigenous people to Alaska, northern Canada and Greenland. They form a genetic cluster (Cavalli 1994) and differ genetically from Native Americans by having an appreciable percentage of blood type B (which is absent in Native Americans).

Their median IQ is 91 :

**Table 31 : IQs of Arctic people**

#	Age	N	Test	IQ	Verbal	Visual	Reference
1	6/11	105	DAM	93	—	—	Eells, 1933
2	8/18	94	—	80	—	—	Anderson & Eells, 1935
3	6/11	469	DAM	89	—	—	Eells, 1933
4	8/18	389	S. BINET	74	—	—	Anderson & Eells, 1935
5	6/9	174	CPM	94	—	—	MacArthur, 1965
6	10/15	326	SPM	84	—	—	MacArthur, 1965
7	25	122	CPM	78	—	—	Berry, 1966
8	Adults	186	CPMT	93	—	93	Kunce et al., 1967
9	10	87	SPM	91	—	—	MacArthur, 1967
10	11	50	MVK	90	80	88	Vernon, 1969
11	6/12	380	WISC	91	—	91	Kaplan et al., 1973
12	9/12	69	CPM	96	—	—	Taylor & Skanes, 1976a
13	7	22	WPPSI	93	78	93	Taylor & Skanes, 1976b
14	7/10	63	CPM	95	—	—	Taylor & Skanes, 1977
15	7/14	366	WISC-R	91	—	91	Wilgosh et al., 1986
16	5	110	CPM	92	—	—	Wright et al., 1996
17	15	261	CF/MH	86	77	—	Grigorenko et al., 2004
18	9	29	SPM+	80	—	—	Shibaev & Lynn, 2015

*Australian Aboriginal people*

Aboriginal people form a whole different genetic cluster of population (Cavalli 1994). They have a distinctive blood group profile with ~73% group O (just under 50% in Europeans). The remaining 27% are A, and virtually none are from group B. The Europeans who first encountered the Australian Aborigines considered them to be a backward people. Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895) considered them the “missing link” between apes and humans, and Chase and John von Sturmer (1973, p. 6) claimed that they represented “one of the lowest echelons of the ladder of intellectual development.”

The median value of Aboriginal IQ is 61, which is lower than the threshold of mental retardation according to the American Psychiatric Association.

**Table 32 : IQs of Aboriginal people**

	Age	N	Test	<i>g</i>	Reas	Verb	Vis	Reference
1	Adults	56	PM	66	66		66	Porteus, 1931
2	Adults	24	PM	59	66		59	Piddington & Piddington, 1932
3	Adults	268	Varions	58	–		–	Porteus, 1933a, 1933b
4	Adults	31	AA/PF	69			69	Fowler, 1940
5	Adults	87	PM	70			70	Porteus & Gregor, 1963
6	11	101	QT	58			–	Hart, 1965
7	Adults	103	PM	74			74	Porteus et al., 1967
8	5	24	PPVT	62		62	–	De Lacey, 1971a, 1971b
9	6-12	40	PPVT	64		64		De Lacey, 1971a, 1971b
10	Adults	60	CPM	53	53	–		Berry, 1971
11	3-4	22	PPVT	64	–	64		Nurcombe & Moffit, 1973
12	6-14	55	PPVT	52		52		Dasen et al., 1973



13	9	458	QT	58	–		McElwain & Kearney, 1973
14	13	42	SOT	62	–		Waldron & Gallimore, 1973
15	6-10	30	PPVT	59	59	–	De Lacey, 1976
16	25	22	CPM/KB	60	60	–	67 Binnie-Dawson, 1984
17	4	55	PPVT	61	–	61	– Nurcombe et al., 1999

### *Bushmen & Pygmies*

The bushmen, also sometimes called Khoisans, and the Pygmies are two minor races of sub-Saharan Africa. Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1994) in their genetic analysis of human populations have confirmed that these two peoples have distinctive but closely related genetic characteristics and form two related clusters. Bushmen have an IQ of around 52. Pygmies have an IQ of around 53 [[1.3.3](#)].

**Table 33 : IQs of Bushmen**

	Age	N	IQ	Reference
1	Adult	25	48	Porteus, 1937
2	Adult	197	62	Porteus, 1937
3	Adult	108	52	Reuning, 1972

### *Jews*

Among Jews, we can distinguish four distinct ethnic groups, being Ethiopian Jews, Mezrahim Jews (Oriental), Ashkenazi and Sephardim Jews (European Jews). It is widely recognized and known that Ashkenazi Jews are the race with the highest IQ. However, this is clearly not the case for the 3 other ethnic Jewish groups.

**Ethiopian Jews** have an IQ of 63, after adjusting for Flynn effect (Lynn, 1994b). Kozulin (1998) studied the IQ of Ethiopian Jews who spent 4 years of education in Israel (a developed/western nation). Their mean IQ was of 65, which indicates that education in western schools does not benefit the African IQ. **Oriental Jews** (Mezrahim) have an IQ of

91. **Ashkenazi Jews'** IQ ranges around 107-115 [1.3.4]. **Sephardi Jews'** IQ is estimated at 99 [1.3.5].

The median IQ in Israel is 95, which is way above the regional average in Middle East/South Asia (86). It is important to note that the Israeli population consists of 40% of European Jews (Ashkenazi & Sephardi), 40% of Mezrahim Jews and 20% of Arabs, with a few Ethiopian Jews.

**Table 34 : IQ in Israel**

	Age	N	Test	<i>g</i>	Reference
1	13-14	200	WISC	95	Ortar, 1952
2	11-15	267	SPM	95	Moyles & Wolins, 1973
3	10-12	180	LT	97	Miron, 1977
4	10-12	268	SPM	95	Globerson, 1983
5	11	2,781	SPM	89	Lancer & Rim, 1984
6	5	52	CPM	96	Tzuriel & Caspi, 1992
7	9-15	1,740	SPM	90	Lynn, 1994a
8	13	–	SPM	96	Kozulin, 1998

The median of IQ for Jews outside Israel is 108, 8 points higher than the European average.

**Table 35 : IQs of Jews outside Israel**

	Country	Age	N	Test	<i>IQ</i>	Reference
1	United Kingdom	8-14	10 81	IQ	110.5	Davies & Hughes, 1927
2	United Kingdom	8-14	10 81	Arithmetic	110.6	Davies & Hughes, 1927
3	United Kingdom	8-14	10 81	English	113.0	Davies & Hughes, 1927
4	United Kingdom	6-14	30 3	IQ	113.0	Winch, 1930
5	United Kingdom	10	90 7	IQ	111.5	Vincent, 1966
6	United Kingdom	8	22	IQ	108.5	Lynn & Longley, 2006
7	United Kingdom	7-16	39	IQ	108.2	Lynn & Longley, 2006

<b>8</b>	Canada	Children	–	WISC	<i>107.1</i>	Wendt & Burwell, 1964
<b>9</b>	Canada	11	100	PMA	<i>110.5</i>	Majoribanks, 1972
<b>10</b>	United States	9–15	50	Pressy	<i>101</i>	Murdoch, 1920
<b>11</b>	United States	6–10	81	Trabue	<i>101</i>	Jordan, 1921
<b>12</b>	United States	5–7	79	Binet	<i>100</i>	Pintner & Keller, 1922
<b>13</b>	United States	10	100	Binet	<i>109</i>	Bere, 1924
<b>14</b>	United States	12–18	872	Army Alpha	<i>99</i>	Feingold, 1924
<b>15</b>	United States	12	80	NIT	<i>102.5</i>	Seago & Koldin, 1925
<b>16</b>	United States	6	47	Binet	<i>106</i>	Graham, 1925
<b>17</b>	United States	9–13	702	PCPM	<i>101.5</i>	Hirsch, 1926
<b>18</b>	United States	6–11	55	DAM	<i>106</i>	Goodenough, 1926
<b>19</b>	United States	8–13	445	NIT	<i>99</i>	Rigg, 1928
<b>20</b>	United States	7–8	174	Dearborn	<i>100</i>	Easterbrooks, 1928
<b>21</b>	United States	13	378	Terman	<i>114</i>	Franzblau, 1934
<b>22</b>	United States	10–15	91	Pintner	<i>103</i>	Pintner & Artensian, 1937
<b>23</b>	United States	11	2999	NIT	<i>101</i>	Pintner & Mailer, 1937
<b>24</b>	United States	6	335	S. Binet	<i>111</i>	Brown, 1944
<b>25</b>	United States	–	2453	Binet	<i>111</i>	Nardi, 1948
<b>26</b>	United States	H	246	Pintner	<i>107</i>	Solomon, 1956
<b>27</b>	United States	4–5	2,083	S. Binet	<i>110</i>	Levinson, 1957a
<b>28</b>	United States	5	1451	S. Binet	<i>107</i>	Levinson, 1957b

<b>29</b>	United States	Adult	49	Vocabul ary	<i>117</i>	Miner, 1957
<b>30</b>	United States	Adult	64	WAIS	<i>116</i>	Levinson, 1958
<b>31</b>	United States	5	11 7	WISE	<i>103</i>	Levinson, 1959
<b>32</b>	United States	10–13	47	WISE	<i>106</i>	Levinson, 1960a
<b>33</b>	United States	16	65	Quick	<i>110</i>	Bachman, 1970
<b>34</b>	United States	12–18	72 0	Otis	<i>115</i>	Romanoff, 1976
<b>35</b>	United States	4–6	40 0	S. Binet	<i>111</i>	Levinson & Block, 1977
<b>36</b>	United States	6	32 4	S. Binet	<i>116</i>	Gross, 1986
<b>37</b>	United States	14–23	98	AFQT	<i>112.6</i>	Herrnstein & Murray, 1994
<b>38</b>	United States	14	39 7	Math	<i>113</i>	Fejgin, 1995
<b>39</b>	United States	14	39 7	Reading	<i>107</i>	Fejgin, 1995
<b>40</b>	United States	18–70	15 0	Vocabul ary	<i>107.5</i>	Lynn, 2004
<b>41</b>	United States	18–70	43 3	Vocabul ary	<i>109</i>	Lynn & Kanazawa, 2008

### *Native Americans*

Amerindians are the natives of the American continent. Cavalli (1994) confirmed that they form a separate genetic cluster. Their median IQ is 87.

**Table 36 : IQs of Native Americans in the Americas**

	<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>TEST</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>REFERENCE</b>
<b>1</b>	USA	6/11	715	Otis	86	Hunter & Sommermier, 1922
<b>2</b>	USA	9/13	1102	National	69	Garth, 1925
<b>3</b>	USA	5/9	961	Pinter/Nat	85	Haught, 1934
<b>4</b>	USA	9/14	1000	Otis	70	Garth and Smith, 1937
<b>5</b>	USA	6/11	323	McArthur	88	Havighurst et al., 1944
<b>6</b>	USA	6/13	205	CPM	93	Turner & Penfold, 1952
<b>7</b>	USA	16	100	WAIS	86	Howell et al., 1958
<b>8</b>	USA	6/15	281	SPM	85	West & MacArthur, 1964
<b>9</b>	USA	8/17	4994	–	91	Coleman, 1966
<b>10</b>	Canada	6/14	124	CF	76	Gaddes et al., 1968
<b>11</b>	Canada	13	137	SPM	94	Bowd, 1973
<b>12</b>	Canada	5/11	111	CPM	92	Cropley & Cardey, 1975
<b>13</b>	USA	6/20	160	WISC	90	St. John et al., 1976
<b>14</b>	Canada	6/13	177	WISC-R	82	Seyfort et al., 1980
<b>15</b>	USA	6/13	177	WISC-R	87	Teeter et al., 1982
<b>16</b>	USA	6/12	236	WISC-R	94	McShane & Plas, 1984
<b>17</b>	USA	6/16	200	WISC-R	93	Browne, 1984
<b>18</b>	USA	14	124	SPM	87	Sidles & MacAvoy, 1987
<b>19</b>	Canada	11	50	R/V/S	87	Vernon, 1987
<b>20</b>	USA	6/16	1129	SPM	93	Raven & Court, 1989
<b>21</b>	USA	6/16	240	WISC-R	72	Reynolds et al., 1999
<b>22</b>	USA	6/15	691	WISC-R	80	Beiser & Gotowiec, 2000
<b>23</b>	USA	9	99	WAIS	84	Tsethlikai, 2011
<b>24</b>	Colombia	4	120	QR	84	Ginsburg et al., 1997
<b>25</b>	Ecuador	6/7	48	DAM	89	Dodge, 1969
<b>26</b>	Ecuador	17	120	WISC-R	88	Fierro-Benitez et al., 1989
<b>27</b>	Ecuador	5/17	104	MAT	80	Proctor et al., 2000
<b>28</b>	Ecuador	8	41	CPM	91	Counter et al., 1998
<b>29</b>	Guatemala	6/12	256	DAM	79	Johnson et al., 1967

<b>30</b>	Mexico	6/13	520	DAM	87	Modiano, 1962
<b>31</b>	Mexico	6/12	197	DAM	92	Laosa et al., 1974
<b>32</b>	Mexico	7/11	194	SPM	83	Lynn et al., 2005
<b>33</b>	Mexico	15	–	PISA	86	Lynn & Mikk, 2009
<b>34</b>	Peru	8/11	4382	CPM	87	Raven et al., 1995
<b>35</b>	Peru	6/7	300	WISC	85	Llanos, 1974

### *Pacific Islanders*

Pacific Islanders are the Natives of the many Pacific islands, the main ones being New Zealand, the island group of Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia, and Hawaii. In their genetic analysis, Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1994) identify Micronesians, Polynesians, and Melanesians as a separate genetic cluster.

The median IQ of maoris in New Zealand is 90, where other Pacific Islanders' median IQ is of 85.

**Table 37 : IQs of Māori people in New Zealand**

	Age	N	Test	<i>g</i>	Reas	Verb	Vis	Reference
<b>1</b>	12-41	53	WB	91	–	92	94	Adcock et al., 1954
<b>2</b>	13	214	PMA	90	90	94	87	Walters, 1958
<b>3</b>	15	98	OTIS	82	–	–	–	Ausubel, 1961
<b>4</b>	11	18	WB	81	–	79	84	Ritchie, 1966
<b>5</b>	8-12	238	OTIS	85	–	–	–	Lovegrove, 1966
<b>6</b>	13-14	236	OTIS	81	–	–	–	Du Chateau, 1967
<b>7</b>	14	77	OTIS	84	–	–	–	Martin, 1969
<b>8</b>	5-7	80	Verbal	90	–	90	–	Clay, 1971
<b>9</b>	14	55	SPM	88	–	–	–	Codd, 1972
<b>10</b>	4-6	151	PIPS	96	–	–	–	St. George, 1975
<b>11</b>	9	211	SPM/VC	91	91	91	–	Harker, 1978

<b>12</b>	8-14	303	QT	95	–	–	–	St. George, 1983
<b>13</b>	10-12	130	TOSCA	90	–	–	–	St. George & Chapman, 1983
<b>14</b>	8-9	22	WISC-R	92	–	–	–	Fergusson et al., 1991
<b>15</b>	Adults	103	VR	92	–	–	–	Guenole et al., 2003

Table 38 : IQs of Pacific Islanders

	Location	Age	N	Test	<i>g</i>	Reference
<b>1</b>	Hawaii	6-12	105	Binet	85	Porteus & Babcock, 1926
<b>2</b>	Hawaii	10-14	302	NV	90	Smith, 1942
<b>3</b>	Hawaii	10-14	319	NV	82	Smith, 1942
<b>4</b>	Mariana Islands	6-16	200	Arthur	81	Joseph & Murray, 1951
<b>5</b>	Marshall Islands	12-18	407	CF	84	Jordheim & Olsen, 1963
<b>6</b>	Samoa	5-7	80	Verbal	90	Clay, 1971
<b>7</b>	Papua N. Guinea	17-18	152	SOP	82	Waldron & Gallimore, 1973
<b>8</b>	Cook Islands	4-6	110	PIPS	89	St. George, 1974
<b>9</b>	Fiji	12	76	QT	84	Chandra, 1975
<b>10</b>	Tonga	8-9	80	PAT	86	Beck & St. George, 1983
<b>11</b>	Papua N. Guinea	7-10	241	BG	83	Robin & Shea, 1983
<b>12</b>	Hawaii-Filipinos	16	3,507	STAS	89	Brandon et al., 1987
<b>13</b>	New Caledonia	5-10	96	KB	85	Cottureau-Reiss & Lehalle, 1988
<b>14</b>	Pacific Islands	9-17	65	SPM	88	Reid & Gilmore, 1989

*South Asians*

The median IQ is 84.

**Table 39 : IQs of indigenous South Asians**

	LOCATION	AGE	N	TEST	IQ	REFERENCE
1	Armenia	5/10	311	DAM	92	Dennis, 1957
2	Armenia	8/15	–	EDUC	95.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
3	Azerbaijan	8/15	–	EDUC	86.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
4	Bahrain	8/15	–	EDUC	89.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
5	Bangladesh	67	672	MMSE	81	Lynn, 2007a
6	Cyprus	8/15	–	EDUC	92.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
7	Georgia	8/15	–	EDUC	87.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
8	India	8/16	1,695	CF	84	Rao, 1965
9	India	5/11	1,339	CPM	88	Gupta & Gupta, 1966
10	India	14/17	1,359	SPM	87	Chopra, 1966
11	India	12/14	5,607	CPM	81	Sinha, 1968
12	India	5/10	1,050	CPM	82	Rao & Reddy, 1968
13	India	15	3,536	SPM	84	Majumdar & Nundi, 1971
14	India	10/16	180	SPM	79	Mohanty & Babu, 1983
15	India	13	100	SPM	78	Agrawa et al., 1984
16	India	9/12	748	WISC-R	79	Afzal, 1988
17	India	7/9	90	TONI	80	Parmar, 1989
18	India	5/12	500	CPM	86	Bhogle & Prakash, 1992
19	India	6/12	29	CPM	82	Jyothi et al., 1993
20	India	11/15	569	SPM	82	Raven et al., 1996
21	India	7/11	828	CPM	80	Barnabus et al., 1995
22	India	7/15	8,040	SPM	88	Raven et al., 2000
23	India	11/15	569	SPM	81	Raven et al., 2000



24	India	8/15	–	EDUC	89.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
25	Iran	15	627	SPM	84	Valentine, 1959
26	Iran	14	250	AH4	83	Mehryar et al., 1972
27	Iran	6/11	1,600	BG	89	Yousefi et al., 1992
28	Iran	6/10	1,195	DAM	84	Mehryar et al., 1987
29	Iran	8/15	–	EDUC	89.3	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
30	Iraq	14/17	204	SPM	87	Abul-Hubb, 1972
31	Iraq	18/35	1,185	SPM	87	Abul-Hubb, 1972
32	Israel-Arabs	6/16	639	WISC-R	86	Lieblich & Kugelmas, 1981
33	Jordan	6/12	210	KABC	84	El-Mneizel, 1987
34	Jordan	8/13	151	Piagetian	82	Za'rour & Khuri, 1977
35	Jordan	11/40	1,542	APM	86	Lynn & Abdel-Khalek, 2009
36	Jordan	8/15	–	EDUC	89.9	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
37	Kazakstan	8/15	–	EDUC	86	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
38	Kuwait	6/15	6,529	SPM	86	Abdel-Khalek & Lynn, 2006
39	Kuwait	7/17	8,418	SPM	87	Abdel-Khalek & Raven, 2006
40	Kyrgyzstan	8/15	–	EDUC	75.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
41	Lebanon	5/10	191	DAM	86	Dennis, 1957
42	Lebanon	8/15	–	EDUC	88.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
43	Mauritius	8/15	–	EDUC	83.9	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
44	Nepal	4/16	807	DAM	78	Sundberg & Ballinger, 1968
45	Oman	9/18	5,139	SPM	82	Abdel-Khalek & Lynn, 2008
46	Oman	5/11	1,042	CPM	85	Khaleefa et al., 2012a
47	Oman	8/15	–	EDUC	85.5	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

<b>48</b>	Pakistan	15	349	GEFT	84	Alvi et al., 1986
<b>49</b>	Pakistan	6/8	140	SPM	84	Rahman et al., 2002
<b>50</b>	Pakistan	12/18	1,662	SPM	82	Ahmad et al., 2008
<b>51</b>	Pakistan	18/45	2,016	SPM	86	Ahmad et al., 2008
<b>52</b>	Palestine	8/15	–	EDUC	84.7	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>53</b>	Palestine	6-11	257	CPM	85	Bakhiet & Lynn, 2014b
<b>53</b>	Qatar	10/13	273	SPM	78	Bart et al., 1987
<b>54</b>	Qatar	6/11	1,135	SPM	88	Khaleefa & Lynn, 2008d
<b>55</b>	Qatar	8/15	–	EDUC	78.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>56</b>	Qatar	6/11	1,003	SPM	90	Khaleefa et al., 2012
<b>57</b>	Saudi Arabia	8/14	3,967	SPM	80	Abu-Hatab et al., 1977
<b>58</b>	Saudi Arabia	8/24	4,659	SPM	78	Abdel-Khalek & Lynn, 2009
<b>59</b>	Saudi Arabia	8/15	–	EDUC	81.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>60</b>	Saudi Arabia	8/18	3,209	SPM	80	Batterjee, 2011
<b>61</b>	Saudi Arabia	6/15	1,634	SPM	76	Batterjee et al., 2013
<b>62</b>	Seychelles	8/15	–	EDUC	83.5	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>63</b>	Sri Lanka	8	46	CTMM	79	Strauss, 1954
<b>64</b>	Syria	7	241	CPM	83	Guthke & Al-Zoubi, 1987
<b>65</b>	Syria	7/18	3,489	CPM	83	Khaleefa & Lynn, 2008a
<b>66</b>	Syria	8/15	–	EDUC	86.6	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>67</b>	Turkey	11/12	92	D 48	84	Kağıtçıbaşı, 1972
<b>68</b>	Turkey	7/9	180	DAM	96	Ucman, 1972
<b>69</b>	Turkey	11	218	DAM	88	Kağıtçıbaşı, 1979
<b>70</b>	Turkey	6/15	2397	SPM	87	Düzen et al, 2008
<b>71</b>	Turkey	11	258	DAM	83	Kağıtçıbaşı & Biricik, 2011
<b>72</b>	Turkey	8/15	–	EDUC	90.8	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

<b>73</b>	Yemen	6/11	1000	CPM	85	Al-Heeti et al., 1997
<b>74</b>	Yemen	6/11	986	CPM	81	Khaleefa & Lynn, 2008c
<b>75</b>	Yemen	8/15	–	EDUC	66	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>76</b>	U Arab Em	6/11	4496	CPM	83	Khaleefa & Lynn, 2008b
<b>77</b>	U Arab Em	8/15	–	EDUC	94	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

The median IQ of South Asians in the United Kingdom is 90. A selective immigration and a better nutrition are probably the main reasons of that increase compared to their home countries.

**Table 40 : IQs of South Asians in the United Kingdom**

	<b>Location</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>N</b>	<b><i>g</i></b>	<b>Rea</b>	<b>Verb</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>1</b>	Britain	Indian	11	43	87	87	–	ILEA, 1967
<b>2</b>	Britain	Pakistani	9-10	173	93	93	93	Dickenson et al, 1975
<b>3</b>	Britain	Indian	10	149	91	91	–	Black People, 1978
<b>4</b>	Britain	Indian	11	173	94	94		Scarr et al., 1983
<b>5</b>	Britain	Pakistani	11	32	89	89		Scarr et al., 1983
<b>6</b>	Britain	Indian	11	37	83	83	82	Mackintosh et al., 1985
<b>7</b>	Britain	Indian	11	25	97	97	99	Mackintosh et al., 1985
<b>8</b>	Britain	Pakistani	10	91	93	93	88	Mackintosh et al, 1985
<b>9</b>	Britain	Pakistani	10	170	96	96	90	Mackintosh et al., 1985
<b>10</b>	Britain	Pakistani	7-15	560	88	88	82	West et al., 1992
<b>11</b>	Britain	Indian	7-15	330	87	87	86	West et al., 1992
<b>12</b>	Britain	Bangladeshi	7-11	177	87	87	82	West et al., 1992

*North Africans*

The median IQ is 83.

**Table 41 : IQs of indigenous North Africans**

	<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>AGE</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>TEST</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>REFERENCE</b>
<b>1</b>	N. Africa	Adults	90	SPM	84	Raveau et al., 1976
<b>2</b>	Algeria	8/15	–	EDUC	84.1	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>3</b>	Egypt	6/10	206	DAM	84	Dennis, 1957
<b>4</b>	Egypt	12/15	111	CCF	81	Sadek, 1972
<b>5</b>	Egypt	6/12	129	SPM	83	Abdel-Khalek, 1988
<b>6</b>	Egypt	8/15	–	EDUC	76	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>7</b>	Libya	6/11	600	CPM	86	Lynn et al., 2008a
<b>8</b>	Libya	8/17	1600	SPM	78	Al-Shahomee & Lynn,
<b>9</b>	Libya	6/16	870	WISC-	85	Lynn et al., 2009
<b>10</b>	Libya	Adults	600	SPM	78	Al-Shahomee, 2012
<b>11</b>	Libya	Adults	520	SPM	79	Al-Shahomee & Lynn,
<b>12</b>	Libya	16	592	SPM	87	Al-Shahomee, Lynn &
<b>13</b>	Morocco	6/11	85	SPM	84	Aboussaleh et al., 2006
<b>14</b>	Morocco	adults	202	SPM	84	Sellami et al., 2010
<b>15</b>	Morocco	8/15	–	EDUC	81.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
<b>16</b>	Sudan	6	80	DAM	64	Badri, 1965a
<b>17</b>	Sudan	9	293	DAM	76	Badri, 1965b
<b>18</b>	Sudan	8/12	148	SPM	75	Ahmed, 1989
<b>19</b>	Sudan	adults	77	ETMT	76	Stanczak et al., 2001
<b>20</b>	Sudan	6/9	1683	CPM	81	Khatib et al., 2006
<b>21</b>	Sudan	4/10	1345	DAM	83	Khaleefa et al., 2008a
<b>22</b>	Sudan	9/25	6202	SPM	79	Khaleefa et al., 2008b
<b>23</b>	Sudan	7/11	3185	SPM	79	Irwing et al., 2008
<b>23</b>	Sudan	50	801	WAIS-	86	Khaleefa et al., 2009
<b>24</b>	Sudan	50	801	WAIS-	84	Khaleefa et al, 2009
<b>25</b>	Tunisia	20	509	SPM	84	Abdel-Khalek & Raven,
<b>26</b>	Tunisia	8/15	–	EDUC	86.4	Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011

The average IQ of North Africans in Europe is 83, and the average of South Asians is 80.

**Table 42 : IQs of South Asians and North Africans in Europe**

	<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>SAMPLE</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>TEST</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>REFERENCE</b>
<b>1</b>	Germany	Turkish	330	SPM	86	Taschinski, 1985
<b>2</b>	Germany	Turkish	—	Math	86	Weiss, 2007
<b>3</b>	Netherlands	Turkish	177	RAKIT	78	Resing et al., 1986
<b>4</b>	Netherlands	Turkish	104	RAKIT	79	Resing et al., 1986
<b>5</b>	Netherlands	Moroccan	177	RAKIT	75	Resing et al., 1986
<b>6</b>	Netherlands	Moroccan	76	RAKIT	79	Resing et al., 1986
<b>7</b>	Netherlands	Mixed	106	GALO	83	De Jong, 1984
<b>8</b>	Netherlands	Turkish	815	CITO	85	Pieke, 1988
<b>9</b>	Netherlands	Moroccan	720	CITO	84	Pieke, 1988
<b>10</b>	Netherlands	Indian	338	CITO	88	Pieke, 1988
<b>11</b>	Netherlands	Mixed	47	Otis/ Son-R	93	Van de Vijver & Laros & Tellegren,
<b>12</b>	Netherlands	Turkish &	33		84	
<b>13</b>	Netherlands	Moroccan	194	LPTP	85	Hamers et al., 1996
<b>14</b>	Netherlands	Turkish	194	LPTP	84	Hamers et al., 1996
<b>15</b>	Netherlands	Moroccan	167	GATB	84	Te Nijenhuis, 1997
<b>16</b>	Netherlands	Turkish	275	GATB	88	Te Nijenhuis, 1997
<b>17</b>	Netherlands	Mixed	1,315	Arith	92	Driessen, 1997
<b>18</b>	Netherlands	Mixed	474	RAKIT	94	Helms-Lorenz et al.,
<b>19</b>	Serbia	Gypsies	323	SPM	70	Rushton et al., 2007
<b>20</b>	Slovakia	Gypsies	728	CPM	83	Raven et al., 1995

***Southeast Asians***

Southeast Asians are Natives of Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Borneo. Their distinctive racial identity has been confirmed by the genetic analysis made by Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1994), in which these peoples constitute a genetic “cluster.” They have some genetic affinity with East Asians, with whom they are somewhat interbred, but the flattened nose and epicanthic eye fold are less prominent.

Their median IQ is 89.

**Table 43 : IQs of indigenous Southeast Asians**

Row	Country	IQ	Ver	Vis	Reference
1	Burma	107		107	Schuster, 1971
2	Cambodia	65	65		Naudeau et al., 2011
3	Indonesia	86		86	Thomas & Shah, 1961
4	Indonesia	87			Bleichrodt et al., 1980
5	Indonesia	87	87		Soewondo et al., 1989
6	Indonesia	87			Hadidjaja et al., 1998
7	Indonesia	79			Rindermann & te Nijenhuis, 2012
8	Indonesia	86			Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
9	Laos	90			Boivin et al., 1996
10	Laos	91			Boivin et al., 1996
11	Malaysia	89			Chaim, 1994
12	Malaysia	85		85	Kuhnen et al., 2001
13	Malaysia	97			Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
14	Philippines	86			Flores & Evans, 1972
15	Philippines	82			Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
16	Philippines	94			Vista & Care, 2011
17	Singapore	93			Lynn, 1977b
18	Thailand	82			Malakul, 1957
19	Thailand	98		98	Talapat & Suwannalert, 1966a
20	Thailand	82			Talapat & Suwannalert, 1966b
21	Thailand	88			Rajatasilpin et al., 1970
22	Thailand	72			Chou & Lau, 1987
23	Thailand	87			Opper, 1977
24	Thailand	91			Pollitt et al., 1989
25	Thailand	90			Thai Institute of Public Health, 1998
26	Thailand	90			Phatthayuttawat et al., 2000
27	Thailand	75			Sungthong et al., 2002
28	Thailand	106			Phatthayuttawat et al., 2003
29	Thailand	98		97	Sangtongluan, 2004
30	Thailand	85			Ruangdaraganon, 2004
31	Thailand	105			Sukhatunga et al., 2006a
32	Thailand	96			Sukhatunga et al., 2006b
33	Thailand	95			Wanitrommani et al., 2004
34	Thailand	88			Isaranurug et al., 2006
35	Thailand	87			Nimmalangkun, 2006
36	Thailand	94			Sroythong, 2008
37	Thailand	94			Thavornsuwanchai, 2008

38	Thailand	81	91	87	Pongcharoen et al., 2011
39	Thailand	88			Aekplakorn, 2009
40	Thailand	97			Thai Department of Mental Health, 2011
41	Thailand	91			Malloy, 2014d
42	Vietnam	99		99	Mayer, 1966
43	Vietnam	82			Watanabe et al., 2005
44	Vietnam	95	95		Glewwe et al., 2012
45	Vietnam	82	82		Glewwe et al., 2012
46	Vietnam	85	85		Behrman et al., 2013
47	Vietnam	102	102		Fink & Rockers, 2014
48	Vietnam	83			Nga et al., 2011
49	Vietnam	97			Rindermann et al., 2013
50	Vietnam	94			Meisenberg & Lynn, 2011
51	Vietnam	102			OECD, 2013

Table 44 : IQs of Southeast Asians in the Netherlands &amp; in USA

	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Test</b>	<b><i>g</i></b>	<b>Reference</b>
1	Filipino	6-14	140	PM	96	Porteus, 1937
2	Filipino	10-14	305	NV	89	Smith, 1942
3	Filipino	10	138	PMA	91	Werner et al., 1968
4	Filipino	16	4,147	STAS	93	Brandon et al., 1987
5	Filipino	9-25	263	Varions	87	Flynn, 1991
6	Indonesian	6-10	84	NV	94	Tesser et al., 1999
7	Vietnamese	12-16	391	SPM	94	Flynn, 1991

## ***Conclusion***

We can thus draw an overall hierarchy of intelligence worldwide, in both native land & in optimal conditions (living in the Western World) :

**Table 45 : IQ by ethnicity and location**

<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>IQ in homeland</b>	<b>IQ in developed countries</b>
<b>Europeans</b>	100	100
<b>East Asians</b>	105	101
<b>Inuits</b>	91	91
<b>Africans</b>	71	86
<b>Aboriginal</b>	61	—
<b>Bushmen &amp; Pygmies</b>	53	—
<b>Ashkenazi</b>	115	108
<b>Mezrahi</b>	91	—
<b>Amerindians</b>	87	87
<b>Maori</b>	90	90
<b>Pacific Islanders</b>	85	85
<b>South Asians</b>	84	90
<b>North Africans</b>	83	83
<b>Southeast Asians</b>	89	93

## **1.4 — Evolution of racial differences in intelligence**

Human intelligence has an interesting story, with two ice ages playing important roles. The first cold period happened between 70,000 and 50,000 years ago. The second ice age, which was more significant, occurred between 28,000 and 10,000 years ago.

We will compare the major human populations or genetic groups as described by Cavalli-Sforza (2000). Our focus will be on how these groups developed into distinct populations and how differences in thinking ability emerged between them.

When we mention Würm Temp, we're talking about the temperature during the second ice age, which was the main driver for intelligence development. Brain measurements are given in cubic centimeters.



**Table 46 : Race differences in winter temperatures (degrees centigrade) and brain size**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Winter Temp</b>	<b>Würm Temp</b>	<b>Brain Size</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Arctic Peoples</b>	-15	-20	1,443	91
<b>East Asians</b>	-7	-12	1,416	105
<b>Europeans</b>	0	-5	1,369	99
<b>Native Americans</b>	7	5	1,366	86
<b>S. Asian &amp; N. Africans</b>	12	7	1,293	84
<b>Bushmen</b>	15	15	1,270	54
<b>Africans</b>	17	17	1,276	67
<b>Australians</b>	17	17	1,225	62
<b>Southeast Asians</b>	24	24	1,332	87
<b>Pacific Islanders</b>	24	24	1,317	85

We will look at each population group to understand where and when thinking differences showed up. First, let's examine homo erectus who lived in Equatorial Africa from 1.7 million years ago until 200 thousand years ago. During this time, their brain size grew from 885 cubic centimeters to 1186 cubic centimeters (Ruff, Trinkau, and Holliday, 1997).

This brain growth happened because smarter mammals generally had more children who survived. The smartest individuals passed on their genes more successfully.

Around 200 thousand years ago, homo sapiens appeared (Relethford 1988). Based on the tools they made, scientists think homo erectus had thinking abilities similar to a European child of 7-8 years, with a mental score of about 50.

### *Africans*

During the past 200,000 years, African ancestors continued living in tropical and subtropical areas of sub-Saharan Africa. This environment didn't demand much mental challenge since primates had adapted to these conditions 60 million years ago. *Homo erectus* mainly ate plants and scavenged meat from animals killed by big cats. Most Africans lived as hunter-gatherers, similar to present-day tropical hunter-gatherer groups. Their food mostly came from year-round plants, insects, and eggs, with occasional meat from hunting.

With edible plants, insects, and eggs available all year, Africans in tropical regions didn't need to hunt animals regularly for food. In 1966, anthropologists agreed that "meat was of little nutritional importance in the African diet" (Standford and Bunn, 2001, p.4). A similar meeting in 1999 concluded that "the diet of the first hominids was originally plant-like, identical to that of the tropical and subtropical populations" (Standford and Bunn, 2001, p.356). Because of this, Africans faced less pressure to develop thinking skills needed for hunting methods, tools, and weapons for killing large mammals.

Also, temperatures in Equatorial Africa range between 17°C and 32°C year-round, so Africans didn't face mental challenges of making clothing or shelters, maintaining fires, or storing food for future use. Keeping children alive was relatively easier since clothes weren't necessary, and children could find food at a young age.

African brain size still increased over the last 200,000 years, from 1186cc to 1276cc, allowing their intelligence to reach current measurements of around 71 IQ. This happened through natural selection favoring smarter individuals who had more children, increasing the frequency of genes for higher intelligence, and possibly some helpful mutations. However, these intelligence-boosting mutations didn't spread as quickly as in populations living in cold climates, because the pressure to become smarter wasn't as strong in equatorial Africa.

The intelligence level that developed among Africans was enough to make some progress from hunting to farming, but not enough to develop what's called civilization with writing, mathematics, calendars, or stone cities and other markers described by Baker (1974).

### ***Bushmen***

About 100,000 years ago, some early African groups moved south and evolved into the Bushmen, who once lived across much of South Africa. Today, only a few tens of thousands remain in the Kalahari Desert. Over these 100,000 years, Bushmen's brains grew about 10 percent to reach 1270 cubic centimeters, and their average mental ability measure increased to 54. The Bushmen lived in conditions similar to other Africans, eating mostly plant-based foods.

This raises a question: why do Bushmen have a lower measured intelligence than Africans (54 versus 71)? The likely explanation is that certain helpful genetic changes for higher intelligence appeared among Africans because they had a much larger population, while these changes didn't occur in the smaller Bushmen population. Interestingly, Bushmen brains are only slightly smaller than African brains (1270 cc versus 1276 cc). This suggests that the genetic differences for higher thinking ability in Africans affect how the brain works internally rather than just making the brain bigger.

### ***North Africans and South Asians***

The first groups to leave sub-Saharan Africa settled in North Africa and Southwest Asia between 100,000 and 90,000 years ago. From 90,000 to 60,000 years ago, they spread across Southeast Asia. These groups became isolated from Africans by distance and the Sahara Desert, evolving into a separate population group: North African and South Asian (called MENA in English for Middle-Easterners and North-Africans). They experienced temperatures similar to today's in these regions, with winter lows around 13°C.

About 70,000 years ago, the first ice age began in the northern hemisphere, lasting until 50,000 years ago. This cold period was followed by a warmer stretch from 50,000 to 28,000 years ago. Then came a second, more severe ice age (the main one) from 28,000 to 10,000 years ago, before temperatures returned to current levels (Roberts, 1989; Foley, 1987). During this main ice age, winter temperatures in North Africa, Eurasia, and North America dropped to around 5°C. The coldest winters in North Africa and South Asia reached about 7°C.

Surviving these cold periods required solving cognitive challenges, creating pressure for greater intelligence than was needed in tropical Africa. Five major problems emerged:

First, plants became unavailable in winter and spring, and less abundant in summer and autumn. Insects and reptiles disappeared during winter because they hibernate in temperate climates. The main food source became large mammals like antelopes, deer, horses, and wild boars that humans had to hunt for food. Hunting these animals in the open grasslands covering most of the northern hemisphere during the ice age was challenging due to excellent visibility across thousands of meters, allowing animals to spot approaching predators. Hunting in open meadows is harder than in tropical woodlands, where hunters can hide behind trees and vegetation.

People from Equatorial Africa were mostly plant-eaters not adapted to hunting large mammals, so they faced new thinking challenges. Large herbivores run fast and are almost impossible to catch by chasing them. The only effective way to kill these animals involved using natural traps where animals could be lured and then killed. One common natural trap was narrow ravines where animals could be driven and trapped, with hunters waiting in ambush. Another method involved driving herds toward cliffs, causing some animals to fall over the edge, becoming injured or killed. Archaeological research shows early humans in Eurasia used such traps (Geist 1978, Mellars 1999). Developing these cooperative hunting strategies required increased thinking skills and teamwork.

Studies show that in hunter-gatherer populations, the proportion of food from hunting versus gathering varies by latitude. People in tropical areas are mainly gatherers, those in temperate environments hunt more, and those in Arctic and subarctic regions get food mainly through hunting and fishing since plants were rarely available except for berries and nuts in summer and fall (Lee, 1968). As people moved to the temperate regions of North Africa and South Asia, those with lower cognitive abilities often didn't survive the cold winters, which increased the average measured intelligence of survivors to around 84.

Second: Hunting large mammals required making various tools from stone, wood, and bone for weapons and processing animal carcasses. These animals were killed using stone weapons and spears, which needed careful preparation, typically with stone points attached to wooden handles. After bringing down a large herbivore, hunters had to cut it into pieces that could be carried back to camp for women and children. The animals had tough skin and thick ligaments that were difficult to cut, forcing people to create many different tools. In very cold environments, killed animals cooled rapidly and became hard to cut, so hunters needed effective tools to work quickly before the carcass became too stiff.

People in cold environments needed more tools with greater complexity compared to those in warmer regions. Torrence (1983) showed a connection between latitude and the number and complexity of tools used by modern hunter-gatherers. His research found that hunter-gatherers in tropical and subtropical areas like the Amazon and New Guinea typically used between 10 and 20 tools, while those in colder northern areas of Siberia, Alaska, and Greenland used between 25 and 60 tools. Additionally, northern peoples made more complex tools requiring assembly of different parts, such as stone arrowheads or bone pieces attached to wooden shafts.

Third: People in the northern hemisphere had to solve the problem of staying warm. They needed to create fires and shelters. Archaeological evidence shows that during the Ice Age, people in China and Europe maintained fires. They learned to create sparks by striking stones together to ignite dried grass. They needed supplies of dry grass, dry wood, and

animal dung stored in caves to start and maintain their fires. This required intelligence and planning ability. While populations in sub-Saharan Africa and Australia also used fire, it was easier to obtain in tropical regions from naturally occurring bush fires. Starting fires in Eurasia and North Africa was much more challenging than in warmer regions.

Fourth: Another problem in staying warm was the need to make clothing and shelters from animal skins. This required drying and treating large animal hides, making bone needles, and creating thread to sew skins together for clothes and footwear. Some people used caves for warmth, but where caves weren't available, they stitched animal skins together to make tent-like structures similar to the yurts still used today in Mongolia (Gelst, 1978; Mellars and colleagues, 1999).

Fifth challenge: The final problem for people in temperate and cold regions was food storage. When hunters killed several large mammals, they couldn't eat everything in a few days and needed to preserve meat for future use. Some animals were migratory, appearing in certain locations for short periods each year. This created opportunities to kill many animals at once, too many for immediate eating, but the extra meat could be stored. For example, reindeer migrate over long distances at specific times of the year, often following the same routes annually. Early humans learned to predict these appearances by developing knowledge of seasons and creating calendars based on watching the stars.

Another important migratory species was salmon, which travel in large numbers at certain times of year between seas and rivers. Many rivers are shallow, making it relatively easy to catch numerous salmon swimming upstream. People also caught them using nets, the creation of which presented another thinking challenge for Eurasian people. These groups needed to anticipate the arrival of these migratory animals and fish to harvest many at once.

In very cold environments, people could solve food storage problems during part of the year using natural cold areas as freezers to preserve animal carcasses. Another solution was cutting meat into thin slices for drying. This technique needed to be done properly for food to remain edible for a long time. If done incorrectly, the food could become poisonous. Some less intelligent individuals who couldn't preserve food properly died from food poisoning. This was one of many pressures that selected for higher intelligence among people living in temperate and cold environments. Miller (1991) suggested that storing food would have required creating rationing rules, which may have led to the development of basic arithmetic. Research by Binford (1980, 1985) on modern hunter-gatherers shows a connection between environmental temperature and food storage practices, the colder the environment, the more food people store for future use.

Beyond these five survival challenges in the Northern Hemisphere, another factor pushing for higher intelligence was mate selection by women. In Eurasia, women became highly dependent on men for much of the year to obtain food for themselves and their children. In Africa and southern regions, where plants and insects are available year-round, women are relatively independent of men. Even women with babies and young children can take them along when gathering food, or leave them with other women for a few hours while collecting plants. In the northern hemisphere, it was much harder or often impossible for women with infants and small children to join hunting trips that might last several days, involving killing and cutting up large mammals, then carrying pieces back to camp.

The result was that women in the northern hemisphere became dependent on men for survival. They began selecting mates who were intelligent, skilled at hunting, and good at making tools and weapons. This sexual selection meant that smarter men had more children, gradually increasing the group's overall intelligence.

Another result of women's greater dependence on men in Eurasia was that men and women developed closer psychological bonds. This explains why marriages and relationships among European and East Asian peoples tend to be more stable than those of

Africans (Lynn, 2002). Surviving in the cold northern hemisphere required an increase in general intelligence, the ability to solve problems and learn quickly, as well as improvements in basic thinking skills. Strong reasoning ability was needed to solve new challenges in cold northern regions, such as building shelters and fires, making clothing, and creating better tools for hunting and processing animals. Better verbal skills were necessary for improved communication when discussing how to solve problems, planning future activities, and teaching knowledge and cultural skills to children.

Improved visual-spatial ability was needed for planning group hunting strategies using spears, and for making more complex tools and weapons from stone, bone, and wood. Fathers taught their sons how to make good cutting tools and spearheads, with these skills learned mainly through watching and copying, similar to how apprentices learn crafts today, by observing skilled workers rather than through verbal explanations. Since hunting and toolmaking were primarily male activities, this helps explain why visual-spatial abilities are typically stronger in men than women (Linn and Peterson, 1986).

The pressures to develop higher intelligence in the temperate environments of North Africa and South Asia, and later in the subarctic regions of Europe and North Asia, affected both men and women. Men needed greater intelligence for hunting expeditions and killing large mammals, as well as making necessary tools for hunting, skinning, and butchering. This required better spatial intelligence and reasoning, abilities that tend to be stronger in men (Lynn and Petersen 1986, Lynn and Irwing 2004). Women needed to enhance their general intelligence to create and maintain fires, preserve and ration food, and keep babies and young children alive by keeping them warm.

The genetic changes occurring in North Africa and South Asia included an increase in the frequency of genes for higher intelligence (through natural selection) and probably the emergence of new genetic mutations for greater intelligence that spread throughout these populations. Most likely, the intelligence of North Africans and South Asians



(MENA) increased during both ice ages—the first between approximately 70,000 and 50,000 years ago, and the second between about 28,000 and 10,000 years ago.

The growth in intelligence after the first ice age can be seen in their more advanced tools and objects (Stringer and McKie, 1996, pp. 185-187). However, their mental abilities hadn't developed enough yet to make the shift from hunting and gathering to settled farming. Further intelligence increases happened during the second major ice age. The harsh climate during this time created important selection pressure that enlarged the brains of South Asians and North Africans to 1342 cubic centimeters and raised their average mental ability measure to 84.

This level of intelligence was enough to allow them to make the transition to settled agriculture, and later to build the first civilizations along the valleys of the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, and Indus rivers. In these places, they developed cities, writing systems, mathematics, legal systems, and all the features of civilization.

### ***Southeast Asians***

People from South Asia moved to Southeast Asia about 70,000 years ago and developed into the Southeast Asian population group. This region has a tropical and subtropical climate where winter temperatures rarely drop below 24°C. These people arrived in this region before the ice ages began, which had minimal impact in South Asia.

Interestingly, their average mental ability measure of 87 is higher than that of North Africans and South Asians (84) from whom they descended. The most likely explanation is some mixing with East Asian populations who migrated southward and bred with the local populations. There have been significant migrations of East Asians into Southeast Asia. For example, in modern Singapore, 76 percent of the population is Chinese; in Malaysia, 30 percent is Chinese; and there are substantial Chinese minorities in Cambodia and Thailand (Philippe, 1996). These East Asian people interbred with the native populations, creating mixed communities. Because of this migration and interbreeding, the people of Southeast

Asia are genetically closely related to those of southern China (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza, 1994, p.78). The Chinese genetic influence introduced some genes for higher intelligence into Southeast Asian populations, raising their average mental ability measure to 87.

This intelligence level allowed Southeast Asians to make the shift from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture, and later to build moderately advanced civilizations around 0-1,000 AD. These civilizations appeared somewhat later than those in South Asia and North Africa because the valleys in Southeast Asia were heavily forested and lacked the open plains that supported the early civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China. However, from 1000 AD onward, their cognitive abilities were not sufficient to compete economically, scientifically, or technologically with European and East Asian societies.

### ***Pacific Islanders***

Only 6,000 years ago, some Southeast Asians began moving to the Pacific Islands, where they evolved into Pacific Islanders. Their IQ of 85 is not significantly different from the 87 of Southeast Asians from whom they largely descended. This score is also higher than would be expected for populations living in mild climates, where winter temperatures rarely fall below 24°C. The explanation for this is genetic mixing with East Asians who migrated southward and interbred with the native populations. Evidence of significant East Asian ancestry among Pacific Islanders is supported by their smaller tooth size (Brace and Hinton 1981).

Unlike the Southeast Asians, Pacific Islanders made only moderate progress in shifting from hunting and gathering to settled farming, and made little advancement toward developing civilizations. The reason for this lies in their small population size, just a few thousand people scattered across distant islands separated by vast stretches of ocean. Only the Maori had a substantial territory in New Zealand, but they didn't

colonize these islands until around 800 AD and didn't have enough time to develop a large population, complete the transition to agriculture, or begin building a civilization.

### *Australian Aborigines*

Some people from South Asia and East Asia moved to the islands of the Indonesian archipelago and reached New Guinea about 65,000 years ago. Around 60,000 years ago, some of these people migrated to Australia, where they evolved into Australian Aborigines (Bradshaw, 1997). A closely related group survived in the highlands of New Guinea as the aborigines of New Guinea.

The ancestors of Australian aboriginals and New Guineans were never exposed to the harsh winters that began in South Asia with the onset of the first Ice Age about 70,000 years ago. At that time, they would have been in South Asia, Indonesia, or New Guinea, which are on or near the equator. Nor were they affected by the main ice age. As a result, Australian Aborigines and New Guineans have physical features of people who evolved in tropical and subtropical environments and never experienced temperate climates. They resemble Africans with their dark skin, flat noses, long legs, thin bodies, and large teeth. Like other groups who evolved in tropical and subtropical environments, New Guineans and Australian Aborigines could survive on plant foods, insects, and eggs year-round.

When Australian aborigines were studied in the Western Australian desert in the twentieth century, researchers found they obtained 70-80 percent of their food from plants and the rest from eggs and insects. They didn't have hunting techniques (Gould, 1969). It's estimated that the Gadio people, a New Guinean tribe, get 96 percent of their food from plants and only 4 percent from meat (Dornstreich, 1973). The availability of plant foods throughout the year, along with insects and eggs, means that aboriginal peoples in tropical New Guinea and Australia never needed to rely on meat for food and didn't face strong pressure to develop thinking skills required for hunting large animals. They also didn't need to make clothing for warmth. "Tasmanians usually were naked" (Coon 1967: 114). This

explains their lower intelligence and smaller brain size. IQ of 62 and average brain size of 1225 cc. These measurements are somewhat lower than those of Africans, with their IQ of 71 and brain size of 1,280 cc. The most likely explanation is that Africans have a much larger population where mutations for greater intelligence were more likely to appear, while Australian aborigines were far fewer in number. The highland New Guinea aboriginal population is about 250,000. The number of Australian Aborigines in the eighteenth century, when Europeans first arrived, is estimated at about 300,000. In such small populations, the chance of new mutations for higher intelligence was low, and the geographic isolation of Australian and New Guinean Aborigines prevented them from acquiring genetic mutations from other populations.

When Europeans first encountered Aboriginal people in the late eighteenth century, they found them at an early level of cultural development. "Their culture was in the Stone Age, the culture was (and still is) without pottery, without agriculture, or metals" (Cole, 1965, 82). They didn't plant seeds to grow food or raise herds of animals (Elkin, 1967). They didn't store food for future use. As Bleakley (1961: 78) described, "the native seems to have no idea of the supply against hunger." Thomas (1925, 295) calls the Aborigine "a nomad, who knows neither pottery nor metalworking, does not have domestic animals, the dingo is at most tame and he does not like cultivating the soil, he feeds on snakes and lizards, larvae, and simple vegetables every day." "Their main instruments are the stone ax and the knife, and microliths. Their weapons consist of clubs and spears. Women use the stick to uproot yam and other roots" (Cole, 1965: 83). They never invented or acquired the bow and arrow (Coon, 1967). Many anthropologists who studied Aborigines in the nineteenth century concluded they had limited cognitive abilities: "they are still only children in their mental development" (Wake, 1872, 80).

Their languages lacked numbers beyond one and two: "one and two represent the range of their numbers" (Crawfurd, 1883, 170). Their languages were also limited in abstract concepts and "poor in collective nouns" (Curr, 1886, p.20), suggesting difficulty

forming general concepts, which is a key aspect of intelligence. Aboriginal people did create primitive drawings that remain in the Jinmion Rock Shelter in the Northern Territories, dated to about 58,000 years ago (Bradshaw, 1997). Diamond (1997: 309) attributes Australian Aborigines' failure to domesticate animals or develop agriculture to "the absence of domesticable animals, the poverty of domesticable plants, and soils, and a harsh climate." But on the next page, he mentions that yams, taro, or arrowroot grow wild in northern Australia and could have been planted, and two wild grasses could have been grown for grain. The kangaroo and dingo could have been domesticated through selective breeding over generations. Australia's climate is diverse, and except for the central desert regions, it's suitable for agriculture, which Europeans successfully developed there in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Tasmanians had an even simpler cultural development than mainland Australian aborigines. Russian anthropologist Vladimir Kabo (1995: 603) wrote that they were "the only society that persists at a paleolithic stage until the beginning of European colonization." Captain William Bligh visited Tasmania in 1788 and described them as nomadic hunter-gatherers who "had miserable wigwams, in which only kangaroo skin lay on the ground," "they move from one area to another, search for food on their own passage, the search for berries and fruits and the seeds of shrubs constitute their diet" and "they usually went nude, but sometimes draped a kangaroo skin on their body" (Bowdler and Ryan, 1997, pp. 313-326). They are the only known people who never discovered how to make fire (Gort, 2002). They sometimes obtained fire from burning logs in the bush. They never invented the technique of fitting a pointed stone into wood to make a spear or an ax (Ryan, 1992).

When Europeans discovered the New Guineans in the 17th and 18th centuries, they found them at a more advanced stage of cultural development than the aborigines of Australia. The New Guineans were mainly hunter-gatherers, but practiced some agriculture, including growing yams and bananas, and had domesticated chickens. But "until the Europeans began to colonize them, the New Guineans were non-literate, dependent on stone

tools, and politically not yet organized into states, or (with a few exceptions) chieftaincies" (Diamond 1997: 299). After European colonization, some moved to villages while others remained in rural areas. Europeans built schools in towns and villages, and created boarding schools for those in rural areas, though some children in remote areas didn't attend school.

Kelly (1977) describes the lifestyle of typical rural village and tribal people in Papua New Guinea in the 1970s. They lived largely on subsistence slash-and-burn agriculture performed mainly by women. Men did some hunting, and some worked on European-run coffee plantations. Clothing consisted of skirts made from leaves and bark. Some tribes had counting systems that allowed them to count to a thousand, while others had only words for "one," "more than one," and "many."

The main reason New Guineans were somewhat more advanced than Australian Aborigines is that South Asian people reached the coastal areas of the island, bringing taro (an edible root they cultivated) and domesticated chickens. The New Guineans adopted some of these cultural innovations, but never developed anything that could be called a civilization with cities, substantial buildings, metal working, written language, or mathematics.

### ***Europeans***

Some of the people who settled in the Near East between 100,000 and 90,000 years ago moved north and around 60,000 years ago reached the Caucasus region. From there, they spread into Ukraine and then, about 40,000 years ago, into Central and Western

Europe. Other groups from Southwest Asia began to settle southeastern Europe through Anatolia. These people developed into Europeans with their light skin and, in northern Europe, their blonde hair and blue eyes. Europeans were cut off from South Asians and North Africans by the Mediterranean Sea, and to the east by the Black and Caspian Seas, the tall mountains of the Caucasus and Himalayas, and the Kara Koum Desert in Turkmenistan. During the main ice age, which lasted from about 28,000 to 10,000 years ago, the winters were much harsher than those in South Asia, with the coldest winter month reaching about  $-5^{\circ}\text{C}$ . Europe became similar to Alaska and Siberia. Northern England, Germany, Russia, and all of Scandinavia were covered with a permanent layer of ice, while the rest of Europe was cold grasslands and tundra with a few groups of trees in protected spots.

These cold winters were the main factor pushing for an increase in brain size and intelligence of Europeans, growing their brains to 1369 cc and their IQ to 99. Measuring the increase in brain size as compared to body size, Cutler (1976) figured that Europeans before the main ice age had a brain-to-body ratio of 7.3, and by the end of the ice age, this ratio grew to 8.1. When the ice covering Northern Europe melted back 10,000 years ago, Europeans with their higher intelligence were able to switch from hunting to farming. However, despite their high IQ, they couldn't build early civilizations like those created by South Asians and North Africans because Europe was still cold, covered in forests, had soil that was hard to plow, and lacked plains with rich soil deposits that could support city-based civilization and a class of thinkers (Landes, 1998). By 2500 BC, Europeans overcame these problems in the better climate of Southern Europe, where they built the first European civilizations in Crete and Greece. Around 700 BC, the Italians began to build a civilization that would grow into the Roman Empire, and by 200 AD, it covered all of Europe from the western Rhine, including the Danube Basin, the Near East, and North Africa. These early European civilizations in Greece and Rome went beyond those of South Asians and North Africans in science, math, technology, writing, philosophy, and the arts. The Western Roman Empire fell apart in 455 AD, and European culture took a step backward in the Dark

Ages that followed, but from 1000 AD onward, it came back, and Europeans became the leading people in almost every area of civilization. This is well documented by Murray (2003).

The genetic processes that raised the IQ of Europeans involved changes in the frequency of genes toward more genes for higher intelligence, and probably also by the appearance of new genetic changes for greater intelligence that spread quickly through the population. The chance of new genetic changes for better intelligence among Europeans was increased by the extreme cold stress that Europeans faced.

The lower IQ in the range of 90-94 in southern Europe is likely due to some mixing between people from the Middle East and Europeans across the Dardanelles Strait and the Aegean Sea. This created a mixed population in the Balkans whose IQ falls between that of Europeans (99) and South Asians (84). This mixing is also seen in Turkey, where the IQ of about 90 is only slightly lower than that of the Balkans.

### *East Asians*

People from South and Central Asia started settling North Asia between 60,000 and 50,000 years ago, where they developed into East Asians. The East Asians were very cut off from Europeans by the Gobi Desert to the west and from South Asians by the Himalayas to the south. The winters they faced were much harsher than in South Asia and somewhat harsher than in Europe, with temperatures in winter around -12°C during the main ice age. The reason for the colder winters compared to Europe is that North Asia forms a much larger land mass, while Europe is smaller, so Europe is warmed by the winds coming from the western Atlantic. In response to cold winters, East Asians developed cold adaptations such as a flat nose to prevent frostbite, short legs and a thick torso to keep heat in, a layer of fat under the skin which gives the skin a yellowish look, sparse facial hair in men (because thick beards would freeze and cause frostbite), and slanted eyes to reduce the glare from light reflected by snow and ice. The harsh winters



would have acted as a strong push for intelligence and raised the IQ of East Asian peoples to 105. The genetic processes involved were likely an increase in gene types for greater intelligence through natural selection, and also new genetic changes for greater intelligence resulting from chance and stress from severe cold. New genetic changes for better visual-spatial intelligence emerged in East Asians and spread through the population because they were useful for hunting, making tools, and finding their way across flat terrain. As with Europeans, most of the increase in intelligence in East Asians probably happened during the main ice age. This would have pushed for a larger brain size and must have driven their IQ up to its current value of 105. Only after the end of the last ice age did their intelligence reach the level where they could move from hunting to farming and then build the civilization of the Yellow River Valley and later civilizations in China, Japan, and Korea. From 0 to 1500 AD, the Chinese built impressive civilizations that were, in some ways, ahead of those of Europe. For example, the Chinese invented printing, paper, paper money, gunpowder, the compass, and the building of canals with locks several centuries before Europeans. In the period from 1500 to now, however, the intellectual achievements of East Asia were less impressive than those of Europeans. Historians see this as a major question for which there is no agreed answer. One factor may be that East Asians have developed a higher level of social conformity than Europeans, documented by Allik and Realo (2004), which is also shown in their low level of psychopathic personalities. A low level of social conformity and some presence of psychopathic traits seem to be ingredients in creative achievement because they reduce the worry about social disapproval and seem to help generate original ideas that are needed for the highest levels of scientific discovery. Another factor suggested by Weede and Kampf (2002), is that for much of its history, China was a single authoritarian state, and the rulers managed to suppress freedoms, including the freedom to think, more effectively than the rulers of the many European states, who were forced by competition to grant freedoms to their people.

### ***Arctic People***

Somewhere between 50,000 and 40,000 years ago, some of the early peoples of Asia moved to the far north of Asia, where they developed into Eskimos. These people evolved into a separate race because they were geographically cut off from East Asia to the south by the high Chersky, Khrebet, Khingan, and Sayan mountains, and about a thousand miles of forest north of the Love River. The northern people faced the most severe conditions with the coldest winter temperatures around  $-15^{\circ}\text{C}$  and dropping to around  $-20^{\circ}\text{C}$  during the main ice age. In response to these cold winters, Arctic peoples developed physical adaptations to cold that were more extreme than those of Asia, including flat noses, short legs, and thick torsos, the layer of fat under the skin that gives the skin a yellowish look, and the slanted eyes. These harsh winters would be expected to have pushed strongly for increased intelligence, but this did not happen because their IQ is only 91.

The explanation is that they make up only a very small population. At the end of the twentieth century, they numbered only about 56,000 compared to about 1.4 billion East Asians. Although it's impossible to make exact estimates of population size during the main ice age, there is no doubt that Asians far outnumbered the Arctic peoples. The effect of this difference in population size was that genetic changes for greater intelligence were much less likely to appear in Eskimos. The East Asians include the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, who formed a single breeding group in which genetic variants for high intelligence spread, but did not pass to the peoples of the Arctic, who were isolated by high mountains and long distances. The Arctic peoples, however, have developed a larger brain size, bigger than that of East Asians, pointing to ongoing evolutionary processes.

There is another unusual case in the intelligence of the peoples of North Asia concerning the IQ of the Mongolians and the closely related Samoyeds of northern Siberia. There is no study of the intelligence of these peoples, but their low level of cultural and technological development suggests that it is not as high as that of Asians

in eastern China, Japan, and Korea. Yet these people have also experienced several thousand years of severe winter conditions that have produced strong physical adaptations like slanted eyes, short legs, and a thick torso that has evolved in the peoples of the Arctic. The likely explanation for this unusual case is the small size of the population of these peoples (the population of present-day Mongolia is about 2.4 million) and they have been isolated from neighboring peoples by the Gobi Desert and high mountain ranges. New genetic changes for higher intelligence have not occurred and their geographical isolation has prevented them from acquiring these genetic changes from other races.

### *Native Americans*

Native Americans developed from people who moved from North Asia to Alaska through the Bering Strait and then made their way to America. The dates when these crossings happened are debated, and many have claimed they occurred 12,000 to 11,000 years ago. Against these claims, there is good reason to believe they happened much earlier, around 40,000 years ago. Evidence comes from both archaeology and genetic analysis. Archaeological findings of Native American artifacts have been dated by radiocarbon analysis at 24,000 years old in Mexico (Lorenzo and Mirambell, 1996), 30,000 years old in California (Bada, Schroeder, and Carter, 1974), 32,000 years old in northeastern Brazil (Guidon and Delibrias, 1996), 35,000 to 43,000 years old for a rock painting in the Serra da Capivara National Park in northeastern Brazil (Watanabe, Aïta, Mamaguchi, et al., 2003) and 33,000 years old at Monte Verde in Chile (Dillehay and Collins, 1998). It took these people several thousand years to travel from Alaska to South America. Archaeological evidence is supported by genetic analysis that also dates the first migration to the Americas to about 40,000 years ago (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000).

It seems very likely that early East Asians moved north about 50,000 years ago. Some traveled north to the Kamchatka Peninsula and then to Cherski, and then crossed the Bering Strait into Alaska about 40,000 years ago. Some of these people moved south until they settled all of the Americas and evolved into Native Americans, while the early Asian peoples

who stayed in North Asia evolved into East Asians. The shared and relatively recent origin of these two races is clear from a number of genetic similarities. For example, the rhesus negative blood group is rare in both races, the Diego blood group exists only in both races, and they both have similar hair texture and black hair. These two races also have special incisor teeth, and an inca bone in the skull (Krantz, 1990).

The early Asians, ancestors of the Native Americans, who lived in North Asia around 60,000 to 50,000 years ago, were exposed to cold winters, but they were not as severe as those of the second ice age between 28,000 and 10,000 years ago (Roberts, 1994). Native Americans have never been exposed to extreme cold and do not have the physical adaptations to cold weather present in East Asians. The nose is not flat but is prominent, and they do not have fully slanted eyes, nor short legs, nor a thick torso. In these features, they are similar to the Ainu, the first inhabitants of Japan. We still find some on the island of Hokkaido. They also lack the physical adaptation to cold climates because the climate of the Japanese islands was less severe than that of mainland Asia. Their IQ is 97 (K. Kura et al., 2014), lower than the average IQ of East Asians (105).

Native Americans settled in America between 33,000 and 30,000 years ago. Those from the southern United States and South America were not exposed to the harsh conditions of the main ice age, so they did not develop the physical adaptations to cold and the higher IQ of East Asians.

Also, once the ancestors of the Native Americans crossed the Bering Strait to the Americas, they found several plant-eating mammals such as mammoths, antelopes, sloths, armadillos, and bison, which were not used to being hunted by humans. Normally, predators and prey evolve together as predators become smarter to catch their prey, and prey become smarter to escape predators. But the plant-eating animals of the Americas had no experience with human hunters and were easy targets for skilled hunters who had developed over several thousand years in the harsher environment of North Asia. Native Americans found many of these plant-eaters easy to catch, and as

they moved south, they also found plant foods more readily available, so that plant foods became an important part of their diets (MacNeish, 1976; Hayden, 1991).

The development of intelligence among Native Americans can be explained as follows. The early Asians from which they evolved would have had more intelligence than South Asians, since they were exposed to the harsh climate of North Asia for about 20,000 years, between about 60,000 and 40,000 years ago. The ancestors of Native Americans also spent a few thousand years in Alaska, during which they experienced a harsh climate that increased their intelligence. Once they were in the southern parts of the Americas, the pressure to develop any further increase in intelligence would have been low because of the mild climate and ease of survival on the continent, previously unused by humans. This explains their IQ of 86, slightly higher than the 84 of South Asians, but much lower than the 105 among East Asians. This explanation provides more evidence that it is the selection pressure created by the main ice age of 28,000 to 10,000 years ago that increased the intelligence of East Asians by about 19 IQ points more than the Native Americans.

There is a problem with this explanation; the Native Americans in the northern part of North America would have been exposed to the cold winters during the main ice age, and we would expect this should have increased their intelligence. The most likely explanation for why this didn't happen was that the Native American population was quite small.

The best estimate of their early population sizes is 1 million around 400 BC in North America (Biraben, 1980). Therefore, the chance of genetic changes for more intelligence was quite small, and probably these changes either never occurred or happened in smaller numbers than in East Asians or Europeans, who had much larger populations.

Native Americans have the same pattern of mental abilities as Eskimos and Asians, specifically, strong spatial visualization skills and weaker verbal abilities. The likely explanation for this common pattern is that one or more genetic changes for superior visualization abilities appeared in early Asians around 50,000 years ago and were passed down to East Asian people, to the peoples of the Arctic, and to the Native Americans.

Genetic studies have shown that there are separate genes that determine visuospatial intelligence in addition to those that determine verbal abilities and general intelligence (Plomin, DeFries, and McClearn, 1990).

With their IQ of 86, Native Americans were able to make the shift from hunting-gathering to settled farming and then build the civilizations of the Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas. However, despite their rather impressive civilizations, the Native Americans were not equal to the Europeans from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who had little trouble defeating them in battle, taking most of their land, and killing many of them.

### ***Conclusions***

The average IQ of different ethnic groups can be explained as resulting from the different environments in which these groups lived, with, in particular, the impact of the Ice Age in the northern hemisphere having created selection pressures for greater intelligence to survive during cold winters.

There were genetic changes for more intelligence in the groups with:

Large populations

Exposure to stress due to cold conditions

Differences in IQ between racial groups explain the differences in their ability to make the shift from hunting-gathering to settled farming, the building of early civilizations, and the development of advanced civilizations during the last two thousand years. The position of those who favor environmental explanations, who claim that since humans emerged 100,000 years ago, people separated by geographical barriers in different parts of the world have evolved into several different races with clear differences in physical features, blood groups and the frequency of genetic diseases, but would somehow have the same genetic makeup for intelligence, is so unlikely that those who propose it must be completely unfamiliar with the basic principles of evolutionary biology or have a political reason to deny the importance of race. Or both.

## **Chapter 2 — Intelligence, sex and socioeconomic factors**

### **2.1 — Human races**

This section provides sufficient evidence that human races exist and are a real biological concept.

#### **Introduction**

The concept of human races has been a subject of controversy and debate since the 1950s. Recently, the term “race” has been criticized and loaded with strong negative connotations intended to undermine its legitimacy. Despite ongoing efforts to remove the phrase from scholarly and public discourse, the concept persists.

Following a long period defined by an egalitarian ideological position, the concept of human races is once again widely accepted, however typically conveyed using alternative terms such as "populations" or "genetic clusters" in contemporary scientific research.

Lysenkoism is evident in this historical example of ideological effect on scientific discourse. Examining these historical misunderstandings critically is becoming more and more important as logical scientific research on this subject resumes.

### The main human races

These genetic groups do not necessarily need to be referred to as "races." Alternatives like "populations," "genetic clusters," or "subspecies" are commonly regarded as synonymous and may be used interchangeably depending on the context,




Figure 61 : Genetic distance by main races

Figure 62 : Genetic distance by main races



even though this term is the most widely used and scientifically proven.

There is variation in the number  $n$  of races, populations, or genetic groups. You can think of a race as a branch of a tree. What is the number of branches on a tree? Only a few significant branches will be seen if you look at the massive branches close to the trunk. You come across progressively smaller branches as you approach the edge. The biological understanding of race is consistent with this paradigm. The larger



branches are usually thought of by scientists as representing races within a species. Although the precise number varies depending on the criteria applied, there are generally thought to be around a dozen such groupings in the case of *Homo sapiens*.

Through processes of speciation, a subspecies or race (or genetic cluster or population) emerges spontaneously, typically affecting a population that is geographically isolated. Long-term isolation causes evolutionary changes, such as changes in allelic frequencies and, occasionally, the appearance of novel mutations, when combined with particular environmental selection pressures and restricted gene flow. Through natural selection, these modifications aid in bringing the phenotypic into line with the surroundings. A new species may eventually emerge as a result of isolation maintained for an extended length of time. In this evolutionary process, a race is an intermediate stage. In fact, races are necessary for Darwinian evolution to occur.

Geographic isolation must last long enough to permit notable differences in allelic frequencies for a race to arise. There are instances where completely new alleles have emerged, but this is not strictly required. Epicanthic fold-causing alleles, for instance, are prevalent in East Asian populations but nonexistent in Europeans. Similarly, East Asians' skin appears slightly yellow due to the presence of a distinct subcutaneous fat layer. Qualitative differences are not necessary, though; a race can be defined by enough quantitative variation brought about by prolonged geographic isolation.

The question this raises is whether human groups have remained sufficiently isolated from one another to support the idea of separate races. How long does it take for this kind of differentiation to happen?

To be able to approach this objectively, it is helpful to look at the average time it takes for races to appear in different animal species and then contrast those times with the times that human populations have stayed apart.

Dogs, for instance, have a remarkable diversity that is unmatched among mammals, having diverged from wolves some 15,000 years ago. Not only have their physical characteristics changed, but so has their behavior: wolves have no understanding of humans, while dogs are much better at identifying human voices and gestures.

No complex behavior that is seen in dogs does not have a wolf precursor that can be detected. This does not mean that all dogs are the same, even if this is the case and no completely new mutations have been found in the canine genome. Variations in the frequencies of alleles within the gene pool give rise to differences. For instance, an American study on dog attacks from 1982 to 2006 found that pit bull terriers were responsible for about 1,100 attacks, while border collies were only involved in one attack.

Despite the fact that all dogs are members of the same species, breeds differ in both morphology and behavior, or "psychology." The number of repetitions needed to learn a new command can differ greatly between breeds, demonstrating these differences in learning ability as well. For example, a basset hound may need 80 to 100 repetitions to learn a new command and only respond correctly about 25% of the time, while a border collie may learn a new command after just five repetitions and respond correctly 95% of the time.


Overall, the time needed for subspecies to form inside a single species varies, but is usually just a few dozens of thousands of years :

**Table 47 : Time of divergence for subspecies to form**

Species	Subspecies	Estimated Timeframe
Gray Wolf ( <i>Canis lupus</i> )	Domestic dog ( <i>C. l. familiaris</i> )	14,000–40,000 years
Dingo ( <i>Canis familiaris</i> )	<i>C. f. dingo</i> (Australian wild dog)	~8,000 years

Red Fox ( <i>Vulpes vulpes</i> )	45+ subspecies (e.g., <i>V. v. vulpes</i> )	Millennia (varies)
Northern Giraffe	Three subspecies (e.g., <i>G. c. camelopardalis</i> )	Likely millennia
California Vole	<i>Microtus californicus scirpensis</i>	Thousands of years
Greenland Wolf	<i>Canis lupus orion</i>	~40,000+ years

Figure 63 : Canine phylogeny with ages of divergence



This variance in times of divergence is also shown among wolves. It took 200,000 years for the African wolf to diverge from the common ancestor of the coyote and the grey wolf. Overall, the times of divergence vary between 800,000 years and 200,000 years.

To show that the durations of isolation between racial groups are similar to those seen in other animal

species, let's go back to *Homo sapiens* and take a quick look at our evolutionary history. Not all human groups experience these periods of isolation in the same way, as shown in Figure 2. For instance, East Asians diverged from other populations more than 40,000 years ago, bringing them closer to some other groups genetically, while African populations have been isolated from other human groups for about 100,000 years.

Although domestic dogs are a well-known example, they are not always the best choice for comparison because they are the subject of human-imposed artificial selection. All it does is provide an example. On the other hand, natural speciation processes are how the majority of animal species create subspecies or races.

For example, there are nine recognized races or subspecies of giraffes:

- 1 C. peralta – Southwest Niger.
2. c. reticulata – Northeastern Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia.
3. c. Angolensis – Angola, Botswana, Namibia.
4. c. antiquorum – Chad, Central African Republic, Northeastern Cameroon.
5. c. tippelskirchi – Masai Giraffe – Central and Southern Kenya, Tanzania, Eastern Rwanda
6. c. camelopardalis – Eastern Sudan, northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
7. c. rothschildi – Uganda, North-Central Kenya.
8. c. giraffa – South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique.
9. thornicrofti – Zambia.

The wolf has 38 recognized subspecies or races.

The fox has 45 subspecies or races.

The raccoon has 22 subspecies or races.

The Bornean orangutan has 3 subspecies or races (in addition to several extinct ones).

Kangaroos have 2 subspecies or races occupying distinct territories within Australia.

In all these cases, the fundamental processes of speciation are at work. The emergence of a dozen races or subspecies within Homo sapiens does not deviate from these same evolutionary mechanisms.

### ***The emergence of human races***

Africa is where Homo sapiens first appeared some 200,000 years ago.

### ***1. People from Africa***

In equatorial Africa, Homo sapiens first appeared some 200,000 years ago.

### ***2. Middle Easterners from South Asia and North Africa***

Between 100,000 and 90,000 years ago, the first groups to leave sub-Saharan Africa made their homes in North Africa and Southwest Asia. These populations gradually developed into a separate racial group that included South Asians and North Africans, despite being geographically separated from sub-Saharan Africans by the Sahara Desert and distance.

### ***3. People from Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Cambodia, etc.***

People from South Asia moved to Southeast Asia some 70,000 years ago, where they became the region's population.

### ***4. People from the Pacific Islands***

Some Southeast Asians started moving into the Pacific Islands about 6,000 years ago. They became a unique group known as the Pacific Islanders as a result of their extended geographic isolation.

### ***5. Aborigines of Australia***

About 65,000 years ago, groups from South and East Asia traveled through the Indonesian archipelago before arriving in New Guinea. Some of them made their way to Australia some 60,000 years ago, where they developed into the Aboriginal Australians.

The Papuan Aborigines are a closely related group that still exists in the highlands of New Guinea.

### ***6. People from Europe***

Some populations moved north after having previously settled in the Near East between 100,000 and 90,000 years ago. They arrived in the Caucasus some 60,000 years ago, then moved into Ukraine and, 40,000 years ago, into Central and Western Europe. Through Anatolia, other groups from Southwest Asia started to colonize southeast Europe. Over time, these populations transformed into Europeans, who were distinguished by lighter skin and, in northern areas, traits like blue eyes and blonde hair. The Mediterranean Sea separated them from North Africans and South Asians, while the Black and Caspian Seas, the Himalayas, the Caucasus Mountains, and the Karakum Desert in modern-day Turkmenistan separated them from the east.

### ***7. People from East Asia, such as China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and others***

Between 60,000 and 50,000 years ago, populations from South and Central Asia started migrating to Northern Asia, where they developed into East Asians. They were cut off from South Asians and Europeans by geographical obstacles like the Himalayas and the Gobi Desert. These populations adapted to severe winters, which frequently reached -12°C during glaciations. These adaptations included shorter limbs, bigger torsos, subcutaneous fat layers that gave the skin a yellowish look, and flatter noses to lower the danger of frostbite (similar to Arctic peoples). Men's facial hair decreased because of the risk of frostbite, and the epicanthic fold, which forms the eye, changed to lessen exposure to cold winds.

### ***8. Arctic peoples***

Some tribes moved into Asia's far north between 50,000 and 40,000 years ago, where they developed into Arctic populations. Mountain ranges like the Chersky, Khingan, and Sayan, along with extensive forests and rivers, separated these tribes from East Asians.

They had distinctive cold-adapted features, including as flat noses, short limbs, heavy torsos, subcutaneous fat layers, and ocular adaptations, as a result of their exceptionally harsh winters, which were approximately  $-15^{\circ}\text{C}$  and dropped to  $-20^{\circ}\text{C}$  during the Würm glacier.

### ***9. Native Americans***


People who crossed the Bering Strait from Northern Asia to Alaska are the ancestors of Native Americans. Although the migration is thought to have occurred between 12,000 and 11,000 years ago, genetic and archeological data points to a considerably older date of 40,000 years ago. This earlier timeframe is supported by artifacts from Mexico that date back 24,000 years, California that date back 30,000 years, and Monte Verde, Chile that date back 33,000 years. Over time, these migrants dispersed throughout the Americas and gave rise to the Native American populations. Given that their skull morphology, shovel-shaped incisors, and hair texture are comparable, genetic evidence supports their common heritage with East Asians. Rare blood indicators like the Diego antigen and the low frequency of Rh-negative blood types are also shared by them.

The evolution of separate human races can be adequately explained by the periods of isolation, roughly 100,000 years between Europeans and Africans, and 40,000 years between East Asians and Europeans. There are obvious physical distinctions between these groupings since they originated in radically diverse settings with distinct climates and selective forces. People from one group are frequently so different from those from another that they are difficult to mistake—for example, no European is ever mistaken for an African, and vice versa.

Numerous studies contradict the common assertion that the distinctions between human populations are merely surface level (e.g., skin or hair color). Skeletal remains can frequently be used by experts to identify a person's lineage, showing that variations exist even in the structure of the bones. Variations in physical characteristics as well as characteristics like brain development and metabolic processes have been found through

genetic study. In [1.1](#), I mentioned how scientists are able to determine one's race thanks to brain structure.

Although visible qualities are the focus of biology by nature, this does not exclude the existence of invisible distinctions. Actually, the most obvious manifestation of deeper genetic diversity is frequently seen in superficial differences.



There are also subsets within a race. Consider the sub-Saharan African race as an example, on the picture above at the right.

Comparative information on the genetic variety of animals, including humans, has been gathered by John Goodrum. This heterozygosity is measured by calculating the average autosomal microsatellite. The percentage of heterozygous individuals (two alleles) on a random locus is known as the population's heterozygosity ( $H$ ). A species' genetic diversity increases with its  $H$  value, which ranges from 0 to 1 or 0–100%. The theoretically predicted heterozygosity,  $H_e$ , and the observed heterozygosity,  $H_o$ , are shown in the table below.



Data on genetic variety in animals, including humans, has been gathered by John Goodrum. When determining the average autosomal microsatellite, heterozygosity of a population (H) is the proportion of heterozygous individuals (two alleles) on a random locus. This heterozygosity is used to quantify this diversity. The higher the value of H, which ranges from 0 to 1 or 0–100%, the more genetically diverse a species is. The following table lists the heterozygosity that was observed in practice (Ho) and the theoretically expected heterozygosity (He).

**Table 48 : Heterozygosity by species**

<b>Species</b>	<b>He</b>	<b>Ho</b>
<b>Humans</b>	--	0.776
<b>Humans</b>	--	0.70–0.76
<b>Humans</b>	--	0.588–0.807
<b>Chimpanzees</b>	0.78	0.73
<b>Chimpanzees</b>	--	0.69
<b>African buffalo</b>	0.759	0.729
<b>Leopards</b>	0.36–0.80	--
<b>Jaguars</b>	0.739	--
<b>Polar bears</b>	--	0.68
<b>Brown Bears (N. America)</b>	0.26–0.76	0.30–0.79
<b>Brown bears (Scandinavia)</b>	0.709	0.665
<b>Canada lynx</b>	--	0.666
<b>Bighorn sheep</b>	--	0.564
<b>Coyote</b>	0.671	0.583
<b>Gray wolf (N. America)</b>	0.620	0.528
<b>Pumas</b>	--	0.52
<b>Bonobos</b>	0.59	0.48
<b>Dogs (42 breeds)</b>	0.616	0.401
<b>African wild dogs</b>	0.643	0.663
<b>Australian dingo</b>	0.47	0.42
<b>Wolverines (N. America)</b>	0.42–0.68	--
<b>Wolverines (Scandinavia)</b>	--	0.27–0.38
<b>Elk (North America)</b>	0.26–0.53	--

Compared to many animal species, humans have a more diversified genetic makeup.

In fact, the degree of variability among these racial subpopulations is lower for many species, including subspecies or races. Examples of genetic variety between races in several animals have been collected by Goodrum; the genetic distance is expressed in  $F_{ST}$ . Note that 0.168 corresponds to 16.8%, 0.155 to 15.5%, and so on in the table below.

**Table 49 : Genetic distance by species**

<b>Species</b>	<b><math>F_{ST}</math></b>
<b>Gray wolves (North America)</b>	0.168
<b>Pumas</b>	0.167 (mean pairwise)
<b>Humans (14 populations)</b>	0.155 (AMOVA)
<b>Asian dogs (11 breeds)</b>	0.154
<b>European wildcats (Italy)</b>	0.13
<b>Humans (44 populations)</b>	0.121 (AMOVA)
<b>Coyotes (North America)</b>	0.107
<b>Wolverines (North America)</b>	0.067 (mean pairwise)
<b>Jaguars</b>	0.065
<b>African buffalo</b>	0.059
<b>Polar bears</b>	0.041 (mean pairwise)
<b>Canada lynx</b>	0.033
<b>Humpback whales</b>	0.026 (mean pairwise)

As a result, humans are in a similar position to other animal species.

[Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994](#) studied the  $F_{ST}$  of various human populations. Some of the results are presented in the table below :

**Table 50 :  $F_{ST}$  between human populations**

	<b>Nio-Saharan</b>	<b>Japanese</b>	<b>Thai</b>	<b>English</b>	<b>New Guinean</b>	<b>Australian</b>
<b>Nio-Saharan</b>	0					
<b>Japanese</b>	0,25	0				
<b>Thai</b>	0,3	0,07	0			
<b>English</b>	0,18	0,12	0,11	0		
<b>New Guinean</b>	0,33	0,12	0,18	0,16	0	
<b>Australian</b>	0,36	0,06	0,13	0,15	0,1	0

The average  $F_{ST}$  between major human populations was 0.175, the highest among the scores we mentioned earlier. [Hall \(2022\)](#) found  $F_{ST}$  scores between breeds among cattle always lower than the one we just found for major human races. The author also mentions that “ $F_{st} = 0.1$  has frequently been taken as indicating genetic distinctiveness between breeds.”.

The Sewall Wright scale-based table that follows demonstrates once more that the Homo sapiens species, with a value of 15.5, is not different from other animal kingdom species.

**Table 51 : Sewall Wright's scale**

$F_{ST}$	<b>Extent of differentiation between populations</b>	
<b>0 – 0.05</b>	small	
<b>0.05 – 0.15</b>	moderate	
<b>0.15 – 0.25</b>	great	<-homo sapiens (>0,15)
<b>&gt; 0.25</b>	very great	

### *Counterarguments*

**1. *“There are biological differences among human populations, but they are not sufficient to justify speaking of races.”***

**Answer:** The term "race" needs to be dropped completely otherwise it applies to all biological species, including humans. As was mentioned earlier, the projected periods of isolation between East Asians and Caucasians are about 40,000 years, while between Africans and Caucasians are about 100,000 years. The idea that the genetic variety of Homo sapiens over 100,000 years would be less important than that of canines over 15,000 years is irrational.

Furthermore, despite the fact that chimpanzees and humans share 98.8% of their genetic makeup, there is no denying the significant phenotypic and cognitive distinctions between the two species. Neanderthals and humans are 99.5% alike, while women and males are even more alike. Nevertheless, these variations lead to easily identifiable disparities. Therefore, substantial phenotypic, behavioral, and physiological variance can result from even very slight genetic changes. Because human communities are so isolated from one another, there is enough variation among them to justify talking about race.

**2. *“We are 99.9% genetically identical.”***

**Answer:** Although technically accurate, this statement is disingenuous. Since there are around 3.2 billion base pairs in the human genome, a 0.1% variance still corresponds to nearly 3.2 million distinct genetic variations. These differences may have important consequences.

Despite the fact that humans and mice share more than 90% of their genes, no one contends that they are fundamentally identical. Men and women share roughly 99% of their DNA, although sex is commonly regarded as biologically relevant.

What's more, divergent DNA % between subspecies of certain animals isn't higher than the one between Europeans and Africans :

**Table 52 : Divergent DNA of certain subspecies**

Species	Subspecies compared	% divergent DNA
<b>Macaque</b>	<i>Macaca fascicularis</i> vs <i>Macaca mulatta mulatta</i>	0,40%
<b>Macaque</b>	<i>Macaca mulatta lasiota</i> vs <i>Macaca fascicularis</i>	0,34%
<b>Macaque</b>	<i>Macaca mulatta mulatta</i> vs <i>Macaca mulatta lasiota</i>	0,31%
<b>Rabbit</b>	<i>Oryctolagus cuniculus algirus</i> vs <i>O. c. cuniculus</i>	0,30%

**3. “Human variation is continuous, such as in skin color, and does not form discrete races.”**

**Answer:** Interbreeding causes constant variation, yet this does not negate the existence of races. The presence of distinct genetic populations is supported rather than contradicted by intermediate forms, much as combining red and yellow results in orange without eradicating red and yellow.

Large-scale interbreeding is actually primarily restricted to areas like South America. Population groups have stayed largely separate across Europe, Africa, and much of Asia.

According to Rosenberg et al. (2005), genetic clustering based on geographic ancestry is still discernible even with slow alterations.

***4. “Racial classification is arbitrary and based on superficial criteria.”***

**Answer:** Racial classification is based on patterns of genetic similarity generated by geographic isolation and is not arbitrary. Variations in testosterone, bone density, gestational length, puberty onset, and rates of early development, as well as higher melanin levels in Africans, are examples of genetic differences among groups that have biological importance.

Additionally, ancestry can be ascertained by labs using samples of bones, hair, blood, or other tissues. These indicators are derived from genetic characteristics that are associated with ancestral geographical areas.

***5. “The concept of race is obsolete and rooted in colonial history.”***

**Answer:** Without abandoning entire domains, science has often moved past outmoded or misapplied ideas. For instance, physics was not abandoned because it was abused to create nuclear bombs. Similarly, historical ideological abuse of racial classification should not be used as an excuse.

***6. “Denying the concept of race is necessary to fight racism.”***

This is not a scientific argument; it is a moral one. The reasoning for historical censorship, such as rejecting heliocentrism out of concern for social unrest, is mirrored in the suppression of facts for ideological reasons. "I prefer a disturbing truth to a useful error," as Goethe famously stated. Even with the best of intentions, science cannot yield to ideology.

***7. “Genes may influence physical traits but not cognitive or psychological traits.”***

**Answer:** It seems unlikely that natural selection would affect every major physiological system, digestive, cardiovascular, and immune, except the brain. Research has proven that the human brain is evolving (Meckel-Bobrov et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2005), and behavioral genetics has long shown that cognitive qualities and personality are heritable (Loehlin, 1992; Pennington, 2007).

#### 8. *“Lewontin’s argument disproves the biological basis for race.”*

**Answer:** Richard Lewontin (1974) asserted that 85% of human genetic variation occurs inside populations rather than between them, implying that race is negligible. However, A.W.F. Edwards (2003) refuted this in "Lewontin's Fallacy," demonstrating that while individual loci may be ineffective, combined study of numerous loci allows for exceedingly precise classification. Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza employed hundreds of genetic markers to define major racial groups. The power of such clustering is derived not from a single gene, but from patterns across multiple genes. Lewontin’s argument is also weak since DNA divergence being higher among individuals than among (supposed)




Figure 65 : Genetic divergence among macaques

Figure 66 : Genetic divergence among macaques

subspecies is also present among actual subspecies. The DNA divergence % between 3 macaques is usually higher than the DNA divergence between subspecies of macaques. Using Lewontin's argument is basically dismissing the concept of subspecies & races in general in biology, which is obviously blatantly wrong.

## **2.2 — Environmental factors**

Socioeconomic factors and environment are one of the most commonly used argument by egalitarians when it comes to intelligence being lower for Africans. However, this clearly is a fallacious argument that explains little to nothing of the difference between Africans and Europeans.

Here is a non-exhaustive list of evidences that socioeconomic factors do not explain the variance in IQ:

### ***Genes do not depend on socioeconomic factors***

The variation in intelligence between races is vastly explained by difference of prevalence of alleles associated with intelligence (see [1.2](#)). The genotype of an



individual is determined before birth and inherited from the parents. Some might brag about epigenetics, but epigenetics studies reversible mechanisms changing the genome. As they are reversible, they are most likely not permanent, and therefore do not explain the IQ difference. Studies show that you can train to improve your IQ by 8 to 10 points, but that gain fades away within 3 years after the test. Smoking-associated DNA methylation changes revert rapidly (within a year) after cessation [2.1.1].

### *Correlation of IQ*

The correlation of IQ increases as genetic similarity increases, regardless of whether the individuals compared were reared in the same environment. The correlation of IQ between monozygotic twins (100% identical genotype) usually is over 0.7 [2.1.2] :

**Table 53 : IQ correlations between separated MZ twins**

<b>Study</b>	<b>N pairs</b>	<b>Mean correlation of IQ</b>
<b>Newman et al, 1937</b>	19	0.71
<b>Shields, 1962</b>	38	0.75
<b>Juel-Nielson, 1980</b>	12	0.69
<b>Bouchard et al, 1990</b>	48	0.75
<b>Pedersen et al, 1992</b>	45	0.78

The same study also shows that no correlation exists between IQ of adopted separated MZ twins and the age of separation or the percent of life spent apart (respectively, 0.06 and 0.17). This suggests that growing up in the same environment early, before being adopted, had no effect on their cognitive ability.

The IQ of adopted children is consistently correlated more with characteristics of their biological parents than of their adoptive parents, although they never lived with their biological parents [2.1.2] This suggests once again that genetics play a much more preponderant role in intelligence than environment.

### *Correlation between siblings*

Another evidence that environment plays almost no role in adult intelligence is that the correlation of IQ between siblings who have no genetic proximity (one biological child and the other adopted child) does not reach higher than 0.33 during the youth and falls to around 0 at adult age :

**Table 54 : IQ correlation between non-biological siblings at certain ages**

Study	Child/young		Adult/older	
	Age	Correlation	Age	Correlation
<b>Horn, 2010</b>	8	0.33	18	0.02
<b>Willoughby, Emily A et al, 2021</b>	15	0.27	32	0.05
<b>Bouchard &amp; McGue, 1983</b>	—	0.29	—	—
<b>Loehlin et al, 1989</b>	—	0.20	10 years after	0.05

To put these numbers into perspective, separated identical twins have an IQ correlated at more than 0.7!

*Correlation between adoptive children and parents*

If environment was to play a major role in determining intelligence of an individual, we would expect adopted children to correlate their IQ much more with their adoptive parents than with their biological parents. But this is not the case at all :

**Table 55 : Parent-child IQ correlations in adoptive and matched biological families**

<b>Study</b>	<b>Correlation with biological parents</b>	<b>Correlation with adoptive parents</b>
<b>Burks, 1928</b>	0.45	0.13
<b>Leahy, 1935</b>	0.36	0.18
<b>Scarr &amp; Weinberg, 1978</b>	0.51	0.25
<b>Hom et al, 1979</b>	0.33	0.18
<b>Loehlin et al, 1989</b>	—	0.16
<b>Willoughby, Emily A et al, 2021</b>	0.35	0.10

Consistently, the correlation of adoptive children's IQ with those of their biological parents is atleast twice higher than with those of their adoptive parents, although they barely lived with their biological parents. That essentially means that the environment they grow in doesn't decrease the influence of genes in intelligence. Rather, as suggested by **Table 43**, the environment's effect totally fades away at adult age to let genes be responsible for most of their intelligence.

### ***Inheritability***

Inheritability of IQ is estimated to be of at least 0.4 or 0.5, and estimations go up to 0.8 (see [1.1](#)). This leaves less than 50% of variance that could be explained by environmental factors, which must mean that environment accounts for less than half of IQ. Therefore, the preponderant vector of intelligence is obviously genetics.

### ***Early onset of IQ differences***

The Black-White IQ gap is present by age 3 (Jensen, 1974), therefore environmental factors like education cannot account for the difference in IQ. If environmental factors like schooling or parenting were primary drivers, the gap would widen over time as environmental disparities compound. Instead, its early stability suggests innate differences.

### ***Wilson effect***

Heritability of IQ increases with age [[2.1.3](#)]. This is known as the Wilson effect. The heritability of IQ reaches a maximum of 0.80 between 18 and 20 years old, and then continues at this level well into adulthood [[2.1.4](#)]. If environment was to play a definitive & preponderant role in intelligence, we would expect the total opposite of this phenomenon.

There are also several arguments commonly used to explain how lower IQ scores among Black individuals are related to environmental factors, including :

### ***Poverty & socio-economic status***

This claim isn't supported by any empirical evidence. The IQ gap between Blacks & Whites appear at only 3 years of age, which isn't related to socio-economic status. SES typically correlates with educational access, nutrition, and healthcare, which all appear (apart from prenatal famine which I will address later) after early childhood. Furthermore, Afro-Americans in the United States are richer, in terms of GDP per

capita, than many other countries including: Estonia, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Russia, China, but they have a considerably lower IQ (85) still.


### *Prenatal famine*

[2.1.x] found no effect of prenatal famine on adulthood cognitive ability.

A study of 435 German children aged 7–9 found SES-linked differences in IQ and economic preferences, but these gaps were attributed to parental investment styles (e.g., time spent on cognitive stimulation) rather than income or education alone [2.1.6]. Now the reader might point that Black parents are less interested into their children having high studies (and high IQ). But this is simply untrue; Black parents have more expectations for their children in terms of earning a college degree. Therefore, the different parental investment styles are most likely related to the inability of the parents to educate their children well, but not due to poverty.

#### **Hispanic and black parents place high value on a college degree**

% saying it is \_\_\_\_\_ that their children earn a college degree



Note: Whites and blacks include only those who are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Survey of parents with children under 18, Sept. 15-Oct. 13, 2015 (N=1,807).

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The IQ gap doesn't shrink at all when controlling for SES, education, sex and income : the gap is still of 11 points between Whites & Blacks.

Figure 67 : IQ difference after mediating various factors

Figure 68 : IQ difference after mediating various factors

Model 2	Education	0.2902			
Model 3	Education, occupation, income, region, gender	0.3514	0.0612		
Model 4	Education, occupation, income, region, gender, race	0.4437	0.0923	38.4%	11.23

Analyses of Hispanic (n = 344) and White (n = 1219) samples ages 20-90					
		R <sup>2</sup>	R <sup>2</sup> DIFF	% of Hispanic/White effect mediated	Mean Hispanic/White difference after mediation
Model 1	Ethnicity	0.1112			11.95
Model 2	Education	0.3113			
Model 3	Education, occupation, income, region, gender	0.3713	0.0600		
Model 4	Education, occupation, income, region, gender, ethnicity	0.4090	0.0377	66.1%	6.56


Note: Mediators are the adult's level of education in 5 bands, occupation in 17 bands, income as estimated by zip code, 4 regions of the country, gender, and racial/ethnic group.  
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American national tests constitute a good evidence that socioeconomic status doesn't explain the gap in intelligence. At any family income range, Whites perform better than Blacks in the SAT. In fact, poor whites (<\$20,000 family income) perform as good (978) as very rich Black Americans (>\$200,000 family income) (981). In college admission tests, the gap of SAT in both Verbal & Maths is the same in 2006 as it was in 1987 when the inequalities between Blacks & Whites clearly dropped between those two dates (Non-hispanic whites had 1.8 times the household income of

Blacks in 1987, that ratio is of 1.6 in 2006 according to Statista). In 2003, Whites whose family income is less than \$10,000 did better in both Math & Verbal SAT than Blacks whose family income was higher than \$80,000. IQ gap remains pretty constant at each socioeconomic status (stabilizes around 0.9 to 1.0 standard deviations for 7 out of 10 parental socioeconomic status). Socioeconomic status is correlated about the same, if not less with IQ as IQ is with brain size; this highlights the fact that socioeconomics are not preponderant for IQ (Sirin & Selcuk, 2005 found a  $r = 0.24$ ).

*The Bell Curve* by Murray & Herrnstein provided dozens of comparisons of the effect of IQ & parental socio-economic status in terms of predicting certain variables, which all, without exception, points to a higher predictive force of IQ than socio-economic status. Here is a list of them:


In the white high school sample, high IQ makes a difference in avoiding poverty; in the college sample, hardly anyone was poor




Note: For computing the plot, age and either SES (for the black curve) or IQ (for the gray curve) were set at their mean values.

When it comes to poverty, IQ is a much better predictive force than parental SES.

For white youths, being smart is more important than being privileged in getting a college degree



A white mother's IQ has a significant role in determining whether her baby is underweight while her socioeconomic background does not



Note: For computing the plot, age and either SES (for the black curve) or IQ (for the gray curve) were set at their mean values.





Figure 69 : Predictive power of IQ compared to socio-economic factors

Figure 70 : Predictive power of IQ compared to socio-economic factors

Table 1  
Predictors of socioeconomic success

	<i>k</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>rw</i>	<i>p</i>	S.D. <i>r</i>	S.D. <i>p</i>	CV 95%	CI 95%
Correlation with education									
Intelligence (all studies)	59	84,828	.46	.48	.56	.12	.10	.36/.75	.53/.58
Intelligence (best studies) <sup>a</sup>	20	26,504	.49	.48	.56	.10	.07	.42/.69	.52/.59
Father's education	72	156,360	.40	.42	.50	.14	.13	.25/.75	.47/.53
Mother's education	57	141,216	.37	.40	.48	.13	.13	.22/.73	.44/.51
Father's occupation	55	147,090	.34	.35	.42	.09	.07	.27/.56	.40/.44
Parental income	13	64,165	.29	.31	.39	.10	.11	.17/.61	.33/.46
SES index	17	69,082	.41	.44	.55	.12	.10	.35/.75	.50/.60
Academic performance	27	49,646	.48	.47	.53	.09	.07	.39/.68	.50/.56
Correlation with occupation									
Intelligence (all studies)	45	72,290	.37	.36	.43	.13	.08	.28/.57	.40/.45
Intelligence (best studies) <sup>a</sup>	21	43,304	.41	.38	.45	.09	.05	.35/.54	.42/.47
Father's education	52	132,591	.27	.26	.31	.08	.06	.19/.43	.29/.33
Mother's education	40	116,998	.24	.23	.27	.08	.07	.13/.41	.25/.30
Father's occupation	57	146,343	.28	.29	.35	.10	.08	.19/.51	.33/.37
Parental income	12	60,735	.19	.21	.27	.07	.10	.07/.46	.21/.32
SES index	16	74,925	.30	.31	.38	.08	.08	.22/.54	.34/.42
Academic performance	17	54,049	.33	.33	.37	.09	.07	.23/.51	.33/.41
Correlation with income									
Intelligence (all studies)	31	58,758	.21	.16	.20	.09	.11	-.01/.40	.16/.23
Intelligence (best studies) <sup>a</sup>	15	29,152	.22	.19	.23	.08	.06	.10/.35	.19/.26
Father's education	45	107,312	.16	.14	.17	.09	.08	.01/.32	.14/.19
Mother's education	37	93,616	.13	.11	.13	.10	.07	.00/.27	.11/.16
Father's occupation	31	98,812	.16	.15	.19	.08	.10	.00/.38	.15/.22
Parental income	17	395,562	.16	.16	.20	.06	.07	.06/.33	.16/.23
SES index	14	64,711	.15	.14	.18	.07	.08	.03/.33	.14/.22
Academic performance	14	41,937	.11	.08	.09	.07	.08	-.07/.24	.04/.13

Note. *k* — number of independent samples, *N* — number of individuals, *r* — average correlation, *rw* — sample size weighted average correlation, *p* — sample size weighted average correlation corrected for unreliability and dichotomization, S.D.*r* — standard deviation of *r*, S.D.*p* — corrected standard deviation of *p*, CV 95%–95% credibility intervals of *p*, CI 95%–95% confidence intervals of *p*, SES — socioeconomic status.

<sup>a</sup>Best studies are the ones where intelligence is tested before the age of 19, and socioeconomic success is measured after the age of 29.



Intelligence (hereditary) is systemically the best predictor for socio-economic success, ahead of parental education, income, socioeconomic status.

When adjusting for IQ, earnings are the same for every race.

**Table 56 : Socioeconomic factors matched for IQ**

	<b>Blacks</b>	<b>Hispanics</b>	<b>Whites</b>
<b>IQ</b>	117	117	117
<b>SES 1</b>	26%	16%	10%
<b>IQ</b>	100	100	100
<b>Earnings</b>	\$25,001	\$25,159	\$25,546

## Education


**TABLE 4.2** Differences in the mean WAIS-R IQs earned by Caucasians and African Americans, by age, gender, education, and occupation

Variable	Verbal IQ			Performance IQ			Full Scale IQ		
	Caucasians	African Americans	Diff.	Caucasians	African Americans	Diff.	Caucasians	African Americans	Diff.
<b>Age</b>									
16-19	100.7	88.0	+12.7	100.7	87.2	+13.5	100.8	86.9	+13.9
20-34	101.5	88.4	+13.1	101.9	87.5	+14.4	101.8	87.0	+14.8
35-54	101.3	87.2	+14.4	101.4	87.2	+14.2	101.4	86.6	+14.8
55-74	101.3	87.8	+13.5	101.0	87.3	+13.7	101.4	87.0	+14.4
<b>Gender</b>									
Male	102.3	88.2	+14.1	101.9	87.9	+14.0	102.4	87.3	+15.1
Female	100.2	87.6	+12.6	100.6	86.8	+13.8	100.3	86.4	+13.9
<b>Education</b>									
0-8 Years	87.9	80.9	+7.0	91.0	81.0	+10.0	88.6	80.2	+8.4
9-11 Years	97.4	87.8	+9.6	99.5	86.4	+13.1	98.0	86.3	+11.7
12 Years	101.1	91.9	+9.2	101.2	90.9	+10.3	101.1	90.7	+10.4
13+ Years	112.1	95.8	+16.3	108.4	97.5	+10.9	111.6	95.8	+15.8
<b>Occupation</b>									
Prof./Tech./Mgr./Cler./Sales/Skilled	105.2	94.9	+10.3	104.7	93.1	+11.6	105.4	93.5	+11.9
Semiskilled and Unskilled	93.9	84.8	+9.1	96.0	85.3	+10.7	94.4	84.2	+10.2
Not in Labor Force	100.8	86.5	+14.3	100.0	85.6	+14.4	100.5	85.3	+15.2

NOTE: Diff. = Difference. Difference scores equal the mean earned by Caucasians minus the mean earned by African Americans. Data are from "Demographic characteristics and IQ among adults: Analysis of the WAIS-R standardization sample as a function of the stratification variables," by C. R. Reynolds, R.L. Chastain, A. S. Kaufman, & J. E. McLean, 1987, *Journal of School Psychology*, 25, 323-342. Copyright 1987 by Elsevier Science. Reprinted with permission.

Performance IQ is higher for Caucasians who had less than 8 years of education than for African Americans who had 12 years of education. The gap remains overwhelming at all education levels, at all ages, at all occupations.

13 years old Whites perform as good as 17 years old Blacks in mathematics national test. This is a full difference of 4 years of education.



This gap can also be seen by the average mathematics score on the NAEP by highest mathematics course. As you can see, Whites with less advanced courses completed consistently perform than Blacks who completed at least

**Table 222.40. Average National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) mathematics scale score of high school graduates at grade 12, by highest mathematics course completed in high school and selected student and school characteristics: 2019**

[Standard errors appear in parentheses]

Selected student or school characteristic	Mathematics course completed				
	Algebra I or below <sup>1</sup>	Geometry	Algebra II <sup>2</sup>	Precalculus, statistics, and trigonometry <sup>3</sup>	Calculus
1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>112 (2.0)</b>	<b>119 (0.9)</b>	<b>136 (0.5)</b>	<b>156 (0.7)</b>	<b>192 (0.9)</b>
<b>Sex</b>					
Male	115 (2.5)	122 (1.0)	137 (0.6)	158 (0.8)	196 (1.2)
Female	107 (2.9)	115 (1.4)	134 (0.7)	154 (0.7)	187 (0.9)
<b>Race/ethnicity</b>					
White	119 (2.8)	125 (1.4)	143 (0.8)	165 (0.8)	194 (1.0)
Black	± (†)	106 (1.8)	121 (1.0)	138 (1.3)	177 (2.1)
Hispanic	107 (2.9)	116 (1.1)	131 (0.7)	146 (1.0)	179 (1.3)
Asian/Pacific Islander	± (†)	± (†)	134 (2.3)	164 (1.5)	202 (1.9)
Asian	± (†)	± (†)	135 (2.3)	166 (1.6)	201 (1.9)
Pacific Islander	± (†)	± (†)	± (†)	± (†)	± (†)
American Indian/Alaska Native	± (†)	± (†)	136 (2.9)	147 (3.3)	± (†)
Two or more races	± (†)	± (†)	139 (2.8)	162 (2.5)	198 (2.9)

one more advanced course. As seen before, the IQ gap remains important even after accounting for education, income, job & socioeconomic status.

### *Environmental factors*

Several environmental factors are commonly brought to explain variance in IQ. Here I'm going to refute every argument brought on the Wikipedia page of "Race and Intelligence".

### **Lead exposure**

The first one is lead exposure. A 10 µg/dL blood lead level increase indicates a 5.8 IQ decrease. This argument however omits that child lead exposure is almost non-existent nowadays, and the IQ gap hasn't shrunk at all. In 2015/16, the blood lead levels gaps were almost non-existent among black & white children : 0.89 µg/dL for Black children vs 0.74 µg/dL for white children [2.1.5]. With proportionality, the current blood lead levels are responsible for an IQ drop, for Blacks, of 0.09 points. The blood lead level explains 0.015 of the variance in IQ points between Blacks & Whites. Unsignificant.

### **Breastfeeding**

Another factor that is commonly used is breast feeding, which supposedly increases average IQ. Most of the studies supporting this point use a sample of complete strangers, comparing their IQ, which isn't a reasonable way of determining whether breastfeeding actually increases IQ. Indeed, this could just be the follow-up of the fact that Whites have higher IQ than Blacks, and that Whites breastfeed more than Blacks; we find ourselves in circular reasoning. There is a plethora of recent studies that show breastfeeding rather has a minimal effect on intelligence. [2.1.6] found no considerable differences of cognitive performance between non-breastfed and breastfed patients by 16 years of age ( $n = 13,557$ ). [2.1.7] found no significant differences between breastfed & non-breastfed siblings in PIAT scores. [2.1.8] also found no significant results of correlation between breastfeeding and IQ.

### **Malnutrition**

A further explanation is poor nutrition. However, in the United States, whites are more exposed to poor quality diet [2.1.9] and to mortality due to malnutrition [2.1.10] than

Hispanics. Yet, the gap between Hispanics and Whites in national tests and cognitive performance remains the same, constant over decades. This suggests that, even if malnutrition plays a role, it's nowhere near being responsible for even a little of the chunk of the difference. From 2009 to 2018, Whites faced a higher death rate than Blacks due to malnutrition [2.1.11]. Overall, malnutrition has decreased much since the 1970s, and IQ gap hasn't shrunk.

**Table 57 : Nutrient deficiency by race**

Reference	Nutrient	Whites	Blacks	Hispanic
<a href="#">CDC (2012)</a>	Vitamin A	0.2	0.5	—
<a href="#">CDC (2012)</a>	Vitamin B12	2.2	1.2	1
<a href="#">CDC (2012)</a>	Vitamin C	7.1	4.3	3.1
<a href="#">CDC (2012)</a>	Vitamin D	3.6	31.1	11.3
<a href="#">CDC (2012)</a>	Vitamin E	0.6	1.2	—
<a href="#">Caldwell et al. (2011)</a>	Iodine	25.7	31.2	21.9
<a href="#">CDC (2012)</a>	Iron	9.8	4.9	11.4

Meta-analytic assessments of the effects of iron or iodine supplementation on the IQ of deficient patients have shown that whereas vitamin D is not thought to have a significant effect on cognitive capacity, iodine and iron may.

**Table 58 : Effect of supplementation on IQ on nutrient-deficient patients**

Citation	Nutrient	Effect of Supplementation
<a href="#">Sachdev et al. (2005)</a>	Iron	0.41
<a href="#">Protzko (2017)</a>	Iodine	0.53
<a href="#">Protzko (2017)</a>	Iron	0.032

We can calculate the contribution of iron and iodine to racial IQ differences using the racial difference in the rate of insufficiency and the effect sizes from supplementing studies.

Nutrient	B-W Gap in Nutrient	W-H Gap in Nutrient	Impact on IQ Gap (BW)	Impact on IQ Gap (WH)
----------	---------------------	---------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------

<b>Iron</b>	0.049	0.016	0.30135 points	0.0984 points
<b>Iodine</b>	0.055	0.038	0.43725 points	0.3021 points
<b>Iron</b>	0.049	0.016	0.02352 points	0.00768 points

We find that iron and iodine may account for up to 0.7 IQ points toward the black-white IQ divide and up to a third of a point toward the Hispanic-white IQ gap.

Crucially, it cannot be assumed that these racial disparities in nutrition have an environmental cause. Racial disparities in dietary consumption are clearly genetically based. It's common knowledge, for example, that people with dark skin have a harder time [absorbing vitamin D](#) from the sun. Since [dairy products](#) are the main source of iodine in America and the majority of [black people are lactose intolerant](#), it follows that genes and iodine are related. Thus, genetic differences across racial groups are likely to be responsible for a portion of the 0.44 point IQ gap between blacks and whites that may be brought on by variations in iodine consumption. Although the causes of iron deficiency in different groups are unclear, there is no reason to believe that they are not genetically based. We have excellent reason to believe that at least some of the nutritional explanation of racial IQ differences is ultimately genetic, but we cannot state with certainty that any of it is ultimately environmental until more study is conducted.


### **Education oriented culture**

Culture is the next environmental factor to take into account. Blacks and Hispanics are sometimes accused of falling behind whites and Asians because their cultures place less importance on education.

The first issue with this theory is that it's unclear whether or not there are racial cultural distinctions. Compared to white parents, black parents are more likely to believe that their child's college education is crucial.

### Hispanic and black parents place high value on a college degree

% saying it is \_\_\_\_\_ that their children earn a college degree



Note: Whites and blacks include only those who are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Survey of parents with children under 18, Sept. 15-Oct. 13, 2015 (N=1,807).

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In line with

this, parents

who check to see if their children have finished their homework are more common among Black and Hispanic students than among white and Asian kids.

**Table 59 : Average hours spent on homework, and % of children whose parents check homework**

Race/ethnicity	Average hours spent on homework per week by students who did homework outside of school	Percentage distribution of students who do homework outside of school by how frequently they do homework				Percentage of students whose parents <sup>1</sup> check that homework is done
		Less than once per week	1 to 2 days per week	3 to 4 days per week	5 or more days per week	
<b>Total</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>38.0</b>	<b>41.9</b>	<b>64.6</b>
White	6.8	4.2	12.9	38.6	44.3	57.2
Black	6.3	†	20.1	41.0	29.7	83.1
Hispanic	6.4	5.9	17.7	36.6	39.9	75.6
Asian	10.3	#	13.8!	18.5!	67.7	59.0
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	†	†	†	†	†	†
American Indian/Alaska Native	†	†	†	†	†	†
Two or more races	7.1	†	10.5	32.9	50.5	65.9

# Rounds to zero.

Racial disparities were repeatedly shown to favor minorities or be practically unimportant ( $d < .20$ ) on measures of family involvement in school, commitment to school, and family attitude toward education in [another survey](#).

**Table 61 : Family involvement in school by race**

**Table 4**

Cohen's d-values for Whites versus Minorities Differences

Race / Ethnicity	Motivation			Social Engagement				Self-Regulation		
	<i>AD</i>	<i>CS</i>	<i>OPT</i>	<i>FA</i>	<i>FI</i>	<i>RSP</i>	<i>SSC</i>	<i>MF</i>	<i>TBA</i>	<i>OC</i>
Hispanic / Latino	.40	.11	.09	.16	.25	.20	.39	.28	.12	.34
American Indian / Alaska Native	.35	.19	.21	.23	.23	.25	.24	.32	.21	.37
Asian	-.24	-.08	.08	-.12	.16	-.11	-.17	-.25	-.29	-.37
Black / African American	.17	-.09	-.17	-.11	-.07	.16	.35	.47	.05	.44
Two or more races	.13	-.04	.10	-.06	.07	.22	.29	.29	.12	.27

*Note.* Reference group = White. The positive values indicate Whites score higher. *AD* = Academic Discipline, *CS* = Commitment to School, *OPT* = Optimism, *FA* = Family Attitude toward Education, *FI* = Family Involvement, *RSP* = Relationships with School Personnel, *SSC* = School Safety Climate, *MF* = Managing Feelings, *TBA* = Thinking before Acting, and *OC* = Orderly Conduct.

### Iodine deficiency

Iodine deficiency is supposed to cause a 12 IQ points drop. Women have a much higher prevalence of iodine deficiency than men [[2.1.12](#)], yet there isn't a big gap in IQ between them. Several studies showed no association between iodine status and cognitive ability like [[2.1.13](#)]. The cherry on the cake is that Blacks have a higher urinary iodine rate than Whites [[2.1.14](#)], and iodine deficiency is defined as urinary iodine  $< 100 \mu\text{g/L}$  by the World Health Organization.

Overall, about health factors, these factors logically cannot account for the variance in IQ. They're either outdated, or are responsible for a minimal effect on IQ. Logically speaking, if health factors were determinant for variance in intelligence, we would observe a drastic shrink in IQ gaps, and overall a drastic increase in global IQ. But this is not the case; IQ gaps between races remain constant since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.




Figure 71 : General intelligence by gender

Figure 72 : General intelligence by gender

## 2.3 — Sex differences in IQ

There are cognitive ability differences between men and women.

### IQ tests worldwide

A meta-analysis of 42 studies related a male advantage in WAIS, with a median advantage of +0.24 standard deviations, which translates to a 4 IQ points gain (given that a standard deviation of IQ equates 15 IQ points).

Table 63 : IQ difference Male/Female

Country	Test: N	Full Scale IQ d	Reference
Brazil	WAIS-III: 3494	.07	Victora et al., 2015



<b>Canada</b>	WAIS-III: 1104	.11	Longman et al., 2007
<b>Chile</b>	WAIS-IV: 887	.20	Diaz & Lynn, 2016
<b>China</b>	WAIS-R:1406	.24	Dai et al., 1991
<b>China</b>	WAIS-R:1979	.33	Lynn & Dai, 1993
<b>China</b>	WAIS-R:120	.43	Yao et al., 2004
<b>China</b>	WAIS-111:888	.29	Chen & Lynn , 2020c
<b>China</b>	WAIS IV:311	.62	Gao et al., 2015
<b>Canada</b>	WAIS 111:1104	.11	Longman et al., 2007
<b>Denmark</b>	WAIS:62	.21	Nyborg, 2005
<b>Germany</b>	WAIS-IV:1425	.21	Daseking et al., 2017
<b>Italy</b>	WAIS-R:1168	.45	Tommasi et al., 2015
<b>Japan</b>	WAIS-R:1402	.22	Hattori & Lynn, 1997
<b>Netherlands</b>	WAIS:2100	.27	Stinissen, 1977
<b>Netherlands</b>	WAIS 111:522	.24	Van der Sluis et al, 2006
<b>Romania</b>	WAIS:100	.44	Dumitrascu, 1999
<b>Roma</b>	WAIS:100	.44	Dumitrascu, 1999
<b>Russia</b>	WAIS:296	.13	Grigoriev et al, 2016
<b>Russia</b>	WAIS:1800	.22	Grigoriev et al, 2016
<b>Scotland</b>	WAIS-R:200	.39	Lynn, 1998
<b>South Korea</b>	WAIS-IV:1228	.31	Lynn & Hur, 2016
<b>Spain</b>	WAIS 111:1369	.24	Colom et al., 2002
<b>Sudan</b>	WAIS-R:330	.31	Sulman et al, 2018
<b>Sudan</b>	WAIS-R:319	.21	Sulman et al, 2018
<b>Taiwan</b>	WAIS 111:888	.29	Chen & Lynn, 2021a
<b>Taiwan</b>	WAIS 1V:1105	.35	Chen & Lynn, 2018
<b>United States</b>	W-Bell:235	.59	Strange & Palmer, 1953
<b>United States</b>	W-Bell:153	.20	Norman, 1953
<b>United States</b>	W-Bell:392	.29	Goolishian & Foster, 1954
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:1700	.10	Matarazzo, 1972
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:279	.40	Boor, 1975
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:588	.17	Horn et al., 1979
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:521	.13	Turner & Willerman, 1977
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:649	.09	Doppelt & Wallace, 1955
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:649	.09	Doppelt & Wallace, 1955
<b>United States</b>	WAIS:100	.33	Shaw, 1965
<b>United States</b>	WAIS-R:230	.27	Arceneaux et al., 1996
<b>United States</b>	WAIS-R:206	.28	Ilai & Willerman, 1989
<b>United States</b>	WAIS-R:1880	.15	Matarazzo et al., 1986
<b>United States</b>	WAIS-III: 2450	.18	Irwing, 2012
<b>United States</b>	WAIS IV:2200	.15	Piffer, 2016

<b>United States</b>	WAIS 111: 850	.04	Du Pont et al., 2020
<b>Median</b>		.24	

### Raven's progressive matrices

In 32 of the 33 studies used, men have higher score. The median effect is 0.3, so a 4.5 IQ points gain.

**Table 64 : Sex differences (ds) for the Progressive Matrices in general population**

<b>Country</b>	<b>N:M</b>	<b>N:F</b>	<b><i>d</i></b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>Britain</b>	300	240	<b>.29</b>	Heron & Chown, 1967
<b>Hungary</b>	250	250	<b>.17</b>	Szegedi, 1974
<b>Israel</b>	100	100	<b>.31</b>	Guttman, 1974.
<b>Hawaii</b>	939	971	<b>.37</b>	Wilson et al., 1975
<b>Taiwan</b>	225	225	<b>1.33</b>	Adair & Pollitt, 1985
<b>Belgium</b>	850	979	<b>.31</b>	Deltour, 1993
<b>Belgium</b>	101	174	<b>.38</b>	Deltour, 1993
<b>USA</b>	63	80	<b>.16</b>	Sitkei & Michael, 1996
<b>Belgium **</b>	564	802	<b>.21</b>	Dufouil et al., 1997
<b>Brazil</b>	1921	741	<b>.28</b>	Campos, 1999
<b>USA**</b>	92	114	<b>.31</b>	Salthouse, 2001
<b>Scotland</b>	210	217	<b>.11</b>	Deary et al., 2004
<b>Scotland</b>	230	313	<b>.29</b>	Deary et al., 2004
<b>Guatemala</b>	683	786	<b>.52</b>	Martorell et al., 2005
<b>Brazil**</b>	104	265	<b>.49</b>	Rossetti et al., 2009
<b>Pakistan</b>	997	1019	<b>.04</b>	Ahmad et al., 2008
<b>Morocco</b>	92	110	<b>.38</b>	Sellami et al., 2010
<b>Spain</b>	101	157	<b>.15</b>	Diaz et al., 2010.
<b>Sudan</b>	115	125	<b>.12</b>	Khaleefa et al., 2010
<b>N. Zealand</b>	143	187	<b>.22</b>	Fletcher & Hattie, 2011
<b>Argentina</b>	374	390	<b>-.02</b>	Flynn, 2012
<b>Libya</b>	300	300	<b>.37</b>	Al-Shahomee, 2012
<b>Libya</b>	260	260	<b>.36</b>	Al-Shahomee & Lynn, 2012
<b>Brazil**</b>	454	534	<b>.10</b>	Flores-Mendoza et al., 2013
<b>Brazil**</b>	161	386	<b>.65</b>	Braga et al., 2014
<b>Serbia</b>	62	74	<b>.27</b>	Čvorović & Lynn, 2014
<b>Romania*</b>	618	823	<b>.18</b>	Iliescu et al., 2016
<b>Australia**</b>	128	327	<b>.30</b>	Waschl et al, 2016

<b>Brazil**</b>	381	216	<b>.43</b>	Flores-Mendoza et al., 2016
<b>USA***</b>	393	503	<b>.21</b>	Van der Linden et al., 2017
<b>Poland**</b>	218	218	<b>.12</b>	Gignac & Zajenkowski, 2019
<b>USA***</b>	346	399	<b>.05</b>	Du Pont et al., 2020
<b>Portugal</b>	250	272	<b>.34</b>	Queiro-Garcia et al., 2021
<b>Median</b>	—	—	<b>.30</b>	—

\*Progressive Matrices Plus; \*\*Advanced Progressive Matrices; \*\*\* Advanced Progressive Matrices Short Form

### Brain size

Boys and girls have similar IQs up until the age of 15. Males' average IQ rises after the age of 16, with an advantage of about 4 IQ points by adulthood.

The reason for this is that male brain size increases relative to female brain size from the age of 16, as shown by Lenroot, Gogtay, Greenstein, Wells et al. (2007) and Lenroot & Giedd (2010), and neurological studies have shown that white matter in the brain continues to grow more in males than in females from mid-adolescence (Simmonds, Hallquist, Asato & Luna, 2014; Wang, Adamson, Yuan, Altaye, Rajagopal, Byars & Holland, 2012). This thesis is supported by studies showing that males have later physical maturation (Hills & Byrne, 2010), behavioral maturation (Greenstein, Blachstein & Vakil, 2010; Keulers, Evers, Stiers & Jollies, 2010; Yurgelun-Todd, 2007), brain maturation (De Bellis, Keshavan, Beers et al., 2001), and brain development as demonstrated by neuroimaging by Bramen, Hranilovich, Dahl et al. (2010) and Tiemeier, Lenroot, Greenstein et al. (2010).

**Table 65 : Female - male differences by age**

Age	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	Reference
<b>Female per cent brain size</b>	92.2	92.5	92.6	91.5	91.2	89.2	—	—	—	86.6	Roche & Malina, 1983; Rushton, 1992
<b>Sex diffs brain size cc</b>	110	120	127	133	140	150	160	170	—		Giedd et al., 2012

<b>US: AR</b>	–	–	0	.04	.09	.10	.16	–	–	–	Feingold, 1988
<b>UK: AR</b>	–	–	.06	.08	.08	.19	.25	–	–	–	Lynn, 1992
<b>Spain: AR</b>	.05	.20	.14	.31	.32	.38	.36	–	–	–	Colom & Lynn, 2004
<b>US: whites: g</b>	–	–	–	-.03	.26	.29	.17	.23	.32	.41	Meisenberg, 2009
<b>US: blacks: g</b>	–	–	–	-.11	.07	.05	.07	.00	.10	.10	Meisenberg, 2009
<b>UK: g</b>	-.06	–	–	–	.12	–	–	–	–	–	Lynn & Kanazawa, 2011
<b>US:DAT</b>	-.80	–	–	.60	–	-.3	–	–	–	–	Keith et al., 2011
<b>US: CogAT</b>	-.03	-.01	–	-.01	–	.03	–	–	–	–	Lakin, 2013
<b>US: whites: g</b>	.08	.10	.02	.16	.23	.26	–	–	–	–	Nyborg, 2015
<b>US: blacks: g</b>	-.13	-.18	-.04	-.19	-.34	.43	–	–	–	–	Nyborg, 2015
<b>US: Hispanics:</b>	.02	.11	-.08	.24	-.23	.30	–	–	–	–	Nyborg, 2015
<b>Spain: IQ</b>	.07	.01	.08	.19	.27	.25	.32	–	–	–	Arribas- Agula et al., 2019
<b>Spain: Verbal ability</b>	-.03	-.07	-.06	.05	.15	.09	.15	–	–	–	Arribas- Agula et al., 2019

Row 1 gives the cranial capacity of females as a % of that of males. Cranial capacity of females as a percentage of that of males declines from the ages of 15 to 17 (data from Roche & Malina, 1983) and declines further at age 21+.

Row 2 gives the differences in brain size in cubic centimetres between males and females obtained by magnetic imaging : the differences increase over the ages 12 through 19.

Rows 3, 4, and 5 give Abstract Reasoning data from the Differential Aptitude Test for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain, all showing a male advantage from ages 14 through 18.

Row 6 gives results for 15- to 21-year-old whites for the ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery) scored for g, showing a female advantage at age 15 followed by increasing male advantages from age 16 reaching .41d (6.15 IQ points) at age 21.

Row 7 gives results from the same data for Blacks, also showing a female advantage at age 15 followed by male advantages from age 16 but these are very small and not statistically significant (smaller sex differences in intelligence among Africans, see below the evolutionary explanation of sex differences and sex differences).

Row 8 gives the differences in g for a UK longitudinal sample, showing girls at age 12 had a significantly higher score than boys but at age 16 the same boys had a significantly higher score than girls.

Row 9 gives results for the American DAT averaged from Gv (visual-spatial) (verbal), Glr (free recall memory), Gsm (short-term memory) and Gs (processing speed), showing girls scored higher at age 12 (also at ages 5-7 and 8-10) while boys scored higher at ages 14-15 and 16-17.

Row 10 gives results for the American CogAT averaged from verbal, quantitative and non-verbal reasoning ability, showing girls scored higher at age 12, 13 and 15 while boys scored higher at age 17.

Rows 11 through 13 give results for the NLSY 97 (National Longitudinal Study of Youth) scored for g for whites, blacks and Hispanics, showing generally small sex differences from ages 12 through 15 but significant male advantages at age 17.

Row 14 gives results for g (general intelligence) for Spain, showing no significant sex differences at ages 12 through 14, and increasingly higher scores by boys from ages 15 through 18.

Row 15 gives results for verbal ability for Spain, showing girls scored higher at age 12. In a Spanish sample there was a female advantage in 12- through 14-year-olds and male advantages from the age of 15 through 18 years of .05d increasing to .15d.

To calculate the magnitude of the higher adult male IQ predicted by the larger male brain size, I took Ankney's figure of the male-female difference in brain size expressed in standard deviation units of  $0.78d$  and Willerman et al.'s (1991) estimate of the correlation between brain size and intelligence of 0.4. These figures would give adult males a higher average IQ of 4.7 IQ points ( $0.78 \text{ multiplied by } 0.4 = .31d = 4.68 \text{ IQ}$ ). This accurate theoretical IQ advantage supports the point that brain size is an accurate predictor of IQ and that sex differences in intelligence exist.

### **Evolution of sex differences in intelligence**

In infants aged 1 to 4, girls had better average intellect than boys. Between the ages of 6 and 15, there is almost no difference in intelligence between men and women. At the age of 16, males begin to have higher average intelligence than females, extending their advantage by 4 IQ points in adults.

Girls have higher intelligence than boys in infancy because they mature earlier, as shown by Lenroot, Gogtay, Greenstein et al. (2007) in a longitudinal study of sex differences in brain development using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of 387 subjects aged 3 to 27 years, who found that cerebral volume peaked at age 10.5 in females and 14.5 in males. The most likely evolutionary explanation for girls' earlier maturation is because it is advantageous for them to begin reproducing in early puberty, when they are mature enough to conceive and care for children. Between the ages of 6 and 15 years, boys' larger brains compensate for their later maturity, resulting in essentially no difference in average intellect between males and females at these ages.

The likely evolutionary explanation for males' higher intelligence after the age of 16 is that in all mammalian group-living species, males compete for territory or high status in hierarchies to secure access to females and reproduction, as detailed by Wynne-Edwards (1962) and Wilson (1975). Greater intelligence would have helped to male competition success during hominid development by allowing males with

higher intelligence to build effective alliances, demonstrate leadership characteristics in hunting and combat, and dominate other males with lower intelligence.

Males' continued maturation and increasing intelligence in late adolescence and into adulthood beginning at the age of 16 would have allowed them to gain the experience and skills needed to work their way up the dominance hierarchies and achieve sufficient status to gain access to females. In contrast, ladies are not required to learn these abilities. The benefit of intelligence is evident in modern civilizations, where it is a substantial determinant of rank measured by socioeconomic level, as reported in the United States by Jencks (1972), who found a correlation of 0.46, and in Britain by Nettle (2003) and Saunders (2012, 2019).

Another possible evolutionary explanation for men's higher average intelligence than women is sexual selection, which occurs when females prefer and accept males with high intelligence as mates because they believe they will be good providers for themselves and their children. Charles Darwin (1871) proposed this hypothesis, known as sexual selection, to explain why men are larger and stronger than females in most animals. Darwin argued that men must compete with each other for mates, and females prefer those that are larger, stronger, and, in humans, more clever, resulting in "man has ultimately become superior to woman". Geoffrey Miller (2000) expounded on this idea, writing: "Male nightingales sing more, and male peacocks present more striking visual ornamentation. Males are more likely to engage in public speaking, singing, and creating art and architecture. Men write more novels. Men deliver more lectures. Men ask more questions following presentations. "Men dominate mixed-sex committee discussions." He claims that educated males have effectively employed these methods to attract females.

Males have higher average IQ than females, and Europeans outperform Sub-Saharan Africans in this regard. Jensen and Johnson (1994) demonstrated this by reporting that 7-year-old white males had a 1.1 higher WISC IQ than girls, while black girls had a 0.6 higher IQ than boys. Meisenberg (2009) verified this disparity, reporting that among 20-

and 21-year-olds, the white male advantage was  $.356d$ , whereas the black male advantage was only  $.10d$ . Nyborg (2015) verified the difference, reporting a female advantage of  $0.24d$  on  $g$  in black 16-17 year-olds and a male advantage of  $0.30d$  in whites. In the meta-analysis by Hyde, Fennema, and Lamon (1990), the similar gap in mathematical problem-solving ability was revealed, with blacks scoring  $.23d$  and whites scoring  $.41d$ . Rushton (1992) found that whites have a larger male-female differential in brain size than blacks, which is consistent with these findings. He observed that for enlisted military soldiers, the male-female difference in brain size was 204 cc. in whites and 189 cc. in blacks, while for officers it was 210 cc. in whites and 197 cc. in blacks.

The likely evolutionary explanation for the greater advantage of males over females in intelligence in Europeans than in sub-Saharan Africans is that in sub-Saharan Africa's tropical and subtropical evolutionary environment, black males had only a weak need for greater intelligence than females because plant and insect foods were available throughout the year, and females could collect these for themselves and their children without the assistance of males. As a result, males faced only weak selection pressure to gain the higher intelligence required to hunt for animal meals. When early humans arrived in Europe, they discovered that plant and insect supplies were unavailable in the winter and spring, forcing males to hunt huge animals to feed themselves, their females, and their children. Hunting large animals requires more cognitive effort than gathering plant and insect feeds, so European males were under selective pressure to have higher intellect than females. Humphreys, Lin, and Fleishman (1976) confirmed this explanation by demonstrating that white men have much superior hunting skill than white females when compared to black males and females.

If the theory is right, North East Asians should have a higher male IQ advantage than Europeans because they grew up in a harsher, more intellectually demanding



environment. This prediction is supported by the gender disparities in Wechsler Full IQs in the 45 adult samples shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. Eight of these samples were North East Asians (four from China, two from Taiwan, one from Japan, and one from South Korea), and the median male advantage was  $.31d$ . The remaining thirty-seven Europeans had a median male advantage of  $.21d$ .

	Sex differences	References
<div>BRAIN</div> <div>Fœtus</div> <div>At Birth</div> <div>Adulthood</div> <div>Adulthood</div> <div>Number of neurons</div> <div>Brain maturation and development</div>	Bigger male brain	Wheelock et al. (2019)
	Bigger male brain ~12% in weight	Swaab & Hoffman (1984)
	Larger male brain by ~12% in volume	Ruigrok et al. (2014)
	Larger male brain by ~1.4SD (92% of men have larger brains than women)	Ritchie et al. (2018)
	16% more neurons in men	Pakkenberg & Gundersen (1997) Escorial et al. (2015)
	Males have later physical maturation, behavioral maturation, brain maturation and brain development shown by neuroimaging	Greenstein et al. (2010) Simmonds et al. (2014) Wang, Adamson et al. (2012)
<div>REACTION TIME</div> <div>(correlated +0.4 with intelligence)</div>	Quicker for males, about ~0.35SD	Archer's (2019 meta-analyse)
<div>NERVE CONDUCTION VELOCITY</div> <div>(correl. +0.37 with intelligence)</div>	Quicker among males by 4%	Reed, Vernon & Johnson (2004)
	<div>INTELLIGENCE</div>	
<div>Up to 4 years</div> <div>5 to 15 years</div> <div>From 16 years old</div>	Slight female advantage Up to 4 years Quite equal intelligence Male advantage by 4-5 IQ points -> 4.5 IQ points male advantage on progressive matrices -> 4 IQ points male advantage on Wechsler Tests -> 4 IQ points male advantage on WAIS full scale -> Male have higher g	Meta-analyse, Lynn (2021)
<div>IQ &gt; 130</div> <div>IQ &gt; 145</div>	Male/Female ratio ~ 2/1 (example: Mensa members) Male/Female ratio ~ 4/1 ➔ As IQ goes up, women proportion goes down (glass ceiling effect)	
<div>RACE DIFFERENCES</div>	-Smaller brain size differences and intelligence differences among African men and women, about 2 IQ points -> seems to lead to smaller gender gap (per example among Afro-Americans) -Larger brain size differences and intelligence differences among East-Asians men and women, about 6-7 IQ points -> larger gender gap.  Gender earnings ratios and wage gaps by race and ethnicity, 2019	
	<div><div><div>10.0%</div><div>Blacks</div><div>(Sexual difference of about 2 IQ points)</div><div>90.0%</div></div><div><div>21.3%</div><div>Whites, non-Hispanics</div><div>(Sexual difference of about 4-5 IQ points)</div><div>78.7%</div></div><div><div>24.9%</div><div>Asians</div><div>(sexual difference of about 6 IQ points)</div><div>75.1%</div></div></div>	


## 2.4 — IQ is a good intelligence measure

I've heard plenty of times that IQ is a pseudoscience and has no validity in reality in biology. This section aims at disproving this obviously false claim. I'll explore many of the biological correlations of IQ, showing that it has a real validity and is correlated with a bunch of biological markers related, factually speaking, to intelligence.

### *Brain size*

Brain size has a positive correlation (+0.45) with IQ. The distribution of brain size is Gaussian, similar to that of general intelligence (g) (see figure below). A +0.45 association between general intelligence (IQ) and brain size indicates that:

1. A 1 SD increase in brain size (about 120 grams in mass) results in an average IQ rise of 0.45 SD (7 IQ points).
2. People with an IQ of 115 (1 SD above average) have an average brain size that is 0.45 SD larger than typical (approximately 55 grams heavier).



In green is the cranial capacity of African Americans and in white is the one of Europeans.

This association is not confined to humans: mice with larger brains are smarter and can navigate a labyrinth more rapidly.




Figure 73 : Head size of Cambridge students

University students have a larger brain (on average), as their IQ is much higher than the national average. Among university students, those who finish with distinction have a larger brain, and those who graduate with great distinction have a bigger brain than those who finish with distinction. This is simply predictable given the positive association between intelligence and brain size.

Figure 74 : Head size of Cambridge students

Figure 75 : Cranial capacity of geniuses

Figure 76 : Cranial capacity of geniuses

Name.	Cranial Capacity in Cubic Centimeters.	Name.	Cranial Capacity in Cubic Centimeters.
Thos. Browne.	1955	Père Prosper, theologian.	1680
La Fontaine, poet.	1950	Hett, physician.	1675
Bésard, banker.	1940	Unterberger, père, painter.	1665
Sestini.	1850	“ R. P. X.,” theologian.	1663
Blumauer, poet.	1846	Jean Kollar, poet.	1655
Voigt, mathematician.	1826	Père Mallet, theologian.	1650
Blanchard, aeronaut.	1793	Lacôtur.	1630
St. Ambrosius, theologian.	1792	“ Homme de peine.”	1620
Kreibig, violinist.	1785	Thouvenin, artistic bookbinder.	1615
Junger, poet.	1773	Choron, musician.	1608
Gauthier, pedagog.	1770	Petrarch, poet.	1602
Arnoldi, orientalist.	1750	Bünger, anatomist and surgeon.	1600
Cassaigne, jurist.	1750	Hamerling, poet.	1583
Duc de Bourgogne.	1750	Kreutzer, musician.	1579
Beethoven, composer.	1750	Sallaba, physician.	1575
Volta, physicist.	1745	Juvenal des Ursins, historian.	1530
Kant, philosopher.	1740	von Mosheim.	1530
Safarjik.	1738	Gen. Wurmser.	1530
Frère David, mathematician.	1736	Cerachi, sculptor.	1520
Jourdan, Marshall of France.	1729	Alxinger, poet.	1507
De Zach, astronomer.	1715	Fusinieri, physicist.	1502
von Rheinwald, scholar.	1710	Heinse, poet.	1500
Chenovix, chemist.	1709	Haydn, poet.	1500
Carême, cuisinier.	1708	Dante, poet.	1493
Descartes, philosopher.	1706	Bach, composer.	1480
Brunacci.	1701	Scarpa, surgeon.	1455
Gall, phrenologist.	1700	Foscolo, poet.	1426
Unterberger, fils.	1692	Leibnitz, philosopher.	1422
Boileau, poet.	1690	Raphael, painter.	1420
Robert Bruce.	1690	d’Arles, antiquary.	1420
Bigonnet.	1685	de Bussuejole, bishop.	1372
Bordoni.	1681	Philip Meckel.	1320
		Average 1650	

Some cranial capacities of famous

geniuses...

It should be emphasized that very clever people can have smaller brains than average; the association is not one-to-one.

How can I interpret a +0.45 correlation between general intelligence and brain size?

Consider a safe packed with jewelry and bank notes totaling 5-10-20-50-100-200-500 euros. In the blind, use a little shovel to extract approximately 1200ml of content from this chest. You repeat the operation ten times. You perform ten blind shots in the safe with a larger 1400ml shovel.

What are you noticing?

1. An intake of 1400ml has a higher average value than 1200ml.

2. This is not always the case: a 1200 ml take, for example, may be extremely expensive due to its high concentration of 500 notes and gems. In contrast, a catch of 1400ml may be of less value because it is more dense in 5 and 10 euro notes.

### ***Myopia & hyperopia***

Myopes have an IQ that is around 7.5 points higher than the average. Myopia is recessive and homozygous. The myopia genes appear to reside on chromosome 11. The eyes are extensions of the brain. It appears that the myopia genes affect both brain and ocular size. Myopic persons have larger brains and eyes than typical. This is a feature of myopia: The eyes are too large, therefore the image is produced in the front of the retina, which must be adjusted with biconcave spectacles.

Heterozygote carriers of a single myopia gene are not myopics and do not use glasses; yet, they experience some intellectual benefit that is less pronounced than homozygous myopia.

Conversely, hyperopia (eyes too small) is correlated negatively with intelligence.

→Positive genetic correlation between intelligence and myopia

Figure 77 : Correlation between intelligence and health outcomes

Figure 78 : Correlation between intelligence and health outcomes

Table 1. Genetic correlations (rg, with *P* values) between intelligence and health outcomes from Hill 2018 [23], Davies 2018 [24], and Savage [25].

Phenotype category	Phenotype	Hill, 2018 [23]		Davies, 2018 [24]		Savage, 2018 [25]	
		rg	<i>P</i>	rg	<i>P</i>	rg	<i>P</i>
Physical and physiological	Longsighted-ness			-0.21	2.04 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>		
	Shortsighted-ness			0.32	1.92 × 10 <sup>-24</sup>		

→Negative genetic correlation between intelligence and hyperopia

*Brain electrochemical activity*

IQ correlates with EEG wave complexity and alpha wave frequency.

The evoked potentials were recorded using EEG. The length of the first four brain waves, E1 through E4, is used to calculate the score (see image below). This score is lower in bright persons and higher in less intellectual individuals.

In other words, brilliant people transmit information faster than less intellectual people.





Figure 7.1

Figure 79 : EEG by IQ

Figure 80 : EEG by IQ

## ***Brain            Glucose***

### ***Metabolic Rate***

The brain's primary energy source is glucose, and its consumption patterns reveal important insights about cognitive efficiency and capacity.

Research shows a strong negative correlation (-0.7 to -0.8) between IQ and glucose metabolic rate (GMR) when performing identical cognitive tasks. Higher IQ brains consistently consume less glucose than lower IQ brains for the same work, demonstrating superior neural efficiency. Like powerful computers that process information using fewer system resources, high IQ brains operate in a lower glucose regime while low IQ brains reach metabolic saturation more quickly.

The relationship reverses when tasks are calibrated to subjective difficulty levels. When defining "difficult" as achieving 75% success rate, lower IQ individuals might successfully retain 6 digits while higher IQ individuals handle 7 digits at the same perceived difficulty. Under these conditions, IQ correlates positively with GMR because higher IQ brains can access greater metabolic capacity when needed.




We can make an analogy with a computer. A weak processor running at 80% capacity accomplishes smaller tasks with lower speeds and less power consumption. A powerful processor at 80% capacity tackles more complex tasks, achieving higher processing speeds through greater power draw. The key distinction is that powerful systems have higher ceilings.

Higher IQ brains demonstrate both superior efficiency (less glucose for identical tasks) and superior capacity (higher potential GMR for challenging tasks). They represent more effective neural architectures with greater metabolic range and processing power.

***Nerve conduction velocity (peripheral nerves and cranial nerves)***

Correlation of +0.4 between nerve conduction velocity and IQ.



A light flashes in front of the eyes, and a device detects how long it takes for the message to reach the rear of the brain's visual regions. This speed has a positive correlation (+0.4) with IQ. Improved nerve myelination in high-IQ individuals.

Figure 81 : Nerve conduction velocity and IQ


Figure 82 : Nerve conduction velocity and IQ

### *Simple reaction time*

Reaction time serves as a fundamental measure of central nervous system efficiency, correlating significantly with IQ scores. Both metrics reflect the speed and effectiveness of basic neural information processing.

Participants face a simple light stimulus and press a button as quickly as possible when it illuminates. This basic task measures the nervous system's capacity for elementary information processing, with results recorded in milliseconds.

The data shows clear distinctions between cognitive groups. Individuals with SAT score  $\leq 1280$  (green) demonstrate slower reaction times compared to those with SAT score  $\geq 1560$  (purple) (very high IQ individuals), who exhibit consistently faster responses.



Lower IQs have longer reaction times with greater variance (SDRT), since from time to time they produce much slower reaction times, which increases the mean and the variance.




Figure 4.2: Distribution of mean reaction times of individuals with normal and




Figure 9.8: SRT and CRT plotted as a function of IQ in deciles from lowest (1) to highest (10). (Data from Der & Deary, 2003, Table 2.)




Figure 83 : Reaction times by IQ

Figure 84 : Reaction times by IQ

Simple reaction times are faster between 20 and 30 years, in agreement with the highest intelligence and the highest brain size of this period of life.

### ***Brain pH***

Brain pH influences neural conduction velocity, with higher pH levels speeding electrical signal transmission across neurons. This is a crucial mechanism that influences how effectively our central nervous system processes information.

pH fluctuations have a substantial impact on receptor sensitivity and neurotransmitter activity throughout the brain. When acidity levels alter, they can either boost or inhibit synaptic transmission, affecting how well and consistently various brain regions interact with one another.

Because conduction velocity influences the rate at which information flows across brain networks, pH-related alterations in transmission speed may have an impact on cognitive processing efficiency. Higher pH settings appear to promote faster brain transmission, which may contribute to better reaction times and general cognitive function.




Figure 2: Relation between brain pH and full-scale IQ

Figure 85 : IQ and brain pH

Figure 86 : IQ and brain pH

### ***Finesse of the auditive spectrum***


Surprisingly, there is a positive association between IQ and auditory fineness, or the capacity to discern between closer sound tones. The tests are conducted as follows: Sounds at various frequencies are emitted. We gradually bring the sounds closer together by asking the respondents to identify the highest sound. The correlation between g and the fineness of the auditory spectrum emphasizes the importance of g in all brain operations. It explains why all prominent composers, for example, have IQs of around 165 (Cox).

### ***Finesse of the visual spectrum***

There is also a favorable association between IQ and visual fineness, or the capacity to differentiate closer hues. These tests are carried out as follows: several color frequencies are shown. We gradually bring the colors together by asking the respondents to identify the two hues and the border between them. Individuals with higher IQs are better able to discriminate neighboring color tones.

### ***Inspection time***

The "inspection time" metric assesses how quickly visual or aural information is processed. These metrics have a correlation of +0.7 with IQ. In this test, two bars of uneven length show on the screen for a brief amount of time (milliseconds). We then ask the participant which bar was the longest: the one to the right or the one to the left. Higher IQs process visual and aural information more quickly. They have shorter inspection times.



### *Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate*

The erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR) is an indirect indicator of inflammation. Several studies have already found a negative correlation between inflammation and cognitive ability. A high ESR is also a risk factor for cardiovascular disease later in life. IQ is classified by decile (decile 1 = average IQ of 81, decile 2 = IQ of 87, decile 3 = IQ of 92, decile 4 = IQ of 96, decile 5 = IQ of 100, decile 6 = IQ of 104, decile 7 = I.Q of 108, decile 8 = IQ of 113, decile 9 = IQ of 119) [[2.4.1](#)].





Figure 87 : ESR and IQ

Figure 88 : ESR and IQ

### ***Baseline pupil size***

Even in a "basic" passive setting, smarter people have larger pupils. This would be related to the activity of the locus coeruleus (LC) and the noradrenergic system (LC-NS). Pupil size is usually a good indicator of LC activity. LC, which has connections throughout the brain and central nervous system, secretes norepinephrine, which aids in the acquisition of essential sensory information and the inhibition of responses to tiny stimuli. A LC-NS deficit impairs cognitive function and attentiveness. The graph below shows pupil size versus IQ (g factor).

Reference : Tsukahara J.S et al. (2016) "The relationship between baseline pupil size and intelligence", *Cognitive Psychology* 91, 109–123.



**Fig. 5.** Correlation between fluid intelligence (Gf) and baseline pupil size for Caucasians, African-Americans, and Other.

Figure 89 : Pupil size and fluid intelligence

Figure 90 : Pupil size and fluid intelligence

### ***Telomere length***

Telomere length correlates positively with intellect. Intelligent people age slower, which explains their longer life expectancy. Low IQ is a recognized risk factor for hastened aging. A, B, C, E, and F: Telomere sizes for tertiles 1, 2, and 3 (tertile 1 = best performance) on several intelligence tests. D: Telomere size based on reaction time. Smarter people have faster reaction times.





Figure 1.



Biological age at age 38 according to intelligence (in SD) in early childhood.

Reference:

Kingma E.M., De Jonge P., Van der Harst P., Ormel J. and Rosmalen J.G.M. (2012) The association

between intelligence and telomere length: A longitudinal population based study PLoS One. 7(11): e49356.

Valdes A.M., Deary I.J., Gardner J., Kimura M., Lu X., Spector T.D., Aviv A. and Cherkas L.F., (2010) Leukocyte telomere length is associated with cognitive performance in healthy women, Neurobiol Aging. 31(6): 986–992.

Schaefer J.D. et al. (2016) Early-life intelligence predicts midlife biological age. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, Volume 71, Issue 6, 17 Pages 968–977.



### ***Conclusion***

IQ correlates with a bunch of biological measures, essentially proving that it's far from being just a pseudoscience.

**Table 66 : Biological correlations of IQ**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Correlation with IQ</b>
<b>Brain size</b>	.4
<b>Myopia</b>	.32
<b>Hyperopia</b>	-0.21
<b>EEG</b>	Large
<b>Brain Glucose Metabolic Rate</b>	-0.7 to -0.8
<b>Peripheral Nerve Conduction Velocity</b>	.4
<b>Reaction time</b>	Large
<b>Brain pH</b>	Significant
<b>Inspection time</b>	-0.7

### **2.5 — Social correlations of IQ**

Apart from having strong biological correlations, IQ is also a very good and accurate predictor of many social measures and successes.

#### **National IQ predicts success in mathematics & science**

Table 67 : IQ and mathematics, science success

Nations	IQ	Math & Science 1964-86	Math 1994 Age 10	Math 1994 Age 14	Science 1994 Age 10	Science 1994 Age 14
<b>East Asia</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>56.60</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>606</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>568</b>
China	103	59.28	—	—	—	—
Hong Kong	107	56.93	587	588	533	522
Japan	105	60.65	597	605	574	571
Singapore	103	56.51	625	643	547	607
South Korea	109	56.21	611	607	597	565
Taiwan	105	56.28	—	—	—	—
<b>Europe</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>52.84</b>	<b>545</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>549</b>	<b>532</b>
Australie	98	48.13	546	530	562	545
Austria	100	—	559	539	565	558
Belgium	99	53.25	—	—	546	511
Britain	100	53.98	513	506	551	552
Bulgarie	93	59.28	—	—	—	565
Canada	99	47.57	532	527	549	531
Czech Rep	98	—	567	564	557	574
Denmark	98	53.48	—	—	—	478
Finland	99	48.76	—	—	—	—
France	98	54.15	—	—	538	498
Germany	98	59.03	—	—	—	531
Greece	92	—	492	484	—	497
Hungary	98	53.85	548	537	532	554
Iceland	101	—	474	487	505	494
Ireland	93	47.59	550	527	539	538
Italy	102	44.59	—	—	—	—
Lithuanie	90	—	—	477	—	476
Netherlands	101	56.84	577	541	557	560
New Zealand	99	52.44	499	508	531	525
Norway	100	49.60	502	503	530	527
Portugal	95	50.28	475	454	480	480
Romania	94	—	—	—	—	486
Russie	97	—	—	—	—	538
Spain	98	49.40	—	—	487	517
Slovakia	96	—	547	544	—	—
Slovenia	96	—	552	541	546	560

<b>Sweden</b>	100	47.41	—	—	—	535
<b>Switzerland</b>	101	57.17	—	545		?
<b>United States</b>	98	43.43	545	500		534
<b>South America</b>	86	30.10	—	385		411
<b>Brazil</b>	86	33.91	—	—		—
<b>Chile</b>	89	26.30	—	—		—
<b>Colombia</b>	84	—	—	385	—	411
<b>South &amp; SE Asia</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>39.83</b>	<b>490</b>	<b>474</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>470</b>
<b>Cyprus</b>	85	—	502	474	475	463
<b>Indic</b>	82	21.63	—	—	—	—
<b>Iran</b>	84	20.75	429	428	416	470
<b>Israel</b>	95	51.29	531	522	505	524
<b>Jordan</b>	84	39.38	—	—	—	—
<b>Kuwait</b>	86		400	392	401	430
<b>Philippines</b>	86	34.35	—	—	—	—
<b>Thailand</b>	91	39.83	490	522	473	525
<b>Turkey</b>	90	41.52	—	—	—	—
<b>Africa</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>32.00</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>326</b>		<b>326</b>
<b>Mozambique</b>	64	24.26	—	—		?
<b>Nigeria</b>	69	34.15	—	—		?
<b>South Africa</b>	72	—	354	326	—	326
<b>Swaziland</b>	68	32.00				
<b>Correlations</b>	—	<b>0.81</b>	<b>0.85</b>	<b>0.89</b>	<b>0.81</b>	<b>0.82</b>

### *IQ predicts salaries*

**Table 68 : Correlation between IQ and salary, meta-analysis**

	Country	Number	Sex	Age	Age	r	Reference
<b>1</b>	Netherlands	835	M	12	43	0.17	Dronkers, 1999
<b>2</b>	Netherlands	819	M	12	53	0.19	Dronkers, 1999
<b>3</b>	Netherlands	350	F	12	43	0.03	Dronkers, 1999
<b>4</b>	Netherlands	237	F	12	53	0.19	Dronkers, 1999
<b>5</b>	Norway	1,082	M/F	18	—	0.33	Tambs et al., 1989

<b>6</b>	Sweden	346	M	10	25	0.08	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>7</b>	Sweden	460	M	10	30	0.22	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>8</b>	Sweden	631	M	10	35	0.34	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>9</b>	Sweden	707	M	10	43	0.40	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>10</b>	Sweden	312	M	20	25	0.10	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>11</b>	Sweden	410	M	20	30	0.22	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>12</b>	Sweden	532	M	20	35	0.43	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>13</b>	Sweden	585	M	20	43	0.50	Fagerlind, 1975
<b>14</b>	USA	–	M	18	30	0.31	Duncan, 1968
<b>15</b>	USA	345	M	–	19	0.15	Hause, 1971
<b>16</b>	USA	345	M	–	24	0.29	Hause, 1971
<b>17</b>	USA	345	M	–	29	0.45	Hause, 1971
<b>18</b>	USA	345	M	–	34	0.49	Hause, 1971
<b>19</b>	USA	4,388	M	17	25	0.26	Hauser et al., 1973
<b>20</b>	USA-whites	24,812	M	18	30	0.24	Brown & Reynolds, 1975
<b>21</b>	USA-whites	24,812	M	18	36	0.33	Brown & Reynolds, 1975
<b>27</b>	USA-blacks	4,008	M	18	30	0.08	Brown & Reynolds, 1975
<b>23</b>	USA-blacks	4,008	M	18	36	0.13	Brown & Reynolds, 1975
<b>24</b>	USA	12,686	M/F	18	30	0.37	Murray, 1998
<b>25</b>	USA	1,943	M/F	18	30	0.35	Rowe et al., 1998
<b>26</b>	USA	–	M	12	45	0.53	Judge et al., 1999

27	USA-whites	3,484	M	19	37	0.36	Nyborg & Jensen, 2001
28	USA-blacks	493	M	19	37	0.37	Nyborg & Jensen, 2001
29	USA	1,448	M	17	27	0.22	Murnane et al., 2001
<b>Median</b>						<b>0.29</b>	

Table 69 : Effect of IQ on earnings

	Country	Number	Sex	Age	Age	% Effect	Reference
1	USA	692	M	12	–	15	Crouse, 1979
2	USA	1,774	M	25-64	25-64	19	Bishop, 1989
3	USA	1,593	M	15-18	19-34	17	Neal & Johnson, 1996
4	USA	1,446	F	15-18	19-32	23	Neal & Johnson, 1996
5	USA	1,448	M	17	27	19	Murnane et al., 2001
6	USA	2,959	M	17	35	11	Zax & Rees, 2002
7	USA	2,264	M	17	53	21	Zax & Rees, 2002
8	Sweden	3,404	M	12	34	10	Zetterberg, 2004
9	Sweden	3,277	F	12	34	11	Zetterberg, 2004

***IQ predicts educational attainment***

Table 70 : Correlation between IQ and educational attainment

	Country	N	Age	Age	Subject	r	Reference
1	Canada	208	13	13	General	0.55	Gagne & St. Pefi~2002
2	England	85	5	16	English	0.62	Yule et al., 1982
3	England	85	5	16	Math	0.72	Yule et al., 1982
4	Great Britain	8,699	11	21	Years	0.70	Thienpont & Verleye, 2003
5	Great Britain	20,000	11	16	GCSE	0.74	Deary, 2004
6	N. Ireland	701	16	16	GCSE	0.65	Lynn et al., 1984
7	N. Ireland	451	16	23	Level	0.40	Cassidy & Lynn, 1991
8	Norway	1,082	18	18	Years	0.50	Tambs et al., 1989
9	Sweden	570	20	20	Years	0.53	Fagerlind, 1975
10	USA	-	-	-	General	0.71	Walberg, 1984
11	USA	455	13	13	Reading	0.68	Lloyd & Barenblatt, 1984
12	USA	-	18	18	Math	0.66	Lubinski & Humphreys, 1996



***IQ predicts productivity*****Table 72 : Correlation between IQ and productivity**


	<b>Country</b>	<b>Complexity</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>1</b>	United States	High	0.58	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>2</b>	United States	Medium	0.40	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>3</b>	United States	Low	0.25	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>4</b>	United States	Electronics	0.67	Hunter, 1986
<b>5</b>	United States	Mechanical	0.62	Hunter, 1986
<b>6</b>	United States	Technical	0.62	Hunter, 1986
<b>7</b>	United States	Clerical	0.58	Hunter, 1986
<b>8</b>	United States	Combat	0.45	Hunter, 1986
<b>9</b>	Europe	High	0.29	Salgado et al., 2003
<b>10</b>	Europe	Medium	0.29	Salgado et al., 2003
<b>11</b>	Europe	Low	0.23	Salgado et al., 2003
<b>Median</b>			<b>0.45</b>	

***IQ predicts job proficiency*****Table 73 : Correlation between IQ and job proficiency**

	<b>Country</b>	<b>Complexity</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>1</b>	United States	High	0.42	Ghiselli, 1966
<b>2</b>	United States	Medium	0.27	Ghiselli, 1966
<b>3</b>	United States	Low	0.15	Ghiselli, 1966
<b>4</b>	United States	High	0.57	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>5</b>	United States	Medium	0.51	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>6</b>	United States	Low-general	0.40	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>7</b>	United States	Low-industrial	0.23	Hunter & Hunter, 1984
<b>8</b>	United States	All	0.51	Schmidt & Hunter, 1998
<b>9</b>	Europe	All	0.25	Salgado et al., 2003
<b>Median</b>			<b>0.4</b>	


### *IQ predicts violence*

A lower IQ is linearly associated with higher violence in the general population



**Fig. 1.** Prevalence of violence perpetration by intelligence quotient (IQ) score. IQ was assessed using the National Adult Reading Test (NART). Violence perpetration was assessed with the following question: 'Have you been in a physical fight or deliberately hit anyone in the past 5 years?'.

Figure 91 : IQ and violence



**Fig. 2.** Mean number of violence episodes by intelligence quotient (IQ) status. IQ was assessed using the National Adult Reading Test (NART). Violence perpetration was assessed with the following question: 'Have you been in a physical fight or deliberately hit anyone in the past 5 years?'. The number of violence episodes was assessed over the past 5 years.

[2.5.1].

Figure 92 : IQ and violence


### **MAO-A**

Monoamine oxidase A is a gene which catalyzes the oxidative deamination of amines, such as dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin. A mutation of this gene results in Brunner syndrome. This gene has also been associated with a variety of other psychiatric disorders, including antisocial behavior.

In a 2013 study, it was shown that the quite rare 2-repeat (2-R) variant was an incredible predictor of crime. People with this 2R genotype are 5-6 times more likely to stab or shoot someone in their lifetime.



This variant is carried by 0.1% of Caucasian males and 5.2% of African-American



**Fig. 1** Predicted probabilities of lifetime prevalence of shooting or stabbing someone (N = 133). *Note* Parameter estimates for logit equation:  $b = 2.56$ ,  $SE = .79$ ,  $OR = 12.89$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ; all equations corrected for the clustering of observations in families by using the “cluster” command in STATA10.0; any cases missing a family ID number were dropped from the analyses

Figure 93 : Stabbing and shshooting by genotype

Figure 94 : Stabbing and shshooting by genotype

males [[2.5.2](#)].

The polymorphism (MAOA gene) is a very significant indicator of aggressivity, much higher than any other parameter. (African-American here is a low indicator because the study relies on self-reported behaviour which favours Africans, for example the concordance in self-reported drug crimes vs actual drug crimes is of 99% for whites, but only 81% for Blacks).

Table 10

*Multiple Regression Analysis to Predict Aggression vs. Polymorphism, Race, and Abuse*

Independent variables	Unstandardized coefficients <i>b</i>	Standardized coefficients $\beta$	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	Collinearity <i>VIF</i>
(Constant)	1.104		1.66	.097	
Polymorphism	.249	.098	4.69	< .001*	1.02
White	-.791	-.300	-1.19	.234	148.23
African American	-.760	-.261	-1.14	.254	121.48
Asian	-.856	-.182	-1.29	.199	46.90
Abuse	.264	.021	0.83	.409	1.46
African American x Abuse	-.795	-.032	-1.20	.229	1.65
Asian x Abuse	-.512	-.009	-.043	.669	1.08
Polymorphism x Abuse	.187	.003	0.15	.885	1.25

Note: \* Statistically significant ( $p < .05$ )

The frequency of another allele in this gene linked with violence is particularly high in Africans [2.5.3]. The 2R variant is present among 4.4% of Americans, <1% in all other groups. The 3R variant is present among 52% of Blacks, 36% of Whites.


***IQ predicts PISA scores*****Table 74 : Correlation between IQ and PISA scores**

Nations	National IQ	Math Age 15	2000	Science Age 15	2000	Math Age 15	2003
Albania	90	370		375		—	
Argentina	93	380		395		—	
Australia	98	533		525		524	
Austria	100	515		520		506	
Belgium	99	520		495		529	
Brazil	86	330		375		356	
Bulgaria	93	430		448		—	
Canada	99	533		530		532	
Chile	90	375		410		—	
China (Macao)	105	—		—		527	
Czech Republic	98	498		508		516	
Denmark	98	514		515		514	
Finland	99	536		540		544	
France	98	517		500		511	
Germany'	99	490		480		503	
Greece	92	447		455		445	
Hong Kong	108	550		540		550	
Hungary	98	488		498		490	
Iceland	101	514		515		515	

<b>Indonesia</b>	82	360	395	360
<b>Ireland</b>	93	503	510	503
<b>Israel</b>	95	435	438	—
<b>Italy</b>	102	457	475	466
<b>Japan</b>	105	557	550	534
<b>Latvia</b>	97	465	455	483
<b>Luxembourg</b>	100	446	445	493
<b>Macedonia</b>	91	370	400	—
<b>Mexico</b>	88	387	420	383
<b>Netherlands</b>	101	—	—	538
<b>New Zealand</b>	99	537	575	523
<b>Norway</b>	100	499	500	495
<b>Peru</b>	85	295	335	—
<b>Poland</b>	99	470	475	490
<b>Portugal</b>	95	452	455	466
<b>Russia</b>	97	480	455	468
<b>Serbia</b>	89	—	—	437
<b>Slovakia</b>	96	—	—	498
<b>South Korea</b>	106	547	550	542
<b>Spain</b>	98	476	485	485
<b>Sweden</b>	100	510	508	509
<b>Switzerland</b>	101	529	495	527
<b>Thailand</b>	91	430	440	417
<b>Tunisia</b>	83	—	—	359
<b>Turkey</b>	90	—	—	423
<b>United Kingdom</b>	100	529	535	—
<b>United States</b>	98	493	500	483
<b>Uruguay</b>	96	—	—	422
<b>Correlations with IQ</b>	—	<b>0.876</b>	<b>0.833</b>	<b>0.871</b>

***IQ/performance at 13 years old predicts future subsequent achievements***

The children were divided into four quintiles. The Q4 reflects the top 25% of these children with SAT scores in maths greater than 700. The first quarter represents 25% of the "least talented" among these children. We see that, even among the most gifted children, SAT/IQ remains strongly predictive.



**Figure 1.6** SAT-Math scores at age 13 predict adult outcomes of academic success.

Figure 95 : SAT scores at 13 predict adult outcomes

Figure 96 : SAT scores at 13 predict adult outcomes

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### ***Other correlations of IQ***

**Table 75 : Other social correlations of IQ**

<b>Excluding the smallest countries</b>	<b>Total (160 countries)</b>
<b>Quality of human conditions</b>	0.839
<b>PPP GNI per capita 2002</b>	0.649
<b>Adult literacy rate 2002</b>	0.733
<b>Tertiary enrollment ratio</b>	0.780
<b>Life expectancy at birth 2002</b>	0.817
<b>Index of Democratization 2002</b>	0.584

### ***Conclusion***

IQ is significantly correlated with bunch of social measures.

**Table 76 : Social correlations of IQ**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Correlation with IQ</b>
<b>Maths success</b>	.89
<b>Science success</b>	.82
<b>Earnings</b>	.29
<b>Educational attainment</b>	.63
<b>Socioeconomic status</b>	.40
<b>Productivity</b>	.45
<b>Job proficiency</b>	.40
<b>PISA scores</b>	.85
<b>Quality of human conditions</b>	.84
<b>PPP GNI per capita 2002</b>	.65
<b>Adult literacy rate 2002</b>	.73
<b>Tertiary enrollment ratio</b>	.78
<b>Life expectancy at birth 2002</b>	.82
<b>Index of Democratization 2002</b>	.58

Now one might say that IQ correlates more with social factors than it does with biological proves, which indicates that IQ is probably more influenced by environment than by actual biology and genetics. [Chapter 1](#) demonstrates that biology is the main component of intelligence and IQ. But also, to decide whether IQ is “generated” from environment or rather from biology, you can just make an analogy and ask yourself which causes the other, as the primary causal factor ? It can’t be environment in modern terms, since this one may favour IQ just since a few centuries. It must be intelligence/IQ, the only trait of the two inherent to humans.

## **2.6 — Worldwide hierarchy**

### ***Introduction***

Regardless of the country, the hierarchy in social class stays exactly identical, with an order set by racial IQ:

Ashkenazi Jews (110)

East Asians (105)

Europeans (100)

Southeast Asians (92)

Arctic People (91)

European-African hybrids (81–90)

Native Americans (86)

North African and South Asian (84–88)

Africans (71–80)

Australian Aborigines (62)

The disparities are, of course, more pronounced between races with significantly different IQs and more tenuous across races with similar IQs.

All of these distinctions stem from intellectual discrepancies among homo sapiens races/populations. Ashkenazi Jews, East Asians, and Europeans (the First World) are genetically more intelligent, as evidenced by higher rates of cultural achievement, higher wages, lower crime rates, higher socioeconomic status, lower fertility rates, good academic achievements, low juvenile delinquency, low single motherhood, low unemployment rates, high THS achievement, and a high prevalence of gifted individuals.

In contrast, North Africans, Middle Easterners, Africans, and Aborigines in Australia have lower intellectual ability, which leads to lower education levels, lower wages, a higher crime rate, lower socioeconomic status, higher fertility, lower academic achievement with more juvenile disorders, a high percentage of single mothers, high unemployment, lower SAT scores, and a lower gifted prevalence.

Richard Lynn's 'The Global Bell Curve' (2008) contains all of the data presented below.

This stable hierarchy is the result of intelligence's strong genetic causation. Regardless of country, populations with a higher frequency of high intelligence alleles (Ashkenazi Jews, East Asians, Europeans) outperform less intelligent populations with a lower frequency of these alleles for high intelligence and a smaller and less powerful brain (North African, Middle Easterners, African and Australian aborigines).

### *Canada*

#### **Education**

**Table 77 : IQ in Canada**

<b>Race</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Jews</b>	109
<b>Chinese</b>	101
<b>Whites</b>	100
<b>Inuits</b>	91
<b>Native</b>	87
<b>Blacks</b>	84

**Table 78 : Racial differences in educational attainment in Canada**

	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Jews</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>French</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Native American</b>	<b>Black</b>
<b>1</b>	Illiterate %	1921	7	27	1	8	14	—	8
<b>2</b>	Illiterate %	1931	4	15	1	6	8	—	8
<b>3</b>	10th grade %	1951	53	31	55	30	35	6	—
<b>4</b>	10th grade %	1961	64	45	63	38	31	9	—
<b>5</b>	10th grade %	1971	80	75	77	59	58	38	—
<b>6</b>	10th grade %	1981	85	80	84	77	72	55	88
<b>7</b>	Years-NB	1981	13.5	13.1	11.7	11.1	11.9	—	11.8
<b>8</b>	Years-FB	1981	12.7	11.9	12.7	12.4	10.7	—	12.4



<b>9</b>	Years-M	1991	15.0	14.7	12.3	11.7	12.4	9.5	12.8
<b>10</b>	Years-W	1991	14.6	14.6	12.6	12.2	12.5	10.4	13.0

**Sources: rows 1-6: Herberg, 1990b; rows 7-8: Li, 1988; rows 9-10: Sweetman & Dicks, 2000.**

The Chinese is a really interesting example and counterargument to the ‘racism’ narrative. Chinese faced huge racism when arriving in Canada, they were the most illiterate ethnic group by far, yet they still ended up being the most educated & one of the richest group besides Jews there. This easily demonstrates that racism isn’t a valid excuse to why Africans fail in developed countries (and in their homeland).

**Table 79 : Racial differences in tertiary education (%) in Canada**

	<b>Year</b>	<b>Jews</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>French</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Black</b>
<b>1</b>	1951	13	5	11	4	5	-
<b>2</b>	1961	15	9	8	5	5	-
<b>3</b>	1971	40	42	29	23	26	-
<b>4</b>	1981	53	44	38	29	34	41
<b>5</b>	1981	32	21	10	8	9	11
<b>6</b>	1991	55	38	12	13	15	13

**Sources: 1951-1981: Herberg, 1990a and b; 1981: Li, 1988; 1991: McMullin 2004.**

**Table 80 : Racial differences in education (%) in Canada**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Advanced</b>	<b>Basic</b>
<b>Korean</b>	44	15
<b>Jewish</b>	42	13
<b>Chinese</b>	41	12
<b>Whites</b>	26	25
<b>Iranian</b>	25	30
<b>Tamil</b>	19	22
<b>Portuguese</b>	16	33
<b>Canadian blacks</b>	16	35
<b>Hispanic</b>	13	38
<b>African blacks</b>	13	39
<b>Caribbean blacks</b>	9	32

**Source: The Toronto Star, Feb 11th 1995.**

**Socioeconomic factors****Table 81 : Racial differences in yearly earnings in Canada**

	<b>Year</b>	<b>Jews</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>British</b>	<b>French</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Native American</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>Southeast Asian</b>
<b>1</b>	1941	1,327	931	1,515	1,007	1,115	802	—	—
<b>2</b>	1951	2,619	2,100	2,481	2,150	2,232	1,404	—	—
<b>3</b>	1961	7,426	3,895	4,852	3,872	3,319	—	—	—
<b>4</b>	1971	12,368	6,668	8,500	7,307	7,846	—	—	—
<b>5</b>	1981	21,349	13,292	15,100	13,831	13,367	9,032	13,029	—
<b>6</b>	1991	50,100	34,570	34,660	31,615	33,100	27,535	28,495	35,615
<b>7</b>	2001	73,928	40,817	43,398	—	—	32,176	35,100	34,100

**Sources: 1941-1981: Herberg (1990b). 1981-2001: Statistics Canada.**

**Table 82 : Annual earnings of Inuit and Native Americans in Canada**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Inuit</b>	<b>Metis</b>	<b>Native American</b>
<b>1986</b>	32,450	—	20,226
<b>2001</b>	36,152	34,778	32,176

**Sources: Gerber 1990-2001· Statistics Canada.**

**Table 83 : Racial differences in poverty (%) in Canada**

<b>Group</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1996</b>
<b>Chinese</b>	13.9	24.6
<b>European</b>	14.6	19.3
<b>Hispanic</b>	39.5	-
<b>Native American</b>	23.9	-
<b>South Asian</b>	23.1	30.1
<b>Blacks</b>	36.1	49.0
<b>Jews</b>	13.9	12.2

**Table 84 : Racial differences in unemployment in Canada**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>Native American</b>	<b>White</b>	<b>Chinese</b>
<b>1991</b>	12.1	19.4	7.4	-
<b>2001</b>	11.5	22.2	7.4	8.4

**Crime****Table 85 : Racial differences in crime rate in Canada**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>White</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>Indian</b>	<b>South Asian</b>	<b>Chinese</b>
<b>1992</b>	M/F	7.1	36.9	19.9	4.6	3.5

**Health****Table 86 : Racial differences in health measures in Canada**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Native Americans</b>
<b>Infant mortality</b>	1981	M & F	11.3	21.8
<b>Infant mortality</b>	1991	M & F	7.1	12.3
<b>Life expectancy</b>	1981	Men	71.9	62.4
<b>Life expectancy</b>	1981	Women	78.9	68.9
<b>Life expectancy</b>	1991	Men	74.6	66.9

Ref : Trovato (2001)

**Brazil****Table 87 : Racial IQ in Brazil**

<b>Race</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Japanese</b>	99
<b>European</b>	95
<b>Mulatto</b>	81
<b>Black</b>	71
<b>Reference</b>	Fernandez, 2001

**Table 88 : Racial differences in educational attainment in Brazil**

	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Japanese</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Mulattos</b>	<b>Blacks</b>
<b>1</b>	High school	1950	—	4.9	0.5	0.2
<b>2</b>	Literate	1950	—	59.3	31.1	26.7
<b>3</b>	Degree	1980	10.0	6.4	1.9	1.0
<b>4</b>	Literate	1991	—	84.3	66.6	65.3
<b>5</b>	High school-M	1996	—	56.5	39.3	28.0
<b>6</b>	High school-F	1996	—	64.9	48.1	45.4
<b>7</b>	Literate	1999	—	91.7	80.4	79.0
<b>8</b>	Degree	1996	—	10.0	2.4	1.8

**Table 89 : Racial differences in income & socioeconomic status in Brazil**

	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Japanese</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Mulattos</b>	<b>Blacks</b>
<b>1</b>	Income, 1960	—	11,601	6,492	5,444
<b>2</b>	Income, 1980	35,610	21,867	11,053	9,004
<b>3</b>	Income, 1991	—	224,752	132,400	129,165
<b>4</b>	Poverty, 1987	—	24%	44%	46%
<b>5</b>	Professionals, 1950	—	4.5%	2.4%	2.1%
<b>6</b>	Professionals, 1980	—	9.0%	3.8%	2.5%
<b>7</b>	Professionals, 1991	—	27.5%	15.8%	12.1%
<b>8</b>	Unemployment: M	—	3.5%	4.1%	4.8%
<b>9</b>	Unemployment: F	—	3.3%	3.6%	4.4%

Sources: 1: Marx, 1998; 2-3, 6-7: Lovell, 1993; 4-5 Andrews, 1992; 8-9: PNAD, 1997

**Table 90 : Life expectancy at birth in Brazil**

<b>Group</b>	<b>1950</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1991</b>
<b>Whites</b>	47.5	54.7	66.1	70.8
<b>Afro-Brazilians</b>	40.1	44.7	59.4	64.0

**Table 91 : Infant mortality rate in Brazil**

<b>Group</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1993</b>
<b>Whites</b>	76	43	37
<b>Afro-Brazilians</b>	96	72	62

**Table 92 : Prison population in Sao Paulo**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Prison population compared to Whites</b>
<b>Whites</b>	1.0
<b>Mulattos</b>	1.5
<b>Blacks</b>	5.6

Ref: Telles (2004).

**Table 93 : Percentages of races in population and convictions for homicide  
in Brazil**

<b>Race</b>	<b>% Population</b>	<b>% Homicide</b>
<b>White</b>	53	39.7
<b>Mulatto</b>	40	49.9
<b>Blacks</b>	6	9.8
<b>Asians</b>	1	0.4

### *United Kingdom*

**Table 94 : Racial IQ in the UK**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Jews</b>	110
<b>Chinese</b>	105
<b>Whites</b>	100
<b>South Asians</b>	92
<b>Blacks</b>	86

**Table 95 : Prevalence of mental retardation by race in the United Kingdom**

<b>#</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Condition</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Blacks</b>	<b>S. Asians</b>
<b>1</b>	1970	Retardation	0.68	2.33	0.40
<b>2</b>	1972	Retardation	0.66	2.90	-
<b>3</b>	1980	Backwardness	8.00	19.00	12.00

**Table 96 : Racial differences in educational attainment in the UK (% who pass)**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Age 7</b>			<b>Age 11</b>			<b>Age 14</b>		
	Reading	Writing	Arithmetic	English	Maths	Science	English	Maths	Science
<b>Chinese</b>	90	88	96	82	88	90	80	90	82
<b>Whites</b>	85	82	91	76	73	87	70	72	70
<b>Mixed</b>	85	82	91	77	72	87	69	69	67
<b>Asians</b>	80	78	86	69	67	79	66	66	59
<b>Blacks</b>	78	74	84	68	60	77	56	54	51

**Table 97 : Educational attainment in the UK at age 11 by origin (% who pass)**

<b>Group</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>English</b>	<b>Math</b>	<b>Science</b>
<b>Jews</b>	905	92	91	95
<b>Chinese</b>	1,938	81	89	89
<b>Whites</b>	489,887	78	74	87
<b>South Asians</b>	38,721	74	69	79
<b>Indian</b>	12,725	83	80	87
<b>Pakistani</b>	16,307	68	61	72

<b>Bangladeshi</b>	5,979	71	66	77
<b>Other Asian</b>	3,710	75	77	82
<b>Blacks</b>	21,575	70	63	77
<b>Caribbean</b>	8,739	70	61	78
<b>African</b>	10,617	69	64	75
<b>Other Blacks</b>	2,219	71	64	80
<b>Others</b>	4,804	66	70	76
<b>Unclassified</b>	18,530	71	68	81
<b>Total</b>	592,163	77	73	86

Table 98 : Race differences in educational attainment in the GCSE

<b>Group</b>	<b>1988</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Chinese</b>	-	46	-	70	75	74
<b>Indian</b>	24	38	48	60	64	67
<b>White</b>	24	37	45	50	51	52
<b>Pakistani</b>	20	26	23	29	42	45
<b>Bangladeshi</b>	20	14	25	29	45	48
<b>Black-African</b>	-	-	-	-	41	43
<b>Black-Caribbean</b>	20	23	23	39	32	36



**Table 99 : Race differences in educational attainment in A level**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>M&amp;W</b>
<b>White</b>	17.7	13.0	13.8
<b>Chinese</b>	14.9	10.4	16.8
<b>Indian</b>	13.7	10.2	11.3
<b>Bangladeshi</b>	11.2	8.2	6.6
<b>Pakistani</b>	8.4	5.7	6.1
<b>Blacks</b>	2.8	2.0	2.3

**Table 100 : Average weekly earnings of racial groups (£)**

<b>#</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>White</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>Indian</b>	<b>Pak./Ban.</b>	<b>Chinese</b>
<b>1</b>	1994	331	311	317	220	368
<b>2</b>	1995	309	268	279	230	342
<b>3</b>	2001	332	225	327	182	-

**Table 101 : Race differences in socioeconomic status in the UK**

<b>SES</b>	<b>Native White</b>	<b>N.B.</b>	<b>Afro-</b>	<b>F.B. Afro-</b>	<b>F.B.</b>	<b>South</b>	<b>Chinese</b>
		<b>Caribbean</b>		<b>Caribbean</b>	<b>African</b>	<b>Asian</b>	

<b>M</b>	47.4	41.9	37.0	46.2	46.6	45.6
<b>F</b>	46.9	46.2	38.1	40.5	42.2	46.0

**Table 102 : Racial differences in unemployment in the UK**

#	Year	Sex	White	Black	Indian	Pak./Ban.	Chinese	Jews
<b>1</b>	1991	M/F	11	15	13	29	10	-
<b>2</b>	1994	M	15	34	20	37	-	-
<b>3</b>	1994	F	13	24	15	43	-	-
<b>4</b>	2001	M/F	4.3	-	5.4	14.6	-	3.8
<b>5</b>	2024	M/F	3.3	7.7	4.9	9.9	6.8	-

**Table 103 : Racial differences in conduct disorders in children (odds ratios)**

#	Sex	White	Black	Chinese	S. Asian
<b>1</b>	M/F	1.0	1.4	-	-
<b>2</b>	M	1.0	3.9	-	-
<b>3</b>	F	1.0	2.3	-	-
<b>4</b>	M/F	1.0	4.4	0.18	0.92

**Sources: 1: Goodman & Richards, 1995; 2-3: Tizard et al. 1988·  
4: Gillborn and Gipps, 1996.**

**Table 104 : Racial differences in crime rate in the UK (odds ratios)**

#	Year	Sex	White	Black	Indian	Pak./Ban.	Chinese
1	1993	M	1.00	6.10	0.87	0.87	-
2	1995	M	0.88	7.12	0.87	1.42	0.66
3	1995	F	0.80	12.19	0.60	0.50	0.66

**Sources: 1: Smith 1997· 2-3: Home Office 1998.**

The data from the UK shows a distinct racial hierarchy, with Chinese (IQ 105) and Jewish (IQ 110) populations outperforming other groups in terms of cognitive ability. Whites (IQ 100), South Asians (IQ 92), and Blacks (IQ 86) follow. These IQ disparities have a strong correlation with academic achievement; Chinese students routinely outperform black students in reading at all ages, with 90% of them passing by age 7 as opposed to 78%. Jewish students perform exceptionally well; at age 11, their core subject pass rates range from 92 to 95%.

Economic results are a direct result of the educational advantage. Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers make the lowest wages (£182 in 2001), while Chinese workers make the highest (£368 weekly in 1994). Black unemployment is consistently twice as high as white unemployment (7.7% vs. 3.3% in 2024), and the highest unemployment rates are among Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups (14.6% in 2001).

Disparities in behavior and criminal activity are equally prominent. Black males are 6–12 times more likely to be involved in criminal activity than white males, and black children have conduct disorder rates that are 3.9 times higher. Nonetheless, with odds ratios for conduct disorders as low as 0.18, Chinese and Indian groups exhibit less criminal involvement than the general population.

*Africa***Table 105 : Racial IQ in Africa**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Whites</b>	100
<b>Indians</b>	86
<b>Colored</b>	83
<b>Blacks</b>	69

**Table 106 : Racial differences in educational attainment in South Africa**

<b>#</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Coloreds</b>	<b>Blacks</b>
<b>1</b>	1980	Primary	15	33	44	37
<b>2</b>	1980	Secondary	57	38	23	14
<b>3</b>	1980	University	4.2	0.26	0.15	0.05
<b>4</b>	1991	Matric.	23.4	19.2	4.8	2.8
<b>5</b>	1991	University	3.6	2.5	0.7	0.6
<b>6</b>	2004	University	29.8	14.9	4.9	5.2
<b>7</b>	2023	Degree	28.6	20.6	4.8	5.2

**Table 107 : Racial differences in mathematics attainment in South Africa**

	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Coloreds</b>	<b>Blacks</b>
<b>Number</b>	831	199	1,172	5,412
<b>Score</b>	373	341	339	254
<b>S. Error</b>	4.9	8.6	2.9	1.2

**Table 108 : Race and ethnic differences in South Africa in earnings (1936-1946, £; 1995-2000, Rand)**

<b>#</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Coloreds</b>	<b>Blacks</b>
<b>1</b>	1936	129.6	27.6	18.8	12.8
<b>2</b>	1946	238.1	45.7	34.1	23.2
<b>3</b>	1995	103,000	71,000	32,000	23,000
<b>4</b>	2000	158,000	85,000	51,000	26,000

**Table 109 : Earnings of Indians and Europeans in Kenya expressed as multiples of blacks**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Blacks</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Europeans</b>
<b>1914</b>	1	26	144
<b>1927</b>	1	25	107
<b>1946</b>	1	22	84
<b>1960</b>	1	20	57
<b>1971</b>	1	24	42

**Table 110 : Racial differences in homicide per 100,000 population in South Africa**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Coloreds</b>	<b>Blacks</b>
<b>1978</b>	3.8	4.4	26.5	23.9
<b>1981</b>	6.8	10.0	76.6	24.5
<b>1984</b>	5.8	9.9	58.0	34.5

White populations continuously hold the top spot across all measured indicators, indicating a deeply established racial hierarchy throughout Southern Africa, according to the data. Whites have an average IQ of 100, followed by Indians (86), Coloreds (83), and Blacks (69), according to cognitive testing. This pattern is highly correlated with academic performance. White students attended university at a higher rate (4.2%) than Black students (0.05%) in 1980. Although all groups' educational attainment improved by 2023, whites still had a 5:1 advantage over Blacks in degree attainment

(28.6% vs. 5.2%). This trend is reflected in economic disparities. White earnings were 5–10 times higher than Black earnings during the apartheid era (1936–1946). Although post-apartheid statistics indicate some decline, whites still made six times as much as blacks in 2000 (R158,000 vs. R26,000. With Europeans earning 144 times Black wages in 1914, the Kenyan data shows even more glaring colonial-era disparities. Serious social inequalities coexist with this economic hierarchy; homicide rates in Black and colored communities are 5–10 times higher than those in white communities, reaching a peak of 76.6 per 100,000 in 1981.

### *Australia*

**Table 111 : Racial IQ in Australia**

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Chinese</b>	105
<b>Vietnamese</b>	100
<b>Whites</b>	100
<b>Aboriginal</b>	62

**Table 112 : Racial differences in education attainment in Australia**

<b>#</b>	<b>Qualification</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Aborigines</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
<b>1</b>	Skilled vocational	M	16.3	23.8	0.68
<b>2</b>	Skilled vocational	F	3.3	4.1	0.81

<b>3</b>	Bachelor's degree	M	2.6	10.1	0.26
<b>4</b>	Bachelor's degree	F	4.3	11.4	0.38
<b>5</b>	Higher degree	M	0.3	2.4	0.13
<b>6</b>	Higher degree	F	0.4	1.4	0.29

Table 113 : Racial differences in educational attainment in Australia (2)

Subject	Aborigines	Europeans	<i>d</i>
<b>Reading</b>	440	531	1.82
<b>Math</b>	450	530	1.60
<b>Science</b>	445	525	1.60

Table 114 : Ethnic differences in marks obtained by applicants for tertiary education in Australia

Group	Score
<b>East Asia</b>	78.9 (1.5)
<b>English Speaking</b>	68.8 (1.1)
<b>C. and S. America</b>	68.4 (5.4)
<b>M. East and N. Africa</b>	67.2 (1.8)
<b>South Europe</b>	65.7 (1.5)
<b>Pacific Islands</b>	65.4 (4.3)
<b>Aborigines</b>	59.0 (3.5)



**Table 115 : Incomes of Aboriginal men as percentages of Europeans**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Group</b>	<b>Aborigines</b>	<b>Europeans</b>
<b>1980</b>	All	50.5	100
<b>1990</b>	All	55.5	100
<b>1980</b>	Employed	65.2	100
<b>1990</b>	Employed	66.7	100
<b>1996</b>	All	65.1	100

**Table 116 : Racial differences in unemployment rate in Australia**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Aborigines</b>	<b>Europeans</b>
<b>1981</b>	25.1	6.1
<b>1986</b>	35.0	9.0
<b>1991</b>	30.1	11.3
<b>1996</b>	22.7	9.0
<b>2021</b>	10.0	4.0

**Table 117 : Unemployment of Aborigines and immigrants, 1985-1988, in  
Australia**

#	Group	Weeks Unemployed
1	Australian Aborigines	39.80
2	1st generation immigrants-ES	0.13
3	1st generation immigrants- ENES	7.67
4	1st generation immigrants- Asian	12.61
5	2nd generation immigrants-ES	1.75
6	2nd generation immigrants- ENES	3.64
7	2nd generation immigrants- Asian	0.06

**Table 118 : Imprisonment rates of Aborigines and Europeans per 1,000**

Crime	Aborigines	Europeans	Ratio
Juveniles	-	-	48
Adults	28.0	1.1	26

**Table 119 : Racial differences in drug consumption in Australia**

#	Measure	Sex	Aboriginal	European	Reference
1	Alcoholism*	M	53	4	Hunter, Hall, and Spargo, 1992
2	Alcoholism*	F	19	0.5	Hunter, Hall, and Spargo, 1992
3	Smoking	M	71	39	Hogg, 1995
4	Smoking	F	76	42	Hogg, 1995
5	Smoking	M	50	28	Perkins et al., 1994
6	Smoking	F	49	20	Perkins et al., 1994

\* drinking nine or more standard drinks per drinking session.

Perkins et al (1994) also found that Aborigines were significantly more likely to have used marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and petrol sniffing.

A study in Western Australia in 1994 found that Aboriginal women were 45 times more likely to experience violence from their husbands than Europeans (Donnan, 2001).

Racial disparities are widespread and maintaining in Australian society, according to the data. In cognitive tests, East Asian groups (Chinese IQ 105, Vietnamese 100) score at or above European Australian levels (IQ 100), whereas Aboriginal Australians score much lower (IQ 62). With bachelor's degree attainment ratios as low as 0.26 for men and 0.38 for women, and Aboriginal students lagging behind Europeans by 1.6–1.8 standard deviations in core subjects, this cognitive gap is evident in education.

Disparities in socioeconomic status are equally pronounced. By 1996, Aboriginal incomes were only 65% of European levels, and unemployment rates constantly doubled European's figure (from 9% in 1996 to 22.7% in 1996). Aboriginal workers experienced

39.8 weeks of unemployment, while English-speaking immigrants experienced 0.13 weeks. These labor market disadvantages are severe. These disparities also exist in the legal system, where the incarceration rate for Aboriginal adults is 26 times higher than that of Europeans.

There are concerning differences in social and health outcomes. Substance abuse rates among Aboriginal people are far higher than those in Europe; 53% of men reported drinking dangerously, compared to 4%, and smoking was almost twice as common. The most alarming finding was that the prevalence of domestic violence among Aboriginal women was 45 times greater than that of European women.

### *Hawaii*

**Table 120 : Racial differences in IQ in Hawaii**

#	Age	N	Test	East Asians	Europeans	Filipinos	Hawaiians	Puerto Ricans	Portuguese
1	9-13	513	Pintner	99	-	-	-	-	-
2	9-14	-	Binet	93	-	-	89	-	88
3	9-14	938	P.Mazes	101	99	98	100	-	92
4	7-12	770	P.Mazes	103	-	-	-	-	-
5	10-14	8,185	NV	101	100	89	86	75	91
6	10-14	8,185	Verbal	90	100	83	79	80	87
7	16-18	1,747	ACPT	97	100	78	-	-	-
8	16-18	683	SCAT-V	104	100	89	85	-	-
9	16-18	683	SCAT-Q	110	100	95	90	-	-
10	-	-	Med-V	94	100	95	85	80	92
11	-	-	Med-NV	103	100	83	90	75	88

**Table 121 : Racial differences in educational attainment in Hawaii**

#	Age	N	Subject	East Asians	Europeans	Filipinos	Hawaiians
1	10	16,508	Math	106	100	95	82
2	16	14,900	Math	107	100	93	89
3	9-16	15,044	Science	101	100	90	88
4	25+	-	Graduates	6%	-	0.3%	2.4%

**Table 122 : Racial differences in mental retardation in Hawaii**

#	Condition	East Asians	Europeans	Filipinos	Hawaiians	Puerto Ricans	Portuguese
1	Ment Ret	0.084	-	0.5	0.2	1.66	0.66
2	Ment Ret	0.4	0	3.6	2.8	-	8.70
3	Backward	2.4	0	9.4	13.9	-	21.7

**Table 123 : Racial differences in income in Hawaii in 1980**

Chinese	Japanese	Europeans	Part- Hawaiian	Filipinos	Hawaiian
23,859	23,209	20,823	16,445	16,361	11,997

**Table 124 : Racial differences in socioeconomic status in Hawaii**

<b>Europeans</b>	<b>East Asians</b>	<b>Portuguese</b>	<b>Hawaiians</b>	<b>Puerto Ricans</b>	<b>Filipinos</b>
3.84	2.80	2.62	2.22	1.85	1.50

**Table 125 : Crime rates per 1,000 population in Hawaii**

<b>Year</b>	<b>East Asians</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Filipinos</b>	<b>Hawaiians</b>	<b>Portuguese</b>	<b>Puerto Ricans</b>
<b>1924</b>	0.75	-	7.08	3.57	1.53	9.32
<b>1930</b>	2.57	12.50	16.64	17.01	-	28.10

**Table 126 : Crime rates in 1986 in Hawaii by race**

	<b>East Asians</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Filipinos</b>	<b>Hawaiians</b>	<b>Blacks</b>	<b>Samoans</b>
<b>Population %</b>	32.5	33.0	13.9	12.0	1.8	1.5
<b>Total arrests %</b>	9.0	34.5	12.3	23.4	4.0	4.7
<b>Murder arrests %</b>	8.1	13.5	54.0	13.5	-	16.2
<b>Drug arrests %</b>	10.5	45.5	8.6	16.9	6.2	2.2

**Table 127 : Racial differences in life expectancy in Hawaii**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Whites</b>	<b>East Asians</b>	<b>Filipinos</b>	<b>Hawaiians</b>
<b>1910</b>	54.83	51.75	-	32.58
<b>1920</b>	56.45	52.17	28.12	33.56
<b>1930</b>	61.90	60.07	46.14	41.87
<b>1940</b>	64.03	65.80	56.85	51.78
<b>1950</b>	69.21	71.16	69.05	62.45
<b>1960</b>	72.80	74.90	71.53	64.60
<b>1970</b>	73.24	76.77	72.61	67.62
<b>1980</b>	75.79	81.78	79.32	71.83
<b>1990</b>	75.53	82.49	78.94	74.27

East Asians (particularly Chinese and Japanese) and Europeans are consistently at the top of cognitive, educational, and economic metrics, which shows a distinct racial hierarchy. East Asians are more successful in school (106–107 in math compared to the European base of 100), have higher incomes, and score higher on IQ tests (e.g., 99–110 on nonverbal scales). Europeans maintain high socioeconomic status (3.84 SES score), longevity (peaking at 75.8 years by 1980), despite slightly lagging behind in some cognitive metrics. They also have higher rates of drug-related arrests (45.5%).

Filipinos and Native Hawaiians fall somewhere in between, with Filipinos having middling cognitive scores (83–95 IQ) but dangerously high rates of mental retardation (peaking at 9.4%) and violent crime (54% of murder arrests in 1986). Despite gradual

advances since 1950, Native Hawaiians still trail in education (2.4% graduation rates) and life expectancy (74.3 years by 1990).

At the bottom of the hierarchy, Puerto Ricans and Portuguese face severe disadvantages, such as the highest rates of mental retardation (8.7–21.7%), the highest rates of crime (in 1930, Puerto Ricans had 28.1 arrests per 1,000), and the lowest SES scores (1.5–2.62).

### *Latin America*

**Table 128 : Racial differences in IQ in Latin America**

<b>Group</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>European</b>	96
<b>Mestizo</b>	94
<b>Native American</b>	87
<b>East Asian</b>	99

**Table 129 : Race differences in Bolivia**

<b>#</b>	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Mestizo</b>	<b>Native Americans</b>
<b>1</b>	Population percent	1990	15	31	54
<b>2</b>	Years education	1966	4.5	-	1.2
<b>3</b>	Socioeconomic status	1966	41(19)	-	16(29)
<b>4</b>	Standard of living	1966	61(24)	-	40(24)



<b>5</b>	Years education	1989	9.7	6.5	0.4
<b>6</b>	No education percent	1989	2.8	11.0	77.9
<b>7</b>	Income per month	1989	591	-	359
<b>8</b>	Poverty percent	1989	11.0	77.9	82.5
<b>9</b>	Sick-injured percent	1989	14.3	20.5	38.8
<b>10</b>	Child mortality percent	1989	4.0	9.0	17.0
<b>11</b>	Fertility	1989	3.6	4.5	6.0
<b>12</b>	Children living	1989	3.1	3.6	4.3

**Table 130 : Race differences in math and Spanish in Bolivia (EQs)**

<b>Grade</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Native Americans</b>
<b>3</b>	Math	100	96
<b>3</b>	Spanish	100	95
<b>6</b>	Math	100	96

**Table 131 : Race differences in math and Spanish in Chile (EQs)**

<b>Grade</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Native Americans</b>
<b>4</b>	Math	100	94
<b>4</b>	Spanish	100	94
<b>8</b>	Math	100	93

**Table 132 : Race differences in Colombia**

	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Mestizos</b>	<b>Native Americans &amp; Blacks</b>
<b>Population %</b>	20.0	68.0	12.0
<b>SES-1 %</b>	76.1	21.7	2.2
<b>Lawyers %</b>	66.1	29.1	4.8

**Table 133 : Race differences in Ecuador**

	<b>Measure</b>	<b>Non-indigenous</b>	<b>Indigenous</b>
<b>1</b>	Years education: m	8.2	5.0
<b>2</b>	Years education: w	8.1	3.8
<b>3</b>	Percent literate: m	87.3	65.3
<b>4</b>	Percent literate: w	85.0	48.4
<b>5</b>	Earnings: m	148.0	80.8
<b>6</b>	Earnings: w	50.4	26.9
<b>7</b>	Percent poverty	46.1	84.3

**Table 134 : Race differences in Guatemala**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Mestizo</b>	<b>Native Americans</b>
<b>IQ</b>	1965	-	-	79
<b>Years education: men</b>	1989	9.8	4.5	1.8
<b>Years education: women</b>	1989	7.9	4.0	0.9
<b>Education: men none %</b>	1989	0	22	50
<b>Education: women none %</b>	1989	0	30	72
<b>Secondary educ: men %</b>	1989	-	17	2

<b>Secondary educ: women %</b>	1989	-	17	1
<b>Income per month-quetzales</b>	1989	238	111	34
<b>Poverty%</b>	1989	-	54	87
<b>Extreme poverty %</b>	1989	-	25	61
<b>Professional</b>	1989	-	7.9	1.3
<b>Administrative</b>	1989	-	3.9	0.7
<b>Office workers</b>	1989	-	5.1	0.5
<b>Artisans</b>	1989	-	18.2	14.7
<b>Agriculture</b>	1989	-	35.2	67.6
<b>Fertility</b>	1989	2.6	2.8	3.1
<b>Child mortality</b>	1985	-	120	142

**Table 135 : Race differences in Mexico**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Mestizo</b>	<b>Native American</b>
<b>IQ</b>	2003	98	94	83
<b>Years education</b>	1989	4.9	2.8	2.0
<b>Literate: percent</b>	1989	76	59	48
<b>Income: Pesos</b>	1989	324	112	91
<b>Poverty: percent</b>	1989	3	44	74
<b>Fertility</b>	1989	2.6	2.8	3.1

**Table 136 : Race and ethnic differences in the years of education in Peru**

<b>Age Groups</b>	<b>European- Mestizo</b>	<b>Native American</b>	<b>EMINA Ratio</b>
<b>60+</b>	6.7	4.8	1.40
<b>50-59</b>	7.7	4.7	1.64
<b>40-49</b>	9.1	5.6	1.63
<b>30-39</b>	10.5	6.6	1.59
<b>20-29</b>	11.0	7.7	1.43
<b>All ages</b>	8.1	5.6	1.47

**Table 137 : Race and ethnic differences in education in Peru (%)**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>European- Mestizo</b>	<b>Native American</b>
<b>Incomplete Primary</b>	7.0	26.5
<b>Completed Primary</b>	15.0	28.8
<b>Incomplete Secondary</b>	16.8	16.4
<b>Completed Secondary</b>	35.1	21.6
<b>Non-univ. Higher</b>	8.2	2.0
<b>University</b>	16.6	3.3

**Table 138 : Race and ethnic differences in literacy, and socioeconomic status  
in Peru**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>European- Mestizo</b>	<b>Native American</b>
<b>Illiterate</b>	5.2%	0.3%
<b>Income</b>	164.7	70.6
<b>Poverty</b>	50%	79%
<b>Farmers</b>	12%	66%
<b>Teachers</b>	6.1%	2.6%

Europeans are at the top of the racial-socioeconomic hierarchy in Latin America, followed by mestizos and Indigenous peoples. Traditional explanations blame discrimination for this discrepancy, but they don't explain why European and Asian minorities thrive while Indigenous majorities suffer economically. Intelligence disparities provide a more credible explanation: mestizos, who have some European ancestry, have higher IQs than Indigenous groups, which is consistent with their intermediate status. Similarly, despite being small minorities, East Asians (Japanese and Chinese) prosper because of their high IQs and strong work ethic, a fact that social scientists frequently ignore.

Equalizing education would lessen inequality, according to some economists, who contend that educational gaps are the root cause of these disparities. This, however, conflates correlation with causation, differences in IQ probably affect both earnings and educational attainment. Research indicates that Indigenous groups continue to be poorer even when educational attainment is equal (Wood and Patrinos, 1994), indicating that other factors, such as innate cognitive differences, may be at play. A sizable amount of the gap cannot be explained (16%), even though parental education and school quality help to explain some of it.

The racial hierarchy in Latin America ultimately reflects innate differences in intelligence: Indigenous groups lag behind, mestizos hold a middle position, and Europeans and East Asians excel due to their superior cognitive ability. This trend continues to exist throughout the world, casting doubt on solely sociocultural theories of economic inequality.

*The Netherlands***Table 139 : Racial differences in cognitive ability in the Netherlands**

<b>Group</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Verbal</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>	<b>Arithmetic</b>
<b>Dutch</b>	55,156	74	71	70
<b>NW Europeans</b>	159	73	67	69
<b>South Europeans</b>	210	67	61	64
<b>Chinese</b>	150	63	59	73
<b>Moluccans</b>	217	61	59	56
<b>Indians</b>	338	58	55	53
<b>Creole</b>	523	58	55	48
<b>Moroccans</b>	730	54	50	49
<b>Turks</b>	815	53	49	51

**Table 140 : Verbal IQ by race in the Netherlands**

<b>Generation</b>	<b>Dutch</b>	<b>Caribbean</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>Indonesian</b>	<b>Moroccan</b>	<b>Turks</b>
<b>First</b>	100	84	-	-	81	81
<b>Second</b>	100	88	105	94	88	88



**Table 141 : Correlations between IQ and length of residence in the Netherlands**

<b>Verbal</b>	<b>Non-Verbal Reasoning</b>	<b>Numerical</b>	<b>Spatial</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>0.31</b>	-	0.12	0.01	De Tong & van Batenburg, 1984
<b>0.30</b>	-0.01	0.05	-	Van Leest & Bleichrodt, 1990

It is evident from both studies that verbal Dutch language proficiency and length of residency in the Netherlands are positively linked, but there are very weak relationships between nonverbal reasoning, numerical and spatial IQs, and length of residency in the Netherlands, once again supporting that environment doesn't play a significant role in intelligence.

**Table 142 : Race differences in expected and actual educational attainment in the Netherlands**

<b>Educational Level</b>	<b>Indigenou s</b>	<b>Antillean s</b>	<b>Moroccan s</b>	<b>Surinamese</b>	<b>Turks</b>
<b>Expected</b>	52	46	22	39	28
<b>Actual</b>	52	26	10	28	13

**Table 143 : Race differences in educational attainment in the Netherlands**

**Dutch                      Surinamese                      Turks                      Moroccans**

<b>Primary only</b>	20	30	70	80
<b>Some High school</b>	18	29	-	-
<b>Completed High school</b>	54	56	-	-
<b>University Degree</b>	28	15	-	-

Table 144 : Race Differences in socioeconomic status

<b>SES</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Dutch</b>	5.3	8.4	30.1	24.4	31.9
<b>Turk/Moroccans</b>	-	-	9.2	20.0	70.8

Table 145 : Race differences in unemployment in the Netherlands

<b>Year</b>	<b>Indigenous</b>	<b>Antilleans</b>	<b>Moroccans</b>	<b>Surinamese</b>	<b>Turks</b>	<b>Europeans</b>
<b>1979</b>	6	-	-	25	-	-
<b>1989</b>	13	24	44	23	42	-
<b>1995</b>	8	23	27	25	22	18

Table 146 : Race and ethnic differences in juvenile crime (odds ratios)

<b>Dutch</b>	<b>Creoles</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Moroccans</b>	<b>Turks</b>	<b>Reference</b>
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<b>1</b>	1.0	1.9	0.9	-	-	Junger and Polder, 1993
<b>2</b>	1.0	2.7	-	3.8	1.4	Junger-Tas, 1997

### *New Zealand*

**Table 147 : Racial IQ in New Zealand**

<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>European</b>	100
<b>Part-Pacific Islander</b>	96
<b>Part-Maori</b>	94
<b>Maori</b>	89
<b>Pacific Islanders</b>	88

**Table 148 : Racial differences in educational attainment in New Zealand**

<b>Education</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>part- Maori</b>	<b>Maori</b>	<b>Chinese</b>
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<b>School Certificate</b>	1960	29.7	-	4.8	-
<b>Primary only</b>	1966	27.0	-	45.0	-
<b>Degree</b>	1966	7.2	-	1.1	-
<b>School Certificate</b>	1969	47.3	-	13.1	-
<b>School Certificate</b>	1986	64.5	56.5	34.5	-
<b>University Degree</b>	1986	6.9	4.0	0.9	10.2
<b>School Certificate</b>	1996	70.5	62.5	37.5	-
<b>University Degree</b>	1996	12.2	5.8	2.2	18.0

Table 149 : Racial differences in earnings (NZ\$) in New Zealand

<b>Income</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Part-Maori</b>	<b>Maori</b>
<b>M&amp;F</b>	1966	22.1	-	4.8

<b>Men</b>	1986	19521	16597	14349
<b>Women</b>	1986	9841	9167	8301
<b>Men</b>	1996	34071	26217	23575

**Table 150 : Median Maori incomes as a percentage of median European incomes**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>1961</b>	89.8%	90.8%	90.3%	Nicol & Ffiske 1991
<b>1981</b>	83.3%	80.1%	81.7%	Nicol & Ffiske 1991
<b>1986</b>	80.6%	97.7%	88.9%	Statistics NZ
<b>1991</b>	64.7%	87.5%	75.5%	Statistics NZ
<b>1996</b>	73.0%	89.3%	79.3%	Statistics NZ

**Table 151 : Racial differences in unemployment in New Zealand**

<b>Year</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>part- Maori</b>	<b>Maori</b>	<b>Reference</b>
<b>Unemployed: men 1986</b>	2.5	5.0	7.4	Maani 2004

**Unemployed: women**      3.8                      6.8                      8.2                      Maani 2004  
**1986**

**Unemployed: men 1996**      3.8                      8.3                      12.8                      Maani 2004

**Unemployed: women**      3.5                      9.3                      11.8                      Maani 2004  
**1996**

**Table 152 : Criminal convictions per 1,000 males aged 15 and over in New Zealand**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Assault</b>	<b>Theft</b>	<b>Drunkenness</b>	<b>Sex Crimes</b>
<b>White NZ</b>	0.61	5.71	5.17	0.40
<b>Poles</b>	2.12	5.56	21.25	0.17
<b>Scots</b>	0.87	3.64	15.27	0.24
<b>English</b>	0.71	3.73	7.04	0.30
<b>Yugoslavs</b>	1.03	2.16	3.04	0.08
<b>Maori</b>	4.79	27.57	15.46	1.49
<b>Samoans</b>	14.03	8.45	29.50	2.00
<b>Chinese</b>	0.42	0.89	0.86	0.13

**Table 153 : Crime rates per annum of 18-21-year-olds in New Zealand**

<b>Crime</b>	<b>Europeans</b>	<b>Maori</b>	<b>Odds Ratio</b>
<b>Convictions: serious</b>	5.2	30.3	5.9
<b>Convictions: all</b>	11.0	44.7	4.1

<b>Self-reported: serious</b>	136	452	3.2
<b>Self-reported: other</b>	1193	1452	1.1
<b>Cannabis: convictions</b>	2.2	13.1	6.0
<b>Cannabis: self-reported</b>	3.3	17.1	5.2

Given that mental illness is linked to low IQ, it is not surprising that Maori and Pacific Islanders have greater rates of mental illness than Europeans. After controlling for age and sex, the 12-month prevalence of any serious mental disorder in the 2003–4 Mental Health Survey was 4.2% for Europeans, 7.6% for Maori, and 5.3% for Pacific Islanders (Baxter, Kokaua, Wells et al., 2006).

With the highest percentage of university degrees, the highest socioeconomic standing, and the lowest crime rates, the Chinese are considered the "model minority" in New Zealand: "Chinese success in education and occupation and their relative invisibility in the law courts established them as whiter than white... they were a model minority" (Yee, 2003, p. 218).


The Pacific Islanders and Maori are an underclass with high crime rates and poor educational and occupational attainment. Pacific Islanders and part Maoris perform better. Several psychologists in New Zealand have demonstrated that Pacific Islanders and Maori have low IQs and do poorly on academic assessments. They have linked these deficiencies to negative environmental factors, particularly a comparatively low level of intellectual stimulation.

None have proposed that some Maori and Pacific Islanders belong to a racial underclass akin to the Aborigines in Australia and the Native American Indians in North and South America, or that genetic factors may play a role.

A number of environmentalist explanations have been put forth by economists in New Zealand who are aware that Maori and Pacific Islanders perform poorly in terms of educational and occupational attainment. Maori may have "different tastes and preferences," particularly a greater preference for leisure, according to Simon Chapple (2000), a senior research economist in the New Zealand Department of Labour.

The low intelligence of the Maori is not mentioned by Chapple or any other economist as a potential cause of their poor performance, high crime, and drug abuse rates. Although test bias is blamed for the low intelligence test scores of Maori, some members of the general public are aware of this. In the House of Representatives, the Education Minister declared in 1978 that "the tests are culturally biased" (Beck and St. George, 1983, p. 34).

The [scientific consensus](#) on whether IQ tests are culturally biased is clear : there is no evidence that IQ tests are biased by culture.



Maori and Pacific Islanders have lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, and worse health than Europeans, according to medical experts. According to Trovato (2001, p. 82), infective and parasitic diseases, as well as respiratory disorders, are "the leading killers for the Maori." He blames European prejudice and discrimination for



these greater death rates, but he doesn't elaborate on how Europeans bear responsibility.

### *Southeast Asia*

**Table 154 : IQ of Chinese and Southeast Asians in Southeast Asia**

<b>Country</b>	<b>N Studies</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>Southeast Asians</b>
<b>China</b>	10	105	-
<b>Hong Kong</b>	9	108	-
<b>Taiwan</b>	11	105	-
<b>Indonesia</b>	4	-	87
<b>Laos</b>	2	-	89
<b>Malaysia</b>	1	99	89
<b>Philippines</b>	1	-	86
<b>Singapore</b>	2	107	93
<b>Thailand</b>	1	-	91
<b>Median</b>	-	105	89

**Table 155 : Chinese populations and control of the wealth in Southeast Asia (%)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Control of Wealth</b>	<b>Per Capita GDP</b>
<b>Cambodia</b>	4.0	-	1257
<b>Indonesia</b>	3.8	73	2651

<b>Malaysia</b>	28.0	69	8137
<b>Philippines</b>	1.3	55	3555
<b>Singapore</b>	77.0	81	24210
<b>Thailand</b>	10.0	81	5456
<b>Vietnam</b>	2.6	38	1689

**Table 156 : Income of Chinese, Indians and Malays in Malaysia**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Malays</b>
<b>1957</b>	272	217	144
<b>1967</b>	321	253	130
<b>1987</b>	1430	1089	868
<b>1990</b>	1631	1201	928
<b>1999</b>	3456	-	1984

**Table 157 : Race differences in Malaysia in the percentages in middle class and other status**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Malays</b>
<b>Population</b>	1988	32	10	58
<b>Middle class</b>	1975	48	38	13

<b>Doctors</b>	1975	45	40	4
<b>Dentists</b>	1975	89	5	3
<b>Professionals</b>	1988	60	25	14
<b>Unemployed</b>	1980	3.9	6.2	6.7
<b>Unemployed</b>	1985	5.5	8.4	8.7
<b>Accountants</b>	2000	77	6	17
<b>Architects</b>	2000	56	1	43
<b>Doctors</b>	2000	32	30	38
<b>Engineers</b>	2000	52	5	43
<b>Lawyers</b>	2000	40	7	33

Table 158 : Wealth held by Chinese, Malays, Indians and foreigners in Malaysia

(%)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Malays</b>	<b>Foreigners</b>
<b>Population</b>	32	10	58	-
<b>1969</b>	22.8	0.9	1.5	62.1
<b>1982</b>	33.4	0.9	15.6	34.7
<b>1990</b>	45.5	1.0	19.3	25.4

<b>1995</b>	40.9	1.5	20.6	27.7
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**Table 159 : Educational attainment by race in Singapore**

<b>Criterion</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Chinese</b>	<b>Indians</b>	<b>Malays</b>
<b>PSLE: pass</b>	1988	89.4	79.4	70.5
<b>PSLE: pass</b>	1990	91.1	80.2	74.1
<b>PSLE: pass</b>	1992	93.4	86.3	81.8
<b>English</b>	1984	87.7	84.9	74.3
<b>English</b>	1991	95.4	92.7	88.4
<b>Mathematics</b>	1984	83.3	51.8	37.4
<b>Mathematics</b>	1991	84.9	55.9	46.6
<b>O Level: 3 passes</b>	1980	72.0	62.0	48.0
<b>O Level: 3 passes</b>	1988	91.0	81.0	78.0
<b>O Level: 3 passes</b>	1992	93.0	86.3	81.8
<b>O Level: 5 passes</b>	1992	60.0	35.0	24.0
<b>Degrees</b>	1992	9.9	6.4	1.4

How is it that, with the exception of Malaysia and Singapore, very small segments of the Chinese population have been able to acquire such substantial shares of the wealth in Southeast Asia? Why did the Chinese manage to climb to the top of the socioeconomic hierarchy by the 20th century after beginning at the bottom when they came to work as traders, miners, and agricultural laborers? Economists and sociologists have found it challenging to explain this. Marxism, which holds that a dominant class suppresses other classes to preserve its own position, is the source of the conventional sociological theory of group differences in education, socioeconomic status, and earnings. Consequently, this is applied to dominant races oppressing subordinate races. The theory is not applicable to Southeast Asia, where the Chinese

have emerged as the most prosperous group in terms of both socioeconomic standing and economic success, despite the fact that indigenous peoples have historically constituted the majority class (with the exception of Singapore).

A lot of effort has gone into trying to explain why the Chinese have been so successful in Southeast Asia. The eight most frequently put forth theories are as follows.

(i) Confucianism. Numerous academics have credited Confucianism's emphasis on hard work, saving, and education with the Chinese people's economic success (e.g., Redding, 1990; Li, 1992). The most widely accepted explanation of Chinese business success links it to Confucianism, which holds that the foundation of Confucianism is to work hard for the benefit of the family (Suryadinata, 2001, p. 66). According to Cindy Fan, a geography professor at the University of California, Confucianism is generally accepted by geographers as a key element contributing to the socioeconomic prosperity of the Chinese: "the high priority given to education is rooted in Confucianism, and is transferred from immigrants to their children." "This is ironic because as recently as the 1970s Western culturalists were blaming Confucianism for the economic backwardness of the Chinese," Jomo remarks, however (1997, p. 237). It only takes a brief moment of thinking to identify this theory's deficiencies. How do the Japanese perform on par with or even outperform the Chinese in terms of earnings in the United States if Confucianism is a major contributing factor to the Chinese's high level of educational attainment?

(ii) Networks of families. Numerous sociologists have claimed that the remarkably robust family networks of the Chinese are responsible for their socioeconomic success across Southeast Asia. Jesuson (1997, p. 122), for example.

Similarly, Chinese sociologist Ma (2003, p. 28) states that "cultural networks, particularly those based on family and place of origin, have long been recognized by scholars as being important to the success of the Chinese in the business world."

(iii) Desire for wealth. According to some sociologists, Chinese people have an exceptionally strong desire for wealth. In his discussion of the socioeconomic success of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, McVey (1992, p. 24) refers to their "desire for wealth accumulation," whereas Reid (1997, p. 40) more directly describes their "greed."

(iv) Middleman minority. Sociologist Anthony Reid claims that "middleman minority" is "the most recently fashionable term in the North American sociological literature" (Reid, 1997, p. 36). According to the theory, immigrants "occupy particular niches in small business." Why are some indigenous populations unable to fill these niches, why are Chinese in Southeast Asia especially skilled at doing so, and why are not all immigrants able to fill these niches? There is no explanation for this.

(v) Minority status. Another commonly advanced theory is this one. "Ethnic minority status has also been used to account for success in the economic domain; according to this theory, the ethnic Chinese are a clannish group; members help each other in business and use ethnic networks to promote economic interests" (Suryadinata, 2001). Chinese believe that "high educational attainment is a strategy to compensate for discrimination in the labor market and a means to overcome racebased discrimination in achieving social mobility" (Fan, 2003, page 279).

This theory's flaw is that it ignores the fact that Indians, who are a minority in both Malaysia and Singapore, perform far worse than Chinese, who do equally well in Singapore, where they make up the majority.

(vi) Education. American sociologist Charles Hirschman, who specializes in Malaysia, explained the high socioeconomic status of the Chinese by arguing that some groups value education, make sure their children receive more of it, and as a result, they do better in the socioeconomic hierarchy. Education has often been used to explain the successes of some racial groups and the failures of others.

Chinese people are so successful because their parents have achieved success and provided them with greater education. Chinese parents succeeded because their parents succeeded, and so on, for generations. Despite not having a socioeconomic level advantage in the nineteenth century, the Chinese were nevertheless able to move up the socioeconomic status scale. What can explain this? After seeing the issue, Hirschman queries, "why were Chinese men more able to take advantage of the emerging opportunities?" (1984, p. 18). His response is lame: "while it is impossible to address this question with the data in hand, it may be that Chinese are better positioned to take advantage of the diverse structure of employment in towns." The Chinese were clearly fortunate to be in the right position at the right moment.

Hirschman points out that while normal sociological theory explains a large portion of the Chinese population's success in terms of wealth and socioeconomic status by pointing to higher socioeconomic status and education, it falls short of offering a comprehensive explanation. Therefore, it would seem that the Chinese must have an extra edge. What might this be? Hirschman relies on this well-worn explanation, which economists and sociologists frequently use when confronted with this issue: "it seems that employers, especially in the small-shop sector that dominates retail trade, are more likely to hire on the basis of ascriptive criteria of ethnic identity" (Hirschman, 1984, p. 4). Employers prefer Chinese, to put it simply.

(vii) Personality qualities. Numerous authors have attributed the Chinese people's economic prosperity to a range of human traits. "The Chinese in Southeast Asia have produced an astounding number of success stories in business and what used to be called the 'liberal professions'; much of this success is owing to a high degree of adaptability," writes Daniel Chirot (1997, p. 25), a professor of international studies at the University of Washington, who attributes their success to their ability to adapt.

However, what is this flexibility exactly, and is it related to intelligence? Chirot doesn't even suggest that this could be true.

The answer to the question is found in "Chinese immigrant entrepreneurial virtues: diligence, patience, self-reliance, discipline, determination, parsimony, self-denial, business acumen, friendship, family ties, honesty, shrewdness, modesty," according to Kasian Tejapira (1997, p. 76), a political science lecturer at the University of Thammasat in Bangkok. Everything is covered here, with the exception of the vital trait of high intelligence.

(viii) Luck. Some have relied on good fortune as the primary cause of the Chinese success. John Wong and Sritua Arief, two economists from the National University of Singapore and the Southeast Asia Research and Development Institute in Kuala Lumpur, have put forth this theory to explain the Chinese success in Malaysia, arguing that it is straightforward and entirely due to luck:

The economic explanation of the ethnic-based income inequality in Malaysia is actually quite simple to follow. The glaring income gaps between the Chinese and Malays were mainly caused by the fact that the former were in the modern-sector employment located in the urban areas (65% of the Chinese were in manufacturing in 1970 as compared with only 29% of the Malays) while the majority of the latter were mainly engaged in low-productivity subsistence farming in the rural areas (68% of the Malays in agriculture as compared with 21% of the Chinese). In other words, the Chinese were in a much better position than the Malays to benefit from the process of modern economic growth (Wong and Arief, 1984, pp. 33-34).

All of these theories have the flaw of being post hoc recommendations for certain Chinese success stories; the attributes put up for this achievement are immeasurable and unreliable.



The entire pattern of Chinese success, not just in Southeast Asia but globally, is not acknowledged by them. High intelligence is the common factor that accounts for the socioeconomic success of the Chinese, not just in Southeast Asia but in many other places as well. The Chinese's socioeconomic success can be explained by their 16 IQ point advantage over native Southeast Asians, which is nearly identical to the 15 IQ point advantage that white people have over black people in the US.

It's also possible that Chinese people are more conscientious or have a better work ethic as personality traits. Despite having nearly identical IQs, Indians outperform Malays in Malaysia and Singapore in terms of their economic and social accomplishments, which implies that racial differences in personality traits also play a role in socioeconomic status and earnings disparities. The Indian population in Malaysia is quite new, and it's possible that those with these personality traits were the ones that moved there.

American sociologists Gary Hamilton and Tony Waters ask, "Why are the Chinese so successful in business?" (1997, p. 258). They keep going "This question has been asked again and again in reference to the Chinese in virtually every location outside of China where they have settled in substantial numbers in the past 150 years." However, they have no response. They only draw the conclusion that "a disproportionately high level of Chinese success and an extraordinary ability of new groups of Chinese to adapt to whatever situation they found" had occurred throughout Southeast Asia. It is still unclear what it is about Chinese people that makes this possible (Hamilton and Waters, 1997, p. 279).

The answer to this question is that the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia are not as intelligent as the Chinese.

*The United States***Table 160 : Racial IQs in the USA**

<b>Race</b>	<b>IQ</b>
<b>Jews</b>	110
<b>East Asians</b>	104
<b>Whites</b>	100
<b>Southeast Asians</b>	92
<b>Hispanics</b>	89
<b>Native Americans</b>	86
<b>Blacks</b>	85

**Table 161 : Racial differences in mental retardation in the USA**

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Asian</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>White</b>	<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>Native American</b>
<b>MR</b>	-	5.3	1.7	-	-
<b>MR</b>	0.5	2.1	1.0	1.0	1.2
<b>LD</b>	2.0	7.0	6.0	5.4	6.3
<b>LD</b>	-	18.6	9.7	15.0	-

Table 162 : Racial differences in high school diploma &amp; college degree

Group	H.S. 1980	Diploma	H.S. 1990	Diploma	Degree 1990
<b>Blacks</b>	62		75		13
<b>East Asians</b>	86		91		37
<b>Hispanics</b>	43		51		10
<b>Jews</b>	92		97		-
<b>Native Americans</b>	62		75		-
<b>S.E. Asians</b>	-		-		20
<b>Whites</b>	79		91		26

Table 163 : Race differences in educational attainment in relation to whites (ds)

Group	Year	Age	Math	Reading	Science
<b>East Asians</b>	1965	9-18	-0.19	-0.29	-
<b>Blacks</b>	1965	9-18	-1.01	-0.93	-
<b>Hispanics</b>	1965	9-18	-0.97	-0.81	-
<b>Native Americans</b>	1965	9-18	-0.81	-0.73	-
<b>Asians</b>	1988	16	0.10	-0.10	-0.11
<b>Blacks</b>	1988	16	-0.68	-0.58	-0.68

<b>Hispanics</b>	1988	16	-0.58	-0.52	-0.55
<b>Asians</b>	1989	18	0.13	-0.30	-
<b>Blacks</b>	1989	18	-0.66	-0.51	-
<b>Hispanics</b>	1989	18	-0.56	-0.49	-
<b>Vietnamese</b>	1994	15	0.27	-0.33	-
<b>Cambodians</b>	1994	15	-0.40	-1.1	-

Table 164 : Race and ethnic percentile scores of 8th graders, 1992

<b>Group</b>	<b>Math</b>	<b>Science</b>
<b>East Asians</b>	73	67
<b>Filipinos</b>	62	57
<b>Southeast Asians</b>	61	52
<b>Whites</b>	56	56
<b>Hispanics</b>	39	37
<b>Pacific Islanders</b>	39	36
<b>Blacks</b>	33	29
<b>Native Americans</b>	29	29

Table 165 : Racial differences in SAT scores

<b>Group</b>	<b>Math</b>	<b>Verbal</b>
<b>Asians</b>	575	508
<b>Whites</b>	534	529
<b>Native Americans</b>	482	480

<b>Mexicans</b>	457	448
<b>Puerto Ricans</b>	453	456
<b>Blacks</b>	426	431

**Table 166 : Racial differences in earnings (1000\$)**

<b>Group</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1990</b>
<b>Asians</b>	23.5	46.4
<b>East Asians</b>	26.6	-
<b>Southeast Asians</b>	20.3	-
<b>Blacks</b>	18.6	24.5
<b>Hispanics</b>	19.3	-
<b>Jews</b>	32.4	-
<b>Native Americans</b>	19.1	-
<b>Whites</b>	23.4	46.4

**Table 167 : Race and ethnic differences in average annual incomes and wealth**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Income 1990</b>	<b>Wealth 1992</b>	<b>Native Wealth</b>
<b>Whites</b>	12,159	105,064	146,821
<b>Asians</b>	-	96,475	-
<b>East Asians</b>	-	-	-
<b>Japanese</b>	15,802	-	135,575

<b>Chinese</b>	12,695	-	191,824
<b>Taiwanese</b>	13,301	-	-
<b>Koreans</b>	10,177	-	91,955
<b>Southeast Asians</b>	-	-	-
<b>Filipinos</b>	12,314	-	74,224
<b>Cambodians</b>	3,760	-	-
<b>Hmong</b>	1,192	-	-
<b>Laotians</b>	4,250	-	-
<b>Vietnamese</b>	7,931	-	38,447
<b>Mexicans</b>	-	38,014	26,320
<b>Puerto Ricans</b>	-	26,971	-
<b>Blacks</b>	7,210	23,414	19,402

Table 168 : Average per capita income (1000\$) vs % White

<b>Group</b>	<b>Income</b>	<b>%White</b>
<b>Argentina</b>	15,506	85
<b>Chile</b>	12,728	75
<b>Cubans</b>	11,727	85
<b>Bolivia</b>	10,662	68

<b>Costa Rica</b>	10,616	59
<b>Puerto Rico</b>	7,250	46
<b>Guatemala</b>	7,104	42
<b>El Salvador</b>	6,745	39
<b>Mexico</b>	6,470	51

The source of these data is Bonilla-Silva (2004). It will be observed that the percentage of people who identified as white and average incomes have a strong linear relationship. The majority of immigrants from Argentina, Chile, and Cuba are white, and their average incomes are the highest. The lowest percentage of white immigrants and those with the lowest average incomes come from Puerto Rico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico. The percentage of white immigrants from Colombia and Costa Rica is in the middle, and their incomes are average.

**Table 169 : Prevalence of the gifted (rows 1 and 2: odds ratios; row 3: percentages)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Asian</b>	<b>Black</b>	<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>Native American</b>	<b>White</b>
<b>1984- 1993</b>	1.80	0.45	0.45	0.90	1.60
<b>1988</b>	2.17	0.37	0.45	0.17	1.86

<b>UC</b>	32	2.5	3.5	-	12.4
<b>Eligible</b>					

**Table 170 : Race differences in rates of crime in 1994 (odds ratios)**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Prison</b>	<b>Assault</b>	<b>Homicide</b>	<b>Rape</b>	<b>Robbery</b>
<b>Black</b>	8.1	5.0	11.0	5.5	11.2
<b>East Asian</b>	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.8
<b>Hispanic</b>	3.6	3.0	2.5	3.0	3.0
<b>Native American</b>	2.7	2.0	2.0	1.7	2.1
<b>White</b>	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

The Bell Curve by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) demonstrated that in the US, the disparities in educational attainment, earnings, socioeconomic status, poverty, crime, and a host of other social phenomena can be largely explained by the differences in intelligence between whites, Hispanics, and Blacks. Four additional racial groups are included in this chapter's analysis: Native Americans, East Asians, Jews, and Southeast Asians. As we have seen, the thesis is valid for all seven racial groups. Jews have the highest IQ (110) and outperform all other social phenomena studied by Herrnstein and Murray in terms of education, income, eminence, and other factors. The model minority, East Asians (IQ 104), are next, and white people (IQ 100) are right behind



them. Blacks (IQ 85), Native Americans (IQ 86), Hispanics (IQ 89), and Southeast Asians (IQ 92) are in descending order below these. The prevalence of mental retardation, educational attainment, earnings, socioeconomic status, poverty, giftedness and eminence, crime, mortality, and fertility are all indicators of the racial gradient in intelligence.

Although we often read about the social pathologies of America's minorities, two of these groups—East Asians and Jews—perform better than the white majority on all of these social criteria. What is the explanation for this? Those who blame white racism and discrimination for the social issues facing Blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics tend to overlook this question. Sometimes it is challenged, and a bizarre justification is put forth. Accordingly, historian David Bell (1985, p. 30) writes of the ethnic Chinese and Japanese that "All the various explanations of Asian Americans' success tend to fall into one category: self-sufficiency." However, Bell offers no proof that Asians are particularly self-sufficient or that self-sufficiency is a factor in socioeconomic and educational success.

Jews and East Asians are more commonly attributed with cultural values that support socioeconomic and educational success. The accomplishments of these two groups, for example, "are the product of cultural values that they have brought with them and transmitted from generation to generation over a very long time," according to Harvard historian Stephan Thernstrom and his wife (Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 2003, p. 98). However, they provide no proof that Asians and Jews possess the cultural values necessary for socioeconomic and educational success.

It seems that making claims is enough in the world of Harvard history professors, and providing evidence to back them up is not seen as necessary. However, as Flynn (1991) argues in the case of East Asians, it is possible that these two groups have an extra advantage beyond their high IQ: greater motivation for achievement.

The spatial segregation theory, which has been the subject of entire books by Wilson (1987) and Massey and Denton (1993), offers yet another surreal explanation for the racial disparities in all these social phenomena. Johns Hopkins University sociologist Hao, who

writes that "persistent racial segregation remains the main force shaping social inequality," is persuaded by this theory (Hao, 2004). According to the theory, Black people, Hispanic people, and Mexican people typically reside in racially segregated neighborhoods, which accounts for their low incomes. Cause and effect are misunderstood by the sociologists and economists who support this theory. These racial groups reside in impoverished areas as a result of their poverty.

They either don't know or don't want to think about how well IQ variations account for variations in wealth, income, and education.

Finally, we should mention that racial differences in fertility are inversely correlated with IQ differences. Blacks and Hispanics with lower average IQs have more children than Whites and East Asians, who have the fewest children on average. However, there is an exception in that Asians and Hispanics were more fertile than Blacks in 2002. Despite having higher average IQs than black people, Hispanics have higher fertility rates primarily because they are Roman Catholics and recent immigrants who have not learned to control their fertility. Due to the large number of recent South Asian immigrants who have also not adapted to controlling their fertility, Asians have higher fertility rates.

#### ***Other Southeast Asian countries***

**Cambodia** : "in the cities, Chinese dominated retail, the restaurant and hotel business, export-import trade, and light industry, including food processing, soft drinks, printing and machine shops; no less than 95 percent of the commercial class was Chinese; the richest men during this period were Chinese" (Pan, 1998, p. 146). Chinese were 4% of the population.

**Indonesia** : According to Mosher (2000), the Chinese owned 110 of the 140 biggest business conglomerates in the nation, while Gooszen (2002) estimates that they dominated 90% of the economy in the first half of the 20th century. The Chinese "have

a controlling position in the modern economy; most large corporations are in ethnic Chinese hands" at the end of the 20th century (Pan, 1998, p. 151).

### **Conclusion**

In this section we examined whether The Bell Curve theory by Herrnstein and Murray, which holds that racial differences in intelligence account for differences in health, education, income, crime, and other social outcomes, is applicable everywhere. Higher-IQ groups (Europeans, East Asians, and Jews) achieve greater socioeconomic success, better health, and lower crime rates, while lower-IQ groups (sub-Saharan Africans, Native Americans, and indigenous peoples) lag behind. These findings provide strong support for their thesis, demonstrating consistent racial hierarchies around the world.

### ***Sociological Theory Criticism***

Assimilation theory, the first theory discussed, postulates that immigrants will eventually attain socioeconomic parity and integrate into their host societies over the course of several generations. This is true for some groups, like Chinese, Japanese, and European immigrants, but it doesn't explain why other groups, especially African immigrants, still face difficulties. This theory is flawed because it assumes that all racial groups are equally intelligent, a claim the book contends is unsupported by the data.

The section then looks at structuralism and discrimination theory, which holds that racial groups in positions of power continue to oppress others in order to stay in power. The success of high-IQ minorities like the Chinese in Southeast Asia or the Jews in Western societies, who have prospered in spite of discrimination, is not explained by this theory, although it may explain some historical instances, such as racial hierarchies in Latin America or apartheid in South Africa. The notion that racial disparities are solely caused by discrimination is called into question by the success of these groups.

Minority status theory, which contends that certain minority groups thrive because of special advantages like "market objectivity," exclusion-driven motivation, or robust ethnic

business networks, is another theory taken into consideration. This may help to explain the successes of East Asians and Jews, but it doesn't explain why other minorities, like immigrants from South Asia and Africa, don't have the same success. The section reinforces the role of intelligence in socioeconomic outcomes by arguing that these alleged advantages only benefit high-IQ minorities.

According to theories of cultural values, certain groups' success can be attributed to characteristics like a strong work ethic, high achievement motivation, or delayed gratification. Although these factors might be important, the section notes that they are hard to quantify and frequently made without proof. Furthermore, a more consistent explanation for why some groups consistently perform better than others in various societies is that of differences in intelligence.

Ogbu put forth a variation of cultural theory that makes a distinction between involuntary and voluntary minorities. While involuntary minorities, like Native Americans or African slaves, suffer because of historical oppression and cultural resistance, voluntary minorities, like Jews and East Asians, are said to thrive because they migrated and adopted the dominant culture. This theory, however, breaks down when taking into account populations such as Black majorities in the Caribbean who continue to face economic disadvantages or African and Hispanic immigrants who migrate willingly but still perform poorly. The section comes to the conclusion that the deciding factor is intelligence rather than immigration status.

### ***The Power of IQ-Based Justification***

The section claims that four important global patterns can be better explained by the racial IQ theory. First, it explains why racial hierarchies are constant across societies, with high-IQ groups continuously outperforming low-IQ groups in terms of health, income, and education. Second, since environmental explanations are insufficient to explain why the same groups perform well or poorly in wildly disparate

contexts, the universality of these hierarchies points to a genetic basis for intelligence differences.

Third, the theory clarifies why mixed-race populations—like mulattos in the Caribbean or mestizos in Latin America—occupy middle-level positions in socioeconomic hierarchies, which is indicative of their intermediate IQs within the two parent races. Lastly, it explains why some high-IQ minorities—such as East Asians and Jews—acquire fast status in new societies in spite of discrimination, while other groups do not.

The section comes to the conclusion that conventional sociological theories, which rely on ad hoc and unquantifiable assumptions, fall short of offering a satisfactory explanation for enduring racial disparities. In contrast, racial hierarchies' persistence across time and space can be explained by intelligence differences, which provide a reliable and empirically based explanation. The section claims that racial IQ differences are the main cause of socioeconomic outcomes globally, with other factors like discrimination, culture, and minority status possibly playing a supporting role.

### **Differences in civilization built by races**

There will be three sections to this paragraph. In the first, we will examine how, from antiquity to the present, technological, economic, and scientific advancements have differed among populations and regions. I will then go over research that demonstrates how a society's level of development long before the industrial revolution or even recorded history can be used to predict its current level of national wealth. Lastly, I will highlight some significant historical and immigration-related ramifications of this research.

### ***Technology & science***

Let's start by examining the technological sophistication of different groups throughout human history. Making a list of the products and skills that, when possessed, indicate a society is at the forefront of technology for a certain amount of time and then

counting how many of these things a society possesses is one method of gauging technological advancement.

In order to assess civilization's technological advancement between 1000 BC and 0 AD, [Comin, Easterly, and Gong \(2010\)](#) developed the following basket of goods:

TABLE 2—CODING CONCORDANCE BETWEEN “ACE” AND THE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION DATASET

“ACE” dataset	Technology dataset for 1000 BC and 0 AD*
Writing and records	Communication
1 = None	
2 = Mnemonic or nonwritten records	0, 1
3 = True writing	0, 1
Technological specialization	Industry
1 = None	
2 = Pottery	0, 1
3 = Metalwork (alloys, forging, casting)	0, 1
Land transport	Transportation
1 = Human only	
2 = Pack or draft animals	0, 1
3 = Vehicles	0, 1
Agriculture	Agriculture
1 = None	0
2 = 10 percent or more, but secondary	1
3 = Primary	2
Military	Military
1 = Stone tools	
2 = Bronze tools	Bronze weapons: 0, 1
3 = Iron tools	Iron weapons: 0, 1

\*0 = indicates absence of technology, 1 = presence of technology.

And this was the basket of goods used for 1500 AD:

TABLE 3—VARIABLES IN THE 1500 AD DATASET

Variable	Description	Values
<i>Military</i>		
Standing army	An organization of professional soldiers.	0, 1
Cavalry	The use of soldiers mounted on horseback.	0, 1
Firearms	Gunpowder-based weapons.	0, 1
Muskets	The successor to the harquebus (the common firearm of European armies) was larger and a muzzle-loading firearm.	0, 1
Field artillery	Large guns that required a team of soldiers to operate. It had a larger caliber and greater range than small arms weapons.	0, 1
Warfare capable ships	Ships that were used in battle are considered "warfare" capable.	0, 1
Heavy naval guns	Ships required significant advances in hull technology before they were capable of carrying heavy guns.	0, 1
Ships (+180 guns), +1500 ton deadweight	Large warships that only state Navies had the capability of building.	0, 1
<i>Agriculture</i>		
Hunting and gathering	The primary form of subsistence.	0
Pastoralism	The primary form of subsistence.	1
Hand cultivation	The primary form of subsistence.	2
Plough cultivation	The primary form of subsistence.	3
<i>Transportation</i>		
Ships capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean	Any ship that had successfully crossed the Atlantic Ocean.	0, 1
Ships capable of crossing the Pacific Ocean	Any ship that had successfully crossed the Pacific Ocean.	0, 1
Ships capable of reaching the Indian Ocean	Any ship that had reached the Indian Ocean from either Europe or the Far East.	0, 1
Wheel	The use of the wheel for transportation purposes. The most common use was for carts.	0, 1
Magnetic compass	The use of the compass for navigation.	0, 1
Horse powered vehicles	The use of horses for transportation.	0, 1
<i>Communications</i>		
Movable block printing	The use of movable block printing.	0, 1
Woodblock or block printing	The use of woodblock printing.	0, 1
Books	The use of books.	0, 1
Paper	The use of paper.	0, 1
<i>Industry</i>		
Steel	The presence of steel in a civilization.	0, 1
Iron	The presence of iron in a civilization.	0, 1

Here is the average score of different populations for each era:

Table 171 : Overall technology adoption by continent and period

Continent	Observations	Average	SD	Min	Max
<i>1000 BC</i>					
Europe	30	0.66	0.16	0.5	1
Africa	34	0.36	0.31	0	1
Asia	23	0.58	0.25	0.1	1
America	24	0.24	0.12	0	0.4
Oceania	2	0.2	0.14	0.1	0.3
<i>0 AD</i>					
Europe	33	0.88	0.15	0.7	1
Africa	40	0.77	0.2	0.6	1
Asia	34	0.88	0.15	0.6	1
America	25	0.33	0.17	0	0.6
Oceania	3	0.17	0.11	0.1	0.3
<i>1500 AD</i>					
Europe	32	0.86	0.07	0.69	1
Africa	39	0.32	0.2	0.1	0.78
Asia	25	0.66	0.19	0.07	0.88
America	24	0.14	0.07	0	0.26
Oceania	9	0.12	0.04	0	0.13
<i>Current</i>					
Europe	34	0.63	0.19	0.27	0.87
Africa	42	0.31	0.08	0.13	0.54
Asia	33	0.41	0.15	0.23	0.76
America	22	0.47	0.17	0.34	1
Oceania	3	0.73	0.32	0.36	0.92

Much could be said about this table, but in relation to other data we'll see in this article, it's crucial to remember that Europeans were the most technologically advanced group in 1000 BC and 1500 AD, and they tied with Asia in 0 AD.

Every population in every region for which Comin et al. could locate data is the basis for the table above. But when evaluating a region solely on the basis of its most developed civilization, Comin et al. also examined what regional comparisons looked

**Table 173 : Overall technology adoption in advanced civilizations by period**

Civilization	1000 BC	0 AD	1500 AD	Current
W. Europe	0.65	0.96	0.94	0.71
China	0.9	1	0.88	0.33
Indian	0.67	0.9	0.7	0.31
Arab	0.95	1	0.7	0.43

like. These outcomes are as follows:

Here, we can observe that in the years 1000 BC and 0 AD, the most technologically advanced Asians outperformed the most technologically advanced Europeans, and that the world's most advanced civilizations may not have become European until as late as 1500 AD.

Since 1500 AD predates colonialism, the industrial revolution, and the majority of the transcontinental slave trade, this data challenges a number of widely held beliefs about what made Europeans the most technologically advanced peoples on the planet.

The degree of technological proficiency among populations was a concern for Comin et al. Asking how much technology was invented by populations is different from this. Any invention made by one group of people will spread throughout the civilized world. However, this diffusion of technology did not occur everywhere in the same way. Some regions, like the Mediterranean and ancient China, have long been hubs for global trade. As a result, they were perfect locations for the diffusion of technology. Due to their




geographic and cultural isolation from much of the ancient world, other populations—such as northern Europeans or, even more extreme, Sub-Saharan Africans—did not trade technology with them to nearly the same extent.

The most thorough attempt to quantify innovation by geography in history was made by [Murray \(2004\)](#). Murray compiled 183 thorough histories, encyclopedias, and other materials about innovation in a variety of fields and created a list of people who appeared in at least 50% of the reliable sources in a particular field. Murray demonstrated that dividing the sources into two groups at random resulted in two sets of nearly identical results, indicating that this measure had an exceptionally high degree of statistical reliability (.93). Murray also demonstrated that when he compared sources from around the globe, the same findings were obtained, indicating that the analysis was not substantially hampered by eurocentrism. Thus, he found that the relevant material showed a strong degree of consensus on which people and events have been historically important in science.

Murray referred to events mentioned in 50% or more of the sources as "significant events" and people included in 50% or more of the sources as "significant individuals." All of these people or events that occurred between 800 BC and 1950 AD were included in his analysis. Below are his findings, arranged by continent:

Whether measured in people or events, 97 percent of accomplishment in the scientific inventories occurred in Europe and North America



When this analysis is broken down by year, we can see that Europe was the driving force behind innovation during the BC period, experienced a decline in scientific productivity around the year 100 AD, and then regained its position as the primary driver of scientific advancement worldwide around the year 1500 AD.

**The distribution of the significant figures across time and place**




Figure 99 : Significant figures by time & region

In

Figure 100 : Significant figures by time & region

general, the data sets from Comin et al. and Murray concur in that they place Europe at the forefront of technological development during the BC era before demonstrating a European decline that ends by 1500 AD. The degree of Europe's relative technological superiority during these times is where they diverge. According to Comin et al.'s data, Europe has frequently, though not always, had the best technology in the world.

According to Murray's data, Europeans have contributed to almost all significant scientific breakthroughs over the past two millennia. Combining these data sets suggests that non-European countries, particularly those in Asia, have profited from the spread of technology far more than has Europe.

Lastly, Murray's data demonstrates that not every European country has made an equal contribution to innovation. In actuality, a small number of countries, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, have produced nearly all of the European innovators




Figure 101 : Inventors by country

Figure 102 : Inventors by country

## ***Wealth***

**Table 175 : Wealth per person by period and region**

After discussing technological advancement, let's move on to economic growth. The economist [Angus Maddison](#) is the foremost expert on ancient GDP estimates. His estimates of wealth per person for the years 1–50 AD, expressed in 1990 dollars, are

<b>Wealth per Person: 1 AD – 1950 AD</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>Eastern Europe</b>	<b>East Asia</b>	<b>Africa</b>
1 AD	576\$	412\$	425\$	472\$
1000 AD	427\$	400\$	433\$	425\$
1500 AD	771\$	496\$	551\$	414\$
1600 AD	889\$	548\$	561\$	422\$
1700 AD	997\$	606\$	577\$	421\$
1820 AD	1,202\$	683\$	612\$	420\$
1870 AD	1,960\$	937\$	620\$	500\$
1913 AD	3,457\$	1,695\$	927\$	637\$
1950AD	4,578\$	2,111\$	1047\$	890\$

shown below:

From this chart, several key conclusions can be drawn. First, for almost the entire last two millennia, Western Europe was the richest region on earth. The year 1000 AD is the only exception. Second, the wealth of Western Europe has consistently outpaced that of Eastern Europe. Long before communism entered the picture, this was accurate. Third, Africa was wealthier than both Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia in the year AD 1. Africa was also wealthier in 1 AD than it was in 1820 AD. Progress is not a given.

***Predicting wealth based on how advanced a society was***

Thus far, I have been comparing populations at a relatively macro level, such as those in "Europe," "Asia," and "Africa." We can make even more definitive claims regarding the long-term consistency of wealth and technology if we divide populations into smaller units, roughly equivalent to the size of individual countries.

Of course, the majority of countries that existed more than a millennium ago have vanished. We can still assess the degree to which the historical development of a population in a particular region accurately forecasts the current development of that same population.

For example, a country's current level of wealth can be predicted based on its score on Comin et al.'s index of technological progress in 1000 BC.

**Table 177 : Ancient technology and wealth today**

Dependent variables	Log income per capita in 2002			Current technology		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Overall technology adoption level in 1000 BC	0.747* (1.87)			0.0851 (1.37)		
Overall technology adoption level in 0 AD		0.0895 (0.19)			0.0138 (0.14)	
Overall technology adoption level in 1500 AD			1.566*** (3.24)			0.221** (2.58)
Constant	8.196*** (28.22)	8.452*** (19.62)	7.786*** (22.72)	-0.590*** (-13.60)	-0.557*** (-6.89)	-0.655*** (-12.22)
Observations	104	123	111	109	130	115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.00	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.12

*Note:* *t*-statistics in parentheses computed using robust standard errors clustered to take into account the correlation in the information used in the coding of technology.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

We haven't taken ancestry into account, which is why these correlations aren't particularly strong. In other words, ancestry adjustment is the process of forecasting an area's current level of development based on the descendants of its current residents rather than the progress of its former inhabitants.

This change can have a significant impact. For example, the level of technological development in Australia and North America in 0 AD differs greatly from that of the ancestors of the present populations in Mexico, the United States, and Australia. The predictive power of Comin et al.'s technological index is significantly increased when it is adjusted for ancestry. Following this, there is a significant correlation between the technological levels of the past and the current levels of wealth and technology.

**Table 179 : Migration-adjusted technology measures and today income**

Dependent variables	Log income per capita in 2002			Current technology		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Migration-adjusted technology level in 1000 BC	1.599*** (3.45)			0.211*** (3.3)		
Migration-adjusted technology level in 0 AD		2.303** (2.35)			0.418** (2.56)	
Migration-adjusted technology level in 1500 AD			3.261*** (6.76)			0.514*** (6.87)
Constant	7.697*** (23.46)	6.602*** (8.65)	6.544*** (18.6)	-0.662*** (-16.65)	-0.895*** (-7.85)	-0.862*** (-21.06)
Observations	104	123	111	109	130	115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.11	0.5	0.07	0.12	0.4

Note: *t*-statistics in parentheses computed using robust standard errors clustered to take into account the correlation in the information used in the coding of technology.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

Technology from the past is not the only early indicator of success in the present. For example, there is a 0.23 and 0.26 correlation between the number of years that a state or an area has been an agricultural region and its 2005 GDP per capita. These correlations increase to 0.46 (agriculture) and 0.48 (state history) when ancestry is taken into account. ([Wacziarg and Spolaore, 2013](#))

In reality, these factors, along with the latitude of a population and whether it is landlocked or on an island, can statistically account for 52% to 59% of the current variation in national income.

**Table 181 : Regressions by variable**

Main regressor:	Years of agriculture	Ancestry-adjusted years of agriculture	State history	Ancestry-adjusted state history
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Years of agriculture</b>	<b>0.019</b> <b>(0.335)</b>			
<b>Ancestry-adjusted years of agriculture</b>		<b>0.099</b> <b>(2.347)**</b>		
<b>State history</b>			<b>0.074</b> <b>(0.245)</b>	
<b>Ancestry-adjusted state history</b>				<b>1.217</b> <b>(3.306)***</b>
Absolute latitude	0.042 (6.120)***	0.040 (6.168)***	0.047 (7.483)***	0.046 (7.313)***
Percent land area in the tropics	-0.188 (0.592)	-0.148 (0.502)	0.061 (0.200)	0.269 (0.914)
Landlocked dummy	-0.733 (4.354)***	-0.671 (3.847)***	-0.697 (4.122)***	-0.555 (3.201)***
Island dummy	0.681 (2.550)**	0.562 (2.555)**	0.531 (2.216)**	0.503 (2.338)**
Constant	7.699 (22.429)***	7.270 (21.455)***	7.458 (22.338)***	6.773 (19.539)***
Beta coefficients on the bold variable	3.75%	17.23%	1.50%	21.59%
Observations	150	148	136	135
R <sup>2</sup>	0.475	0.523	0.558	0.588

Notes: Robust *t* statistics in parentheses.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

In the same way, 50% of the current national variation in wealth can be statistically explained by the genetic distance between a population and the United States when combined with the previously mentioned geographic factors. 55% of the variation in national wealth can be statistically explained if the proportion of a country that is European is

**Table 183 : Genetic distance and economic development**

Main regressor:	Indigenous genetic distance	Ancestry-adjusted genetic distance	Control for the share of Europeans
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b><math>F_{ST}</math> genetic distance to the United States, 1500 match</b>	<b>-4.038</b> (3.846)***		
<b><math>F_{ST}</math> genetic distance to the United States, weighted, current match</b>		<b>-6.440</b> (3.392)***	<b>-4.576</b> (2.341)**
Absolute latitude	0.034 (5.068)***	0.030 (4.216)***	0.015 (1.838)*
Percent land area in the tropics	-0.182 (0.582)	-0.041 (0.135)	-0.384 (1.189)
Landlocked dummy	-0.637 (3.686)***	-0.537 (2.971)***	-0.521 (3.051)***
Island dummy	0.584 (2.389)**	0.607 (2.392)**	0.557 (2.262)**
Share of descendants of Europeans, per Putterman and Weil			0.863 (3.601)***
Constant	8.451 (23.577)***	8.618 (21.563)***	8.637 (20.941)***
Beta coefficients on the bold variable	-23.85%	-27.11%	-20.30%
Observations	155	154	149
$R^2$	0.499	0.496	0.545

Notes: Robust  $t$  statistics in parentheses.  
 \*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.  
 \*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.  
 \* Significant at the 10 percent level.

included in this model.

This does not establish causation, as is the case with all statistical associations. However, causality can only go in one direction; it is not conceivable that disparities in wealth thousands of years ago led to the differences in populations today. Therefore, these statistical correlations only raise the possibility that the majority of contemporary disparities in national wealth can be causally explained by some ancient variable, either the ones measured in these models or those correlated with them.

Furthermore, the improvement of these models when ancestry is taken into account indicates that whatever ancient variable affected these populations, it did so in a way that remained with them during migration.

### *Conclusion*

Why Western Europe has contributed so much to the advancement of human civilization is still a mystery to us. Although IQ undoubtedly plays a part, East Asians are smarter than Western Europeans. Self-control is probably no different.

Individualism predicts contemporary national wealth and distinguishes the West from Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia ([Last, 2016](#)). Additionally, U.S. immigrants are more likely to be wealthy and work in scientific research if their home country is more individualistic ([Gordonichenko and Ronald, 2012](#); [Hasen, 2013](#)). In conclusion of this, individualism appears to be a strong contender for one of the causes of this historical trend, though it is most likely not the only one.

Immigration policy is significantly impacted by uncertainty surrounding this "X factor" (also known as the "West factor"). Given the information analyzed here, it appears likely that immigration from non-Western countries could cause the West to lose whatever it is that makes it so unique. This appears to be the case regardless of whether immigrants were from Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, or Africa.

Additionally, this data presents an intriguing historical possibility. Africa used to be wealthier than both East Asia and Eastern Europe, as we have seen. These regions may be wealthier than Africa today in part due to their greater ability to adopt Western innovations, though this is undoubtedly not the only factor. There are numerous cultural, geographic, and genetic reasons for this unequal capacity to profit from Western development.



## 2.7 — IQ and religion

At the individual and national levels, there is a negative relationship between religious inclination and intelligence.

Religious belief has a negative correlation with general intelligence, or psychometric g. This is a bad relationship between countries. The average IQ and atheism have a 0.60 correlation in a sample of 137 countries. IQ and religious inclination have a -0.88 correlation at the individual level.

According to Dawkins' most recent book, "The God Delusion," believing in God is foolish. This section will look at (1) the evidence supporting this claim, namely whether intelligence and religious belief are negatively correlated; (2) whether this correlation is due to differences in psychometric terms; and (3) whether there is a negative correlation between intelligence and religious belief across countries.

### **Intelligence and Religious Belief within Nations**

We are by no means the first to propose that there is a negative correlation between religious belief and intelligence within a country. Howells (1928) and Sinclair (1928) both noted studies that demonstrated negative correlations between religious beliefs and intelligence among students of -.27 and -.29 to -.36 (using various measures of religious belief) in the 1920s. In the 1950s, Argyle (1958) came to the conclusion that "smart students are a little less likely to have pro-religious attitudes, and much less likely to accept orthodox beliefs."

Four factors provide evidence of a negative relationship between religious belief and intelligence within nations: (1) religious belief and intelligence are negatively correlated; (2) the percentage of religious beliefs among intellectual elites is lower than that of the general population; (3) religious belief declines with age in children and adolescents as cognitive abilities increase; and (4) religious belief declines during the twentieth century as population intelligence increases.

***Negative Correlation between Intelligence and Religious Belief***

Religious belief and intelligence have been found to be negatively correlated in a number of studies. Bell (2002) reviewed forty-three studies, all but four of which found a negative correlation. Agnostics have four more IQ points than believers, according to a study conducted in the Netherlands using a nationally representative sample (total N = 1538) (Verhage, 1964). The American National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, a nationwide sample initially assessed for IQ using the PPVT (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) (N = 14277), contains data that Kanazawa (2007) examined in a more recent study.

"How religious are you?" was the question posed to them during the interview. "Non-religious," "not religious," "moderately religious," and "very religious" were the codes assigned to the responses. According to the results, the "non-religious" group had the highest IQ (103.09), followed by the other three groups (IQ = 99.34, 98.28, and 97.14) in decreasing order. There is a strong correlation between religious belief and IQ ( $F(3, 14273) = 78.0381, p < .00001$ ).

***There is a lower percentage of believers in intellectual elites than in the general population***

By comparing the percentage of believers among the elites to the general population, it was discovered that there was a negative correlation between intelligence and religious belief, supporting these studies. This was demonstrated in 1921 when a survey of prominent scientists' and American researchers' religious beliefs revealed that 39% of them believed in God (range: 48% for historians, 24% for psychologists) (Leuba, 1921). According to Roe (1965), out of 64 eminent scientists, 61 expressed no religious preference, leaving 4.8% of them as believers.

This is significantly less than the population's percentage of believers, which in the United States was 95.5% in the 1948 Gallup Poll (Argyle, 1958). According to a

1990s study of American National Academy of Sciences members, only 7% of them believed in God, while a general population poll found that 90% of people did (Larsen and Witham 1998). According to reports, 78.8% of fellows of the Royal Society in Britain do not believe in God, while 3.3% do (the remaining members were unsure) (Dawkins, 2006). Meanwhile, according to a survey, 68.5% of people worldwide believe that God exists.

### ***Decline in Religious Belief with Age in Children and Adolescents***

As cognitive ability improves during adolescence and adulthood, religious belief declines. Kuhlen and Arnold (1944) discovered this in the United States for the 12–18 age group. They found that 94% of 12-year-olds agreed with the statement, "I believe there is a God," whereas 78% of 18-year-olds agreed. Francis (1989) discovered a similar drop in religious belief among children aged 5 to 16 in England. A scale comprising questions like "God means a lot to me" and "I think people who pray are stupid," among others, was used to measure religious belief. The scale's scores are displayed in condensed form in the following table :

**Table 185 : Decline in percentage holding religious belief, with age (Francis, 1989)**

<b>Age</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Boys</b>	<b>Girls</b>
<b>5-6</b>	400	87.9	96.0
<b>11-12</b>	400	79.6	84.1
<b>15-16</b>	400	55.7	70.4

It was frequently observed that girls score higher than boys (they believe more) (see, for example, Argyle, 1958). According to a different study conducted on students aged 12 to 15 in a Protestant school in Northern Ireland, pro-religionist sentiments continue to decline significantly ( $p < .001$ ) every year by roughly 0.75 standard deviation over a 4-year

period, while the correlations between pro-religionist sentiment and IQ get more negative and significant ( $p < .001$ ) (Turner, 1980). The following table provides a summary of these findings.

**Table 186 : Declining belief Correlates with Age (sd =15.6)**

Age	N	Belief (%)	R: Non-belief x IQ
12	50	69.54	0.183
13	50	66.10	0.110
14	50	59.86	-0.113
15	50	57.94	-0.354*

***Decline of Religious Belief in the Twentieth Century, as the Intelligence of the Population Has Increased***

Over the past 150 years, there has been evidence of either a decrease in religious belief or an increase in population intelligence. The Flynn effect is a well-established phenomenon that refers to the increase in intelligence. Statistics on church attendance and belief in God from opinion polls have shown that religious belief is on the decline. For instance, in England, the percentage of people who attend church fell from 40% in 1850 to 35% in 1900, 20% in 1950, and 10% in 1990 (Giddens, 1997, p.460).

Children's Sunday participation fell from 30% of the child population in 1900 to 13% in 1960 (Goldman, 1965), and attendance at the Church of England Easter week fell from 9% of the population in 1900 to 5% in 1970 (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 1975). According to Gallup polls, 72% of people said they believed in God in 1950 (Argyle, 1958), but by 2004, that number had fallen to 58.5% (Zuckerman, 2006).

In the United States, religious belief has also decreased over the past century. A number of studies that revealed a drop in religious belief among college students were reviewed by Hoge (1974). Students at Bryn Mawr, for instance, were asked if they thought that God heard their prayers. In 1894, 42% of students responded positively, 31% in 1933, and 19% in 1968. The question of whether or not they were believers was posed to University of Michigan students. Eighty-six percent of students said they believed in God in 1896. 70% in 1930 and 44% in 1968. Between 1946 and 1966, the proportions of students who believed in God, prayed daily or fairly frequently, and went to church roughly once a week decreased at Harvard, Radcliffe, Williams, and Los Angeles City College. Additionally, according to Heath (1969), students' belief in God decreased from 79% in 1948 to 58% in 1968. According to Gallup polls, 95.5% of the general public believed in God in 1948 (Argyle, 1958), while 89.5% did so in 2004 (Zuckerman, 2006).

### Mean IQ of Atheists, Agnostics, and Believers




Figure 103 : IQ by religiosity

Figure 104 : IQ by religiosity

Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) were examined to see if religious belief and Psychometric  $g$  (the general intelligence factor) were negatively correlated. A national sample, NLSY97, was chosen in 1997 to represent roughly 15 million adolescents in the 12–17 age range in the United States. In addition to being tested using the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB97), subjects ( $N = 6825$ ) were questioned about their religious preferences. There are twelve scales in this test. These were examined using the main axis factor analysis ( $t(N-2) = 662, 62, p < .000$ ) and the dimensions of a correlation scale, .992 (Psychometric  $R$ ), with general information,  $g$ .

Compared to all subjects in the group who professed either of a wide variety of religions, atheists received six more Q.I. points. Even without the use of weighted data, the difference in IQ between believers and atheists was significant ( $t(1, 6.893) = 2.87, p = .004$ ).

### Intelligence and Religious Belief across Nations




Figure 105 : National IQ vs religiosity

Figure 106 : National IQ vs religiosity

We used the country IQs in Vanhanen and Lynn's (2006) IQ and global inequality study to investigate the connection between religious belief and intelligence across nations. The correlation of 92 between the various measures and the correlation of 83 between IQ and educational attainment demonstrate the high reliability and validity of these national IQs, according to this source. Rindermann (2007) has confirmed the high validity and reliability of these national IQs. We used data from Zuckerman's (2007) study on religious belief, which covers 137 nations and accounts for slightly more than 95% of the global population.

To provide the most recent results, these data were gathered from multiple surveys. For a particular nation, there are multiple surveys. Zuckerman highlights four problems with this dataset: low response rates, poor random sample selection, responses influenced by diet or peer pressure, and issues with cross-cultural terminological variation on terms like "religious" and "secular." Zuckerman quotes Robert Putnam as saying that "we must do with the imperfection of evidence that we can find, not just lamenting its shortcomings" in spite of these potential sources of error.

The appendix contains the IQ and percentages of people who say they believe in God for each of the 137 countries. In just 17% of nations (23 out of 137), the percentage of people who do not believe in God is higher than 20%. These are almost all of the nations with the highest IQs.

Following table shows correlations between atheism and national IQ. For the entire sample, Line 1 provides a correlation of 0.60, which is statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). Moreover, we separated the nations into two categories: those with an average IQ of 64–86 and those with an average IQ of 87–108. The information for the 69 nations with IQs ranging from 64 to 86 is shown in Line 2. Just 1.95% of people in this group do not believe in God. The data for 68 nations with IQs ranging from 87 to 108 are shown in Line 3. 16.99% of people in this group do not believe in God.

**Table 187 : Correlations between the National IQs and Religious Disbelief**

<b>IQs</b>	<b>N.Countries</b>	<b>Non-Believers</b>	<b>Range Believers</b>	<b>Non- R: Non-belief x IQ</b>
<b>64-108</b>	137	10.69%	<1% to 81%	+0.60
<b>64-86</b>	69	1.95%	<1% to 40%	+0.16
<b>87-108</b>	68	16.99%	<1% to 81%	+0.54

### Conclusion

First, we started this study with the hypothesis that religious belief and IQ are negatively correlated. Second, we have demonstrated that there is a difference in psychometric g between religious belief and intelligence. Third, we have applied this presumption to the inquiry of whether there is a cross-national negative correlation between IQ and religious belief. Using data from 137 nations, we discovered a 0.60 correlation between IQ and the lack of faith in God. Instead of using belief, the metric used to compare the nations was disbelief in God. We think it is reasonable to assume that there is a strong (negative) correlation between belief in God and disbelief in him. Thus, we draw the conclusion that there is a negative relationship between IQ and religious belief that has been observed in numerous studies conducted within a country as well as between countries.

Second, this finding demands the question of why IQ and religious belief are negatively correlated. The claim made by Frazer (1922, p.712) in *The Golden Bough* that in advanced civilizations, "the quick-witted states the theory of religious nature insufficient ... religion, considered an explanation of nature, is replaced by science," is undoubtedly one that many rationalists will accept. Some have assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that those with greater intelligence are more likely to challenge



religious doctrine. For instance, "greater intellectual maturity may increase religious skepticism," according to Kuhlen and Arnold (1944). Humans in the preindustrial world had little control over nature, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 27). Therefore, they attempt to make up for this by appealing to the metaphysical forces that appear to govern the world: worship is viewed as a way to influence its destiny, and it is simpler to accept his helplessness if one knows that the outcome is in the hands of an all-powerful being whose kindness cannot be won by adhering to strict and predictable rules of contact. The growing awareness of technology allows for greater control over nature and lessens the need for supernatural powers, which is one reason why traditional nuns are losing their faith in industrial societies.

Third, the general rule that there is a linear relationship between IQ and the lack of belief in God varies from country to country. Cuba and Vietnam rank among the most unusual, with higher rates of atheists (41 and 81 percent, respectively) than their respective Q.Is of 85 and 96 would indicate. Communism and powerful atheist propaganda opposing religious belief are most likely to blame for this. Furthermore, it has occasionally been argued that communism is a religion in and of itself, with Lenin as the Messiah who came to bring paradise to earth and Das Capital as the sacred text. His followers at the time, including Stalin, Mao, Castro, and others, traveled to various nations to disseminate the message.

Fourth, despite having a high average IQ, the United States has a very low percentage of people who do not believe in God (10.5%). Compared to northwestern and central Europe (e.g., Belgium, 43%, Netherlands, 42%, Denmark, 48%, France, 44%, United Kingdom, 41.5%), the percentage of people who do not believe in God is substantially lower in the United States. This could be explained, in part, by the fact that many Americans identify as Catholic, and that the proportion of believers in Catholic European nations is typically significantly higher than that of Protestant nations (e.g., Italy, where 6% of people are atheists, Ireland, 5%, Poland, 3%, Portugal, 4%, Spain, 15%). The

immigration of people with strong religious convictions may also be a factor. Another explanation could be that a number of European immigrants came to the US with strong religious convictions, which were then transmitted to the next generation as a cultural entity and even as genetic inheritance. According to Newcomb and Svehla (1937), the correlation between religious beliefs and parent-child is fairly high, at 0.64 for father-son and 0.69 for mother-daughter. According to research, the heritability of religious belief ranges from 0.40 to 0.50 (Koenig, McGrue, Krueger, and Bouchard, 2005). The genetics of religious belief may have been passed down to the majority of the current population from a number of religious emigrants from Europe.

### **Mean IQ by religion**

The different American religious movements and their classifications (atheist, agnostic, liberal, and dogmatic) are displayed in the table below.

The largest percentage of people with high IQs are Jews (Ashkenazim in America), with 33% of American Jews having an average IQ of 120 or higher. Anglicans, atheists, and agnostics come in second, with 29, 25, and 19% of people with an IQ above 120, respectively.

Lower IQs are drawn to dogmatic religions. The percentage of gifted people is lowest among Muslims (4%), followed by Baptists (8%), Pentecostals (9%), and Mormons (11%). It goes without saying that the racial factor must be considered. Middle Easterners and North Africans, who make up the majority of Muslims, have lower IQs than Ashkenazi Jews, who are genetically more intelligent. African-Americans make up a sizable portion of Pentecostals and Baptists.

**Table 188 : Proportion of high-IQ individuals by religion**

Denomination	Classification	High-IQ fraction
Jewish	Liberal	33
Episcopal/Anglican	Liberal	29
Atheist	Atheist	25
Agnostic	Agnostic	19
Bible Church	Dogmatic	17
Other	?	17
Methodist	Liberal	17
Lutheran	Liberal	16
Roman Catholic	Dogmatic	15
Protestant (Other)	Liberal	14
Presbyterian	Liberal	14
Personal Philosophy	?	13
Disciples of Christ	Dogmatic	13
Un. Church of Christ	Dogmatic	13
Holiness	Dogmatic	11
Mormon	Dogmatic	11
Pentecostal	Dogmatic	9
Baptist	Dogmatic	8
Muslem	Dogmatic	4

The average IQ of White (European) Americans is slightly higher for atheists than for agnostics, followed by liberal religious and, finally, dogmatic religious. Intelligence, a physiological measure of the brain primarily influenced by genes, is not directly impacted by religion. A higher IQ will favor rational explanations and atheism (even more liberal religions for reflection and interpretation, whose followers have an intermediate IQ), while a previously lower average IQ will draw some to a more dogmatic religion (pre-rational, with magical thoughts, fixed rules of behavior, emphasis on sins, need for atonement ...).

**Table 190 : Average IQ of white people by religiosity**

Level of factor	Representative N	IQ (PAF)	SD
Atheist	117,681	111.08	12.78
Agnostic	303,645	109.13	14.21
Liberal	3,903,069	107.26	13.55
Dogmatic	6,629,517	105.19	13.48
Total	10,953,912	106.10	13.57

**Appendix****Table 192 : IQ and belief in God by country**

Country	IQ	% Not believing in God
Afghanistan	84	0.5
Albania	90	8
Algeria	83	0.5
Angola	68	1.5
Argentina	93	4
Armenia	94	14
Australia	98	25
Austria	100	18
Azerbaijan	87	0.5
Bangladesh	82	0.5
Belarus	97	17
Belgium	99	43
Benin	70	0.5
Bolivia	87	1
Botswana	70	0.5
Brazil	87	1
Brunei	91	0.5
Bulgaria	93	34
Burkina Faso	68	0.5
Burundi	69	0.5
Cambodia	91	7
Cameroon	64	0.5
Canada	99	22
Central African Rep.	64	1.5
Chad	68	0.5

<b>Chile</b>	90	2
<b>China</b>	105	12
<b>Colombia</b>	84	1
<b>Congo: Rep of (Brazz)</b>	64	2.7
<b>Costa Rica</b>	89	1
<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	69	0.5
<b>Croatia</b>	90	7
<b>Cuba</b>	85	40
<b>Czech Republic</b>	98	61
<b>Denmark</b>	98	48
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	82	7
<b>Ecuador</b>	88	1
<b>Egypt</b>	81	0.5
<b>El Salvador</b>	80	1
<b>Estonia</b>	99	49
<b>Ethiopia</b>	64	0.5
<b>Finland</b>	99	28
<b>France</b>	98	44
<b>Gambia</b>	66	0.5
<b>Georgia</b>	94	4
<b>Germany</b>	99	42
<b>Ghana</b>	71	0.5
<b>Greece</b>	92	16
<b>Guatemala</b>	79	1
<b>Guinea</b>	67	0.5
<b>Haiti</b>	67	0.5
<b>Honduras</b>	81	1
<b>Hungary</b>	98	32
<b>Iceland</b>	101	16
<b>India</b>	82	3
<b>Indonesia</b>	87	1.5
<b>Iran</b>	84	4.5
<b>Iraq</b>	87	0.5
<b>Ireland</b>	92	5
<b>Israel</b>	95	15
<b>Italy</b>	102	6
<b>Jamaica</b>	71	3
<b>Japan</b>	105	65
<b>Jordan</b>	84	0.5
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	94	12

<b>Kenya</b>	72	0.5
<b>Kuwait</b>	86	0.5
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	90	7
<b>Laos</b>	89	5
<b>Latvia</b>	98	20
<b>Lebanon</b>	82	3
<b>Liberia</b>	67	0.5
<b>Libya</b>	83	0.5
<b>Lithuania</b>	91	13
<b>Madagascar</b>	82	0.5
<b>Malawi</b>	69	0.5
<b>Malaysia</b>	92	0.5
<b>Mali</b>	69	0.5
<b>Mauritania</b>	76	0.5
<b>Mexico</b>	88	4.5
<b>Moldova</b>	96	6
<b>Mongolia</b>	101	20
<b>Morocco</b>	84	0.5
<b>Mozambique</b>	64	5
<b>Namibia</b>	70	4
<b>Nepal</b>	78	0.5
<b>Netherlands</b>	100	42
<b>New Zealand</b>	99	22
<b>Nicaragua</b>	81	1
<b>Niger</b>	69	0.5
<b>Nigeria</b>	69	0.5
<b>Norway</b>	100	31
<b>Oman</b>	83	0.5
<b>Pakistan</b>	84	0.5
<b>Panama</b>	84	1
<b>Paraguay</b>	84	1
<b>Peru</b>	85	1
<b>Philippines</b>	86	0.5
<b>Poland</b>	99	3
<b>Portugal</b>	95	4
<b>Romania</b>	94	4
<b>Russia</b>	97	27
<b>Rwanda</b>	70	0.5
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	84	0.5
<b>Senegal</b>	66	0.5

<b>Sierra Leone</b>	64	0.5
<b>Singapore</b>	108	13
<b>Slovakia</b>	96	17
<b>Slovenia</b>	96	35
<b>Somalia</b>	68	0.5
<b>South Africa</b>	72	1
<b>South Korea</b>	106	30
<b>Spain</b>	98	15
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	79	0.5
<b>Sweden</b>	99	64
<b>Switzerland</b>	101	17
<b>Syria</b>	83	0.5
<b>Taiwan</b>	105	24
<b>Tajikistan</b>	87	2
<b>Tanzania</b>	72	0.5
<b>Thailand</b>	91	0.5
<b>Togo</b>	70	0.5
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	85	9
<b>Tunisia</b>	83	0.5
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	87	2
<b>Uganda</b>	73	0.5
<b>Ukraine</b>	97	20
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	84	0.5
<b>United Kingdom</b>	100	41.5
<b>United States</b>	98	10.5
<b>Uruguay</b>	96	12
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	87	4
<b>Venezuela</b>	84	1
<b>Vietnam</b>	94	81
<b>Yemen</b>	85	0.5
<b>Zambia</b>	71	0.5
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	66	4

## Conclusion of Part I

The results of Part I reveal an unsettling but undeniable fact: genetics significantly influences the cognitive ability differences among human populations, which have significant ramifications for societal outcomes. These distinctions are more than just

scholarly quirks; they correspond to real differences in the level of civilization, economic output, and social structure among countries. The inevitable question that arises when we focus on immigration policy in Part II is what happens when countries willfully disregard these biological realities in their demographic planning.

Decades of data support the answer, which is a series of predictable outcomes. Three interconnected crises are always present in societies that import large numbers of migrants from populations with significantly lower average cognitive ability: rising crime rates even after controlling for socioeconomic factors, ongoing economic underperformance among immigrant communities, and the slow deterioration of social cohesiveness and trust. The success of high-ability immigrant groups in the same host countries shows that these results are not the product of racism or discrimination, but rather of the unchangeable limitations of population-level differences in behavioral characteristics and cognitive ability.

Take a look at the crime statistics examined in this section, which show that cultural explanations are insufficient to explain why certain immigrant groups have rates of criminal activity that are multiple times higher than those of native populations across all income levels. The ability to control one's impulses, focus on the future, and reason abstractly, all of which are measured by IQ tests and have a strong correlation with law-abiding behavior—is the missing variable. Similarly, the economic data shows that, as technology advances and low-skilled labor becomes less and less economically viable, mass immigration from low-IQ populations leads to permanent welfare dependency rather than prosperity.

This is basic demographic math, not conjecture. Cognitive stratification leads to the development of disjointed parallel societies that deplete public resources and make minimal contributions to innovation or productivity growth when combined with contemporary welfare states and anti-assimilation ideologies. The biggest tragedy of modern immigration policy is its deliberate ignorance of these facts, which harms both



the host communities and the immigrants themselves by positioning them for failure in societies that require cognitive abilities that their native populations never developed to supply. Part II reveals how the hard realities of human biodiversity clash with the lofty rhetoric of multiculturalism, documenting this unfolding disaster with unwavering empirical rigor.

## **Part II — Immigration, race, crime and economy**

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In this part, we'll discuss the impacts of immigration, analyzing the empirical data regarding the effects of immigration on labor markets, crime rates, and national economies. We start by analyzing the connection between immigration and crime, refuting the widely held belief that socioeconomic factors alone account for differences in criminal activity. We then examine whether mass immigration actually boosts the economies of the host countries or if it lowers wages, strains welfare systems, and drains the national economy.

At the conclusion, readers will have a clear-eyed understanding of the practical effects of immigration, not as a theoretical ideal, but as a policy with quantifiable effects on social cohesion, safety, and prosperity. Whether immigration alters societies is no longer the question; rather, it is how, and if those changes are long-lasting.

### **Chapter 3 — Immigration, race and crime**

In this chapter we'll discuss and analyze the rough data of crime by immigration background in dozens of countries, while also refuting several common arguments. Black crime will also be thoroughly analyzed, providing explanations for the disparities. We are also going to show that the outcome of immigration in crime is easily predictable from the country of origin.

#### **3.1 — Immigration & crime data**

In this section I will provide sufficient data that shows that specific immigration, depending on the country of origin, provokes increases in criminal activity. I'll proceed with an analysis of the crime and immigration relations in a bunch of developed countries.

##### ***France***

In 2023, 10,7% of the French population are immigrants. Based on the nationality of immigrants, France is the country in Europe with the most % of foreigners who are Muslims. They have by far the highest proportion of African foreigners (43%, the second is Spain with 22%). There is a recurrent relation between crime & country/region of origin, a specific hierarchy that was already shown in [2.6](#). This is, for example, shown in the rate of people charged for violent crimes by 1,000 people. The criteria for “violent crime” are murder, murder attempt, intentional assault & battery, sexual assault, and violent robberies.

**Table 193 : Rate of persons charged with violent crimes**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Per 1,000 population</b>
<b>France</b>	4.8
<b>EU-27</b>	6.3
<b>Europe outside EU</b>	7.5
<b>Asia</b>	9.1
<b>Africa</b>	15.5

**Source : Ministère de l’Intérieur, « Insécurité et délinquance en 2023 : bilan statistique » and INSEE**

This overrepresentation in crime is particularly present in urban areas, as shown by the rate of persons charged with crime in the 3 major cities in France [3.3.1] :

City	% foreigners in population	% foreigners in persons charged
Paris	14	48
Marseille	11	55
Lyon	10	39

Foreigners are charged proportionnally more than natives in most violations and crimes [3.3.2].

**Table 194 : Foreigners % among suspects of each offense and odds ratio**

Crime or Offense	% of Foreigners Among Suspects	OR
Pickpocketing	48%	14,46
Pimping	47%	13,89
Other economic and financial offenses	32%	7,37
Gambling and gaming-related offenses	29%	6,40
Counterfeiting and industrial/commercial fraud	28%	6,09
Sexual assaults	27%	5,79
Tax fraud	25%	5,22
Other offenses against public health and medical regulations	23%	4,68
Theft from vehicles	22%	4,42
Attempted homicides during thefts	21%	4,16
Theft from adults	21%	4,16
Kidnapping	21%	4,16

<b>Offenses related to banned stays and penalties</b>	20%	3,92
<b>Drug trafficking and sale without use</b>	20%	3,92
<b>Counterfeit money</b>	20%	3,92
<b>Alcohol and tobacco regulation violations</b>	19%	3,67
<b>Hostage-taking during thefts</b>	18%	3,44
<b>Homicides during thefts</b>	17%	3,21
<b>Hostage-taking for other purposes</b>	17%	3,21
<b>Attempted homicides for other motives</b>	17%	3,21
<b>Bankruptcy, corporate misuse, and other company-related offenses</b>	17%	3,21
<b>Sexual harassment and other sexual assaults on adults</b>	17%	3,21
<b>Violent theft without weapons in commercial/financial/industrial establishments</b>	15%	2,76
<b>Credit card forgery and misuse</b>	15.2%	2,81
<b>Forgery of public and official documents</b>	15.2%	2,81
<b>Theft of freight transport vehicles</b>	15.1%	2,79
<b>Receiving stolen goods</b>	15.0%	2,76
<b>Violent theft (without weapon) against women in public spaces</b>	15.0%	2,76
<b>Other thefts involving bladed weapons</b>	14.8%	2,72
<b>Literary and artistic counterfeiting</b>	14.7%	2,70
<b>Burglaries of primary residences</b>	14.7%	2,70
<b>Homicides for other motives</b>	14.6%	2,68
<b>Violations of regulated profession laws</b>	13.7%	2,49
<b>Theft by deception in any location</b>	13.5%	2,45
<b>Other intentional assault (criminal or correctional)</b>	13.3%	2,40
<b>Other simple thefts against individuals in public/private spaces</b>	13.3%	2,40
<b>Fraud and breach of trust</b>	13.3%	2,40
<b>Violent theft (without weapon) against other victims</b>	13.2%	2,38
<b>Assault leading to death</b>	13.1%	2,36
<b>Violence against public officials</b>	12.5%	2,24
<b>Food fraud and hygiene violations</b>	12.5%	2,24

<b>Theft with bladed weapons in financial/commercial/industrial establishments</b>	12.4%	2,22
<b>Threats or blackmail for other purposes</b>	12.3%	2,20
<b>Burglaries of industrial, commercial, or financial premises</b>	12.3%	2,20
<b>Unvoiced purchases/sales (tax evasion)</b>	12.2%	2,18
<b>Threats or blackmail for extortion</b>	12.2%	2,18
<b>Simple theft at construction sites</b>	12.1%	2,16
<b>Homicides committed against children under 15</b>	11.6%	2,06
<b>Violence, mistreatment, and abandonment of children</b>	11.2%	1,98
<b>Other simple thefts against public or private entities</b>	11.1%	1,96
<b>Other document forgery</b>	10.9%	1,92
<b>Theft with bladed weapons against individuals in their homes</b>	10.7%	1,88
<b>Home invasion</b>	10.6%	1,86
<b>Other offenses</b>	10.6%	1,86
<b>Carrying or possession of prohibited weapons</b>	10.2%	1,78
<b>Armed robbery against individuals in their homes</b>	10.2%	1,78
<b>Theft from trailers (caravans)</b>	10.2%	1,78
<b>Forgery and misuse of stolen checks</b>	9.8%	1,70
<b>Non-payment of alimony</b>	9.5%	1,64
<b>Insults against public officials</b>	9.3%	1,61
<b>Violations of urban planning and construction laws</b>	9.2%	1,59
<b>Theft of accessories from registered motor vehicles</b>	9.0%	1,55
<b>Other armed robberies</b>	8.7%	1,49
<b>Other destruction or damage to private property</b>	8.5%	1,46
<b>Violations of check legislation</b>	8.3%	1,42
<b>Armed robbery against industrial or commercial establishments</b>	8.0%	1,36
<b>Violent theft (without weapon) against individuals in their homes</b>	7.9%	1,34
<b>Armed robbery against financial establishments</b>	7.9%	1,34
<b>Sexual harassment and other sexual assaults against minors</b>	7.6%	1,29
<b>Theft from minors</b>	7.5%	1,27

<b>Offenses related to child custody</b>	7.4%	1,25
<b>Drug use</b>	7.2%	1,22
<b>Destruction or damage to private vehicles</b>	6.9%	1,16
<b>Environmental offenses</b>	6.8%	1,14
<b>Car thefts</b>	6.8%	1,14
<b>Drug use and resale</b>	6.5%	1,09
<b>Offenses against dignity and personality</b>	6.5%	1,09
<b>Burglaries of other locations</b>	6.4%	1,07
<b>Settling scores between criminals</b>	6.4%	1,07
<b>Other violations of drug legislation</b>	6.1%	1,02
<b>Simple thefts on agricultural properties</b>	6.1%	1,02
<b>Explosive attacks against private property</b>	6.0%	1,00
<b>Armed robberies against cash-in-transit companies</b>	5.7%	0,95
<b>Burglaries of secondary residences</b>	5.3%	0,88
<b>Other destruction or damage to public property</b>	5.1%	0,84
<b>Arson of public property</b>	4.9%	0,81
<b>Arson of private property</b>	4.6%	0,76
<b>Offenses against the fundamental interests of the Nation</b>	4.5%	0,74
<b>Explosive attacks against public property</b>	4.4%	0,72
<b>Theft of motorized two-wheeled vehicles</b>	4.4%	0,72
<b>Hunting and fishing violations</b>	3.3%	0,53

Foreign Africans exhibit extremely high rates of charge rates across all infractions [3.3.3].

**Table 195 : Persons charged per 1,000 by background, odds ratios**

<b>Persons charged with per 1,000</b>			
	<b>French</b>	<b>Africans</b>	<b>OR</b>
<b>Sexual assault</b>	0.8	1.9	2,4
<b>Murder</b>	0.02	0.06	3,0
<b>Assault</b>	3.3	11	3,4
<b>Violent robberies</b>	0.21	2.1	10,0
<b>Robberies w/ violence</b>	0.7	6.2	8,9
<b>Burglaries</b>	0.29	2.9	10,0
<b>Drug affairs</b>	4.1	11.8	2,9
<b>Scam</b>	1.3	3.5	2,7
<b>Racist offenses</b>	0.05	0.12	2,4

The same hierarchy seen previously resurges for various crimes :

**Table 196 : Relative rate of persons charged for ... by region of origin**

<b>Region of origin</b>	<b>of</b>	<b>Assaults</b>	<b>Violent robberies</b>	<b>Murders</b>	<b>Sexual violence</b>	<b>Non-violent robberies</b>
<b>France</b>		1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
<b>EU-27</b>		1.5	1.6	0.8	1.1	2.7
<b>Europe outside EU</b>		1.7	2.0	3.5	1.0	5.6
<b>Asia</b>		2.0	1.5	2.1	1.8	1.9
<b>Africa</b>		3.5	7.7	2.7	2.2	7.7



Foreigners are just as over-represented among those convicted by the courts as among those charged by law enforcement. Foreigners are 8% of the population but they represent 24% of the prison population.

**Table 197 : Detention rate by nationality, per 10,000 inhabitants**

<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Rate</b>
<b>French</b>	8
<b>Foreigners</b>	29
<b>African</b>	>35
<b>Maghreb</b>	48
<b>Algeria</b>	73

### ***Denmark***

In 2017, 30% of prisoners in Denmark are of foreign nationality, while they represent only 8% of the total population [3.3.3]. When compared to native Danes, the conviction rates among migrants are shockingly high. Male migrants between the ages of 15 and 64 had a conviction rate of 4% in 2018, which was double that of Danish males, and 13% of non-Western immigrant descendants had convictions [3.3.4]. This difference is not a singular occurrence. According to a 2015 study, the crime rate for foreign-born men was 43% higher than the average for Danish men, while the incidence of crime for male descendants of non-Western immigrants was an astounding 144% higher [3.3.5]. By 2016, it was discovered that the crime rate among male non-Western migrants was three times higher than that of Danish men [3.3.6].

The overrepresentation also includes violent offenses. Despite only constituting 14% of the population, immigrants and their descendants were responsible for 45% of rapes,

29% of violent crimes, and 30% of killings, with non-Western migrants perpetrating the majority of sexual assaults [3.3.7]. These numbers cannot be written off as the result of pure chance or socioeconomic influences. This discrepancy is further shown in a 2012 report by the Danish National Police, which found that conviction rates per 1,000 residents were 12.9 for Danish citizens, 114.4 for Somali people, and 54.3 for other foreign nationals [3.3.8]. These figures point to a structural problem associated with specific immigration populations.

It is an issue that endures beyond generations. By 2019, a stunning 64% of Palestinian refugees who came to Denmark in 1992 had been convicted at least once, and 34% of their children had been convicted as well [3.3.9].

These patterns are supported by prison demography. Middle Eastern and African nationalities, including Lebanese, Turkish, Somali, Iraqi, and Syrian, accounted for 31.1% of Danish convicts of foreign origin in 2021 [3.3.10]. In 2018, the proportion of non-Danish immigrants incarcerated increased to 66.3% in Copenhagen, from 44.3% in 2018 [3.3.11]. According to Danish statistics, 16% of those charged with sexual assault against minors are foreign nationals.




Figure 107 : Violent crime conviction by ethnic group

Figure 108 : Violent crime conviction by ethnic group




Figure 109 : Violent crime conviction by nation of origin

Figure 110 : Violent crime conviction by nation of origin

### ***Finland***

The overrepresentation of immigrants in sexual violence is among the most alarming trends. Despite immigrants making up a far lower portion of the population, those with a "foreign" name are responsible for 24% of rapes in Finland [3.3.12]. Even worse, 27% of rapes in 2005 were perpetrated by immigrants, who make up only 2.2% of the population [3.3.13]. Refugees from the Middle East and North Africa are the most overrepresented group, with a 17-fold higher rape rate than native Finns. These numbers indicate significant cultural and behavioral variations that cannot be explained by socioeconomic causes.

Importantly, socioeconomic considerations were "of little relevance" in explaining the fact that young immigrants had higher crime rates in 14 out of 17 delinquent behaviors, according to a 2015 study [3.3.14]. This implies that a significant factor may be cultural background, a lack of assimilation, or even ingrained criminal impulses. Native Finns in comparable circumstances would commit crimes at comparable rates if poverty were the only factor, but they don't.

Violent crimes are not the only overrepresentation. In Finland, immigrants are responsible for an alarming 90% of burglaries [3.3.15]. This suggests not only sporadic criminal activity but also a potential trend of organized theft networks or cultural perspectives on property crime that deviate significantly from those of Finland.

### ***Germany***

According to the Wall Street Journal, foreigners made up 34.7% of all crimes and misdemeanors in 2017, although only making up 12.8% of the population. In violent offenses, this discrepancy is considerably more noticeable. 74.4% of pickpocketings, 55.4% of official document falsifications, 41.3% of burglaries, 37% of rapes and sexual violence, and 29.7% of murders were committed by foreigners.

Despite making up only 2% of the population, refugees are responsible for 8.5% of all crimes, with substantially higher proportions in violent categories. According to data from the German Ministry of the Interior, they are responsible for 11.4% of thefts, 12.2% of rapes, and 14.3% of crimes against persons, which include murder and torture.

The overrepresentation of immigrants in sexual crimes, especially gang rapes, is one of the most alarming phenomena. The Bundeskriminalamt reports that immigrants make up 67% of gang rape suspects. Although they make up less than 1% of the population, Africans and Afghans are 40 and 70 times more likely to commit gang rape than Germans, respectively. According to Welt, 78.1% of North Rhine-Westphalia gang rape perpetrators in 2023 were immigrants. Almost half (48%) of gang rape suspects nationwide were foreign nationals.

Youth crime has significantly increased as a result of foreigners. According to research by Pfeiffer et al. (1998), 83% of the increase in crime among 14–21-year-olds between 1984 and 1997 was caused by foreigners. Although they only make up 10% of the youth population, foreigners account for 17% to 33% of delinquents between the ages of 14 and 25 (Schwind, 2003). According to previous studies, Turks are the most violent ethnic group; they make up 34.9% of all delinquents and 15.1% of highly active delinquents (those who have committed five or more offenses) (Pfeiffer et al., 1998).

Other serious crimes are disproportionately committed by foreigners. They are responsible for 38–42% of rapes, 83% of forced marriages, and 57% of drug trafficking charges (German Police, 2017). Furthermore, there is a marked overrepresentation of particular nationalities in particular crimes. According to the German Federal Police, suspects from Algeria and Guinea are 4.7 and 4.4 times more likely to be charged with pedophilia, respectively, while those from Afghanistan and Pakistan are six times more likely than Germans.

***Italy***

In Italy, although though they make up a substantially smaller portion of the population overall, foreigners account for 34% of judicial convictions. In terms of violent crimes, immigrants are accountable for 41% of rapes, 33% of assaults, 49% of burglaries, and 28% of homicides and attempted homicides. According to Italian judicial data, 43% of prisoners in 2011 were immigrants, making the overrepresentation even more noticeable in prisons.

A significant percentage of violent crimes in Italy are committed by foreigners. According to data, foreign nationals make about 21% of homicide suspects, indicating that some immigrant groups are disproportionately associated with violent crimes. It is impossible to ignore the part that foreign-born criminals play in making organized crime, human trafficking, and drug-related offenses worse in Italy.

**Table 198 : Relative accusation rates in Italy by nationality**

<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Relative Accusation Rate (Italy = 1x)</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	10.5x
<b>Tunisia</b>	9.6x
<b>Somalia</b>	9.3x
<b>Nigeria</b>	6.2x
<b>France/Germany/UK/Spain</b>	1.0x
<b>Japan</b>	0.1x

Table 199 : Relative accusation rates of foreigners in Italy

<b>Crime Category</b>	<b>Relative Accusation Rate (Italians = 1x)</b>
<b>Total Crimes</b>	4.9x
<b>Violent Crimes</b>	5.3x
<b>Homicides &amp; Attempts</b>	4.4x
<b>Rapes</b>	6.8x
<b>Pedophilia</b>	4.2x
<b>Child Pornography</b>	3.5x
<b>Robberies</b>	8.2x
<i>- of which on Public Roads</i>	11.7x
<b>Drug Trafficking/Possession</b>	5.8x

### *Netherlands*

The Netherlands has a serious and enduring issue with immigrant criminality that goes beyond socioeconomic justifications and calls into question the nation's stellar integration record. More than half of all Moroccan-Dutch people in Rotterdam have already been suspected of a crime by the police, according to RTV Rijnmond. This startling statistic highlights a pervasive problem. According to NIS News, 63% of teenagers who commit significant crimes are the offspring of parents who were not born in the Netherlands, demonstrating the widespread nature of this trend. Furthermore, official police data shows

that 37.5% of all crime suspects in the nation are foreign-born, which is a disproportionate percentage considering their lower demographic presence.

Blom et al. (2005) found that the crime rates of non-European immigrant descendants are more than four times higher than those of native Dutch residents. This overrepresentation is especially noticeable in cases involving violence and predatory behavior. 38% of assaults, 32% of rapes and sexual assaults, 60% of street robberies, and 40% of drug-related charges are committed by immigrants. 61% of violent thefts are committed by non-Western immigrants alone, indicating a pronounced focus on confrontational and aggressive offenses.

The rates of delinquency among young men are startlingly high. The percentage of young non-European immigrant immigrants who have committed crimes is 54%; for young men of Moroccan heritage, that number soars to 70%. The differences persist even after adjusting for education, which is frequently mentioned as a mitigating factor. Crime rates for Dutch nationals with university degrees are only 0.6%, while those for Moroccans, Antilleans, and Turks are 2.7%, 1.8%, and 1.4%, respectively. This implies that social and cultural variables—rather than just economic disadvantage—are important.

According to a study from the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, just 38% of the differences in crime rates between native-born people and immigrants can be explained by the conventional explanatory factors of age, education, and poverty. Deeper problems including unsuccessful integration, cultural resistance to Dutch legal norms, genetic predispositions to violence, and, in certain situations, outright rejection of host-country values are indicated by the remaining 62%.



*Norway*

The crime rate for refugees is 108.8 per 1000 people, while the rate for indigenous is 45 per 1000 people. Kosovo, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Morocco, Turkey, Chile, Eritrea, and Russia are the nationalities with the highest rates of crime.

Foreigners made up 31.1% of the prison population in 2010. 47% of murderers who kill their spouse are foreigners. According to a 2018 poll, 47% of court cases involving domestic abuse against children involved parents who were both foreign-born.

**Table 200 : Crime rate per 1,000 by continent in Norway**

<b>Continent</b>	<b>Crime rate per 1,000 inhabitants</b>
<b>Africa</b>	153.8
<b>Asia</b>	117.4
<b>Eastern Europe</b>	98.4
<b>Central America</b>	164
<b>Western countries</b>	50.7

**Table 201 : Number of people (per 1,000) charged with violence and abuse from 2020 to 2023, 15-24 years old**

<b>Region/Country of Birth</b>	<b>Rate per 1,000</b>
<b>By Region</b>	
<b>Africa</b>	181.0
<b>Latin America</b>	111.2
<b>Asia</b>	107.4
<b>Nordics/EU/EFTA/GB/NA/Oceania</b>	45.6
<b>By Country</b>	
<b>Somalia</b>	269.9
<b>Iraq</b>	185.6
<b>Russia</b>	166.1
<b>Iran</b>	161.6
<b>Syria</b>	151.4
<b>Eritrea</b>	113.3
<b>Ethiopia</b>	111.0
<b>Pakistan</b>	89.8
<b>Afghanistan</b>	86.3
<b>Spain</b>	29.0
<b>Germany</b>	23.4
<b>France</b>	15.4

**Table 202 : Number of people (per 1,000) charged with violence and abuse from 2020 to 2023, 15-24 years old, by parents' country of origin**

<b>Parents' Origin</b>	<b>Country of</b>	<b>Rate per 1,000</b>
<b>Somalia</b>		311.8
<b>Morocco</b>		288.4
<b>Ethiopia</b>		196.0
<b>Iraq</b>		162.8
<b>Turkey</b>		147.0
<b>Pakistan</b>		125.3
<b>Iran</b>		109.7

The overrepresentation of immigrants in crime is getting worse, according to recently revealed statistics from Norway [3.3.16]. The 2020–2023 timeframe shows worse discrepancies than the 2015–2018 period. Despite their smaller demographic share, people with immigrant backgrounds were implicated in 25% of all charges, with 20% of the 527,000 criminal charges decided in Norwegian courts during these years targeting first-generation immigrants and 5% involving immigrant children born in Norway.

Extreme generational persistence in criminality is revealed by the data. The rate of accusations against young males (15–24 years old) with immigrant backgrounds is significantly higher: 550 charges per 1,000 for first-generation immigrants and 630 charges per 1,000 for descendants born in Norway. This is more than twice the rate of 280 charges per 1,000 among adolescents who are native to Norway. The statistics from Oslo are especially concerning: the number of youth from immigrant backgrounds is 820–910 per 1,000, whereas that of their local peers is only 210.

One important indicator of criminal activity is still national origin. While young male immigrants of Filipino or Thai ancestry had accusation rates below native levels, individuals from Iraq and Somalia have accusation rates of 1,200 per 1,000, four times the

national norm. Even more startling is the 1,300 charges per 1,000 Norwegian-born sons of Somali and Moroccan immigrants, which points to a lack of successful integration and ingrained subcultural dysfunction. Youth of Vietnamese descent, on the other hand, had lower crime rates than those of ethnic Norwegians, denying general socioeconomic theories.

Disparities in violent crime are particularly bad. Despite making up a small portion of the population, immigrants are responsible for 27% of killings and attempted murders, a category with high clearance rates. Charges of assault and traffic infractions also disproportionately target immigrant populations.

### *Sweden*

Decades of unsuccessful immigration policies have put Sweden's image as a peaceful and progressive country to the test, as official statistics show that foreign-born people and their offspring are unquestionably overrepresented in violent and sexual crimes. Even though they make up a small portion of the population, immigrants and their offspring are heavily represented in Sweden's criminal scene, especially when it comes to crimes that undermine societal trust and inspire fear.

Given their lower percentage of the overall population, immigrants made up a staggering 33% of Sweden's prison population in 2019. Foreigners were previously twice as likely to commit crimes as native-born people as early as 2014, so this discrepancy is not new. In several important areas, like sexual violence, the situation has only become worse. In Sweden, a startling 58% of convicted rapists are foreign-born, with 40% having been born in Africa or the Middle East. A 2016 police report detailing sexual harassment in public places supports this trend even further. Eighty percent of the identifiable offenders of the 123 cases that were reported in baths and swimming pools, the majority of which targeted young girls, were foreign nationals. Similarly, immigrants accounted for the vast majority of identified suspects in sexual assault instances that occurred in parks and on the streets.

However, gang violence is the most concerning increase. By 2017, immigrants or their descendants were responsible for at least 90% of shootings that resulted in murder or attempted murder. Parallel societies have created organized crime networks that function with almost complete impunity, as evidenced by the fact that 94.5% of criminal gang members in Stockholm are immigrants.

It is impossible to write off these figures as purely socioeconomic. Poverty is not a major motive in Sweden because of its robust labor laws and extensive assistance system, but the fact that some immigrant groups, especially those from the Middle East and North Africa, continue to commit crimes over generations points to innate cultural and integration issues, combined with genetic predispositions. Once praised for its pluralism, Sweden has instead created pockets where anarchy flourishes and local customs are disregarded.

**Table 203 : % of people suspected of crimes by region of origin in Sweden**

Region of Origin		% Suspected of Crime
North (Maghreb)	Africa	>30%
East Africa		30%
Other Africa		>30%
Middle East		24%
Central Asia		22%
East Asia		5%
Western Europe		7.5%

63% of all criminals condemned for rape between 2000 and 2021 in Sweden are of immigrant background.

### *Spain*

Despite making up a far smaller percentage of the population, foreigners are 33% of homicide suspects, which indicates a severe overrepresentation in the most violent crimes. The discrepancy in sexual violence is even more noticeable, as 43% of rape suspects are immigrants, a statistic that highlights hazardous vulnerabilities in Spanish communities. Foreigners are implicated in 47% of violent theft cases and 49% of street robberies that directly affect public safety, making the issue even more concerning when looking at robberies. This trend is shown in drug trafficking cases, where 31% of suspects are foreign nationals.

The statistics are still alarming when it comes to domestic violence. Even while Spaniards are the ones who commit domestic violence the most, 27% of suspects are foreigners, which is a sizable percentage considering their smaller numerical presence. The fact that 25% of child abuse cases involve strangers, many of whom end up being foreign nationals, is even more alarming since it suggests that the most vulnerable members of society are at a heightened danger.

**Table 204 : Relative indictment rate, by nationality, in Spain**

<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Relative Indictment Rate (Spain = 1x)</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	14.3x
<b>Morocco</b>	5.9x
<b>Senegal</b>	4.2x
<b>Venezuela</b>	2.6x
<b>Philippines</b>	1.0x
<b>China</b>	0.9x

### *Switzerland*

As official 2022 crime figures show a shocking overrepresentation of foreign nationals in violent and organized crime, Switzerland's reputation for law and order is coming under increasing pressure. Foreigners make up only 26% of the population,

but they are responsible for 60% of killings, 55% of rapes, and 53% of assaults. This trend raises major questions about the efficiency of border control and integration efforts. Switzerland's susceptibility to transnational crime networks is shown by the startling fact that 75% of members of criminal or terrorist organizations are foreign nationals.

Despite making up just over 25% of Switzerland's resident population, foreigners are responsible for 53% of all convictions for crimes and misdemeanors, according to the country's 2022 crime statistics. All four of the hostage-taking cases that were reported nationwide that year were committed by foreigners, demonstrating that this overrepresentation even extends to the most spectacular transgressions.

It is especially concerning how widespread international criminal involvement is. According to analysis, immigrants are overrepresented in 142 out of 156 crime categories, or 91% of all offense kinds. This shows that illegal behavior is almost universally engaged in disproportionately, rather than being concentrated in a single sort of crime. Disparities are particularly pronounced among some national groups:

Compared to native Swiss people, North Africans have conviction rates that are seven times greater.

The conviction rate for other Africans (apart from Maghreb) is five times higher than the Swiss rate.

**Table 205 : Foreign crimes (%) in Switzerland**

Type of Offense	% Committed by Foreigners
<b>Theft</b>	63%
- of which pickpocketing	91%
<b>Physical altercations</b>	57%
<b>Violence/threats against authorities</b>	51%
<b>Corruption of officials</b>	90%
<b>Securities forgery</b>	60%
<b>Other document falsifications</b>	77%
<b>Kidnapping</b>	70%
<b>Child sexual offenses</b>	40%
<b>Human trafficking</b>	82%
<b>Property damage/theft</b>	66%
<b>Serious bodily harm</b>	55%

*United States***Table 206 : Black overrepresentation in arrests, USA**

Crime Category	% Black/African Americans among arrests
<b>Murder</b>	51.3%
<b>Rape</b>	26.8%
<b>Robbery</b>	50.3%
<b>Burglary</b>	27.3%
<b>Illegal Weapons Possession</b>	41.9%
<b>Embezzlement</b>	35.7%
<b>Violent Crime (Aggregate)</b>	35.3%



Black % of population vs % of violent crime offenders (FBI, 2021)




Figure 111 : Black % vs violent crime offenders who are Black %

Figure 112 : Black % vs violent crime offenders who are Black %




Figure 113 : Black % vs % of homicides

Figure 114 : Black % vs % of homicides

Table 207 : Murderers per 100,000 per race &amp; age, USA

[FBI NIBRS 2021] Ages	White Male Murderers per 100,000	Hispanic Male Murderers per 100,000	Black Male Murderers per 100,000	Black Female Murderers per 100,000	Hispanic Female Murderers per 100,000	White Female Murderers per 100,000
15–64	5.2	17.4	95.5	8.7	3.6	1.1
5–14	0.2	0.8	4.9			
15–24	8.3	28.1	207.4	16.9	4.8	1.4
25–34	7.6	23.5	119.5	13.3	5.7	1.9
35–64	3.6	9.4	38.4	3.9	2.2	0.8
65+	0.6	1.2	3.8	0.4	0.3	0.1
All	3.5	11.9	64.4	5.8	2.4	0.7
Projected Lifetime	274	819	4508	423	174	59

### Canada

While it only represents 2.5% of the Canadian population, the black community represents 10% of prisoners in Canada.

Figure 1: Rate of homicide victims and accused identified as Black and as non-racialized, Canada, 2021




Figure 115 : Homicide accused by race

Figure 116 : Homicide accused by race

### ***Portugal***

Despite making up only 5% of Portugal's population, foreigners are overrepresented in the country's prison population (15%), highlighting differences in criminal activity. 54% of these foreign inmates are of African descent, suggesting that some immigrant groups have a disproportionately high incarceration rate in comparison to their proportion of the population.

### ***United Kingdom***

Significant racial and ethnic gaps exist in the UK's criminal offending statistics, with Asian and Black communities exhibiting an especially alarming overrepresentation in major crimes. Despite making up only 4% of the population, 10% of convicted offenders nationwide are Black, a 2.5-fold overrepresentation [3.3.17]. Black kids, who make up only 5% of children nationwide, account for 30% of the underage prison population, making this discrepancy much more pronounced among young criminals [3.3.17].

Particularly concerning trends in violent and sexual offenses are shown by the data. Black perpetrators were responsible for 72% (66 of 92) of group rape convictions between 2006 and 2009 [3.3.18]. Black people are implicated in 64% of gun crimes, 59% of killings, 53% of robberies, and 47% of knife offenses in London, where they make up 13.5% of the population [3.3.19]. Asian people constitute 84% of members of grooming gangs [3.3.20].

Asian cultures, which account for 27% of all identified group child abuse perpetrators, exhibit distinct but equally alarming tendencies [3.3.21].

## Japan

Over 230,000 (roughly 3% of the 7 million residents) of Saitama Prefecture, which is close to Tokyo, are foreigners. Saitama's arrest data makes it possible to determine crime rates by nationality. Foreign national arrest data for 2022–2023 can be found [here](#) (pages 26 and 38), and foreign national population data for the same years can be found [here](#). The arrest rates for Japanese nationals in comparison to 1.0 are summarized below. Smaller groups of a few thousand people or less are combined into larger categories (such as "South Asia," "Africa," etc.) to guarantee accurate results. For the approximately 2,000 Turkish citizens, there is an exception. Their crime rate is also noteworthy because this community in Japan has recently received attention.

**Arrest rates of foreign nationals in Saitama Prefecture, Japan, for criminal offences in 2022-2023**

Excluding immigration-related and other "special law offences".




Figure 117 : Arrest rate by nationality in Saitama

Figure 118 : Arrest rate by nationality in Saitama

Turkish nationals have the highest arrest rate when it comes to criminal offenses (apart from immigration violations and other "special law offenses"), with a 15-fold overrepresentation compared to Japanese nationals. This means that Turkish nationals are 15 times more likely than Japanese to be arrested for crimes. With an odds ratio of 3.4, Africans come in second, followed by Latin Americans (with the exception of people from Brazil and Peru) at 2.4. At 1.8 and 1.5, respectively, South Asians and Southeast Asians also exhibit high rates. The majority of those from Brazil and Peru are ethnically Japanese and are descended from Japanese emigrants in the early 20th century. After spending one or two generations in South America, a large number of them have recently returned to Japan as foreign workers. Their arrest rate is almost the same as that of the Japanese population as a whole. Japanese nationals have arrest rates that are comparable to or lower than those of Chinese, "Westerners" (from Europe, the USA, Canada, and Oceania), and Koreans (Koreans ranking lower).

It should be mentioned that although foreigners are more likely to be arrested than Japanese people overall, they do not account for the majority of crimes in Saitama or Japan overall because they are so few. Foreigners made up 4.6% of all arrestees in 2023, a slight overrepresentation given that they made up 3.2% of Saitama's total population. Nonetheless, Japanese nationals continued to make up 95.4% of all arrestees. It's also important to note that the great majority of foreigners follow the law. In 2022–2023, the arrest rate for Japanese citizens was 1.3 per 1,000, while the rate for Turkish citizens was 20.1 per 1,000, a 15-fold difference. The majority of Turkish citizens, like other foreign residents, were not detained for criminal offenses in spite of this discrepancy.

Nonetheless, when examining per capita crime rates, as we did here, the trend is essentially the same as in Europe and other Western nations: East Asians are at the bottom, South and Southeast Asians are in the middle, and Middle Easterners and Africans are at the top. Professionals and those with more education are overrepresented in Japan due to its stringent immigration laws, which typically draw highly selected immigrants. Since most immigrants in Japan are of high quality, their crime rates are probably lower than they otherwise would be. Nevertheless, despite this elite profile, Africans are still overrepresented by a factor of 3.4.

This elite immigration does not apply to Turkish citizens, who are mostly Kurdish. The majority are probably neutrally selected in terms of social status and hail from Turkish rural villages. Many Turkish nationals can enter Japan as tourists, apply for asylum, and stay longer during the drawn-out reviews, which can take months, thanks to the country's visa-free entry policy for up to 90 days. As a result, traveling from Turkey to Japan is not too difficult. Prior to a 2024 law capping reapplications at three, it was possible to reapply more than once, even though the majority of applications are denied. This route has allowed many Kurds to work in Japan's demolition sector. Although their rural upbringing may point to negative selection, their migration to Japan and acquisition of Japanese language skills suggests some ambition, which may counteract their selectivity.

Since immigrants are typically younger than native-born people, their crime rates are likely somewhat inflated. Nevertheless, adjusting for sex and age usually only marginally lessens group differences and leaves most disparities in crime rates intact (see for example Norway and Finland [Skardhamar et al., 2014](#), Germany and Denmark [Kirkegaard & Becker, 2017](#)).

Since they were brought to Japan to perform unskilled labor, ethnic Japanese immigrants from Brazil and Peru are likewise not considered elite. They have arrest rates that are lower than many elite immigrant groups and comparable to the Japanese

population, despite their non-elite origin, low socioeconomic status in Japan, and upbringing in relatively impoverished developing countries, such as Brazil and Peru.

Japan still shows almost the same patterns of racial and ethnic crime rates as the rest of the world, despite having few and mostly elite immigrants and almost no segregated immigrant neighborhoods.

### ***Conclusion***

The data shows a distinct and recurring pattern across Western countries, from Sweden and Germany to the UK, Switzerland, and Portugal: immigrant populations and some ethnic minority groups are disproportionately overrepresented in crime statistics, especially for organized, violent, and sexual offenses. Disparities can range from two to fifteen times higher than native populations, a concerning tendency that continues even when socioeconomic considerations are taken into consideration. Immigrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa are disproportionately represented in categories such as killings, sexual assaults, and gang violence. For instance, although making up only 13.5% of the population, Black people in London are responsible for 64% of gun crime arrests and 59% of homicide suspects, a trend that is common in European cities.

Immigrants of the first generation are not the only ones affected. The claim that inequalities will eventually disappear is undermined by the fact that second and even third generation descendants frequently have comparable or worse crime rates. For example, indictment rates for Somalis born in Norway are four times higher than those of the native population, while British-born offspring of Somali and Pakistani immigrants are disproportionately implicated in violent crime and gang grooming. This generational persistence points to more serious problems with failed integration, genetics, cultural attitudes, and the emergence of parallel societies where crime is accepted as the norm.

Significant specialties in criminal conduct are also revealed by the data. While violent street crime is dominated by Sub-Saharan Africans, sexual offenses are disproportionately committed by Middle Eastern and North African communities. Asian grooming gangs are a prime example of how some crimes become ethnically concentrated; since 2005, they have been 84% of grooming gangs members in the UK. However, crime rates among immigrants from East Asia and Western Europe are consistently at or below native levels, demonstrating that different immigrant groups have different trends.


These results necessitate swift, uncompromising policy responses. Denying the issue will only increase public mistrust and give radical movements more clout. Stricter immigration screening, zero-tolerance enforcement in high-crime areas, required integration programs, and expedited deportation of foreign offenders are all necessary for effective solutions. However, officials must safeguard law-abiding immigrants while avoiding general stigmatization and concentrating on high-risk groups. Public safety will be undermined and societal divisions will only widen if the data is ignored out of political correctness. The statistics are unmistakable: immigration and crime are closely related, and the situation can only be resolved by forceful action.



### 3.2 — Black crime

In this section I will further discuss black crime, showing how Africans are overrepresented in violent crime everywhere around the world, while also giving away some explanations.

#### *United States*



Sources: Vital statistics (1910-1967), CDC (1968-2020), Uniform Crime Reports (1933-2020), Decennial censuses (1930-2020). Chart by @Scientific\_Bird

Figure 119 : Homicide rates relative to Whites


Figure 120 : Homicide rates relative to Whites

***United Kingdom***

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
<b>Table 30: Proportion of convicted principal suspects by suspect's ethnic appearance, compared to the ethnic profile of the population [notes 2,4,18]</b>									
<b>England and Wales, combined data for year ending March 2019 to year ending March 2021</b>									
This worksheet contains one table. Some cells refer to notes which can be found on the notes worksheet.									
Some shorthand is used in this table: [z] indicates 'not applicable'.									
<a href="#">Link to table of contents</a>									
<a href="#">Link to notes worksheet</a>									
Source: Home Office - Homicide Index									
Ethnic appearance of suspect	Convicted principal suspects (Apr 2018 to Mar 2021 combined)		Mid 2016 population estimates						
	Proportion (%)		Proportion (%)						
White	68		85						
Black	18		3						
Other [notes 13,19]	13		11						
Not known/not recorded	1		[z]						

***Canada***

Figure 1: Rate of homicide victims and accused identified as Black and as non-racialized, Canada, 2021



*Brazil*

**Murder rate per 100,000 people, according to race, per state**

Sorted by % difference




Chart: THE BRAZILIAN REPORT • Source: ATLAS DA VIOLENCIA • [Get the data](#) • Created with Datawrapper

Figure 121 : Murder rate per 100,000 by race

Figure 122 : Murder rate per 100,000 by race

**Overall**

From the handbook of crime correlates :

TABLE 2.3.2a Black-White Comparisons of Official Violent Offenses.	
Nature of any difference	Officially detected offenses
	Violent
Blacks more	<p><b>EUROPE</b> Britain: Hood 1992:205</p> <p><b>MIDDLE EAST</b> Israel: Landau &amp; Drapkin 1968:11; Shoham 1970:336</p> <p><b>NORTH AMERICA</b> Canada: Gartner 1995:206; United States: Stearns 1925; Brearley 1930; Bowler 1931:119; Brearley 1932; DePorte &amp; Parkhurst 1935; Lottier 1938; Sutherland 1939:120; Harlan 1949; Vold 1952; Wolfgang 1958: 31; Bensing &amp; Schroeder 1960:70; Wolfgang 1961; Sellin &amp; Wolfgang 1964; Porkony 1965:480; Forslund 1966; A Henry &amp; Short 1967:262; Langberg 1967; Wolfgang 1967:18; Voss &amp; Hepburn 1968; Lalli &amp; Turner 1968; Voss &amp; Hepburn 1968:501; Mulvihill &amp; Tumin 1969; Boudouris 1970; Block 1975; Wolfgang 1975:33; Mumford et al. 1976; Block 1977; Count-van Maner 1977; Lundsgaarde 1977; Shin et al. 1977; Dennis 1979:20; R Lane 1979:112 (19<sup>th</sup> century); R Parker &amp; Smith 1979; Skogan 1979; Farley 1980; M Smith &amp; Parker 1980; Gurr 1981:326 (19<sup>th</sup> &amp; 20<sup>th</sup> centuries); Hindelang 1981:466; Tinklenberg &amp; Ochberg 1981:123; Wolfgang &amp; Weiner 1981; Messner 1982; Messner 1983a; Messner 1983b; Poussaint 1983; Riedel 1984; Weiner &amp; Wolfgang 1984:28; K Williams 1984; Bankston et al. 1985; Block 1985; Hawkins 1985; Sampson 1985; Centers for Disease Control 1986 (males, homicide); Farley 1986; Harvey 1986; Hawkins 1986; Kruttschnitt et al. 1986; O'Carroll &amp; Mercy 1986; Shai &amp; Rosenwaike 1988 (males, homicides); Christoffel 1990; Rose &amp; McClain 1990; Hammett et al. 1992; M Harer &amp; Steffensmeier 1992; Sommers &amp; Baskin 1992:194; CR Block 1993:305; Wolfner &amp; Gelles 1993; Zingraff et al. 1993:192; Dilulio 1994; Huizinga et al. 1994 (adolescents); Hutson et al. 1995:1035; La Free 1995; Massey 1995; Harer &amp; Steffensmeier 1996 (prison violence, males); La Free 1996; R Martinez 1996 (males, homicides); Singh &amp; Yu 1996:562; Sorenson &amp; Shen 1996:98; Hickey 1997 (serial killers); McKenna 1997:42 (19<sup>th</sup> century); JF Short 1997:8; Stanton et al. 1997:27; Bradshaw et al. 1998 (homicide); Verdugo 1998:113; Fingerhut et al. 1998; Martinez &amp; Matthew 1998 (homicide); R Peterson &amp; Krivo 1999; Snyder 1999 (adolescents); Hawkins et al. 2000 (adolescents); Krivo &amp; Peterson 2000 (homicide); J Fox &amp; Levin 2001; McNulty 2001; McNulty &amp; Bellair 2003 (adolescents); A Walsh 2005</p> <p><b>OCEANIA</b> Hawaii: Blanchard &amp; Blanchard 1983:167</p>
No signif. difference	
Whites more	

Figure 123 : Meta-analysis of Black-White comparison in crime

Figure 124 : Meta-analysis of Black-White comparison in crime

I could continue, but you understand. Africans are more likely than (most) other citizens to engage in violent behavior everywhere and at every period for which we have statistics. Why? Naturally, the simplest explanation to describe a pattern that is continuous over time and space is a single constant source. An appropriate candidate is genetics. Really, there isn't another viable contender. Anti-African sentiment? It

raises the question of why people developed this sentiment in the first place. Hatred of others is something people learn for a reason; it is not something they are born with.

The widespread misconception that Africans are violent is an excellent indicator of their true conduct, since we know demographic stereotypes are very accurate [3.2.1]. European colonization? Regardless of the size of the population or whether the country is governed by Europeans, Asians, or Africans, Africans are violent everywhere. In any event, there is no solid proof that colonialism's legacy contributes to violent conduct. After all, despite their recent history of British colonization, Singapore and Hong Kong are incredibly safe locations. One may create a crude ranking system of races based on their propensity for violent conduct by comparing them throughout time (the last few hundred years) and location:

Africans

MENAP (most Muslim groups)

Amerindians

Indians

Europeans (lots of variation)



Southeast Asians (Thai etc. but also Muslim Indonesians)

East Asians

Although they are more difficult to pinpoint, other smaller tribes, such as the Polynesians, Siberians, and Eskimos (arctic peoples), are somewhere above Europeans. Although not entirely constant historically, some distinctions are steady enough. With the exception of Southeast Asians, who have lower crime rates than their intellect would suggest, the ordering above largely reflects the average level of intelligence for the groups.

*Purely socioeconomic factors*


Naturally, others may argue that Africans are aggressive because they experience poverty and other non-genetic problems that they did not generate. However, this only raises the issue of the sociologist's fallacy. Examine the following causal models:

**Blank slate model****Hereditarian model**

African heritage simply happens to be associated with, say, poverty throughout time and location according to the blank slate concept. The regularity of the observation cannot be explained by such model. However, there is no mystery in the

hereditarian model. Africans are the ones who are responsible for their own crimes, poverty, and lack of education. The sociologist's fallacy is identifying correlations between poverty, crime, and race, determining that adjusting for poverty (or anything else) lessens racial disparities in crime rates, and then drawing the conclusion that exogenous poverty is the cause of these trends. This is not a logical inference. The hereditarian model predicts the same thing, but for a different reason (the direct effect of an ultimate cause is lessened when a mediator is controlled for). This error results from a failure to comprehend causal reasoning.

However, we can do more. Here are the racial disparities in crime rates by economic level in the United States, for example:



Clearly, there are significant racial disparities in homicides regardless of financial level (victimization and perpetuation rates exhibit a similar pattern).

Additionally, we can examine incarceration rates (which are primarily caused by violent crimes) and household incomes by race:




Figure 125 : Incarceration rate by race

The significant disparity in incarceration rates cannot be quantitatively explained by growing up in poverty.

However, poverty and income are not a viable argument because poverty is only connected with criminality rather than causing it in the first place:

Sariaslan, A., Mikkonen, J., Aaltonen, M., Hiilamo, H., Martikainen, P., & Fazel, S. (2021). [No causal associations between childhood family income and subsequent](#)



psychiatric disorders, substance misuse and violent crime arrests: a nationwide Finnish study of > 650 000 individuals and their siblings. International journal of epidemiology, 50(5), 1628-1638.

**“Background** Childhood family income has been shown to be associated with later psychiatric disorders, substance misuse and violent crime, but the consistency, strength and causal nature of these associations remain unclear. **Methods** We conducted a nationwide cohort and co-sibling study of 650 680 individuals (426 886 siblings) born in Finland between 1986 and 1996 to re-examine these associations by accounting for unmeasured confounders shared between siblings. The participants were followed up from their 15th birthday until they either migrated, died, met criteria for the outcome of interest or reached the end of the study period (31 December 2017 or 31 December 2018 for substance misuse). The associations were adjusted for sex, birth year and birth order, and expressed as

adjusted hazard ratios (aHRs). The outcomes included a diagnosis of a severe mental illness (schizophrenia-spectrum disorders or bipolar disorder), depression and anxiety. Substance misuse (e.g. medication prescription, hospitalization or death due to a substance use disorder or arrest for drug-related crime) and violent crime arrests were also examined. Stratified Cox regression models accounted for unmeasured confounders shared between differentially exposed siblings.

**Results** For each \$15 000 increase in family income at age 15 years, the risks of the outcomes were reduced by between 9% in severe mental illness (aHR = 0.91; 95% confidence interval: 0.90–0.92) and 23% in violent crime arrests (aHR = 0.77; 0.76–0.78). These associations were fully attenuated in the sibling-comparison models (aHR range: 0.99–1.00). Sensitivity analyses confirmed the latter findings.

**Conclusions** Associations between childhood family income and subsequent risks for psychiatric disorders, substance misuse and violent crime arrest were not consistent with a causal interpretation.”

Similarly, one cannot point to educational attainment as the cause. Why? African violence begins much before people finish their educational journey. One can see this e.g. in school violence rates ([US data](#)):

*The recent Department of Education survey on racial disparities in public education found that black students were still getting the boot from schools faster than any other group, and that included black females, who were disproportionately suspended and expelled more than white females from schools. But it also found that the students were getting suspended in astoundingly disproportionate numbers even before they ever set foot in a regular school classroom. According to figures, nearly 50 percent of preschoolers who received more than one suspension were blacks. This was double that of white students though blacks made up less than 20 percent of public school preschoolers.*

*No matter what age they were suspended or expelled, the students were far more likely to wind up in police stations and courtrooms after removal. This cast an even harsher glare on the stiff punishment school officials routinely dish out to black students who allegedly misbehave. It's no overreach or apology for misconduct to say "allegedly" about the reasons for their suspensions, expulsions and often arrest. Teams of academics closely examined the notion that black students were more violent, disruptive or menacing than white students. They found that the disparities in suspensions didn't result from blacks "acting out" in the classroom more than whites. The heavy-handed oust of black students from schools is also a major factor in the grossly high dropout rate of black students from many inner city schools.*

### **Conclusion**

Africans are more likely than average to be involved in violent crimes in every society where data is available. This regularity demands an explanation, which ought to be a consistent cause as well (Occam's razor). An excellent theory is African descent. According to this view, we know that aggressive conduct is highly heritable,

meaning that individual genetic variations are the cause. This genetic diversity results from tens of thousands of genetic variations with little effects that are difficult to detect in research. Thus, the hereditary model of racial differences is straightforward: all races (ancestries) have these genetic variants, but Asians and Africans have slightly different frequencies.

As with any other group difference, it should be noted that this hypothesis only considers average differences and that an individual African may or may not be violent. Similar to this, racial differences in criminality that are heritable do not always indicate a general "superiority" or "inferiority" index because they may be counterbalanced by other trait differences. Other than suggesting miraculous non-genetic elements that happen to follow Africans everywhere they go, there isn't really an opposing model. One may call it the "magic bad dirt theory," but scholars seem to subscribe to a theory that resembles a miasma, according to which Europeans make Africans criminals when they approach them too closely.

Relative rather than absolute distinctions across groups are the focus of the hereditarian model. There may be a violent phase in a civilization where all groups face increased rates of violence. The model also takes into account the genetic variation frequencies in typical samples. Finding an elite segment of the population and demonstrating that they don't have a high rate of violent crime, such as elite migrants in the USA from this or that nation or race, will not invalidate the concept. Additionally, the model does not suggest that Africans always have the greatest rates of crime or homicide in any nation. Whether they are selective effects (elite or pleb selection for migrants) or non-genetic causes (e.g., the drug war in Latin America), local conditions may be relevant.

### **3.3 — Environmental factors for higher crime rates of Blacks**

#### ***Racial bias in the justice system***

Black people are arrested more frequently than white people, as most people are aware. This is often interpreted as indicating that Black people are more likely than White people to commit crimes. However, a lot of other people think that the high arrest rates of Black people are a sign of the criminal justice system's bias against them. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. The percentage of Black people behind bars closely mirrors the percentage of victims who say they were the victims of a Black person's crime.

Additionally, according to official data, Black students are more likely than white students to be disciplined for breaking school regulations, which can be viewed as a juvenile equivalent of crime. When it comes to drug crime, some people think there is a strong argument against the legal system. However, these arguments are predicated on self-report data and fail to consider racial disparities in honesty or the methods in which Black and White drug users utilize drugs. The claim that Black people are being killed by police at disproportionately high rates will then be discussed. Lastly, we'll see that Black people receive the same penalties as White people for committing the same crime after the appropriate regulations are put in place.

The degree to which official arrest rates match victimization statistics is one of the most compelling arguments in support of their legitimacy. More specifically, there is a noticeable correlation between the Uniform Crime Report and the National Crime Victimization Survey.

Every year, the Department of Justice conducts the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which asks 160,000 people and a random sample of roughly 90,000 families about their experiences with crime during the previous six months. In the past six months, participants have been asked if they have been the victim of a violent crime. If they have, they are questioned on a number of topics pertaining to the crime and its perpetrator. Every year, these biannual interviews are merged.

The FBI receives an annual compilation of data from police stations across the nation, known as the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The UCR is able to obtain information for police stations that have authority over 277 million Americans (about 94% of the total population), even though not all police stations submit this data. The demographics of those arrested each year are among the statistics the FBI gathers ([Crime in the United States 2014, The Nation's Two Crime Measures](#)).

According to the two measurements shown below, Black people are essentially responsible for the same level of violent crime ([Last 2015](#)):

**Table 209 : Proportion of offenses committed by Blacks**

The Proportion of Rapes, Robberies, and Assaults, Committed by Blacks between 2000 and 2008, as estimated by the Uniform Crime Report and the National Victimization Survey					
<b>Rape</b>		<b>Robbery</b>		<b>Assault</b>	
UCR	NCVS	UCR	NCVS	UCR	NCVS
34%	34%	56%	61%	33%	27%

The fact that Black students are in trouble at school considerably more frequently than White students adds credence to the argument that Black people actually commit more crimes than White people. Take a look at these statistics:

Black preschoolers have a higher than normal suspension rate, according to a 2014 Department of Education report. This was particularly noticeable for repeat offenders: although Black preschoolers make up only 18% of preschools, they account for over 50% of preschoolers who have received several suspensions ([The Associated Press 2014](#)).

According to a US Department of Education document cited by [Vega \(2014\)](#), in 2011 and 2012, black females were responsible for 12% of primary school suspensions, while white girls were only responsible for 2%. (The majority of those suspended were male.)

According to a Department of Education analysis published in [2012](#), which examined data from more than 72,000 schools, Black kids accounted for 18% of the student body,

but 35% of those who had received a single suspension, 45% of those who had received several suspensions, and 39% of those who had been expelled.

Even after adjusting for socioeconomic status, Black middle school students had a higher suspension rate than White middle school students, according to research by [Skiba et al. \(2002\)](#).

Therefore, it is acceptable to say that Black people are more prone than White people to have problems in school.

Some will contend that this is because educators share racial biases with law enforcement. There is evidence to the contrary, though. In particular, [Wright et al. \(2014\)](#) discovered that Blacks and Whites had an identical chance of being suspended if they have an equivalent number of prior behavioral issues. Furthermore, after being sent to the principal's office, Blacks and Whites had an identical chance of being suspended, according to research by [Skiba et al. \(2002\)](#).

Therefore, the argument that Black people do not commit more crimes than white people would now have to embrace the perspective that police, teachers, and victims of crime all happen to share the same prejudices against Black people. That seems a bit unrealistic.

While some may contend that police officers are not generally biased toward Black people, they are when it comes to drugs. Surveys demonstrating that Black people are either not more likely than White people to use drugs, or, as many of these studies indicate, that White people are more likely than Black people to use drugs, will be used to support this assertion. This argument has two issues: first, it disregards racial variations in honesty; second, it fails to consider pertinent distinctions between drug users who are Black and those who are White.

Although this may sound harsh, the fact that Black people are more prone than White people to lie about using narcotics must be addressed first. How are we aware?

In order to determine what drugs a person has recently taken, criminologists may perform studies in which they perform biological tests on their hair, blood, urine, etc., and compare the results to the substances the subject claims to have just taken. According to these research, Black people are more prone than white people to lie and say they haven't used a drug when in fact they have ([Page et al. 2009](#), [Falk et al. 1992](#), [Feucht, Stephens, and Walker, 1994](#), and [Fedrich and Johnson 2005](#)).

The majority of research based on self-reported criminal history actually indicates that Black people are not more prone than white people to commit crimes in general, according to Ellis, Beaver, and Wright's Handbook of Crime Correlates. And that is untrue, as we

**Table 210 : Black-White comparisons of self-reported criminal behavior**

Nature of the relationship	Self-reported offenses	
	Overall offenses	Illegal drugs
Blacks higher	<b>EUROPE Britain:</b> Newcombe et al. 1995:334 <b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Baughman & Dahlstrom 1968; Williams & Gold 1972; Berger & Simon 1974:151; Fors & Rojek 1983:216; Elliott et al. 1986:486; Sampson 1986:881; Elliott et al. 1989; Elliott 1994:6; Marshall & Webb 1994:332; Ross 1995; Farrington et al. 1996:509; Kelley et al. 1997:6	<b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Brunswick 1969; Murray et al. 1987; Flewelling et al. 1994; Marshall & Webb 1994:337
Not signif.	<b>EUROPE Britain:</b> Bowling et al. 1994:55; Graham & Bowling 1996 <b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Lively et al. 1962; Gold, 1966; Epps 1967; Gould 1969:330; Chambliss & Nagasawa 1969; Gould 1969; Williams & Gold 1972; Elliott & Voss 1974; Gold & Reimer 1974; Elliott & Ageton 1980:104; Gold & Petronio 1980; Petronio 1980; Harris 1992:92; Peeples & Loeber 1994; Dembo et al. 1995b:271; Weber et al. 1995; Heimer 1997:814; Manolakes 1997:245	<b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Brook et al. 1977; Fors & Rojek 1983:213; Oetting & Beauvais 1990; Wallace & Bachman 1991:341; Gottfredson & Koper 1996; Johanson et al. 1996:526; Friedman & Ali 1997; Gottfredson & Koper 1997; Neumark & Anthony 1997:195
Whites higher	<b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Walberg et al. 1974; Mazur 1995:280; Evans et al. 1996:55; Felson & Staff 2006	<b>EUROPE Britain:</b> Leitner et al. 1993:28 <b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Globetti & Windham 1967; Preston 1968; Bloom et al. 1974; Prendergast 1974; Kandel et al. 1976b; Nyberg & McIntosh 1979; Harrell & Cisin 1980; Fors & Rojek 1983; Zucker & Harford 1983; Harford 1985; Harford 1986; Maddahian et al. 1986:76; Newcomb et al. 1987:424; Welte & Barnes 1987; Austin 1988; Mensch & Kandel 1988a; Palmer & Ringwalt 1988; Austin & Gilbert 1989; Prendergast et al. 1989; Oetting & Beauvais 1990; Anthony & Helzer 1991; Bachman et al. 1991a; Blum et al. 1992; Wallace & Bachman 1991:350; Bass & Kane-Williams 1993; Johnston et al. 1995:137; Mazur 1995:280; O'Donnell et al. 1995; Parker et al. 1995; Mieczkowski 1996:365; Farley 1997:90; Whitmore et al. 1997:93

have already seen.

Source: [Wright, Beaver, and Ellis, 2009, page 25](#)

These arguments also overlook significant distinctions between Black and White drug users, as was previously mentioned. What kinds of distinctions exist? "African Americans are nearly twice as likely to buy outdoors (0.31 versus 0.14), three times more likely to buy from a stranger (0.30 versus 0.09), and significantly more likely to buy away from their homes (0.61 versus 0.48)," according to a study that compared drug use among Black and White people. [Pacula, Iguchi, and Ramchand MY \(2006\)](#). Black drug users also use drugs more frequently than White drug users, use more dangerous substances than White drug users, and are more likely to use drugs in high-crime neighborhoods, according to a Justice Department report [\(Lagan 1995\)](#).

Black drug users are more likely than White drug users to be arrested due to all six of these disparities. Considering all of this, there is no solid evidence to support the idea that racism is reflected in Black drug arrest rates. They are much more likely to represent the dishonesty and careless drug-using behavior of Black people.

The assertion that Black people are frequently unfairly slain by police has gained a lot of popularity recently. Treyvon Martin, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray are just a few of the alleged cases of this phenomenon that have received a great deal of media attention.

It is no accident that there is a fascination with vivid (and frequently dishonest) anecdotes. The notion of the police war on Black people is immediately debunked by a cursory examination of the pertinent statistics. As we saw above, Black people make up more than half of robbery offenders and approximately one-third of rape and assault offenders, according to both NVCS and UCR data. According to UCR data, approximately half of murder offenders, 38% of violent offenders, and 29% of all arrested individuals are Black [\(2014, Crime in the United States, Table 43\)](#). Given this, we would anticipate that between 29% and 38% of people killed by police would be Black if we had a just police force that only killed criminals who constituted a serious



threat to society and if such criminals of all races were equally likely to be killed by police.

Numerous sources exist regarding police killings. There is debate regarding which is the best. However, since they all essentially depict the same subject, it isn't really important. First, according to an analysis of UCR statistics by Harvard economist Sendhil Mullainathan, 32% of people killed by police were Black ([Mullainathan 2015](#)). Similarly, data from Killedbypolice.net, which describes itself as “The most accurate, most comprehensive and always up-to-date list of people killed by U.S. law enforcement officers,” was examined by sociologist Peter Moskos. The website essentially compiles every news article of a police officer killing someone throughout the nation. The website is meant to provide a thorough substitute for the government's sloppily produced and biased statistics. Moskos used this data set to determine that Black people made up 30% of police-killed victims between 2013 and 2015 ([Moskos 2015](#)). He also found that Black people represent 44% of the people who feloniously kill a policeman. The CDC's Compressed Mortality Database is a third resource that we can utilize. The causes of American mortality are the main focus of this database, not criminality. Nonetheless, one such cause, apart from lawful execution, is being killed by law enforcement. This information shows that, according to the CDC's estimations of the [Compressed Mortality Database](#), Black people made up 27% of those killed by police between 1999 and 2014. Therefore, we find that, if anything, Black people make up a smaller percentage of those slain by police than we would anticipate given their crime rates across a number of data sources. Given this, there is no reasonable basis for believing that Black people are being unfairly killed by the police.


**Table 211 : Black murderers (%) and murdered by police (%)**

<b>Data</b>	<b>% Black</b>
<b>Murderers</b>	49
<b>Murderers of policemen</b>	37
<b>Murdered by police (<math>\bar{x}</math>)</b>	29

The fact that Black people receive lengthier sentences than white people for the same offenses is another prevalent claim that the legal system is racist. This is accurate, although there are other, more comprehensive explanations for this.

There are more important considerations than the offense a criminal has recently committed when determining his sentence. Other factors also come into play, such as his courtroom demeanor and the probability that he will conduct another crime in the future. Blacks and Whites receive the same penalties for the same offenses if these factors remain constant.

This was [Beaver et al. \(2013\)](#)'s conclusion. After adjusting for verbal IQ and self-reported violent history, researchers examined the length of time that criminals were sentenced. They discovered that the racial gap on punishment was totally removed when these factors were held constant.



First, we observed that racism is most likely not the reason why Black people are detained more frequently than White people. The correlation between victimization surveys, arrest records, and school misbehavior rates demonstrated this. Subsequently, we observed that Black drug arrest rates can be explained by the higher dishonesty of Black drug users on drug-related surveys as well as the behavioral variations between

Black and White drug users that increase the likelihood of arrest for Black drug users. After that, we examined police killings and demonstrated that, given their prevalence among criminals generally, Black people are killed by police at a rate that is about what one should anticipate. Lastly, we observed that Black people receive lengthier sentences than white people for reasons that have nothing to do with racism. Therefore, it may be concluded that, in general, the American criminal justice system does not discriminate against Black people, and that Black people do commit crimes at the rate indicated by arrest data.

### *Poverty*

Let's start with a straightforward question do poor people commit more crimes than the wealthy? Without a doubt, the answer to this question is yes. After reviewing the literature, [Ellis, Beaver, and Wright \(2009\)](#) showed that it consistently demonstrates that a person's likelihood of being a criminal increases with their level of poverty:

**Table 212 : Individual social status and criminal behavior**

TABLE 2.4.3 Individual Social Status (Income/Wealth) and Criminal/Delinquent Behavior.						
Nature of the relationship	Officially detected offenses				Self-reported offenses	
	Violent offenses	Property offenses	Delinquency	General & adult offenses	Overall offenses	Illegal drugs
Positive						
Not signif.						EUROPE Britain: Buchmueller & Zurekos 1988 NORTH AMERICA United States: Gill & Michaels 1992; Register & Williams 1992; Kaestner 1994
Negative	NORTH AMERICA United States: Kaplan & Reich 1976	NORTH AMERICA United States: Cameron 1964 (shoplifters); E Yates 1986 (shoplifters)	NORTH AMERICA United States: Laub & Sampson 1994:245	NORTH AMERICA United States: Paez 1981:44	NORTH AMERICA Canada: SW Ramon 2003 (self-control statistically controlled); United States: JB Ray et al. 1983 (shoplifters); RH Moore 1984 (shoplifters); Laub & Sampson 1994:245	

Considering this, you would expect that a region's crime rate would tend to be higher the more deprived its residents are. However, the pertinent empirical data does not

unequivocally demonstrate this. I want you to ask yourself this question before we continue: what percentage of studies must find an impact for us to have weak, moderate, and strong confidence in it? Since the effect is equally likely to be discovered as not to be found, 50% clearly provides no confidence and we have no solid reason to believe it exists. However, how much higher do you think it should be to account for different levels of confidence? An 85% replication rate would support strong confidence, 75% would support moderate confidence, and 65% would support weak confidence, according to my personal judgment. Which figures would you pick for these cutoff points? Remember them, whatever they may be. (Perhaps even put them in writing.)

[Hsieh and Pugh \(1993\)](#), who meta-analyzed 34 papers, are frequently cited by proponents of the poverty causes crime argument. They concluded that 97% of the 76 associations reported, all but two, indicated that crime rates were greater in poorer locations. Poverty and violent crime had a statistically significant average connection of 0.44. Additionally, Hsieh and Pugh examined research on income disparity. Surprisingly, they discovered that the average correlation was 0.44 and that 97% of the impact sizes recorded were positive.

But more significantly, Hsieh and Pugh's work is more than two decades old and contradicts the findings of larger and more current meta-analyses. [Vieratsis 2000](#), for example, meta-analyzed 45 studies, 9 more than Hsieh and Pugh 1993, and discovered the following:

**Table 213 : Association between poverty and violent crime**

Crime	Positive and Significant	Positive and Not Significant	Negative and Not Significant	Negative and Significant
Homicide	53%	16%	9%	12%
Rape	27%	37%	27%	9%
Robbery	23%	23%	51%	3%
Assault	10%	70%	20%	0%

**Table 214 : Association between income inequality and crime**

Crime Type	Positive and Significant	Positive and Not Significant	Negative and Not Significant	Negative and Significant
Homicide	48%	41%	10%	4%
Rape	38%	50%	62%	13%
Robbery	40%	40%	20%	0%
Assault	56%	44%	0%	0%

An even larger meta-analysis on poverty and crime was done in Ellis, Beaver, and

**Table 216 : Relationship between median income and crime**

Crime Type	Number of Studies	Positive	Not Significant	Negative
Violent Crime	17	0%	18%	82%
Property Crime	9	44%	22%	44%
Overall Crime	8	0%	22%	67%

**Table 215 : Relationship between poverty and crime**

Crime Type	Studies	Positive	Not Significant	Negative
Violent Crime	43	79%	14%	9%
Property Crime	12	50%	42%	8.3%
Overall Crime	11	64%	36%	0%

Wright's 2009 [Handbook of Crime Correlates](#). The results can be seen below:

An even more extensive meta-analysis of 288 research on the connection between unemployment and crime was conducted by [Chiricos \(1987\)](#):

**Table 217 : Relationship between unemployment and crime**

Crime Type	Studies	Positive	Not Significant	Negative
Violent Crime	29	41%	41%	19%
Property Crime	24	50%	46%	4%
Overall Crime	27	59%	41%	0%

**Table 218 : Direction and statistical significance  
for unemployment and crime rate relationships**

	(N)	All Studies		% Pos & Sig. / Sig.
		% Positive	% Negative	
All Crimes	(288)	75 / 25		31 / 02
Property Crimes <sup>1</sup>	(125)	85 / 15		40 / 03
Violent Crimes <sup>2</sup>	(138)	64 / 36		22 / 02
General Crime	(25)	84 / 16		32 / 00
Burglary	(42)	86 / 14		52 / 02
Larceny	(32)	84 / 16		47 / 03
Auto Theft	(28)	79 / 21		21 / 07
General Property	(18)	89 / 11		33 / 00
Other Property	(05)	100 / 00		20 / 00
Murder	(38)	66 / 34		16 / 05
Robbery	(41)	66 / 34		22 / 02
Rape	(17)	71 / 29		35 / 00
Assault	(25)	52 / 48		12 / 00
General Violent	(17)	76 / 24		41 / 00

<sup>1</sup> Includes Burglary, Larceny, Auto Theft, General & Other Property

<sup>2</sup> Includes Murder, Robbery, Rape, Assault, General Violent

**Table 219 : Relationship between income inequality and crime (2)**

Crime Type	Studies	Positive	Not Significant	Negative
Violent Crime	12	50%	50%	0%
Property Crime	5	60%	40%	0%
Overall Crime	7	86%	14%	0%



Using a meta-analysis of 153 studies on poverty, [Pratt and Cullen \(2005\)](#) estimated a mean effect size of 0.253 with 59% of results being statistically significant, 167 studies on inequality with a mean effect size of 0.207 and 55% of effects being statistically significant, and 204 studies on unemployment with a mean effect of 0.135 and 44% of findings being statistically significant. Likewise, [Nivette \(2011\)](#) conducted a meta-analysis of 37 papers that examined factors that influence national crime rates. The mean effect size for national wealth was not statistically significant, at -0.055. Depending on the method used to measure income disparity, the mean effect size varied from 0.224 to 0.416. The effect size was statistically significant in both instances. The correlation between unemployment and crime (based on only four studies) was 0.043 and not statistically significant.

In standard deviations, an effect size shows how much we would anticipate a predictor variable to increase in response to a one standard deviation increase in the variable we are forecasting. In other words, it is the percentage of real-world variations that a predictor variable statistically accounts for. The definition of  $r^2$  is not this. Therefore, an effect size of 0.2 would mean that the predictor variable may statistically account for 20% of the differences in the predicted variables. [Conventionally](#), the threshold for a weak effect is 0.2, for a moderate effect it is 0.5, and for a high effect it is 0.8.)


The majority of research do find that crime is higher in impoverished places, however the majority of these meta-analyses do not discover a statistically significant effect size. This is probably because the mean impact size found is too small to be significant, as shown by Pratt, Cullen, and Nivette.

It is important to consider why Hiegh and Pugh's analysis is a significant anomaly. Hiegh and Pugh obviously fell short of the goal of a meta-analysis, which is to provide us with a representative look at all the papers on a particular association. "In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of important literature reviews cataloged a variety of studies on crime and economic conditions and all too frequently could not reach a clear conclusion

on the existence of even the most simple bivariate associations" (Box, 1987; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 1980; Chiricos, 1987; Clelland & Carter, 1980; Elliott & Ageton, 1980; Tittle, Villemez, & Smith, 1978) makes this result particularly perplexing. As a result, they were able to reference six research that expressed dissatisfaction with the inconsistent evidence, but they were only able to locate three that found no correlation between poverty and crime!

To be honest, I am inclined to believe that their results are fraudulent because they contradicted their own literature review and every other meta-analysis I could find on the subject. Additionally, their study yielded identical results for poverty and income inequality, but in terms of the percentage of studies that found effect and the mean effect size down to the second decimal. In other words, research that did not demonstrate a link between poverty and crime were literally thrown out. Can I demonstrate this? No. However, that is the most likely explanation for this strange collection of facts that I can come up with. In any case, it is evident that their study is not representative, and the body of evidence points to a weak, at best, correlation between poverty and crime.

Naturally, the associations we have examined thus far are merely cross-sectional. Furthermore, as internet users frequently point out, correlation does not equate to causation. Let's examine how poverty and crime have changed throughout time.



First, here is the changes in poverty and crime in the United States throughout the past half-century (1):

In fact, there was a negative correlation between poverty and the crime rate throughout this time. This indicates that crime increased as the poverty rate decreased. Similar to this, crime rose during the Roaring Twenties and decreased during the Great Depression ([Brearly 1932](#) and [Wilson 2011](#)). Further supporting this, [Ellis, Beaver, and Wright \(2009\)](#) examined eight research on the correlation between crime and national wealth across time, and the findings were wildly divergent.

**Table 220 : Correlation matrixes for crime & poverty**

<b>Correlation matrixes</b>	<b>Violent crime</b>	<b>Property crime</b>
<b>Property crime</b>	0.892	
<b>Poverty rate</b>	-0.594	-0.621

**Table 222 : Relationship between economy and crime over time**

Crime Type	Studies	Positive	Not Significant	Negative
Violent Crime	8	63%	25%	13%
Property Crime	8	38%	13%	50%
Overall Crime	8	25%	38%	63%

**Table 221 : Relationship between unemployment and crime over time**

Crime Type	Studies	Positive	Not Significant	Negative
Violent Crime	21	38%	38%	24%
Property Crime	15	73%	0%	27%
Overall Crime	31	61%	13%	26%

Only 60% of the 35 reported correlations between income inequality and crime over time that [Rufrancos et al. \(2013\)](#) meta-analyzed were positive and statistically significant.

Thus, at best, the long-term correlation between poverty and crime appears to be inconsistent.

The lack of a consistent or significant economic impact on crime in the research is very striking. Sociologists and criminologists frequently pretend that economy is the primary factor influencing crime. Nevertheless, the group doesn't really reject the theory. However, suppose it did. Assume for a moment that researchers have regularly discovered huge and significant cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of poverty, inequality, and unemployment on crime. The direction of causality would remain a significant challenge to the poverty causes crime theory.

Consider that you run a store and that local crime has increased. As a result, there are more break-ins at your store and less people are eager to come into your neighborhood, which lowers your client base. At first, you have to provide employees less hours as a result of this decrease in profits. After that, you release a few individuals. You either go bankrupt or relocate your store to a nicer place, taking the money you brought with you, as crime rates continue to grow. You're not alone, either. A number of the local store owners experienced this. In this believable tale, crime has caused poverty instead of poverty creating crime.

Therefore, if there were any strong statistical correlations between economics and crime, they would be explained by one of two very distinct interpretations. Furthermore, I am not aware of any research that significantly favors one over the other.

Confounding factors are the other main challenge in this case, as they are in any statistical association. Numerous research on poverty and crime attempt to account for a variety of confounding factors. They continually fail to account for psychological factors, though. This is a major problem since it is conceivable that the same psychological factors that contribute to poverty, such as anger, stupidity, a lack of self-control, etc., also contribute to crime.

Evidence that the modest statistical correlation between poverty and crime is not coincidental was shown by [Sadiaslan et al. \(2014\)](#). This study examined more than half a million Swedes and found a correlation between their future criminal behavior and their

childhood income levels. According to the study, children from low-income homes had a higher than normal chance of becoming criminals as adults, which is consistent with earlier findings. Even if their families had become wealthier by the time these impoverished children were growing up, they discovered that the same thing applied to their siblings. If the high crime rates among the poor were caused by poverty, then children of wealthy former impoverished families shouldn't be more likely to commit crimes. However, they are equally as likely to commit crimes as their impoverished siblings. This clearly implies that rather than poverty causing crime, there are some characteristics of these families that simultaneously increase their likelihood of being impoverished and criminals.

So, how can we make sense of all this data? Here is one interpretation of the facts that I believe to be believable: a subset of persons have certain characteristics that contribute to their poverty and criminality. However, poverty itself isn't it. For this reason, there is a high correlation between poverty and criminality on an individual basis. Because being in a poor location does not make one more criminal, it only exposes one to that group of people more frequently who are also poor for other reasons. As a result, the association between poverty and higher degrees of aggregation is less.

Furthermore, crime does not necessarily follow poverty over time since short-term rises in poverty are not the result of people's psychology shifting to reflect the thoughts of those who are typically impoverished.

This interpretation is obviously unproven. However, I can't think of another that fits the data as well. Perhaps you can come up with a better one. Or perhaps you know of some significant empirical data that I am overlooking.

***Race is the best predictor of crime***

The link between race and crime is very well-established at the individual level. According to [Ellis, Beaver, and Wright \(2009\)](#), all 113 of the studies that examined whether or not Black people commit more crimes than white people did so. In a similar vein, all 17 studies examining the disparity in crime between East Asians and Whites concluded that East Asians are less likely than Whites to commit crimes.

Additionally, research utilizing self-reported criminal activity is less reliable, as demonstrated by Ellis, Beaver, and Wright. Despite committing the same number of crimes, some would interpret this as proof that Black people are arrested more frequently than White people. That assertion was already refuted earlier.

At the regional level, the connection between race and crime is also well-established. A meta-analysis of 162 studies examined whether areas with a higher percentage of Black people had higher crime rates ([Pratt and Cullen, 2005](#)). 72% of the studies' findings were statistically significant, and the average study found a positive effect of 0.294. Only five, or 15%, of the 34 variables that [Pratt and Cullen \(2005\)](#) meta-analyzed and are generally believed to be related to crime had a higher percentage of significant findings. Furthermore, not a single one of these five variables has been the subject of even 15 studies. This probably explains why their results are so consistent. Therefore, "percent black" is the variable most consistently linked to crime among all the variables that Pratt and Cullen have extensively studied.

Thus, crime is predicted by race. In comparison to economic variables, how predictive is it?

For the years 1960, 1970, and 1980, [Land, McCall, and Cohen \(1990\)](#) gathered information on the homicide rates in states, cities, and standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). Every city, SMSA, and all 50 states were included in the census each year. Then, they examined the degree to which the following 11 factors—population size, population density, percentage of Black people, percentage of people between the ages of 15 and 29, percentage of divorced people, percentage of children without two parents,

median family income, poverty rate, income inequality, unemployment rate, and whether the city, SMSA, or state was in the south—predicted the variation in crime between these areas. The estimated effect size for each of these variables held all ten other variables constant since they were all included in a single regression model. Thus, over the course of three decades, this analysis generated nine models that explained variations in crime in cities, SMSAs, and states. Among these nine models, race was a stronger predictor of homicide in seven cases (78%) than unemployment, poverty, and median income, and in eight cases (89%) than income inequality. Therefore, race was consistently a better predictor of homicide rates than economic variables over three decades of very large data sets.

The proprietor of Unz.com, Ron Unz, conducted another pertinent analysis. [Unz \(2013\)](#) examined the relationship between the crime rates of major American cities from 2006 to 2011 and the following factors: median income, population density, poverty, and the percentage of black people. Compared to all other variables examined, he discovered that the size of the black population was a significantly better predictor.

Furthermore, the 2005 violent crime rates in all 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C., were examined in the New Century Foundation's report "[The Color of Crime](#)." State violent crime rates were found to be 0.81 with the Black or Hispanic population percentage, 0.37 with the state's high school dropout rate, 0.36 with the state's poverty rate, and 0.35 with the state's unemployment rate.

The findings of the New Century Foundation were substantially repeated by [Templer and Rushton \(2011\)](#). The percentage of the population that was Black was a stronger correlate of murder rates (0.84 vs -0.40), robbery rates (0.77 vs 0.06), and assault rates (0.54 vs -0.23) than average income, according to their analysis of crime variation across the 50 U.S. states. Although neither of these correlates was statistically significant or large, the study did find that income was a stronger predictor of rape rates than the size of the Black population (-0.16 vs. -0.22).



In 1995, [Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison](#) examined the differences in crime in 2,078 counties in the United States. The percentage of the population that is Black was a stronger explanatory variable than unemployment, poverty, and income inequality (gini) for explaining variation in both violent and property crime, as can be seen below (standardized beta coefficients are under the "beta" column)

**Table 223 : Regressions for violent crimes**

Variable	b	Beta	t	Sig.
South	-20.076	-.036	-1.4	.1563
Black	6.941	.369	15.1	.0000
Poverty	-1.687	-.044	-1.3	.1921
Gini	106.458	.017	.7	.4708
Church	-1.550	-.101	-5.3	.0000
Divorce	6.342	.053	3.1	.0023
Migrants	1.147	.033	1.5	.1467
Population change	1.116	.093	4.3	.0000
Urban	3.031	.317	15.0	.0000
Density	.033	.196	12.4	.0000
Unemployment	16.939	.077	4.4	.0000
Education	2.547	.072	1.9	.0553
Professional workers	-6.265	-.071	-2.6	.0101
Hispanic	4.399	.161	8.9	.0000
Native American	4.291	.086	5.2	.0000
Median age	.875	.012	.5	.6117
Age, 5-17	-10.391	-.095	-4.0	.0001

Last but not least, [Rushton and Templer \(2009\)](#) examined how crime varies by country. Skin color, a stand-in for race, was found to have a stronger correlation with homicide (0.25 vs. 0.17), rape (0.24 vs. 0.10), and serious assault (0.20 vs. 0.09) than national income.

Race is therefore a better predictor of crime than economic factors, according to a wide range of research examining crime variations across cities, counties, states, and countries.

**Table 224 : Correlations between violent crime and chosen variables, meta-analysis**


Study	Black %	Poverty	Inequality	Education	Income	Unemployment
Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990)	.50	.21	-.03	–	.09	-.25
Unz (2013)	.81	.65	–	–	.53	–
The Color of Crime	.86	.36	–	.37	–	.35
Templer and Rushton (2011)	.84	–	–	–	-.40	–
Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison (1995)	.37	-.04	.02	.07	–	.08

We have only examined the relative predictive power of economic and racial factors thus far. Moving on from that, I want to examine the degree to which racial wealth disparities accurately predict racial crime disparities.

White populations with lower or comparable incomes to African Americans should have higher or comparable crime rates to African Americans if poverty was the true cause of racial crime disparities. This comparison is simple to make on a global basis. The [Census](#) indicates that the average African American earns \$20,458 annually. The [International Monetary Fund](#) estimates that the average European earns \$25,434 per year. Europeans are therefore marginally wealthier than African Americans. Given this, we should anticipate that crime rates in Europe will be comparable to those of African Americans if poverty is the primary factor causing racial crime disparities.

This doesn't work out. According to [Cooper and Smith \(2011\)](#), there are 34.4 Black homicides for every 100,000 people in America. White Americans have a homicide rate of 4.5 per 100,000. Furthermore, the [2013 United Nations Global Study on Homicide](#) reports that Europe has a homicide rate of only 3 per 100,000. As a result, Europeans have slightly lower murder rates than White Americans in addition to lower murder rates than African Americans. The idea that Black people commit more crimes than white people simply because they are poor is difficult to reconcile with these findings.

Additionally, the poverty causes black crime theory is not supported by changes in economic disparities and racial crime over time. Blacks' income has increased in comparison to whites during the 20th century. According to an economic theory of crime, we might anticipate a decline in Black crime rates in comparison to White crime rates. The exact opposite has occurred. Between 1940 and 1990, there was a 0.86 correlation between increases in Black wages relative to Whites and a significant rise in Black crime rates compared to Whites during the 20th century.




Since there were only six data points in each data set, the high correlation value shouldn't be taken too seriously. The general idea is still the same, though: rather than declining as the economic causes of black crime theory would have predicted, Blacks' disproportionate representation in crime has increased as they have surpassed Whites economically.

We must reevaluate some of the previously seen data for this section's next argument. According to [Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison \(1995\)](#) and Land, McCall, and Coen (1990), even when economic factors are held constant, the percentage of a region that is Black is a significant predictor of crime at the county, city, SMSA, and state levels. Let me reiterate: even after adjusting for the effects of unemployment, poverty, and inequality, criminal activity tends to be higher in blacker areas.

Last but not least are [Zaw and Darity \(2016\)](#), who examined the probability that Black, Hispanic, and White individuals would be incarcerated at some time between 1985 and 2012 based on their net worth in 1985. It is noteworthy that, to the best of my knowledge, this is the only study that directly compares the incarceration rates of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics across income brackets.

## Rich black kids are more likely to go to prison than poor white kids

Share of people born between 1957 and 1965 who eventually went to prison or jail, by how much wealth they had as of 1985, when they were between 20 and 28 years old



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Note: Rates may be understated, as those incarcerated for brief periods between surveys are not included.

Source: NLSY; Zaw, K., Hamilton, D. and Darity, W. 2016. "Race, Wealth and Incarceration," Race and Social Problems.

Therefore, it is evident that economics cannot explain all or even the majority of the racial disparities in crime that we observe. Its causal role in racial crime disparities is likely very small, if it exists at all, given its weak relationship with crime in general and the evidence against that relationship being causal.

### *Family structure*


Another argument commonly brought to explain racial differences in crime is single parenthood and overall family structure.

The question "do people from broken homes or children born out of wedlock have higher than average crime rates?" is a good place to start this analysis. There is a "yes, but barely" response. 44 studies on the relationship between coming from a broken

home and juvenile delinquency were meta-analyzed by [Well and Rankin in 1991](#). Only 0.11 was the mean N-weighted correlation. Across six studies, the mean effect size for violent delinquency was a mere 0.04. In a comparable way, [Price and Kunz \(2003\)](#) examined 72 studies to determine the mean effect size of -0.16 between juvenile delinquency and family structure. Additionally, among subjects aged 16 to 19, this relationship was only -.10, declining with age. More thoroughly, [Petrosine et al. \(2009\)](#) examined five earlier meta-analyses that examined the connection between crime and family structure. These meta-analyses yielded five correlations: 0.07, 0.09, 0.09, 0.10, and 0.10 between a person's home breaking up and their subsequent criminal activity. Stated differently, the effect is incredibly weak and accounts for only 1% of the variation in criminality within the population.

All of these studies compare individuals. The correlation between crime and family structure is somewhat stronger when we examine regional differences in crime. In their 2005 meta-analysis of 137 studies, [Pratt and Cullen](#), for example, found that 71.5% of the studies found a significant effect with a mean effect size of 0.262 between crime and family disruption at the regional level. Similarly, ten studies that examined the extent to which divorce rates explained national variation in crime were meta-analyzed by [Nivette \(2011\)](#). The average effect size was 0.277, which was statistically significant.

But, at least in the United States, the regional relationship between crime has been wildly erratic over time. Advocates of the broken-homes-cause-crime theory would often point out in the 1980s that the rise in violent crime in the 1960s coincided with an increase in the number of single mothers in the country. However, as [Luscombe \(2012\)](#) reviews, the 1990s saw a decline in violent crime and a rise in non-marital birth rates, which caused the national relationship between single motherhood and crime to collapse.



Therefore, even at the national level, there doesn't appear to be much evidence that family structure has a significant impact on crime.

Furthermore, it is not possible to attribute these effect sizes to crime being a direct result of family structure. After all, parents who divorce or have children outside of marriage may exhibit higher levels of aggression, impulsivity, and other negative traits than the norm, which they may then pass on to their offspring. Twin studies support the idea that genetically impacted traits contribute to marital instability. Having a divorced identical twin, for example, increases your chances of getting divorced by 600%, but having a divorced fraternal twin or parent only increases your chances of getting divorced by 200%, according to research by [McGue and Lykken \(1992\)](#). They calculated that 52% of divorces are heritable overall. As reviewed in Turkheimer 2000, [Bouchard 2004](#), and Polderman et al. (2015), almost all human traits are heritable, so it would be strange if divorce were not. From now on, I will refer to the theory that the relationship between crime and family structure can be explained by genetically inherited traits as "the genetic-mediation hypothesis."

[Connors, Caspi, DeFries, and Plomin \(2000\)](#) compared the impact of divorce on biological and adopted children in an effort to test this theory. This study was

motivated by the genetic-mediation hypothesis, which holds that since adopted children do not inherit genes from their legal guardians, their divorce should not negatively impact them. They had a small sample size. There were 210 biological families and 188 adoptive families. Variables related to general adjustment and psychopathology predictors made up the child outcome measures. When the kids were twelve, they were measured.

The measures of general psychological adjustment are reported in this first table. The child's positive self-perception is gauged by the first six variables in this table. For four of the six measures, the effect size, expressed in standard deviations, was greater in biological families. Nevertheless, there was no statistically significant relationship between adoptive status and self-concept. The interviewer and parents' reports of "social competence" comprise the next three metrics. In biological families, the effect size was greater across all three measures. There were two statistically significant differences. Achievement was measured by the final three variables. The size of the biological effect was larger in two out of three cases. The average effect size in biological families was 0.33. The average effect size in adoptive families was 0.08. Thus, after removing genetic confounders, the effect of divorce remained at only 25%.

**Table 225 : Measures of general psychological adjustment**


<b>Variable</b>	<b>Effect in adoptive families</b>	<b>Effect in biological families</b>	<b>Difference</b>
<b>Scholastic achievement</b>	.03	.61	.58
<b>Social acceptance</b>	-.21	-.02	.19
<b>Athletic</b>	-.10	-.01	.09
<b>Attractiveness</b>	.08	.34	.26
<b>Good conduct</b>	.19	.34	.15
<b>Self-acceptance</b>	.04	.53	.49
<b>Social responsibility</b>	.14	.47	.33
<b>Positive assertiveness</b>	-.03	.28	.32
<b>CBC Social competence</b>	.33	.35	.02
<b>CBC School competence</b>	.09	.37	.28
<b>Reading Achievement</b>	.29	.19	-.10
<b>motivation</b>	.16	.47	.31

The variables linked to psychopathology are displayed in the second chart. It is evident that adoptive parents reported fewer issues with their kids, whereas biological parents reported the opposite. However, for adoptive families, the effect of divorce on substance abuse was significantly greater. For biological families, the average effect size was 0.30. For adoptive families, the average effect size was 0.29. As a result, the average effect sizes for all five measures were fairly comparable. The previous statement is false, though, as the average difference for the five measures was 0.26, albeit in different directions. The effects of divorce were very different for the two types of families, even though genetic confounding did not explain the majority of the effect.



**Table 226 : Measures of general psychopathological adjustment**

Variable	Effect in adoptive families	Effect in biological families	Difference
Parent reported problems	-.23	.16	.39
Teacher reported problems	.29	.35	.06
Self-reported loneliness	.10	.32	.22
Child drug use	.81	.47	-.34
Friend drug use	.50	.21	-.29




I would say that this study supports the genetic-mediation hypothesis, despite some statistical significance problems that are undoubtedly caused by the small sample size. [Ryan et al. \(2013\)](#) could be evaluated similarly. Ryan et al. examined how children's behavior changed after a divorce using a nationally representative sample of almost 4,000


children in the United States. They discovered that when families were reduced from two parents to one, children in the majority of age groups and income brackets did not show a statistically significant rise in behavioral issues.

After examining two studies that provide evidence in favor of the genetic mediation hypothesis, let's examine one that does not. [Burt et al. \(2008\)](#) examined the relationship between behavioral problem changes and divorce among adoptive parents. They discovered that adopted children from dysfunctional adoptive households were more likely to be delinquent, but only if the divorce occurred after the adoption. In other words, children adopted from parents who had previously divorced but had not divorced during the child's lifetime did not show significant behavioral issues. In addition to contradicting the genetic mediation hypothesis, this shows that parents aren't passing on divorce-related personality traits to their kids through their shared environment.

Let's examine how family structure differs by race after examining the connection between crime and family structure. Let's start by discussing nonmarital births. The distinctions are rather straightforward here. Blacks have the highest rates of nonmarital births, followed by Hispanics, Whites, and Asians, according to the [U.S. National Vital Statistics](#).



[Census data](#) also demonstrates that this is nothing new:



The tale of marriage is a bit more complicated. According to current data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Black people are marginally less likely than white people to have ever been divorced and less likely to ever get married. The disparity in divorce rates is minimal, though, even when examining only those who have been married.

**Table 227 : Marriage statistics by race**

Characteristic	Black	White	Hispanic
<b>Percent ever married</b>	68	90	84
<b>Percent ever divorced</b>	33	40	39
<b>Among those ever married, percent ever divorced</b>	48	44	47


According to [census data](#), this same fundamental pattern dates back several

**Table 228 : Marriage experience by age, race and origin**


Category	All races				White				Black				Hispanic origin <sup>1</sup>		
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990	1975	1980	1985	1990	1980	1985	1990
Percent ever married															
20 to 24 .....	62.5	49.5	43.3	38.5	64.9	52.2	46.6	41.3	47.5	33.3	23.9	23.5	55.4	56.7	45.8
25 to 29 .....	87.2	78.6	74.0	69.0	88.8	81.0	77.4	73.2	76.5	62.3	53.4	45.0	80.2	78.4	69.6
30 to 34 .....	93.1	89.9	85.8	82.2	93.9	91.6	88.1	85.6	87.1	77.9	70.9	61.1	88.3	88.0	83.0
35 to 39 .....	95.5	94.3	91.6	89.4	96.2	95.3	93.1	91.4	90.1	87.4	80.7	74.9	91.2	91.6	88.9
40 to 44 .....	95.8	95.1	94.6	92.0	95.9	95.8	95.6	93.4	95.1	89.7	86.1	82.1	94.2	90.3	92.8
45 to 49 .....	95.9	95.9	94.4	94.4	95.9	96.4	95.1	95.1	95.4	92.5	88.4	89.7	94.4	91.1	91.7
50 to 54 .....	95.8	95.3	95.2	95.5	96.0	95.8	95.4	96.1	94.6	92.1	93.4	91.9	95.0	92.5	91.8
Percent divorced after first marriage															
20 to 24 .....	11.2	14.2	13.9	12.5	11.3	14.7	14.4	12.8	10.6	10.5	11.0	9.6	9.4	11.0	6.8
25 to 29 .....	17.1	20.7	21.0	19.2	17.7	21.0	21.5	19.8	15.3	20.2	18.2	17.8	13.9	14.8	13.5
30 to 34 .....	19.8	26.2	29.3	28.1	20.0	25.8	29.0	28.6	20.5	31.4	34.4	26.6	21.1	19.2	19.9
35 to 39 .....	21.5	27.2	32.0	34.1	21.2	26.7	32.0	34.6	22.7	32.9	34.6	35.8	21.9	26.3	29.7
40 to 44 .....	20.5	26.1	32.1	35.8	19.7	25.5	32.0	35.2	27.4	33.7	36.9	45.1	19.7	22.8	26.6
45 to 49 .....	21.0	23.1	29.0	35.2	20.3	22.7	28.4	35.5	26.9	29.0	36.0	39.8	23.9	24.3	24.6
50 to 54 .....	18.0	21.8	25.7	29.5	16.8	21.0	24.6	28.5	29.7	29.0	33.7	39.2	22.5	21.8	22.9
Percent remarried after divorce															
20 to 24 .....	47.9	45.5	44.3	38.1	50.1	47.0	46.0	39.3	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)
25 to 29 .....	60.2	53.4	55.3	51.8	62.0	56.4	58.3	52.8	43.1	27.9	25.4	44.4	(B)	50.5	49.5
30 to 34 .....	64.4	60.9	61.4	59.6	67.5	63.3	64.3	61.4	41.8	42.0	41.1	42.0	58.3	44.9	45.9
35 to 39 .....	69.5	64.9	63.0	65.0	70.9	66.9	64.9	66.5	62.6	50.6	44.8	54.0	45.2	57.1	51.2
40 to 44 .....	69.7	67.4	64.7	67.1	71.9	68.6	67.5	69.5	57.1	58.4	45.4	50.3	(B)	50.6	53.9
45 to 49 .....	69.6	69.2	67.9	65.9	70.7	70.4	69.6	67.2	61.7	62.7	54.6	55.0	(B)	78.9	51.0
50 to 54 .....	73.5	72.0	68.2	63.0	73.4	72.6	68.4	65.4	73.7	72.7	64.3	50.2	(B)	(B)	62.2
Percent redivorced after remarriage															
20 to 24 .....	(NA)	8.5	8.7	13.1	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
25 to 29 .....	(NA)	15.6	18.2	17.8	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
30 to 34 .....	(NA)	19.1	20.0	22.7	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
35 to 39 .....	(NA)	24.7	26.9	28.5	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
40 to 44 .....	(NA)	28.4	33.0	30.6	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
45 to 49 .....	(NA)	25.1	33.8	36.4	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
50 to 54 .....	(NA)	29.0	27.3	34.5	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)

decades:

This hasn't always been the case, though. Prior to the 1950s, the Black marriage rate was actually higher than the White marriage rate, as discussed in [Ricketts 1989](#).



Black over-representation in prisons began in the 1920s and has continued to increase since then, according to data from the [Department of Justice](#), as shown below. If family structure does contribute to the disparity, it must primarily be through out-of-wedlock births rather than divorce, as divorce rates are not significantly different between races and the



Black marriage rate was higher in the early 20th century, when Blacks were still more likely to be incarcerated.

It would be surprising if family structure could explain a significant portion of the wide racial disparity in crime, given the weak correlation between family structure and crime. Indeed, it doesn't, according to the pertinent research.

For the years 1960, 1970, and 1980, [Land, McCall, and Cohen \(1990\)](#) gathered information on the homicide rates in states, cities, and standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). Every city, SMSA, and all 50 states were included in the census each year. Then, they examined the degree to which the following 11 factors—population size, population density, percentage of Black people, percentage of people between the ages of 15 and 29, percentage of divorced people, percentage of children without two parents, median family income, poverty rate, income inequality, unemployment rate, and whether the city, SMSA, or state was in the south—predicted the variation in crime between these areas. The estimated effect size for each of these variables held all ten other variables constant since they were all included in a single regression model. Thus, over the course of three decades, this analysis generated nine models that explained variations in crime in cities, SMSAs, and states. Even when all of these factors were held constant, race remained a predictor of homicide rates in all nine models. Furthermore, race continued to be a stronger predictor of violent crime in most models than either the divorce rate or the percentage of children without two parents.

Similarly, [Kposowa, Breault, and Harrison \(1995\)](#) used a wide range of variables, such as the percentage of divorced and black counties, to analyze crime variation across 3,076 U.S. counties. The explanatory power of each variable, which is reported, indicates how well each variable predicted crime when all other variables were held constant. This is because all of these variables are being entered into a single regression model. The percentage of the population that is Black was a significantly stronger

explanatory variable than the divorce rate for both property crime and violent crime, as shown below (standardized beta coefficients are under the "beta" column):

**Table 229 : Regression results for property crime**

Variable	b	Beta	t	Sig.
South	−98.318	−.023	−1.1	.2782
Black	25.177	.178	8.6	.0000
Poverty	−16.168	−.057	−2.0	.0509
Gini	−1760.490	−.038	−1.9	.0626
Church	−6.907	−.060	−3.7	.0002
Divorce	53.605	.060	4.0	.0001
Migrants	−15.333	−.058	−3.0	.0025
Population change	16.230	.179	9.7	.0000
Urban	29.600	.412	22.9	.0000
Density	.010	.008	.6	.5410
Unemployment	280.239	.169	11.4	.0000
Education	63.896	.240	7.5	.0000
Professional workers	45.352	.069	3.0	.0030
Hispanic	21.459	.105	6.8	.0000
Native American	17.058	.046	3.3	.0012
Median age	−65.440	−.123	−5.9	.0000
Age, 5–17	−133.536	−.162	−8.1	.0000

**Table 230 : Regression results for violent crimes**


*TABLE IV: Regression results for violent crimes*

Variable	b	Beta	t	Sig.
South	−20.076	−.036	−1.4	.1563
Black	6.941	.369	15.1	.0000
Poverty	−1.687	−.044	−1.3	.1921
Gini	106.458	.017	.7	.4708
Church	−1.550	−.101	−5.3	.0000
Divorce	6.342	.053	3.1	.0023
Migrants	1.147	.033	1.5	.1467
Population change	1.116	.093	4.3	.0000
Urban	3.031	.317	15.0	.0000
Density	.033	.196	12.4	.0000
Unemployment	16.939	.077	4.4	.0000
Education	2.547	.072	1.9	.0553
Professional workers	−6.265	−.071	−2.6	.0101
Hispanic	4.399	.161	8.9	.0000
Native American	4.291	.086	5.2	.0000
Median age	.875	.012	.5	.6117
Age, 5–17	−10.391	−.095	−4.0	.0001

Regretfully, neither study indicates the magnitude of the correlation between race and crime prior to the inclusion of all these additional variables in the regression models. Furthermore, it is clear that much more than family structure is taken into account. But according to these South models, there is a significant correlation between race and crime. Therefore, even after adjusting for a variety of environmental factors, such as family

structure, we can conclude that there is still a moderate to strong correlation between crime and race.

Lastly, it is important to note that racial variations in family structure may also have some genetic roots. Black people tend to have more sex with more people, have more children, and are less monogamous than other races, as discussed elsewhere on this website. It is therefore hardly surprising that Black people are less likely than White and Asian people to raise their children in a two-parent household. Additionally, this phenomenon is not exclusive to the US:



Therefore, family structure's marginal effect on racial crime disparities may be one way that racial genetic differences contribute to varying crime rates.

In summary:

1. Family structure is a weak predictor of crime
2. Family structure in the U.S. has continued to deteriorate while violent crime has fallen



3. It is possible that the weak relationship between crime and family structure which does exist is mediated by genetic factors

4. The races differ in family structure. Blacks have always had more children out of wedlock and, since the 1950's, have had lower marriage rates and higher divorce rates. However, difference in divorce rates are still rather small.

5. Race is a better predictor of crime than family structure is and continues to predict crime when family structure is held constant.

6. Given that Blacks are less monogamous than Whites all around the world, racial differences in family structure may be caused by genetics

### ***Lead exposure***

Although having already discussed this argument in **2.2**, I'm going to provide more evidence contradicting the claim likewise lead exposure explains racial differences in intelligence and, by extension, crime.

After reviewing the research that links lead exposure to criminal activity, I will talk about how lead contributes to the Black-white crime gap in America. There are two types of lead exposure data: those that show the relationship between lead exposure and individual criminality and those that show the relationship between lead levels and regional crime. Let's start by examining regional data.

[Stretesky and Lynch \(2001\)](#) examined the relationship between homicide rates in 3,111 US counties and air lead levels. Poverty, the percentage of Black people, educational attainment, and whether a county was in the South were among the controls. There was a 14-fold increase in homicides without controls and a 4.1-fold increase with controls when moving from the county with the fewest leads to the one with the most. Nonetheless, the estimate's 95% CI ranged from 1.09 to 16.615, indicating that a very broad range of effect sizes are likely to be realistic given the available data.

[Stretesky and Lynch \(2004\)](#) examined the relationship between air lead levels and crime in 2,772 US counties. A measure of general air pollution, the percentage of black people, poverty, income inequality, whether a county was in the South, the unemployment rate, the divorce rate, and the average crime rate of the five closest counties were among their controls. Property crime (effect size of 0.319) and violent crime (effect size of 0.164) were significantly correlated with lead exposure. Lead was also found to account for a greater portion of the variation in crime in poorer counties.

[Feigenbaum and Muller \(2016\)](#) used data from 545 cities and discovered that homicide rates from 1921 to 1936 were predicted by the installation of lead pipes in the 1880s. Because lead water pipes were more flexible and long-lasting than iron pipes, they were widely used at this time. People's blood lead levels (BLL) were significantly higher than they are now as a result of lead being present in city water.

Even after adjusting for home ownership rates, the percentage of black people, sex and age demographics, latitude, longitude, and population density, the study discovered that a city's homicide rate was positively correlated with its use of lead pipes and its distance from a lead refinery. % Even when the other covariates were held constant and lead was present, black was still a significant predictor.

Preschoolers' blood lead levels were found to have a strong correlation with trends in crime rates 19 years later, when those preschoolers would have become young adults, according to [Nevin \(2007\)](#). In the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Australia, Finland, Italy, West Germany, and New Zealand, this association was discovered over a number of decades. Each country had a different range of years examined, but in some, the 1930s through the 1990s were included.

Nevin also presented the results of a cross-sectional study that examined the factors that predicted the murder rates in 124 US cities from 1985 to 1994. Nevin discovered that a significant predictor was the percentage of the population that had lead poisoning (LP). 14% of the variation in murder rates was explained by LP. But when LP was taken

into account, the percentage of a city that was Black was no longer significantly correlated with the murder rate; instead, it was a stronger predictor.

All things considered, the regional data unequivocally demonstrates a strong cross-sectional and longitudinal association between lead exposure and crime that endures even after accounting for a wide range of potentially confounding factors.

Let's now examine research on crime at the individual level as opposed to the regional level. [Stretesky and Lynch \(2004\)](#) provided the following description of a book-formatted study:

*Deborah Denno's (1990) longitudinal study of the link between lead and crime among African American males, which controlled for many other potentially influential independent variables (including environmental and social factors, such as parents' income and occupation), found that early childhood lead poisoning was one of the most important predictors of three types of delinquent outcomes: (1) disciplinary problems from ages 13–14; (2) juvenile delinquency from ages 7–17; and (3) the number of adult offenses from ages 18–22."*

A merely statistically significant correlation of 0.19 was found by [Marcus et al. \(2010\)](#) when they meta-analyzed the relationship between conduct issues and lead exposure in children and adolescents across 19 studies with a total of 8,561 participants.

Thus, both at the regional and personal levels, there is a definite correlation between lead exposure and antisocial behavior. However, since lead exposure is becoming less common, it might not be a major factor in explaining why some members of modern society are more criminals or antisocial than others.


During childhood, African Americans in America have higher BLLs than whites and Hispanics. The mean BLL of African American children was approximately 1.4 µg/dL higher than that of non-Hispanic White American children, according to [White et al. \(2015\)](#), who examined five national samples collected between 1998 and 2004.

Black children had a mean BLL that was 1  $\mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$  higher than White children in 1999–2004, according to more recent [CDC](#) data. This BLL gap decreased to 0.9  $\mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$  in samples taken between 2003 and 2006 and to 0.5  $\mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$  in samples taken between 2007 and 2010.

It's interesting to note that both studies examined the differences in BLL between White and Hispanic children and discovered no discernible differences.

Even more recent data collected by [Teye et al \(2021\)](#) shows BLL racial differences to be insignificant in 2015-16. By this year, Black children had a BLL of 0.89  $\mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$ , when non-hispanic Whites amounted at 0.74  $\mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$ .

Moreover, by adulthood, this small racial disparity in blood lead levels almost disappears. According to CDC data [taken from [Tsoi et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Prickett et al. \(1994\)](#)], there is no longer a significant racial difference in BLL levels across the entire population.



In conclusion of this, lead likely has little to no effect on the Black-white IQ gap in America, despite the fact that it affects crime. This is because the races hardly differ in terms of lead exposure as children and not at all as adults. This conclusion is in line with

research by [Feigenbaum and Muller \(2016\)](#) and [Nevin \(2007\)](#), who discovered that even after controlling for the degree of lead exposure, the percentage of a community that was Black continued to predict its crime rate. However, lead exposure is more prevalent in developing countries and contributes to the high crime rates in African countries.


We're now going to talk about the real factors that make Black more prone to crime and violence. We're starting off with the only "environmental" factor that actually influences Black crime.

### ***Child abuse***

Racial disparities in crime and IQ are likely influenced by racial differences in the prevalence of child abuse. The [Department of Health and Human Services](#) estimates that the prevalence of child abuse is approximately 14.6 per 1,000 Black children, 8.5 per 1,000 Hispanic children, and 8.1 per 1,000 White children. As a result, the rate of child abuse among Black people is roughly 80% higher than that of White and Hispanic people.

Some argue that Black child abuse is more likely to be reported, denying that Black parents abuse their children more frequently than white parents. This theory is contradicted by the fact that Black people are disproportionately involved in "substantiated" [child abuse cases](#), such as parental murder. Furthermore, it is not well known that African Americans are particularly prone to call the police. It is abundantly evident from the weight of the evidence that Black people abuse children more frequently than White people.

Abuse as a child increases the likelihood of criminal activity and low IQ. Even after [adjusting](#) for [socioeconomic status](#), this effect persists. Furthermore, research indicates that when one twin experiences abuse while the other does not, the abused twin is typically [less intelligent](#) and [more criminal](#) than their non-abused cotwin. This result implies that this relationship cannot be explained by genetic confounding. Even [after adjusting](#) for factors like birth order, maternal education, paternal criminality, religion, and family structure, abused children continue to be more criminally inclined than the general population.



One possible confounding explanation for these empirical findings is that parents are more likely to abuse their children when they are aggressive and stupid. As far as I'm aware, the literature hasn't sufficiently addressed this. It would seem intuitively that this must be somewhat true. That being said, there is no reason to believe that this fully explains the connection between abuse and IQ/crime. Although it is likely less than what most studies estimate, I will assume for the purposes of this article that there is some actual causal relationship there.

Child abuse accounts for less than 10% of the variance in both criminality and IQ in the general population due to its rarity. It is difficult to determine how much abuse raises a person's risk of becoming a criminal, though. The way that different studies measure criminality, define abuse, and use statistical controls varies. Accordingly, estimates of the extent to which abuse raises a person's likelihood of becoming a criminal range from [28%](#) to [200%](#). There is no straightforward method to assess the actual impact because no meta-analysis of this data has been conducted.

There are numerous potential causal explanations for how child abuse affects IQ and criminality, but the precise mechanism is unknown. According to some theories, for example, child abuse results in long-term emotional distress in kids, which has a detrimental effect on how their brains develop in areas like intelligence, aggression, and

self-control. Another widely held belief is that children who have experienced abuse are more likely to become criminals because they inherit their parents' violent tendencies.

Child abuse is probably an environmental factor that accounts for some of the black/white gaps in both criminality and low IQ, regardless of the exact mechanism of causality.

The incarceration rate for Black women is about [twice](#) that of White women. The likelihood of incarceration is approximately [six times higher](#) for Black men than for White

**Table 231 : Imprisonment rate by race, 2014**

Age group	Total <sup>a</sup>	Male					Female				
		All male <sup>a</sup>	White <sup>b</sup>	Black <sup>b</sup>	Hispanic	Other <sup>b</sup>	All female <sup>a</sup>	White <sup>b</sup>	Black <sup>b</sup>	Hispanic	Other <sup>b</sup>
Total <sup>c</sup>	471	890	465	2,724	1,091	968	65	53	109	64	93
18-19	169	317	102	1,072	349	542	14	8	32	17	12
20-24	746	1,365	584	3,868	1,521	1,755	96	72	152	94	109
25-29	1,055	1,912	958	5,434	2,245	2,022	170	150	244	165	208
30-34	1,161	2,129	1,111	6,412	2,457	2,193	185	163	264	174	225
35-39	1,067	1,982	1,029	6,122	2,272	1,878	155	138	229	137	189
40-44	904	1,689	942	5,105	1,933	1,619	132	119	213	107	174
45-49	758	1,417	815	4,352	1,602	1,444	111	90	203	94	161
50-54	567	1,081	633	3,331	1,320	1,112	72	57	128	67	124
55-59	358	698	400	2,178	978	832	37	27	72	42	63
60-64	212	422	252	1,265	680	483	20	15	37	25	37
65 or older	72	158	109	418	299	208	5	4	8	7	12
Number of sentenced prisoners <sup>d</sup>	1,508,636	1,402,404	453,500	516,900	308,700	123,300	106,232	53,100	22,600	17,800	12,800

men.

With all of this data, it would be helpful if we could calculate the percentage of the Black/white crime gap that can be linked to child abuse. This is problematic because the impact of child abuse on crime has not been consistently found. Furthermore, there appears to be a racial difference in the effect of child abuse on crime. Take this data from the [Department of Justice](#), for example:

Type of Arrest	Abused and Neglected Group (n = 900)	Comparison Group (n = 667)
Juvenile		
Black	40.6	20.9***
White	21.8	15.2**
Adult		
Black	59.8	43.6***
White	33.8	26.6*
Violent Crime		
Black	34.2	21.8**
White	11.0	9.7

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

In this case, child abuse raised the likelihood of an arrest for a White adult by 27%, compared to 37% for Black adults. There was absolutely no statistically significant correlation between child abuse and violent crime among White people.

Due to these complications, I am unable to provide a precise estimate of the proportion of racial disparities in crime that can be ascribed to child abuse. The fact that Black men are six times more likely than white men to be incarcerated, however, is clearly not explained by the fact that Black people are 80% more likely than White people to experience a very uncommon environmental stimulus that increases criminality by 30–200%.

According to [research](#), child abuse usually results in a 3–4 point drop in IQ. Nonetheless, Black people are likely to experience this effect more strongly than White people. According to [research](#), if someone is abused, their likelihood of becoming a criminal will decrease with increasing intelligence. Put another way, those with higher IQs are less susceptible to the negative effects of child abuse than those with lower IQs.

As far as I'm aware, there are no reliable point estimates for how child abuse affects IQ by race. In light of this, it is challenging to determine the extent to which child abuse contributes to the racial IQ gap.



However, the majority of the 15–16 point gap in IQ scores between Blacks and Whites cannot be explained by the fact that Blacks are 80% more likely to experience a very rare environmental stimulus that lowers IQ by about 3–4 points.

Child abuse is often thought of as an environmental stimulus. This is untrue in a significant way: a person's genetic makeup and that of those around them can affect their likelihood of experiencing child abusive behavior.

For example, parents are more likely to abuse their children if they have a genetic predisposition to be impulsive and violent. In a similar vein, previous research suggests that a person with a low "genotypic" IQ is likely to be more susceptible to the negative impacts of child abuse than someone with a high "genotypic" IQ.


A vicious gene-environment cycle may result from this, whereby populations that are genetically weaker in terms of IQ, aggression, and self-control are also more likely to be exposed to environmental stimuli that further deteriorate these traits.

There are a number of reasons to believe that Black people are experiencing this.

First, there is ample evidence that Black people are genetically more likely than White people to be aggressive, impulsive, and less intelligent. You must either deny this evidence or the role that aggression, intelligence, and self-control play in child abuse if you want to deny the heritability of racial differences in child abuse rates.

Second, a number of twin studies have demonstrated that there is a significant heritability in the tendency to abuse children.

Thirdly, although there is a dearth of high-quality data on child abuse in the third world, what is known indicates that, in line with a hereditary hypothesis, male child abuse is far more common in Africa than in Europe or North America.



The MAO-A gene provides additional proof that Black people are more susceptible to the negative impacts of child abuse. Those who have experienced abuse are more likely to develop criminal tendencies as adults than those who do not have these gene variants.

These forms of the MAO-A gene are more prevalent in Black people. Naturally, having a low IQ also increases a person's susceptibility to the effects of child abuse, and as was previously mentioned, Black people are more likely to have low IQs.

In conclusion, the great majority of racial disparity in crime and intelligence cannot be explained by child abuse. Furthermore, this "environmental factor" is considerably heritable since genetics is a major factor in explaining why Black people are more likely than White people to experience child abuse and why they react to it more severely.

### ***Conclusion***

A consistent pattern of inadequacy is revealed by the thorough analysis of numerous environmental factors that are supposed to account for the high crime rates among Black people. The empirical evidence strongly refutes the widely held beliefs that the main causes of racial disparities in crime are poverty, family structure, lead exposure, systemic bias, and child abuse. Black people are not disproportionately targeted by the

criminal justice system; arrest rates closely match victimization reports, and racial disparities in sentencing vanish when pertinent factors like past criminal history and courtroom conduct are taken into account. The racial disparity in crime is also not explained by poverty, as cross-national comparisons reveal that economically comparable White societies have significantly lower crime rates than Black communities, and wealthier Black populations continue to have higher crime rates than poorer White populations. Although family structure varies by race, it only shows a weak relationship with crime and is unable to account for the extent of racial disparities, especially considering that Black crime rates increased even as economic conditions improved. Even though lead exposure is associated with antisocial behavior, the current racial disparity in crime cannot be adequately explained by this factor alone. Even though it is more common among Black populations, child abuse has too little impact and is only partially mediated by genetic predispositions to explain the wide variations in criminality.

Regional, cross-national, and individual-level data all support the idea that race is still the most reliable and potent predictor of crime. The fundamental biological and behavioral distinctions between racial groups are ignored by environmental explanations, which is why they are always insufficient. According to the evidence, genetic factors that affect intelligence, impulsivity, aggression, and self-control are far more important in determining criminal behavior than structural or socioeconomic factors. Environmental factors do not cause these tendencies, but they may make them worse. The inability of environmental theories to account for racial disparities in crime highlights the need to recognize innate differences instead of depending on narratives that are politically expedient but lack empirical support. In the end, social and economic interventions alone will not be sufficient to address the high crime rates among Black populations because the underlying causes are ingrained in biological realities that cannot be completely overcome by environmental manipulation.

### 3.4 — Actual factors for higher crime rates of Blacks

In this section we're going to explore through all the actual factors that make Black people more prone to being criminals. The turh is that, for genetic reasons, Blacks are more likely than Whites to exhibit various personality traits which in turn causes them to have high rates of crime, poverty, and single parenthood. Such an explanation may come as a surprise to those who are not familiar with behavioral genetics, as they find it hard to accept that individual differences in behavior have a genetic foundation. However, twin studies conducted over a number of decades have demonstrated that genetics plays a role in the variation of almost all human traits ([Polderman et al. 2015](#)). These studies look at traits like family structure, income, and criminality.

**Table 232 : Heritability of traits**

Trait	Heritability	Source
<b>Violent Crime</b>	55%	<a href="#">Frisell et al. (2012)</a>
<b>Anti-social personality</b>	50%	<a href="#">Mason and Frick (1994)</a>
<b>Income</b>	42%	<a href="#">Hyytinen et al. (2013)</a>
<b>Divorce</b>	32%	<a href="#">Jerskey et al. (2010)</a>

#### *Intelligence*

We'll examine how racial crime disparities are influenced by racial intelligence differences. I'll start by going over the data at the national and individual levels that demonstrate a negative correlation between crime and IQ that remains after adjusting for all factors related to the home environment. Second, I will demonstrate the fallacy of the so-called differential detection hypothesis and the likelihood of a causal relationship between IQ and criminal behavior. Lastly, it will be demonstrated that adjusting for IQ can explain a significant amount of the Black-white crime gap.

The data linking national crime rates and national IQ was compiled by [Lynn and Vanhanen \(2012\)](#). National IQ and crime are consistently found to be negatively correlated. As can be observed, depending on the study, the strength of this correlation ranges from weak to strong.

**Table 233 : Correlation between crime and intelligence**

	Variable	N countries	r x IQ	Reference
1	Homicide, 1970s	70	-.50	Lester, 2003
2	Homicide, 1990s	-	-.82	Templer et al., 2007
3	Homicide, 1990s	116	-.25	Rushton & Templer, 2009
4	Rape, 1990s	116	-.29	Rushton & Templer, 2009
5	Assault, 1990s	116	-.21	Rushton & Templer, 2009

[Bartels et al. \(2010\)](#) examined the correlation between IQ, racial demographics, and crime rates in US states. The percentage of a state that was Black and its mean IQ score (calculated using NAEP data) predicted different types of crime when each variable was examined separately. However, because of the small sample size (n=50), they occasionally lost statistical significance when put into a regression all at once. However, when predicting murder and percentage, both variables remained significant. IQ was not as good a predictor as black.

**Table 234 : Regressions for subcategories of crime**

Measure	$\beta$	$t$	$p$
<i>Aggravated assault (N = 50)</i>			
IQ	-.26	-1.74	NS
% Black	.30	2.00	NS
<i>Robbery (N = 50)</i>			
IQ	.02	0.13	NS
% Black	.61	4.51	<.01
<i>Murder (N = 50)</i>			
IQ	-.27	-2.44	<.05
% Black	.57	5.10	<.01
<i>Burglary (N = 50)</i>			
IQ	-.46	-3.38	<.01
% Black	.20	1.48	NS

[Beaver and Wright \(2011\)](#) looked at 243 US counties and the correlation between IQ, crime, and other factors. Beaver and Wright used factor analysis to determine the percentage of black households, the percentage of female-headed households, the percentage of poor households, the percentage of households receiving public assistance, and the percentage of unemployed households in order to develop a measure of "concentrated disadvantage."

**Table 235 : Associations between IQ and crime**

The association between county-level IQ and county-level property crime rates ( $N = 243$  counties).

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Beta	$t$	$p$	Beta	$t$	$p$
Property crime						
IQ	-.40	-6.76	<.001	-.32	-4.71	<.001
Concentrated dis.				.17	2.51	.013
Burglary						
IQ	-.44	-7.54	<.001	-.28	-4.38	<.001
Concentrated dis.				.32	5.08	<.001
Larceny						
IQ	-.29	-4.74	<.001	-.21	-2.97	.003
Concentrated dis.				.17	2.41	.017
Motor vehicle theft						
IQ	-.51	-9.14	<.001	-.55	-8.62	<.001
Concentrated dis.				-.09	-1.34	.182

The association between county-level IQ and county-level violent crime rates and the county-level composite crime rate ( $N = 243$  counties).

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Beta	$t$	$p$	Beta	$t$	$p$
Violent crime						
IQ	-.58	-11.16	<.001	-.40	-7.26	<.001
Concentrated dis.				.37	6.66	<.001
Robbery						
IQ	-.54	-10.07	<.001	-.49	-7.89	<.001
Concentrated dis.				.12	1.86	.065
Aggravated assault						
IQ	-.52	-9.56	<.001	-.27	-4.98	<.001
Concentrated dis.				.53	9.84	<.001
Composite crime						
IQ	-.53	-9.68	<.001	-.41	-6.74	<.001
Concentrated dis.				.24	3.92	<.001


IQ and concentrated disadvantage primarily had significant independent effects, with IQ's effect size typically being larger, whether predicting violent or property crime.

Research on the connection between IQ and crime, delinquency, and associated factors was meta-analyzed by [Ellis and Walsh \(2003\)](#). Of the 68 studies that examined the relationship between IQ and delinquency, 60 (88%) found it to be negative, while the other 8 found no significant correlation. Fifteen (79%) of the 19 studies that examined the relationship between IQ and adult criminal offending found it to be negative. Fourteen (82%) of the 17 studies that examined the relationship between self-reported offending and IQ found it to be negative. Nineteen studies found a negative correlation between IQ and childhood conduct disorder, and five studies found a negative correlation between IQ and anti-social personality disorder. Therefore, IQ is established as a correlate of crime and related constructs in the great majority of research.

However, only 7 out of 19 studies (36%) that looked at recidivism and IQ found a negative correlation. In order to explain this, Ellis and Walsh propose that the mean IQ of the population of people who have already committed a crime is significantly lower than that of the general population (and has a smaller range), and that the variance in crime among this subset of the population is not nearly as well explained by differences in IQ as it is among the general population.

[Schwartz et al. \(2015\)](#) discovered a linearly negative correlation between IQ and a number of criminality measures in a cohort of people born in 1987 (n=60,069).

**Table 236 : Crime by IQ decile**



[Frisell et al. \(2012\)](#) examined the relationship between IQ and criminal activity in a sample of 700,514 male Swedish birth cohorts. At age 18, IQ was assessed. When income and single motherhood were taken into account, the negative correlation between IQ and crime (-0.19) only decreased to -0.18. Additionally, the crime differences between half-siblings and full siblings raised together were predicted by differences in IQ. Given that IQ predicts crime within families, the relationship cannot be explained by differences in the home environment between families.

In their 2011 study, [Levine et al.](#) examined the correlation between criminality and IQ in a sample of 12,686 Americans, 496 of whom had served time in prison. The mean IQ of those who had served time in prison was 89.61, whereas the mean IQ of those who had not was 100.6. This was a statistically significant difference of 0.77 SD. SES also varied between the groups (SMD = -0.37,  $p < .001$ ). A regression analysis of IQ and SES revealed that they had independent effects as well as a significant interaction, with low IQ having a greater impact on those with lower SES and vice versa.



**Table 237 : Regressions between verbal intelligence and crime after controlling for variables**

Variable	B	SE	Odds ratio
Verbal intelligence	-.33*	.08	.72
Neighborhood disadvantage	-.01	.06	.99
Control variables			
Age	-.08*	-.03	1.08
Black	-.18	-.14	.92
Non-Black minority	-.51*	.15	.60
Sex	.79*	.10	2.22
Household income	-.01	.01	.99
Low self-control	.05*	.02	1.04
Wave I delinquency	.06*	.01	1.06

\* Significant at the .05 level, two tailed.

Yun and Lee (2013) examined how a person's neighborhood affects the relationship between their verbal IQ and likelihood of being arrested. In a sample of about 2,000 Americans, they discovered that, even after adjusting for individual age, sex, race, poverty, self-control, and unemployment, as well as neighborhood poverty, Blackness, female-

**Table 238 : Effect of intelligence on arrest by neighborhood disadvantage**

Variable	Adequate neighborhood sample (n = 1,342)			Disadvantaged neighborhood sample (n = 714)		
	B	SE	Odds ratio	B	SE	Odds ratio
Verbal intelligence	-.41*	.10	.66	-.17	.12	.84
Control variables						
Age	.11*	.04	1.11	.05	.05	1.05
Black	-.15	.19	.86	-.04	.18	.96
Non-Black minority	-.48*	.19	.61	-.69*	.25	.50
Sex	.81*	.17	2.25	.80*	.18	2.22
Household income	-.01	.01	.99	-.01	.00	1.00
Low self-control	.03	.02	1.03	.06*	.03	1.06
Wave I delinquency	.06*	.01	1.06	.04*	.02	1.04

\* Significant at the .05 level, two tailed.

headed households, and public assistance, verbal intelligence was negatively associated with criminality.

Additionally, Yun and Lee discovered that there was a significantly stronger correlation between criminality and IQ in wealthy areas compared to underprivileged ones.

Additionally, there is a substantial body of longitudinal research that connects childhood IQ to adult criminal behavior. For example, in a sample of 411 boys, [Farrington \(1989\)](#)

discovered that IQ at age 8 was a significant predictor of being convicted of a violent crime as an adult. Similarly, [Stattin et al. \(1993\)](#) examined the long-term correlation between IQ and crime in a sample of 122 boys and discovered that, even at the age of three, criminals scored lower on intelligence tests than non-criminals.

*L*  
*S*

**Table 239 : IQ by age and offenders of crime**

Age (years)	Nonoffenders			Sporadic offenders <sup>a</sup>			Frequent offenders <sup>b</sup>		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>
3	100.5	14.3	83	97.0	20.1	22	88.2	11.7	14
5	101.0	16.0	81	98.4	18.9	21	91.8	18.2	12
8	101.7	14.8	77	99.2	21.2	18	97.8	18.8	12
11	101.6	14.1	72	96.7	15.3	18	92.5	17.8	11
14	100.6	14.7	70	95.0	14.4	17	87.7	19.6	10
17	101.8	15.2	68	96.7	12.5	15	93.4	19.7	9
<i>M<sup>c</sup></i>	101.7	11.9	81	96.9	13.8	19	91.4	15.7	12

<sup>a</sup> One to three crime occasions. <sup>b</sup> Four or more crime occasions. <sup>c</sup> Computed for males for whom intelligence data were available on at least three occasions:  $F(2, 109) = 4.08, p < .05$ . Contrast tests of differences in intelligence (between nonoffenders and the other two groups) revealed a significant difference ( $p < .01$ ) between nonoffenders and frequent offenders.

The small sample size of Stattin et al. likely contributed to the reduction of some, but not all, of these associations to statistical insignificance when controlling for SES.

**Table 240 : Relationship between intelligence  
and registered criminality, controlling for SES**

Variable and age	Full correlation	Partial correlation
Language ability		
18 and 24 months		
Brunet and Lézine (1951)	-.17*	-.16*
3 years		
Maturity of language use	-.08	-.01
Comprehension of language	-.24**	-.15*
5 years		
Maturity of language use	-.23**	-.15*
Comprehension of language	-.26**	-.18*
Intelligence		
3 years	-.25**	-.16*
5 years	-.19*	-.11
8 years	-.11	.00
11 years	-.19*	-.09
14 years	-.25**	-.13
17 years	-.19*	-.11

Note. SES = socioeconomic status.

\*  $p < .05$  (one-tailed). \*\*  $p < .01$  (one-tailed).

Finally, a 25-year longitudinal study with 1,625 participants was carried out by [Fergusson et al. \(2005\)](#). They discovered that criminality in adulthood was predicted by IQ at ages 8–9. Childhood conduct issues were also found to mediate this relationship, which simply indicates that IQ influences criminal behavior from a young age.

According to some, people with low IQs simply commit crimes in ways that increase their chances of being caught, rather than causing crime itself. The previously mentioned self-report data, which demonstrates that low IQ predicts both arrest and self-reported criminal activity, contradicts this line of reasoning.

This question was further investigated by [Moffitt and Silva \(1988\)](#), who used two distinct forms of measures of criminal activity, self-report and police report, to examine crime and IQ in a sample of 654 boys. They discovered that adolescents who were delinquent had IQs that were below average and that there was no difference in IQ between those who had been arrested and those who had not. To put it another way, IQ had no bearing

on whether a criminal was apprehended. Because stupid criminals are more likely to be caught, this directly contradicts the theory that IQ and crime are correlated.

Table 241 : IQ by type of delinquent

Score	Group		
	Delinquents detected by police ( <i>n</i> = 40)	Delinquents not detected ( <i>n</i> = 69)	Non- delinquents ( <i>n</i> = 545)
<b>SRED 29-item subscale</b>			
<i>M</i>	4.66	5.21	1.14
<i>SD</i>	7.06	5.04	1.86
<b>Full scale IQ</b>			
<i>M</i>	102.52	101.85	108.70
<i>SD</i>	15.98	15.75	14.22
<b>Verbal IQ</b>			
<i>M</i>	98.37	97.98	104.95
<i>SD</i>	14.60	16.95	14.05
<b>Performance IQ</b>			
<i>M</i>	106.70	106.32	111.37
<i>SD</i>	16.55	15.62	14.69

It appears reasonable to conclude that IQ most likely has a causal relationship with crime given that this explanation of the relationship between IQ and crime fails, that home environmental factors and related psychological constructs like self-control cannot explain it, and that IQ in toddlerhood predicts criminality in adulthood. Having said that, let's examine how IQ contributes to racial disparities in crime.

The effects of holding IQ constant on racial crime differences have been examined in two studies. [Beaver et al. \(2013\)](#) first examined the extent to which racial disparities in crime vanished after adjusting for verbal IQ and self-reported lifetime violence. There were 3,029 men in their sample.


Compared to white men, African American men were 43 percent more likely to be arrested. After adjusting for IQ and lifetime violence, this fell to a statistically insignificant 13%. Black men were 56% more likely to have been incarcerated prior to the controls. This percentage fell to a statistically insignificant 18% after controls were

applied. Lastly, Black men were 50% more likely to be incarcerated after being arrested; this number decreased to a statistically insignificant 24% after these controls were applied.

Second, [Herrnstein and Murray \(1994\)](#) found that merely controlling for age and IQ reduced the Black-white incarceration gap by almost  $\frac{3}{4}$ . They did this by analyzing a large nationally representative data set.

**Table 242 : Incarceration by race and IQ**

Controlling for IQ cuts the black-white difference  
in incarceration by almost three-quarters



Therefore, while not entirely, racial differences in IQ likely account for a significant portion of the Black-white crime gap.

### *Genotypic disparities*

The monoamine oxidase-a gene (MAO-A) is one gene that contributes to Black people's high crime rate. The same-named enzyme is produced by this gene. In the brain, a class of neurotransmitters known as monoamines are broken down by the enzyme MAO-A. Among these neurotransmitters are dopamine and serotonin, which are known to influence behavior. Certain mutations in the MAO-A gene result in increased monoamine activity in the brain and decreased levels of the enzyme MAO-A.


The number of times a particular section of the MAO-A gene's promoter region is repeated determines the molecular differences between the various versions of the gene. Lower than normal levels of the enzyme MAO-A are caused by three repeat alleles. Even lower levels of MAO-A are caused by the two repeat allele.

Researchers started to suspect that characteristics like aggression and criminal behavior might be linked to variations in MAO-A levels in the 1990s. A study on the specific family that possessed a rare mutation that resulted in abnormally low levels of the enzyme MAO-A raised suspicions. Rapists, arsonists, and other violent criminals were members of this family ([Brunner et al. 1993](#)).

Later, low MAO-A production resulted from geneticists increasing rates using an artificial version of the MAO-A gene. The rats exhibited significantly more aggressive behavior than usual as a result of it ([Cases et al. 1995](#), [Scott et al. 2008](#), [Vishnivetskaya et al. 2007](#), and [Mejia 2002](#)).


[Caspi et al. \(2002\)](#) established the first direct connection between common MAO-A alleles and human violence. According to this study, individuals with the 2R or 3R variants of the MAO-A gene tended to be more aggressive than average, but only in cases where their upbringing was challenging. These findings led to the hypothesis that individuals with low activity MAO-A genes might react more strongly to unpleasant

experiences than those with high activity gene variants. The association between childhood trauma and the MAO-A genotype has since been well-replicated in male subjects, according to a meta-analysis ([Bryd and Manuch 2013](#)).



Since then, researchers have discovered that, even in people who have not been abused as children, low activity MAO-A also predicts higher levels of anti-social personality ([Ficks and Waldman 2014](#)). Obesity and high credit card debt have also been associated with these gene variants ([Camarena et al. 2004](#), Neve and Flower 2009, Need et al. 2005, and Feummeler 2008). It has also been demonstrated that low activity versions of the gene considerably raise the likelihood of incarceration ([Roux 2014](#), [Vaughn et al. 2009](#), [Beaver et al. 2009](#), and [Beaver et al. 2013](#)).

In a 2013 study, it was shown that the quite rare 2-repeat (2-R) variant “was carried by 0.1 % of Caucasian males and by 5.2 % of African-American males.”. Its association with aggression was confirmed in the same study, the American Add Health dataset:



**Fig. 1** Predicted probabilities of lifetime prevalence of shooting or stabbing someone (N = 133). *Note* Parameter estimates for logit equation:  $b = 2.56$ ,  $SE = .79$ ,  $OR = 12.89$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ; all equations corrected for the clustering of observations in families by using the “cluster” command in STATA10.0; any cases missing a family ID number were dropped from the analyses

In regard to this, it appears likely that low activity forms of the MAO-A gene cause impulsivity to rise, most likely as a result of increased dopamine activity. This, in turn, raises the risk of aggression, criminal activity, obesity, and credit card debt. It is well known that MAO-A genotypes vary by race. An overview of the American literature is shown below. Blacks are more likely than Whites to carry both versions of the low repeat allele, according to the great majority of research.

**Table 243 : 2R variant (%) by race**

Study	Sample Type	Sex	Black 2R %	White 2R %
<a href="#">Beaver et al. (2013)</a>	Nationally Representative	Male	5.2	0.1
<a href="#">Widom and Brzustowicz (2006)</a>	Abuse victims	Male	6.12	0.6
<a href="#">Widom and Brzustowicz (2006)</a>	Abuse Victims	Female	2.6	7
<a href="#">Reti et al. (2011)</a>	Psychiatric Patients	Both	4.7	.5
<a href="#">Choe et al. (2014)</a>	N/A	Male	6.0	0



**Table 244 : 3R variant (%) by race**

<b>Study</b>	<b>Sample Type</b>	<b>Sex</b>	<b>Black 3R%</b>	<b>White 3R%</b>
<a href="#"><u>Beaver et al. (2013)</u></a>	Nationally representative	Male	52.3	37
<a href="#"><u>Widom and</u></a>				
<a href="#"><u>Brzustowicz (2006)</u></a>	Abuse victims	Male	35.7	41.1
<a href="#"><u>Widom and</u></a>				
<a href="#"><u>Brzustowicz (2006)</u></a>	Abuse victims	Female	74.1	62.8
<a href="#"><u>Rosenberg et al.</u></a>				
<a href="#"><u>(2006)</u></a>	N/A	Male	54.1	36.1
<a href="#"><u>Reti et al. (2011)</u></a>	Psychiatric patients	Both	48.7	34.1
<a href="#"><u>Choe et al. (2014)</u></a>	Low income	Male	42.2	30
<a href="#"><u>Sabol, Hu, and</u></a>				
<a href="#"><u>Hamer, (1998)</u></a>	Various combined samples	Both	59.1	33.1

In conclusion, Black people have higher levels of low repeat MAOA alleles than White people, which leads to higher crime rates. This partially, but not entirely, explains why Black people have higher crime rates than White people.

Other genotypic differences explaining disparities in violence & crime by race lie in frequency of alleles associated with antisocial behaviour and diverse disorders. An extensive overlook was already made in [1.2](#).

[GWAS Catalog](#) provides data of risk alleles associated with various traits. We're going to look at those with the highest effect on borderline personality disorder firstly. The risk allele rs114497090-A is the allele that increases risk of having borderline personality disorder the most. That allele is present among Africans at a rate of almost 6 times those of Europeans and 111 times those of East Asians. Africans have also a very high count of homozygosity for that allele.

The risk allele rs13188771-A is the one allele that reduces conduct disorder the most. This risk allele is present among Africans at a rate 5 times lower than Europeans and 7 times lower than East Asians and Ashkenazi Jews.

### *Testosterone*

Testosterone is one element that contributes to Black people's higher than average crime rates. Black people are known to have higher levels of testosterone and to be more susceptible to its effects due to genetic factors. Testosterone is known to cause aggression.


Numerous studies have connected testosterone levels to criminal activity and aggression. Testosterone is linked to aggression in both humans and non-human animals, according to meta-analyses ([Book, Starzyk, and Quinsey, 2001](#)). Women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia are exposed to excessive levels of testosterone and exhibit unusually high levels of aggression. It has been demonstrated that raising a person's blood testosterone levels artificially can increase their level of aggression ([Burnham 2007](#); [Kouri et al. 1995](#)). Indeed, when female fetuses were given testosterone injections, they behaved just as aggressively as young males, according to a study conducted on Rhesus monkeys ([Book, Starzyk, and Quinsey, 2001](#)). Lastly, testosterone levels are higher than normal among inmates ([Dabbs et al., 2005](#)). Therefore, testosterone appears to be linked to both criminal activity and aggression.

Blacks have higher blood levels of free floating testosterone than Whites, according to [Richard et al. \(2014\)](#), who meta-analyzed data from 14 different studies.

The fact that Black people are more likely than White people to have low repeat versions of the androgen receptor gene exacerbates this issue even more. A receptor with the same name that responds to androgenic hormones like testosterone is encoded by the androgen reception (AR) gene. This receptor plays a crucial role in the process by which testosterone affects the brain and body.



A CAG nucleotide sequence appears multiple times in all variants of this gene. The quantity of these repeats varies from person to person. Increased androgen activity is the result of versions of this gene with fewer than normal repeats, which have frequently been linked to aggression and criminal activity. For example:

Data on 645 men, including 241 convicted rapists, 107 convicted murderers, and 26 convicted men for both rape and murder, were examined by [Rajender et al. \(2008\)](#). The shortest average number of CAG repeats was found among those incarcerated for both rape and murder, followed by murderers and rapists. The longest CAG repeats were found in the non-criminal controls.



**Fig. 2** Comparison of the distribution of the CAG repeats below average (<21), average (21) and above average (>21) among criminals and controls, taking 21 repeats as the average repeat size

In a Tanzanian study, [Butovskaya et al. \(2013\)](#) discovered a correlation between 138 adult men's AR genotype and their levels of anger and aggression.



[Comings et al. \(2003\)](#) discovered a correlation between an individual's AR genotype and the likelihood that their father was present during their first seven years of life and that their parents were divorced. Additionally, they discovered the anticipated associations between aggression and AR genotype; however, perhaps as a result of the small sample size, these associations were not statistically significant.

**Table 245 : Association between AR**

Trait	p
In males (substance abuse sample)	
Sexual compulsivity	.02 <sup>a</sup>
Lifetime number of sex partners	.044 <sup>b</sup>
In females (health promotion sample)	
Biological parents divorced	.0030 <sup>c</sup>
Biological father absence 0–7 years	.0068 <sup>d</sup>
Age of menarche	.0220 <sup>e</sup>

Similarly, in a sample of 1,007 men, [Pichard et al. \(2007\)](#) discovered that anti-social personality was predicted by AR genotype.

In a sample of 188 men, [Hurd et al. \(2010\)](#) discovered a significant association between AR genotype and physical aggression and anger, as well as insignificant but positive associations with verbal aggression and hostility.

In a sample of 335 Swedes, [Jonsson et al. \(2001\)](#) discovered non-significant associations with impulsivity and aggression.

According to a study by [Cheng et al. \(2006\)](#), violent offenders had a higher likelihood of having short CAG repeats than controls. Despite being in the anticipated direction, the mean difference was not statistically significant.

**Table 246 : Androgen receptor distribution**


	CAG repeat length, n (%)		P
	≤17	≥18	
Violent-criminal (n= 146)	11 (7.5)	135 (92.5)	0.047
Controls (n=108)	2 (1.9)	106 (98.1)	

Accordingly, the literature on the association between shorter AR genes and aggression/crime shows both positive and significant effects as well as positive and insignificant effects. It is highly likely that the true mean effect is real and positive based on this distribution of effect sizes. Theoretically, this finding makes a lot of sense given what we know about the function of the AR gene and the role testosterone plays in aggression and criminality.

According to four different studies ([Irvine et al. 1995](#), [Wang et al. 2013](#), [Bennet et al. 2002](#), and [Shibalev et al. 2013](#)), Black people are more likely than White people to have low repeat alleles of the AR gene. Several studies ([Harris et al. 1998](#), [Travison et al. 2013](#), [Hoekstra et al. 2012](#), [Leinonen 2023](#)) also found that testosterone levels are highly inheritable. Given both these facts, it is very likely that low repeat AR alleles raise the impact of testosterone, which in turn raises Black crime rates, and that these disparities are inheritable and due to genetics. These same mechanisms may also account for the high rate of single parenthood among Black people due to the influence of testosterone on sexuality. Given that low repeat AR alleles predict family structure, as demonstrated above, this is particularly likely.


### *Aggressivity*

Aggression is the personality trait most clearly linked to criminal activity. Black people appear to be more aggressive than white people, according to a number of lines of evidence. First, compared to white people, Black people are more likely to fight at school, according to the [ChildTrends Bank](#).



Second, bullying at school is more common among Blacks than Whites ([Wang, 2013](#)).

Thirdly, the more violent a crime is the more heavily African Americans tend to be overrepresented in it.



Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Black people are more violent and aggressive than white people.

### *Self control*

Additionally, Black people are more impetuous than White people. People are asked to choose between a smaller reward that they can receive now and a larger reward that they can receive later in order to measure self-control experimentally. Individuals who decide to postpone gratification in order to receive a larger reward are more capable of exercising self-control.

Even after adjusting for IQ and parental socioeconomic status, studies have demonstrated that a lack of self-control predicts poverty and criminality ([Moffitt et al. 2010](#)). Furthermore, racial disparities in self-control have frequently been discovered. For example:

The first self-control experiment was carried out by Michel (1958) on a sample of 53 Trinidadian children ages 7 to 9. He discovered that Asian children exhibited greater self-control than Black children.



In 1978, [Herzberger and Dweck](#) examined a sample of 100 fourth-grade American students and discovered that, even after adjusting for socioeconomic status, Black students exhibited less self-control than White students.

A semi-natural experiment created by the military was exploited by [Warner and Pleeter \(2001\)](#). When sufficiently experienced military personnel retired in the mid-1990s, the U.S. government gave them two choices: they could accept a sizable lump sum payment now or agree to receive an annual payment from the military for the remainder of their lives, which would eventually total much more than the lump sum. Using data on 66,000 people's decisions, Warner and Pleeter discovered that Black people were 15% more likely than non-Black people to take the lump sum payment.

Using a sample of 5,291 college students from 45 different countries, [Wany, Rieger, and Hens \(2011\)](#) offered participants the option of choosing between a larger long-term reward or an immediate monetary reward. The percentage of individuals from various regions who opted for the bigger and less instantaneous reward is displayed in the chart below:




Figure 3: The percentage of choosing to wait grouped by cultural origin

Eighty-two percent of the students in four middle schools in a low-income Georgia school district made up the sample used by [Castillo, Ferraro, Jordan, and Petrie \(2011\)](#). "In our experiment, subjects are asked to make a total of twenty decisions, both orally and in writing," they write. For every choice, participants are asked if they would rather have \$49 in a month or \$49+\$X in seven months. Over the course of the twenty decisions, the sum of money, \$X, is always positive. They were able to gauge the degree to which people preferred instant gratification by using this design to determine when they started to favor the later reward. Compared to White people, Black people were found to have substantially less self-control.

[Borgo \(2013\)](#) examined data from 25,820 American households and discovered that, even after adjusting for factors like income, age, family size, education, region of residence, and marriage, Black households had lower savings rates than White households. Since it is evidently easier to save money when one has a large income, using savings rates as a gauge of self-control would typically be problematic. However, this study used an impressive set of controls, so it can be considered a valid measure of self-control.

Lastly, [Andrade and Petry \(2014\)](#) examined a sample of 317 people with gambling disorders and discovered that, even after adjusting for income, drug use, and education, White gambling addicts exhibited greater self-control than Black gambling addicts.

Thus, numerous studies have demonstrated the existence of racial differences in self-control. These disparities, which affect both adults and children worldwide, cannot be attributed to racial variations in socioeconomic standing. Racial disparities in poverty, non-marital birth rates, and crime are probably influenced by these factors.

Sargon mentioned a study called the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime, which found a correlation between poverty and crime even after adjusting for impulsivity differences. This, in turn, could be interpreted as evidence that contradicts

my belief that the relationship between poverty and crime is greatly muddled by self-control.

For four reasons, I do not consider this to be strong evidence against my position. It is only one study, to start. Second, a self-report measure of self-control was used in the study ([Smith et al., 2001](#)). To gauge impulsiveness, participants were specifically asked to score how much they agreed with the following statements:

Planning detracts from the enjoyment of activities.

I get into problems because I act impulsively.

On tests, I write down the first response that comes to mind and frequently forget to review it later.

I also get caught up in situations that I later wish I could avoid

I break the rules because I act impulsively.

It goes without saying that asking people such questions invites issues brought on by social desirability bias.

Thirdly, the time preference (preference for immediate rewards over future ones) based concept of self control that is employed in the majority (though not all) of the studies I have cited is not clearly related to a number of items on this scale. As a result, people may have similar scores on this scale but have different preferences for time.

Lastly, even if it is true that poverty and crime are correlated regardless of self-control, this does not imply that self-control does not contribute to poverty and crime. In other words, just because self-control does not fully account for the correlation between poverty and crime does not mean that it does not account for some or even the majority of it.

### ***Psychopathology***

On tests of psychopathic personality, Black people also score higher than White people. [Lynn \(2002\)](#) explained the Psychopathic Deviate Scale, a popular tool for assessing psychopathic personality:

*“This was constructed by writing a number of questions, giving them to criterion groups of those manifesting psychopathic behaviour and ‘normals’, and selecting for the scale the questions best differentiating the two groups. The criterion group manifesting psychopathic behaviour consisted of 17–24 year olds appearing before the courts and referred for psychiatric examination because of their ‘long histories of delinquenttype behaviours such as stealing, lying, alcohol abuse, promiscuity, forgery and truancy’” (Archer, 1997, p. 20). The common feature of this group has been described as their failure to ‘learn those anticipatory anxieties which operate to deter most people from committing anti-social behaviour’” (Marks, Seeman, & Haller, 1974, p. 25). The manual describes those scoring high on the scale as follows: irresponsible, antisocial, aggressive, having recurrent marital and work problems, and underachieving (Hathaway & McKinley, 1989). A number of subsequent studies have shown that the Psychopathic Deviate scale differentiates delinquents and criminals from nondelinquents and non-criminals (e.g. Elion & Megargee, 1975).”*

After that, Lynn examined five studies that contrasted racial groups on this metric. It was discovered that Black people in White, Asian, and African nations had higher than average psychopathic personality scores:

**Table 247 : Psychopathic scale**

Psychopathic deviate scale of the MMP1 (d)								
No.	Location	Test	Blacks	E. Asians	Hispanics	N. Americans	Whites	Reference
1	USA	MMP1	0.29	−0.31	0.00	0.44	0.00	Dahlstrom et al., 1986
2	USA	MMP1-2	0.48	−0.18	0.70	0.74	0.00	Hathaway & McKinley, 1989
3	Japan	MMP1-2		−0.36				Japanese MMP1, 1993
4	Nigeria	MMP1-2	0.50					Nzewi, 1998
5	USA	MMP1-A	0.33		0.36		0.00	Archer, 1997
6	Mean		0.40	−0.28	0.35	0.59	0.00	

Blacks did have higher levels of psychopathy than Whites, according to two subsequent meta-analyses on the subject. However, they concluded that although the difference was statistically significant, it was not large enough to be practically significant ([Skeem et al., 2004](#); [McCoy and Edens, 2006](#)). The practical significance of this difference alone, however, does not indicate whether it is one of the numerous factors contributing to racial crime disparities. Additionally, every sample that was used in these meta-analyses was either clinical or remedial in nature. As a result, the mean differences reported in these studies might be much smaller than what would be discovered if the sample were drawn from the general population.

In conclusion, racial disparities in poverty, crime, and non-marital birth rates are probably influenced to some extent by variations in psychopathic personality.

### ***Stress and anxiety***

Low stress levels are another trait that criminals and Black people have in common. Criminologists have explained the link between low stress and crime by arguing that a less active stress response would predispose people to criminality because many people would be discouraged from committing a crime even if they wanted to because of the amount of anxiety, stress, and nervousness that attempting to commit said crime would cause.

Two biological indicators of this phenomenon : a slow heartbeat and low cortisol levels, have been independently connected to criminality and have been demonstrated to be more prevalent in Black people than in White people ([Aggarwal, 2013](#); [Murray et al., 2016](#); [Higginbotham et al., 1991](#); [Gillum, 1988](#); [Easton, 2000](#)). Additionally, Black people self-report feeling less stressed than white people.


Determining the true levels of "stress hormones" in people would be the first obvious step. After adjusting for age, [one study](#) examined three stress hormones in urine samples from males, females, whites, blacks, and Hispanics:

Table 248: Hormone levels by race and sex


Hormone (ng/dl)	Male	Female	White	Black	Hispanic
Epinephrine	156.66	97.4	107.44	159.57	113.87
Norepinephrine	2830.18	2073.89	2157.9	2921.6	2261.87
Cortisol	1099.79	904.43	1101.61	963.09	1062.74

Cortisol levels in white, black, and Hispanic adolescents were examined throughout the day in [another study](#):

*A.S. DeSantis et al. / Journal of Adolescent Health 41 (2007) 3–13*



[Hajat et al. \(2011\)](#) did the same, but for people aged 48-90:




According to the studies, white people generally have higher cortisol levels but lower levels of norepinephrine and epinephrine. Given that environmental stressors consistently elevate all three of these hormones, it is now implausible to claim that these differences are caused by the environment.

Therefore, the fact that white people score higher in one but lower in two strongly implies that genetic differences account for the majority of these differences.

The main conclusion, however, is that these variations are negligible, and that the average impact of varying levels of these "stress hormones" may differ for the races, with whites and blacks reacting differently to varying levels of cortisol and norepinephrine/epinephrine.

It's also important to keep in mind that stress, at least temporarily, likely increases IQ. Numerous studies on animals have confirmed that raising cortisol levels enhances memory function. This served as the foundation for the [Yerkes–Dodson law](#), which states that arousal enhances cognitive function up to a certain point, after which function starts to deteriorate.




According to the one human study I am aware of, both men and women who had their cortisol levels raised to an additional 400 ng/dl performed well on a memory test; however, further cortisol caused their memory to deteriorate.

Naturally, chronic stress, not acute stress, is thought to have a detrimental impact on IQ; however, as demonstrated above, there is likely no discernible difference in the levels of chronic stress among the races. If they do, it's even possible that stress has a greater detrimental effect on white people's IQ than it does on Black or Hispanic people.

In [one study](#), men were given math and public speaking tasks to complete in front of an audience. Their urine cortisol levels were then measured. Before the speech, one group received glucose (sugar), another received fat, a third received protein, and a fourth received water. These are the outcomes:





Examine the first chart in this article. The cortisol levels in the glucose group were more than twice as high as those in the white group, peaking at about 2,300 ng/dl. "High stress" is similar to this: a stressful situation combined with a high-carb diet.

It's a bit off topic, but it does highlight the context of racial differences in stress hormones.

### ***Conclusion***

The overwhelming amount of evidence shows that environmental factors like poverty, family structure, or systemic discrimination are insufficient to explain the disproportionately high crime rates among Black populations. Innate, genetic, and biological differences that affect behavior, cognition, and impulse control are instead the main causes of this higher crime rate and violence. These variables, which range from a lower average IQ to genetic tendencies toward aggression and impulsivity, are consistently found to be more powerful predictors of criminal behavior than cultural or socioeconomic factors.

These disparities are further reinforced by genetic differences. Low-activity variants of the MAO-A gene, which controls neurotransmitters associated with aggression and impulse

control, are more common in Black populations. These variations are linked to increased rates of criminal recidivism, antisocial personality traits, and violent behavior. Similarly, Black people are more likely to have androgen receptor gene variants that intensify the effects of testosterone and have higher baseline testosterone levels, both of which are associated with higher levels of aggression and risk-taking. These biological differences are significant, consistently replicated across studies, and not negligible.

There are also noticeable racial differences in behavioral characteristics like psychopathic tendencies, increased aggression, and poor self-control. Measures of impulsivity, present-oriented time preference, and antisocial behavior, traits that are highly heritable and associated with criminality, are higher among Black populations. Black people exhibit a stronger propensity for instant gratification, even in controlled situations like delayed-gratification experiments. This pattern is consistent with real-world results like higher financial impulsivity and lower savings rates. These inclinations are a reflection of deeper cognitive and temperamental differences rather than being a result of poverty.

Crucially, these biological and genetic elements interact to make criminal behavior worse. While high testosterone and MAO-A deficiencies increase aggression and impulsivity, lower IQ decreases the capacity to anticipate consequences. The end effect is a criminal propensity at the population level that cannot be eliminated by social programs or economic development. The biological realities that cause these disparities cannot be overcome by environmental interventions, though they may lessen some of their effects at the margins.

It is not scientific rigor but political and ideological biases that prevent these differences from being acknowledged. Environmental explanations are consoling, but they don't explain why racial crime trends are consistent across countries, economic situations, and historical eras. The evidence is unmistakable: innate genetic and

neurobiological factors, rather than systemic oppression or poverty, are the cause of Black crime rates.

### 3.5 — Predicting immigration outcomes in crime

In this section we'll be reviewing several studies who have attempted to predict immigration outcome in crime based on national IQ.

[Kierkegaard \(2014a\)](#) examined the fertility and criminality rates of Danish immigrant populations according to their home countries. The author determined relative crime rates (violent, property, and overall crimes) and fertility rates for 71 immigrant groups using data from Danish statistics bureaus. Correlational and regression analyses were used to look at factors like GDP, height, national IQ, and the proportion of Muslims in the home country. The findings indicated that national IQ had a strong predictive power and had a negative correlation with both fertility ( $r = -0.51$ ) and crime rates ( $r \approx -0.47$  to  $-0.65$ ). The home country's percentage of Muslims was the best indicator of crime ( $r \approx 0.59$  to  $0.79$ ), and GDP was a moderate predictor as well. Surprisingly, height contributed to regression models but had no predictive value on its own. Using these variables, the study showed that group-level outcomes, including fertility and criminality, are highly predictable, with national IQ playing a significant role. This implies that while individual-level evaluations are still preferable to prevent overgeneralization, immigration policies may benefit from taking such group-level trends into account. The results demonstrate how useful national IQ is for predicting the outcomes of immigrants.

[Kierkegaard \(2014b\)](#) replicated the above study but for immigrants in Norway. The study examined the overall and violent crime rates of immigrant populations using data from Norwegian statistics agencies. It also examined the correlations between these rates and predictors like national IQ, GDP, the proportion of Muslims, height, and the rate of murder in the immigrant's home country. Weak correlations were found in the first dataset (Study 1), most likely as a result of data errors (such as extreme outliers like Mongolia). The Danish results, however, were closely supported by Study 2, which had a smaller but

more trustworthy sample ( $N=21$ ). The greatest predictor of crime ( $r \approx 0.70-0.81$ ) was the home country's Muslim prevalence, which was followed by GDP ( $r \approx -0.45$ ) and national IQ ( $r \approx -0.62$ ). Murder rates and height were negligible. The best predictor of crime rates, according to regression analyses, was the combination of IQ and Muslim prevalence (adj.  $R^2 = 0.52$ ). The study confirmed that, similar to Danish findings, immigrant criminality in Norway is predictable at the group level. Although the data limitations (small sample size, potential errors) call for caution, national IQ and cultural/economic factors (such as GDP and the prevalence of Muslims) were important predictors. The results imply that characteristics of the country of origin can influence immigration policy.

[Kierkegaard \(2014f\)](#) investigated, using the spatial transferability hypothesis as a foundation, the predictability of socioeconomic outcomes: crime, income, education, and employment, among immigrant groups in Finland and Norway. According to this theory, immigrant performance in host countries is influenced by origin-country characteristics like national IQ and cultural elements. With an emphasis on violent crime, larceny, unemployment rates, income levels, and educational attainment among immigrant populations, the study examined datasets from official statistics bureaus. National IQ, GDP per capita, the prevalence of Islam, and an international socioeconomic (S) factor were important predictors. The findings showed that national IQ was positively correlated with income ( $r \approx 0.61$ ) and educational attainment ( $r \approx 0.47$ ), but negatively correlated with unemployment ( $r \approx -0.43$  to  $-0.50$ ) and violent crime ( $r \approx -0.63$  to  $-0.64$ ). The strongest predictor of violent crime was the prevalence of Islam ( $r \approx 0.82-0.83$ ), indicating the influence of culture and religion. In order to support the notion that origin-country characteristics endure after migration, the study found a strong general socioeconomic factor (S) among immigrant groups that had a strong correlation with both national IQ ( $r \approx 0.59$ ) and GDP ( $r \approx 0.55$ ). The results showed that group-level outcomes are predictable from origin-country variables, supporting the spatial transferability hypothesis. National IQ became a reliable

indicator, but its impact was frequently overshadowed by cultural elements such as the prevalence of Islam.

[Kierkegaard \(2015d\)](#) investigated whether origin-country variables such as national IQ, the prevalence of Islam, and a general socioeconomic factor could be used to predict crime rates among Dutch immigrant groups. The study examined information from a 2005 Dutch report on crime suspects, paying special attention to young men between the ages of 12 and 24 from 57 different countries of origin. The findings indicated that there were significant negative correlations between national IQ and crime rates, ranging from -0.51 to -0.81. The prevalence of Islam displayed less strong positive correlations, ranging from 0.34 to 0.54. At roughly -0.43, the socioeconomic factor also had a negative correlation with crime. It's interesting to note that, in some groups, such as Turkey, second-generation immigrants had higher crime rates than first-generation immigrants, whereas in other groups, such as those from the Netherlands Antilles, crime rates decreased over time. The study's limitations included small sample sizes for generational comparisons and possible police bias in suspect data. Nevertheless, the results corroborated previous studies that found origin-country characteristics predict immigrant outcomes. High-crime non-Muslim populations from former Dutch colonies were blamed for the lower correlation for the prevalence of Islam when compared to Nordic nations. The study emphasizes the generational persistence of group-level disparities.

[Kierkegaard \(2017a\)](#) investigated how various country-of-origin characteristics, including national IQ, the prevalence of Islam, and demographic factors like age and sex distribution, relate to immigrant crime rates in Germany (2012–2015). To determine the per capita crime rates for 83 immigrant groups according to citizenship, the researchers used census data from the German Federal Office of Statistics and official crime statistics from the German Federal Police Office (BKA). The percentage of Muslims in the countries of origin (from the Pew Research Center, 2011) and national IQ scores (from Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012) were then linked to these rates.

According to preliminary unadjusted analyses, there was a moderately negative correlation between national IQ and crime rates ( $r = -0.53$ ). This suggests that immigrant groups from nations with higher average IQs typically had lower crime rates in Germany. On the other hand, the prevalence of Islam demonstrated a positive correlation ( $r = 0.49$ ), indicating that individuals from countries with a large Muslim population were marginally more likely to be involved in criminal activity. However, because younger and male-dominated populations are typically more likely to engage in criminal activity, the study found significant confounding effects from age and sex distribution. Age and sex breakdowns were absent from the German crime data, so the researchers devised a novel adjustment technique to take these demographic factors into consideration.

The authors used comprehensive Danish crime data, which did contain age and sex information, to validate their approach. They discovered that their modifications yielded results that were very similar to those of direct subgroup analyses. The predictive power of national IQ remained strong ( $r = -0.46$ ) after adjusting for age and sex differences in German crime rates, but the correlation with the prevalence of Islam weakened ( $r = 0.35$ ). Furthermore, regression analyses showed that geographic distance from Germany (a proxy for migrant selectivity) and national IQ continued to be significant predictors. With IQ being the most reliable predictor, a combined model that included national IQ, the prevalence of Islam, and distance explained 20–25% of the variance in adjusted crime rates (corresponding to a correlation of roughly 0.45–0.50).

Consistent patterns were found when the study compared German crime data with comparable datasets from Denmark, Norway, and Finland. The notion that cognitive ability, as determined by national IQ, significantly influences immigrant outcomes, including criminal behavior, is supported by this cross-national consistency. Islam prevalence initially exhibited some correlation, but when demographics and IQ were

taken into consideration, its predictive power decreased, indicating that its influence might be indirect or muddled by other factors.

### *Conclusion*

There are a number of common trends that should be carefully examined when analyzing this collection of research on the connection between national IQ and immigrant crime outcomes in various European nations.

In terms of the predictive ability of origin-country characteristics on immigrant outcomes, Kierkegaard's research conducted in Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Germany from 2014 to 2017 shows remarkably consistent results. Generally falling between -0.46 and -0.81, national IQ consistently demonstrated strong negative correlations with crime rates across all studies, indicating that immigrants from nations with higher average IQ scores typically have lower crime rates in their host countries. This trend persisted across a variety of crime categories, such as property crime, violent crime, and general criminal activity.

It is not possible to analyze the connection between national IQ and crime outcomes independently, though. The studies consistently discovered that the prevalence of Islam in the countries of origin was a stronger predictor of crime rates than national IQ, with correlations often surpassing that of national IQ. With correlations between Muslim prevalence and crime rates as high as 0.82-0.83, this relationship seemed to be most noticeable in Nordic nations. Curiously, this correlation was less pronounced in the Netherlands study, which the author ascribed to high rates of crime among primarily non-Muslim populations from former Dutch colonies.

The studies also emphasized how crucial it is to account for demographic variables, especially the distribution of sexes and age. Given that crime rates are generally higher among younger and male-dominated populations, regardless of origin, the German study (2017a) was especially creative in creating adjustment strategies to take these confounding

factors into consideration. While the correlation with Islamic prevalence somewhat decreased when these demographic factors were taken into account, the predictive power of national IQ remained strong, indicating that demographic composition may mediate some of the religious correlation.

Although generally weaker than either national IQ or religious composition, economic factors, which are primarily measured by GDP per capita of the countries of origin, have consistently shown themselves to be moderate predictors of immigrant outcomes. Additionally, the studies found a general socioeconomic factor that had a strong correlation with both GDP and national IQ, confirming what the researchers called the "spatial transferability hypothesis"—the notion that immigrant populations in host countries tend to retain socioeconomic traits from their countries of origin.

Intriguing generational trends were found in the research; some groups had higher crime rates in the second generation, while others saw gradual improvements. This implies that different groups and generations may experience different changes in the relationship between immigrant outcomes and origin-country characteristics.

From a methodological perspective, the studies used advanced regression analyses that, when combined with national IQ, religious composition, economic factors, and geographic distance, typically explained 20–52% of the variance in crime rates. The findings' cross-national consistency across various European nations with disparate immigration laws and social structures adds to the conclusions' strength.

These results have significant implications for our comprehension of immigrant outcomes and integration. The strong predictive power of group-level characteristics indicates that origin-country factors play a significant role in determining immigrant outcomes, even though the researchers stressed that individual-level assessments are still preferred to prevent overgeneralization. According to the research, national IQ, a measure of cognitive ability, is a significant predictor of immigrant success and integration.



### 3.6 — Terror attacks

Another important factor when looking at the impact of immigration on crime is the number of terror attacks immigrants and Muslims provoke.

From 2001 to 2024, [601 islamist terror attacks](#) were carried out in Europe and Western countries (excluding Israel). They have caused the death of more than 5,600 people and injured 9,700 other people. Most of them are caused by people with immigrant background : e.g. in France, [95%](#) of individuals who carried out islamist terror attacks from 2015 to 2020 were either foreigners or had a Muslim immigrant background.

We can breakdown the terror attacks data by country, as follows :

**Table 249 : Terror attacks statistics by country**

Country/Region	Terror attacks	Killed	Injured
<b>Austria</b>	8	12	58
<b>Belgium</b>	22	52	242
<b>Bosnia</b>	5	4	11
<b>Bulgaria</b>	2	7	31
<b>Denmark</b>	7	3	12
<b>England</b>	64	128	1031
<b>Finland</b>	1	2	6
<b>France</b>	103	298	771
<b>Georgia</b>	5	6	3
<b>Germany</b>	57	51	178
<b>Greece</b>	1	1	0
<b>Ireland</b>	2	3	1
<b>Italy</b>	14	18	11
<b>Macedonia</b>	3	14	39
<b>Netherlands</b>	6	6	10
<b>Norway</b>	8	7	20
<b>Russia</b>	121	1149	2482
<b>Scotland + Wales</b>	5	4	5
<b>Spain</b>	8	211	1999
<b>Sweden</b>	19	15	211
<b>Switzerland</b>	5	3	3
<b>Türkiye</b>	23	438	1702
<b>Total (Europe)</b>	490	2432	8829
<b>United States</b>	93	3158	824
<b>Canada</b>	18	16	26
<b>Total (EU + US + CA)</b>	601	5606	9679

You should know that this list barely includes half of the real Islamist attacks. In November 2014, the BBC estimated with in-depth analysis the number of Islamist attacks in the world at 664 with 5,042 deaths this month. The source I used only recorded 284 for 2,515 deaths. Thus, with a rough estimate, we can say that the real number of attacks causing deaths and injuries is probably around 1,300 attacks, 11,000 deaths and 19,000 injured.

***What aboutism (far-right activism?)***

Since 1970, in Europe and North America, 118 terror attacks were carried out by far-right activists, killing around 1,600 and injuring roughly 6,200. Since 2001, respectively, those numbers are of 62, 269 and 609. Every extremism should be fought, but there is an obvious priority which harms our society the most.

Also, from 2010 to 2022 in the [European Union](#), 36 far-right terror attacks were carried out or foiled or aborted, far less than the number of 290 attackers by far-left activists. In fact, far-left activism has caused more potential attacks than religion (150 terror attacks carried out, aborted or foiled). The ideology of tolerance and righteousness, my ass.

## Chapter 4 — Immigration, race and economy

In this chapter, I'm going to discuss the economic impact immigration has on a country. We're going to go through all the data, while also refuting common arguments raised to promote immigration. Economic impact by race will also be analyzed.

### 4.1 — Motives for immigration

One of the main arguments raised for immigration is that it helps the economy of the welcoming country. This would imply that most immigrants come for economic motives. This is generally untrue as in most Western countries in the EU who welcome considerably high number of immigrants, the proportion of those who come for employment and economic motives is smaller than 30%. And here we're talking about legal immigration only.

Table 250 : Immigration by motive in the EU

Country	Family	Education	Economy
<b>European Union - 27 countries (from 2020)</b>	27%	14%	33%
<b>Belgium</b>	45%	13%	12%
<b>Bulgaria</b>	32%	12%	33%
<b>Czechia</b>	29%	22%	31%
<b>Denmark</b>	28%	30%	33%
<b>Germany</b>	36%	13%	15%
<b>Estonia</b>	22%	5%	24%
<b>Ireland</b>	5%	45%	27%
<b>Greece</b>	24%	1%	17%
<b>Spain</b>	42%	17%	23%
<b>France</b>	27%	33%	17%
<b>Croatia</b>	3%	0%	95%
<b>Italy</b>	35%	7%	10%
<b>Cyprus</b>	25%	8%	49%
<b>Latvia</b>	22%	32%	38%
<b>Lithuania</b>	4%	8%	84%
<b>Luxembourg</b>	48%	8%	32%
<b>Hungary</b>	10%	15%	69%
<b>Malta</b>	8%	17%	66%
<b>Netherlands</b>	34%	17%	21%
<b>Austria</b>	29%	10%	11%
<b>Poland</b>	3%	5%	66%
<b>Portugal</b>	33%	18%	41%

<b>Romania</b>	9%	9%	78%
<b>Slovenia</b>	26%	8%	65%
<b>Slovakia</b>	13%	14%	70%
<b>Finland</b>	41%	24%	28%
<b>Sweden</b>	46%	15%	25%
<b>Iceland</b>	36%	19%	20%
<b>Liechtenstein</b>	75%	3%	12%
<b>Norway</b>	40%	13%	30%
<b>Switzerland</b>	41%	26%	27%

Among countries who welcomed more than 300,000 legal immigrants in 2023 (France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland), none of them with the exception of Poland has more than 24% of economic immigrants. Family reasons are systemically more cited as immigration motive. The case of Poland is interesting, they welcome the 2<sup>nd</sup> most immigration in Europe (more than 600,000 in 2023), but they are able to keep an impressively high growing economy while sustaining a high proportion of economic immigrants. How's that possible? The answer is pretty simple : they welcome no African immigrant. The only non-European countries in the top 11 nationalities of immigration are Vietnam, China, India and Georgia.

Thus, immigration cannot be good for most European countries' economy as most of the legals do not even come here for economic motives.

## 4.2 — Net economic contribution of immigrants

In this section we're going to browse through all the data compiling net economic contribution and net fiscal contribution of immigrations in various countries.

### *Netherlands*

van de Beek et al. (2024) has provided a thorough investigation of Dutch data on the economic cost & revenue from immigrants by origin. The researchers examine precise tax and spending statistics to see whether different immigrant groups eventually pay more to the public coffers than they receive in benefits and services. The data show significant disparities depending on where immigrants came from and

why they relocated to the Netherlands. The analysis records all government revenues (taxes, social premiums) and expenditures (benefits, education, healthcare) for each immigrant.

Total expenditure and revenue by immigrant background is included in the following table. Numbers are in billions. (%) indicate relative (per capita) compared to native Dutch people. No % means 100%.

**Table 251 : Expenditures and revenues by immigrant background**

	Dutch	With immigrant background	
		Western	Non-Western
Population (x1000)	13,352	1,671	2,127
Revenue – Expenditure	16.1	0.9	-18.2
<b>EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>229.6</b>	<b>28.2 (98%)</b>	<b>42.1 (115%)</b>
Public administration	48.2	6.6 (100%)	12.7 (165%)
Defence	5.3	0.7	0.9
Education	20.8	2.0 (73%)	4.9 (149%)
Child benefit	3.8	0.4 (75%)	1.1 (179%)
Disability benefit	10.2	1.3 (96%)	2.0 (125%)
Unemployment	6.2	0.9 (116%)	0.9 (88%)
Social assistance	3.2	0.8 (106%)	3.4 (648%)
Social security residual	13.4	1.7 (103%)	2.1 (100%)
State pension	32.1	3.5 (99%)	1.3 (26%)
Transfers abroad	8.2	1.0	1.3
Allowances	6.2	1.0 (106%)	2.2 (227%)
Healthcare	53.1	6.2 (97%)	6.0 (71%)
Gross invest. Buildings	6.6	0.8	1.1
Gross invest. Infrastructure	7.8	1.0	1.2
Gross invest. Schools	4.5	0.4 (77%)	1.0 (144%)
<b>REVENUES</b>	<b>298.8</b>	<b>29.1 (100%)</b>	<b>24.0 (61%)</b>
Wage & income taxes	153.2	15.5 (104%)	11.8 (59%)
Other taxes households	7.9	0.8 (104%)	0.6 (59%)
Inheritance tax	1.7	0.1 (79%)	0.1 (26%)
Corporate income and div. tax	21.8	1.7 (81%)	0.8 (26%)
Indirect tax	68.1	6.8 (102%)	6.3 (72%)
IRN from companies	16.1	1.3 (81%)	0.6 (26%)
Net land sales	2.3	0.2	0.3 (100%)
Non-tax resources residual	27.8	2.7	3.4 (100%)


Thus, non-Western immigration in the Netherlands are a huge economic burden for the country. One might argue that the main difference comes from taxes on income, and that immigrants are likely to earn less due to racism. However, in comparable situations (same job and qualifications), immigrants earn only 4.5% less than natives. This gap is largely explained by differences in education.

Using 2016 as a base year, the study forecasts these flows over each immigrant's expected lifetime in the Netherlands, making realistic assumptions about future earnings, benefit use, and demographics. Three key variables influence the results: the immigrant's age when they arrive, their country of origin, and their reason for migrating.

**Table 252 : Net contribution of immigrants by entry age**

	Net contribution (x €1,000)							
	by entry age (years)						hypothetical	per
Immigrants (with remigration)	0	10	30	50	70	90	family	person
First generation total	-179	-160	-37	-95	-190	-149	-414	-76
First generation Western	-69	-37	83	7	-154	-145	60	42
First generation non-Western	-266	-257	-125	-174	-236	-161	-772	-167
Native Dutch reference	-49	0	153	48	-148	-149	256	98
<b>Born in the Netherlands (without emigration)</b>								
								<b>per person</b>
Average native Dutch person (person with a Dutch background)								-3
Average resident (total all migration backgrounds)								-65

In fact, as seen in the table and in the following graph, non-Western immigrants **never** benefit to the economy in terms of net contribution. They're always in the negative.



The study also breaks down contribution by country of origin more specifically rather than just region of origin. Immigrants from North America and Scandinavia make the largest positive contributions, up to €210,000 net per person. They typically arrive at work, earn high wages, and pay significant taxes while receiving few benefits. Refugees from Somalia, Syria, and other conflict zones cost the Dutch government more than €300,000 each on average. They struggle to find work and are heavily reliant on social services.




Figure 2. Net contribution of first-generation immigrants for 42 regions of origin, with remigration. The Netherlands is coloured with the results of the native Dutch reference (a hypothetical immigrant with the characteristics of the average native Dutch person). Source: Our own calculation based on CBS-StatLine and CBS-microdata.

The map visualization makes these geographic patterns immediately clear. Blue/green countries are net contributors; red/orange are net costs. Notably, cultural distance from Dutch norms appears closely tied to economic outcomes, even after accounting for education levels. Keep in mind this particular map as we will observe recurrent patterns in net contribution by country later.

In relation to our previous point in section 4.1, the study provides a chart for net contribution by motive of immigration.




Figure 3. Net contribution of first-generation immigrants by immigration motive and entry age. For study and work immigrants, the numbers for young ages are low and the profile is wholly or partly synthetic, which is indicated by a dotted line.<sup>36</sup> Source: Our own calculation based on CBS-StatLine and CBS-microdata.

As it can easily be seen, the only motive that actually benefits the welcoming country is labour/economic motive. We recall that only one legal immigrant in three in the EU who came in 2023 came there for economic motives. To put it in other words; **only one legal immigrant in three in Europe benefits the economy.**



[van de Beek et al.](#) published another study which gives even more data of net contribution, specifically with this table that resumes the data we've seen already, including 2<sup>nd</sup> generation :

**Table 253 : Average net contribution of immigrants by motive, region in the Netherlands**

Migration motive		Amount
Labour immigration	+	€125,000
Study immigration	-	€75,000
Family immigration	-	€275,000
Asylum immigration	-	€475,000
Region		Amount
Western average	+	€25,000
Japan, North America, Oceania, British Isles, Scandinavia and Switzerland	+	€200,000
Central and Eastern European EU countries	-	€50,000
Other EU countries (excl. British Isles, and Scandinavian EU countries)	+	€50,000
Former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union	-	€150,000
Non-Western average	-	€275,000
Southern Africa ( <i>de facto</i> RSA)	+	€150,000
Israel	+	€50,000
Morocco	-	€550,000
Horn of Africa and Sudan	-	€600,000
Immigration motive combined with region		Amount
Labour immigration from Japan, North America and Oceania	+	€625,000
Asylum immigration from Africa	-	€625,000
Study immigration from the European Union (including UK)	+	€75,000
Study immigration from Africa	-	€250,000

Now one can argue that all we've seen so far relates to first-generation immigration. What about the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation ? Thoses who are born in the country, raised in the educational system, who assimilated to the culture ?

They are far worse.




Figure 4. Net contribution of people with a second-generation immigration background for 42 regions of origin, with permanent settlement (no remigration). Source: Our own calculation based on CBS-StatLine and CBS-microdata.

Only a few countries of origin have positive contribution. This affects a dozen countries, primarily in North-West Europe and East Asia. Switzerland, Scandinavia, and China report a positive net contribution of €15,000 to €20,000 from the second generation. Japanese immigrants with a second generation background make the highest net contributions (€95,000). The net contribution for East-Asians (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) is 'budget neutral'. Immigrants from Israel and France integrate well into Dutch society, but incur net costs of around €30,000 per person.


In most regions of origin, second-generation immigrants contribute negatively throughout their lives. Net costs for former Yugoslavia, Aruba, the Antilles, Suriname, Pakistan, Turkey, and West and North Africa range from €200,000 to €300,000 per person. Negative outliers include West Africa (-€390,000), the Caribbean (-€435,000), the Horn of Africa and Sudan (-€460,000), and Morocco (-€480,000).

The first and second generations' net contributions show a notable asymmetry. Children of first-generation immigrants with a positive or high net contribution, with few exceptions, have a net contribution similar to that of a native Dutch person born in 2016, which is roughly 'budget neutral'. Children of immigrants who make a significant negative net contribution are also likely to do the same.

The study indicates that individuals with one parent born in the Netherlands and one born abroad make a more positive or less negative net contribution than those with both parents born abroad. Latin America (approximately €210,000) and Aruba and the (former) Antilles (approximately €270,000) have the most significant differences. Asia and Turkey have a much smaller difference (approximately €20,000 and €25,000, respectively). The difference may be due to the fact that in the first two cases, the Dutch-born parent is typically a Dutch native, while in the last two, the parent is typically a second-generation migrant.

### *Denmark*


[The Economist](#) has published an article with data similar to those we find in Netherlands. Similarly, they calculated the average net contribution by immigrant background and age :



The Economist


We recognize the same patterns seen before. Western immigrants contribute positively, generally, non-Western countries much less and immigrants from MENAPT (Middle-East, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey) **never** contribute positively to the public finances. The numbers also include information about their children, primarily the second generation, as the third generation is currently very young. Given these findings, we can conclude that, on average, immigrants from these countries have a negative economic impact. It doesn't matter what age they enter the country.

If we look at lifetime contribution, the same pattern emerges, even age-adjusted.




The red bars represent the age-standardized fiscal impact, or the effect of age removed. These tell us what to expect in the future, from a long-termist perspective. The blue bars represent the current fiscal impact due to the current age distribution. Based on this, we can conclude that Western immigrants are very net positive, as they typically arrive in their working years and frequently leave the country before retiring. This is a typical Eastern European worker. They exemplify the "we wanted workers" dream scenario of immigrants from the state's perspective. They stay for a while and work before leaving, so they have no impact on the country's long-term demographics,

and Danes do not have to pay for their elderly or children's healthcare. Non-Western groups, on the other hand, are consistently net negatives, regardless of their current age distribution or long-term expected effects. The same is true for their children, who fare much better (their negative impact is roughly half that of their parents).




### *Finland*

[Salminen](#) reviewed fiscal data to find the net economic effect of immigrants by origin in Finland. The figure below displays net economic effect by country of birth :



We can easily again identify the common patterns we've seen earlier. A look at this data by the region of birth would however be more representative :



Once again, the data aligns with the patterns we've discovered thanks to data from the Netherlands and Denmark. Africans and Arabs harm the economy the most in general.

### ***Fiscal impact of immigrants in the EU***

The EU had published [a report](#) exploring the fiscal impact of immigrants in EU countries, showing no exception to the fact that non-EU immigrants have a net negative fiscal impact. Somehow, I couldn't find this report back in the normal data search, I really wonder why the pro-immigration EU would delete such a report. Anyways, here we report their general findings for every country in the EU, and a quick summary.

### Summary

The following table gives estimated lifetime net fiscal impact by immigrant status and origin, in EU countries. I estimated this figure using the following method :


First, I transformed available graphs into graphs with datapoints using automeris.io, pasted those on a graph viewer. Then I computed the following formula, with  $x_i$  being the midpoints of each age group,  $y_i$  being yearly net fiscal impact at each age group, and  $n$  being the total number of points (here, 7, since there are 7 age groups), using the trapezoidal rule for an integral :

$$\int y(x) dx \approx \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \frac{x_{i+1} - x_i}{2} (y_i + y_{i+1})$$

**Table 254 : Net fiscal impact by immigrant's origin in the EU**

Country	Extra-EU	Intra-EU	Natives	$\Delta$ Natives/Extra-EU	Ratio
<b>Austria</b>	-157 845 €	108 735 €	110 715 €	268 560 €	2.43
<b>Belgium</b>	-188 600 €	149 365 €	116 440 €	305 040 €	2.62
<b>Finland</b>	-257 561 €	143 113 €	163 688 €	421 249 €	2.57
<b>France</b>	-39 103 €	76 282 €	146 795 €	185 897 €	1.27
<b>Sweden</b>	-157 143 €	94 156 €	248 701 €	405 844 €	1.63
<b>Germany</b>	-4 110 €	52 740 €	128 767 €	132 877 €	1.03
<b>Ireland</b>	-155 177 €	-134 965 €	-55 730 €	99 447 €	1.78
<b>Italy</b>	-11 275 €	12 389 €	118 843 €	130 119 €	1.09
<b>Netherlands</b>	-279 612 €	-155 987 €	25 243 €	304 854 €	12.08
<b>Cyprus</b>	-46 675 €	-130 048 €	-109 739 €	-63 064 €	-0.57
<b>Spain</b>	755 €	-17 192 €	34 796 €	34 041 €	0.98
<b>Czechia</b>	46 135 €	36 160 €	20 200 €	-25 935 €	-1.28
<b>Greece</b>	-57 147 €	-11 986 €	-22 449 €	34 698 €	1.55
<b>Hungary</b>	8 997 €	99 499 €	28 754 €	19 757 €	0.69
<b>Lithuania</b>	3 024 €	52 643 €	49 873 €	46 849 €	0.94
<b>Poland</b>	-1 912 €	-22 108 €	4 816 €	6 728 €	1.40
<b>Portugal</b>	2 394 €	-11 702 €	1 064 €	-1 330 €	-1.25
<b>Croatia</b>	-14 373 €	-18 349 €	7 951 €	22 324 €	2.81

Austria



Belgium



Finland



France






We can note down a few interesting facts shown by this table. First, there are only three countries in which non-EU immigrants have a better fiscal impact than natives : Cyprus, Czechia and Portugal. In Portugal, most non-EU immigrants come from India, Brazil and China, rather than Africa for other countries, who have neutral to positive net fiscal impact as seen before. The same happens for Czechia, most non-EU immigrants come from Vietnam, Russia, USA and India, rather than Africa. More than 58% of residence permits in Cyprus were given to Russians, Nepalese, Indians and Sri Lankans. Overall, the majority of non-EU immigrants in those countries aren't from African or Middle East, which explains why they have positive net fiscal impact.

### ***Conclusion***


In all countries with data, specific group of immigrants have consistently a negative net contribution at every age. Generally, no immigration regardless of the region benefits the country in terms of net fiscal impact. Thus, it is obvious that immigration, and particularly African and Arab immigration, has considerable negative effects on the economy.

Last but not least, as we have observed in recent years, the immigration of non-Westerners into Western nations is [linked to a decline in GDP per capita](#) ( $r = -.41$ ), and the more non-Western immigrants, the lower the living standards will be in the West.



### 4.3 — Unemployment and welfare use

Kierkegaard has plotted the net economic contribution of immigrant groups in Denmark as a function of their total employment rate.



We can see that the net fiscal contribution is easily predictable by employment rate, which totally makes sense. A more employed population will rely less on allowances and welfare and will pay more taxes. In this section, we're going to browse through the data of employment of immigrants throughout Western countries, checking if the same patterns seen above can be found in employment and welfare use. Considering that these variables have been measured much more times than the net economic contribution, we will have an exhaustive view on the economic impact of immigrants.

#### *France*

In France, immigrants have an unemployment rate generally twice higher than natives, at 6.5%. African immigrants are particularly unemployed at a rate of 13.6%. Inactivity rate is also far higher among immigrants than among natives.

Table 255 : Unemployment and inactivity by origin in France (%)

Origin	Unemployment rate	Inactivity rate
<b>French without immigrant background</b>	6.5	14.7
<b>French with immigrant background</b>	10.2	14.3
<b>America &amp; Oceania</b>	13.1	23.6
<b>Europe</b>	7.3	20.2
<b>Asia</b>	11.8	25.4
<b>Africa</b>	13.6	25.9

Since they have higher unemployment & inactivity rates, immigrants rely more on

welfare use than natives :

Table 256 : Revenue by type and birthplace (€)

Birthplace	Total revenue	Wages	Retirement pensions	Unemployment allowances	Social allowances	% allowances
<b>Africa</b>	21650	14510	2270	1020	3110	19
<b>Europe (without France)</b>	28810	17020	7220	820	1380	8
<b>Natives</b>	31270	20600	6610	770	1610	8

Consequently, they pay less in taxes :

Table 257 : Revenue and taxes by birthplace (€)

Birthplace	Total revenue	Taxes	% taxes
<b>Africa</b>	21650	2660	12
<b>Europe (without France)</b>	28810	4130	14
<b>Natives</b>	31270	4660	15

As their quality of life is lower, they benefit more from social housings :

Table 258 : Type of housing by region of birth (%)


	Owners	Tenant	Social housing	Other	Total
<b>Immigrants</b>	37	28	29	6	100
<i>including born in ...</i>					
<b>South Europe</b>	61	23	12	5	100
<b>Other Europe</b>	52	30	12	6	100
<b>Maghreb</b>	25	27	44	4	100
<b>Other Africa</b>	17	31	44	8	100
<b>Other</b>	39	33	21	7	100
<b>Natives</b>	63	21	11	5	

The net contribution of immigration in France per year is negative, per [several studies](#). It ranges from -24 billions € to -250 billions €.

### *European Union*

In general, non-European immigrants benefit more of the benefits from social systems, as shown by [this report](#) :

Figure 4. Access to non-contributory benefits for natives and migrants



Unemployment rate among non-European immigrants is of 12.2% and 5.4% for nationals.

### *The United States*

We haven't talked about the USA in our last section about the net economic contribution of immigrants as I'm not aware of any study covering this measure for all immigrants in America.

However, the Center of Immigration Studies evaluates the fiscal drain of all illegal immigrants in their lifetime in the United States to be around \$750 billion.

Immigrants in the United States do use more welfare according to Camarota & Zeigler, 2018b. In 2014, 55.3% of immigrant-headed households reported using at least one welfare program, compared to 34.6% of native households.

**Table 259 : Welfare use by nativity**

Table 1. Welfare Use Based on Nativity of Household Head									
	Native-Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households w/o Adult Natives <sup>1</sup>	Households Headed by Non-Citizen in U.S. for		Naturalized-Citizen-Headed Households	Naturalized-Citizen-Headed Households w/o Adult Natives <sup>1</sup>	All Immigrant-Headed Households (Citizen & Non-Citizen)	All Immigrant Headed Households (Citizen & Non-Citizen w/o Adult Natives <sup>1</sup> )
				< 10 yrs. <sup>2</sup>	> 10 yrs. <sup>3</sup>				
Any Welfare	34.6%	62.6%	61.4%	49.6%	69.6%	50.3%	50.8%	55.1%	55.3%
Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)	30.4%	57.7%	56.3%	42.1%	66.1%	44.3%	45.3%	49.5%	49.9%
Cash	19.5%	31.1%	29.8%	26.4%	33.6%	28.2%	28.9%	29.3%	29.3%
Cash (Excluding EITC)	7.7%	6.3%	5.9%	2.2%	8.5%	11.7%	13.1%	9.6%	10.1%
SSI	6.3%	4.5%	4.1%	1.5%	6.1%	10.6%	12.1%	8.2%	8.7%
TANF	1.3%	1.4%	1.5%	<.5%	2.1%	0.8%	0.8%	1.1%	1.1%
EITC	13.6%	27.2%	26.1%	25.4%	28.1%	18.7%	18.1%	22.0%	21.5%
Food	21.0%	45.5%	45.5%	32.0%	52.8%	27.8%	28.8%	34.7%	35.9%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	10.4%	33.4%	33.2%	20.8%	40.2%	15.3%	15.6%	22.4%	23.1%
WIC	3.8%	17.2%	17.7%	15.7%	18.1%	5.8%	5.9%	10.3%	10.9%
SNAP	15.2%	23.0%	22.3%	16.4%	26.5%	15.4%	16.4%	18.4%	18.9%
Medicaid	23.3%	49.9%	48.6%	38.5%	56.1%	36.8%	37.1%	41.9%	42.0%
Housing	4.7%	3.9%	4.2%	3.0%	4.4%	5.9%	7.1%	5.1%	5.9%
Weighted N	107,454,456	7,489,098	6,223,342	2,630,711	4,858,386	11,645,357	8,405,224	19,134,455	14,628,566
Sample Size	19,432	1,203	972	381	830	1,666	1,192	2,859	2,156

**Source:** 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
<sup>1</sup> Households with natives 21 and older are excluded.  
<sup>2</sup> Arrived in 2005 or later.  
<sup>3</sup> Arrived before 2005.

Regardless of which welfare program is excluded, immigrants continue to use welfare more than their native counterparts:

**Table 260 : Welfare use by nativity excluding program**

	Native-Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households w/o Adult Natives*	Naturalized-Citizen-Headed Households	All Immigrant-Headed Households (Citizen & Non-Citizen)
Any Welfare	34.6%	62.6%	61.4%	50.3%	55.1%
Excluding EITC	30.4%	57.7%	56.3%	44.3%	49.5%
Excluding SSI	33.9%	62.4%	61.2%	49.5%	54.5%
Excluding TANF	34.6%	62.6%	61.4%	50.3%	55.1%
Excluding School Lunch	33.2%	60.6%	59.2%	48.3%	53.1%
Excluding WIC	34.5%	62.2%	61.1%	49.8%	54.7%
Excluding SNAP	33.0%	61.0%	60.1%	49.3%	53.9%
Excluding Medicaid	29.9%	55.1%	54.8%	42.1%	47.2%
Excluding Housing	33.9%	62.2%	61.0%	49.7%	54.6%
Weighted N	107,454,456	7,489,098	6,223,342	11,645,357	19,134,455
Sample Size	19,432	1,203	972	1,666	2,859

**Source:** 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
 \* Households with natives 21 and older are excluded.

Both non-citizen-headed and naturalized-citizen-headed households use welfare more than their native counterparts with the same level of education.

**Table 261 : Welfare use by nativity and education**

	Native-Headed Households					Non-Citizen-Headed Households				
	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More
Any Welfare	63.1%	43.1%	47.7%	37.5%	17.6%	83.0%	77.3%	81.0%	58.3%	27.8%
Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)	59.9%	38.4%	43.3%	32.6%	14.1%	79.7%	74.3%	77.7%	53.4%	19.6%
Cash	36.8%	24.7%	27.4%	21.5%	8.9%	40.8%	33.9%	38.3%	28.7%	17.8%
Cash (Excluding EITC)	24.3%	10.1%	13.3%	7.1%	2.3%	11.3%	4.7%	8.9%	3.6%	2.2%
SSI	21.6%	8.4%	11.4%	5.2%	1.9%	8.7%	3.3%	6.7%	1.7%	1.3%
TANF	2.7%	1.8%	2.0%	1.5%	.3%	2.5%	.9%	2.0%	1.1%	.6%
EITC	15.9%	17.1%	16.9%	16.6%	7.2%	33.8%	30.8%	32.7%	26.5%	16.5%
Food	45.0%	27.7%	31.6%	23.0%	7.4%	67.4%	57.0%	63.6%	39.8%	11.8%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	18.1%	13.1%	14.2%	12.6%	4.0%	53.3%	37.7%	47.6%	29.3%	6.9%
WIC	6.7%	5.1%	5.4%	4.6%	1.3%	24.9%	24.1%	24.6%	17.2%	2.7%
SNAP	39.3%	20.8%	25.0%	15.6%	3.9%	33.9%	27.4%	31.5%	18.5%	7.9%
Medicaid	48.8%	30.3%	34.5%	24.6%	9.8%	70.3%	62.9%	67.6%	45.7%	16.5%
Housing	14.6%	6.2%	8.1%	4.2%	1.4%	7.1%	3.8%	5.9%	2.6%	.6%
Weighted N	8,757,747	29,820,502	38,578,249	33,716,480	35,159,727	2,770,022	1,584,745	4,354,767	945,484	2,188,847
Sample Size	2,168	5,924	8,092	6,093	5,648	509	266	775	147	292

	Naturalized-Citizen-Headed Households					All Immigrant-Headed Households <sup>2</sup>				
	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More
Any Welfare	72.3%	65.4%	68.2%	45.5%	36.2%	78.8%	69.9%	74.5%	48.9%	33.5%
Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)	67.9%	57.6%	61.8%	40.5%	29.9%	75.1%	63.9%	69.7%	44.0%	26.7%
Cash	46.1%	36.0%	40.1%	23.1%	19.9%	42.8%	35.2%	39.2%	24.6%	19.3%
Cash (Excluding EITC)	27.3%	10.9%	17.5%	8.5%	8.0%	17.5%	8.6%	13.2%	7.1%	6.1%
SSI	25.2%	9.9%	16.0%	7.1%	7.4%	15.1%	7.4%	11.4%	5.7%	5.5%
TANF	1.1%	.8%	.9%	1.6%	.3%	2.0%	.8%	1.4%	1.5%	.4%
EITC	22.2%	26.9%	25.0%	17.9%	13.3%	29.3%	28.4%	28.8%	20.2%	14.3%
Food	46.4%	36.4%	40.4%	28.6%	15.5%	59.2%	44.2%	52.0%	31.6%	14.3%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	24.3%	21.4%	22.6%	19.6%	6.2%	42.0%	27.5%	35.0%	22.2%	6.4%
WIC	8.9%	8.1%	8.4%	6.1%	3.3%	18.7%	14.1%	16.5%	9.0%	3.1%
SNAP	28.3%	19.3%	22.9%	13.2%	9.6%	31.7%	22.4%	27.2%	14.6%	9.0%
Medicaid	60.3%	49.5%	53.8%	30.4%	24.3%	66.4%	54.6%	60.7%	34.5%	21.8%
Housing	14.1%	6.8%	9.7%	4.1%	3.2%	9.8%	5.7%	7.8%	3.7%	2.4%
Weighted N	1,767,280	2,623,460	4,390,740	2,584,902	4,669,716	4,537,301	4,208,205	8,745,506	3,530,385	6,858,563
Sample Size	318	392	710	360	605	826	657	1,483	505	895

**Source:** 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
<sup>1</sup> Combines those with less than a high school education and those with only a high school education.  
<sup>2</sup> Naturalized and non-citizens.



Perhaps this is because immigrants are attempting to support their children, but when we look at immigrant households without children, they continue to use significantly more welfare than native households without children (and the percentages are actually higher than the 34.6% of native-headed households).

**Table 262 : Welfare use by nativity and without children**

	Native-Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households w/o Adult Natives*	Naturalized-Citizen-Headed Households	All Immigrant-Headed Households (Citizen & Non-Citizen)
<b>Any Welfare</b>	24.7%	37.7%	36.9%	40.2%	39.4%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	20.7%	28.8%	27.1%	34.2%	32.5%
<b>Cash</b>	12.8%	19.9%	19.8%	24.4%	23.0%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	6.4%	6.6%	5.9%	13.8%	11.6%
SSI	5.9%	6.2%	5.7%	13.0%	11.0%
TANF	<0.5%	<0.5%	<0.5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
<b>EITC</b>	7.0%	14.8%	15.0%	11.7%	12.7%
<b>Food</b>	11.3%	12.8%	12.5%	14.2%	13.8%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	<0.5%	<0.5%	<0.5%	<0.5%	<0.5%
WIC	<0.5%	1.7%	1.5%	0.9%	1.1%
SNAP	11.1%	11.9%	11.4%	13.7%	13.2%
<b>Medicaid</b>	15.1%	21.4%	20.2%	29.2%	26.8%
<b>Housing</b>	4.1%	4.8%	5.2%	7.9%	7.0%
Weighted N	75,804,818	3,047,455	2,545,674	6,948,753	9,996,208
Sample Size	13,924	465	378	993	1,451
<b>Source:</b> 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.					
* Households with natives 21 and older are excluded.					

This trend remains true when looking at immigrant households with at least one worker:



**Table 263 : Welfare use of households with at least one worker**

	Native- Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed Households	Non-Citizen Headed House- holds w/o Adult Natives*	Naturalized- Citizen- Headed Households	All Immigrant- Headed House- holds (Citizen & Non-Citizen)
<b>Any Welfare</b>	34.5%	63.1%	61.9%	49.6%	55.2%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	29.3%	57.8%	56.2%	42.9%	49.1%
<b>Cash</b>	20.2%	31.7%	30.4%	26.4%	28.6%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	5.5%	5.1%	4.6%	7.4%	6.5%
SSI	4.1%	3.5%	2.9%	6.5%	5.3%
TANF	1.2%	1.5%	1.5%	0.7%	1.1%
<b>EITC</b>	16.9%	29.1%	28.2%	21.3%	24.5%
<b>Food</b>	20.3%	46.2%	46.2%	26.7%	34.8%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	12.1%	35.3%	35.2%	17.3%	24.8%
WIC	4.6%	18.2%	18.8%	6.9%	11.6%
SNAP	12.9%	22.3%	21.4%	12.2%	16.4%
<b>Medicaid</b>	22.4%	50.1%	48.7%	35.0%	41.3%
<b>Housing</b>	2.9%	2.9%	2.9%	3.0%	2.9%
Weighted N	81,928,626	6,923,931	5,705,951	9,702,344	16,626,274
Sample Size	14,047	1,101	881	1,359	2,450
<b>Source:</b> 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.					
* Households with natives 21 and older are excluded.					

Even when we look at immigrant households with at least one worker and according to education level, they use more welfare than native households:

**Table 264 : Welfare use by nativity, education for households with at least one worker**

	Native-Headed Households					Non-Citizen-Headed Households				
	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More
<b>Any Welfare</b>	62.9%	46.3%	49.2%	38.7%	18.2%	82.4%	78.6%	81.0%	63.2%	28.1%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	57.5%	40.2%	43.3%	32.8%	14.3%	78.7%	75.4%	77.5%	57.9%	19.4%
<b>Cash</b>	38.9%	27.8%	29.8%	23.0%	9.5%	40.3%	35.1%	38.4%	31.6%	18.6%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	16.9%	8.1%	9.7%	5.5%	2.0%	8.4%	4.0%	6.8%	3.9%	2.4%
SSI	14.5%	6.3%	7.7%	3.6%	1.6%	6.2%	2.5%	4.9%	1.9%	1.4%
TANF	3.0%	1.7%	1.9%	1.4%	.3%	2.6%	1.0%	2.0%	1.2%	.6%
<b>EITC</b>	27.7%	23.0%	23.8%	20.1%	8.1%	36.4%	32.9%	35.1%	29.2%	17.2%
<b>Food</b>	44.9%	29.1%	31.9%	23.5%	7.6%	68.1%	58.0%	64.4%	43.5%	11.9%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	27.2%	16.9%	18.8%	14.4%	4.6%	56.8%	39.6%	50.5%	32.3%	6.9%
WIC	10.6%	6.6%	7.3%	5.3%	1.5%	26.2%	25.5%	25.9%	18.9%	2.8%
SNAP	34.9%	19.7%	22.4%	14.6%	3.5%	31.9%	27.1%	30.1%	20.1%	7.9%
<b>Medicaid</b>	47.5%	32.1%	34.8%	24.7%	9.9%	69.1%	64.4%	67.4%	49.3%	16.6%
<b>Housing</b>	8.5%	3.9%	4.7%	3.2%	1.0%	4.7%	2.9%	4.0%	2.9%	.6%
Weighted N	4,458,457	20,678,566	25,137,022	26,881,067	29,910,537	2,538,793	1,474,449	4,013,243	857,804	2,052,884
Sample Size	1,063	3,986	4,985	4,694	4,683	462	249	706	131	270
	Naturalized-Citizen-Headed Households					All Immigrant-Headed Households <sup>2</sup>				
	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More	Less than H.S.	H.S. Only	No more than a H.S. Education <sup>1</sup>	Some College	Bachelor's or More
<b>Any Welfare</b>	71.5%	69.1%	70.0%	46.9%	35.0%	78.9%	73.0%	76.0%	51.4%	32.8%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	65.5%	59.8%	61.9%	41.8%	28.5%	74.4%	66.3%	70.5%	46.2%	25.5%
<b>Cash</b>	42.5%	38.0%	39.7%	23.0%	17.9%	41.0%	36.8%	39.0%	25.4%	18.2%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	15.4%	7.0%	10.1%	6.9%	5.6%	10.6%	5.7%	8.3%	6.1%	4.5%
SSI	13.3%	6.1%	8.7%	5.4%	5.4%	8.5%	4.6%	6.6%	4.4%	4.1%
TANF	1.6%	.6%	1.0%	1.5%	.2%	2.3%	.8%	1.5%	1.4%	.3%
<b>EITC</b>	31.7%	33.0%	32.5%	18.6%	13.8%	34.9%	33.0%	33.9%	21.5%	14.9%
<b>Food</b>	47.0%	37.8%	41.2%	30.1%	13.5%	61.3%	46.2%	54.0%	33.8%	12.9%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	33.3%	26.4%	29.0%	20.7%	6.3%	49.2%	31.9%	40.8%	23.8%	6.5%
WIC	12.1%	10.3%	11.0%	6.9%	3.7%	21.7%	16.6%	19.2%	10.2%	3.4%
SNAP	22.5%	16.4%	18.6%	12.5%	7.0%	28.8%	20.8%	24.9%	14.6%	7.3%
<b>Medicaid</b>	56.8%	50.8%	53.0%	31.0%	22.9%	65.1%	56.5%	60.9%	36.1%	20.8%
<b>Housing</b>	7.6%	4.4%	5.6%	3.1%	.9%	5.6%	3.8%	4.7%	3.0%	.8%
Weighted N	1,211,014	2,068,800	3,279,814	2,264,543	4,157,986	3,749,808	3,543,249	7,293,057	3,122,348	6,210,870
Sample Size	223	304	525	313	528	684	552	1,229	442	796

**Source:** 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
<sup>1</sup> Combines those with less than a high school education and those with only a high school education.  
<sup>2</sup> Naturalized and non-citizens.

There is no scenario in which welfare use isn't higher among the immigrant household compared to native households of the same circumstances. When we break down the welfare use of immigrants by region of origin, suddenly the high welfare usage makes a lot of sense, can you guess why?

**Table 265 : Welfare use by region of origin**

Non-Citizens					
	Europe	Asia	Western Hemisphere	Africa	Natives
<b>Any Welfare</b>	33.9%	32.0%	78.1%	41.4%	34.6%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	31.8%	24.7%	74.0%	33.3%	30.4%
<b>Cash</b>	18.7%	16.3%	38.4%	22.0%	19.5%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	3.6%	3.2%	7.9%	1.2%	7.7%
SSI	3.6%	2.3%	5.5%	1.2%	6.3%
TANF	<0.5%	<0.5%	2.2%	<0.5%	1.3%
<b>EITC</b>	18.7%	14.6%	33.1%	22.0%	13.6%
<b>Food</b>	14.1%	15.2%	61.2%	24.8%	21.0%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	4.4%	9.1%	46.7%	14.9%	10.4%
WIC	6.0%	4.5%	23.5%	11.0%	3.8%
SNAP	12.6%	9.7%	29.6%	12.4%	15.2%
<b>Medicaid</b>	24.3%	21.6%	64.4%	28.9%	23.3%
<b>Housing</b>	2.0%	1.9%	5.1%	<0.5%	4.7%
Weighted N	463,965	1,750,998	4,852,443	300,527	107,454,456
Sample Size	63	233	849	41	19,432
Naturalized Citizens					
	Europe	Asia	Western Hemisphere	Africa	Natives
<b>Any Welfare</b>	35.4%	43.4%	58.7%	65.2%	34.6%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	30.1%	38.5%	53.0%	49.1%	30.4%
<b>Cash</b>	20.8%	26.1%	31.5%	37.2%	19.5%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	11.1%	13.2%	11.0%	12.0%	7.7%
SSI	10.0%	12.3%	9.9%	9.3%	6.3%
TANF	1.1%	0.6%	0.7%	2.7%	1.3%
<b>EITC</b>	10.7%	15.1%	22.8%	29.9%	13.6%
<b>Food</b>	17.3%	19.3%	37.4%	28.9%	21.0%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	5.2%	9.1%	23.8%	13.5%	10.4%
WIC	1.1%	3.7%	8.4%	7.7%	3.8%
SNAP	13.5%	12.5%	17.4%	24.4%	15.2%
<b>Medicaid</b>	26.3%	32.6%	43.0%	40.6%	23.3%
<b>Housing</b>	7.5%	5.4%	5.6%	6.8%	4.7%
Weighted N	1,704,224	3,867,645	5,291,818	601,507	107,454,456
Sample Size	248	515	808	75	19,432
All Immigrants (Naturalized and Non-Citizen)					
	Europe	Asia	Western Hemisphere	Africa	Natives
<b>Any Welfare</b>	35.1%	39.9%	68.0%	57.3%	34.6%
<b>Any Welfare (Excluding EITC)</b>	30.4%	34.2%	63.0%	43.9%	30.4%
<b>Cash</b>	20.4%	23.0%	34.8%	32.1%	19.5%
<b>Cash (Excluding EITC)</b>	9.5%	10.1%	9.5%	8.4%	7.7%
SSI	8.7%	9.2%	7.8%	6.6%	6.3%
TANF	0.8%	0.4%	1.4%	1.8%	1.3%
<b>EITC</b>	12.4%	14.9%	27.7%	27.3%	13.6%
<b>Food</b>	16.6%	18.0%	48.8%	27.6%	21.0%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	5.0%	9.1%	34.8%	14.0%	10.4%
WIC	2.1%	3.9%	15.6%	8.8%	3.8%
SNAP	13.3%	11.6%	23.2%	20.4%	15.2%
<b>Medicaid</b>	25.9%	29.1%	53.3%	36.7%	23.3%
<b>Housing</b>	6.3%	4.3%	5.4%	4.5%	4.7%
Weighted N	2,168,189	5,618,643	10,144,261	902,034	107,454,456
Sample Size	311	744	1,651	116	19,432
<b>Source:</b> 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.					

Unsurprisingly, Africans and those from the 'Western Hemisphere' (i.e., Latin America) have the highest rates of welfare use. A more recent version of this report is also available for the year 2018, and once again, the trend of immigrant households using more welfare than native households holds, regardless of the circumstances of the immigrant households ([Camarota, 2021a](#)).

**Table 266 : Welfare use by nativity (2021)**

	Native-Headed Households	Households Headed by All Immigrants	Households Headed by All Immigrants in the U.S. for <10 years <sup>1</sup>	Households Headed by All Immigrants in the U.S. for >10 years <sup>2</sup>	Non-Citizen-Headed Households	Households Headed by Non-Citizens in U.S. <10 Years <sup>1</sup>	Households Headed by Non-Citizens in U.S. for >10 Years <sup>2</sup>	Naturalized Citizen-Headed Households
<b>Any Welfare</b>	32.2%	49.1%	43.5%	50.2%	54.6%	40.3%	61.7%	45.2%
Any Welfare (Excl. EITC)	27.9%	44.6%	40.0%	45.5%	50.8%	37.0%	57.6%	40.2%
<b>Cash</b>	17.5%	24.9%	20.2%	25.9%	26.8%	18.0%	31.2%	23.6%
Cash (Excl. EITC)	6.1%	8.2%	4.8%	8.9%	7.0%	3.8%	8.6%	9.0%
EITC	14.7%	20.5%	19.6%	20.6%	24.6%	18.2%	27.6%	17.7%
SSI	5.2%	7.0%	3.6%	7.7%	5.0%	2.3%	6.4%	8.3%
TANF	0.8%	0.9%	1.0%	0.9%	1.6%	1.1%	1.9%	0.4%
<b>Food</b>	18.6%	31.3%	26.4%	32.3%	38.5%	25.5%	45.0%	26.2%
School Lunch and/or Breakfast	9.7%	21.5%	17.9%	22.3%	29.9%	16.6%	36.4%	15.7%
WIC	2.8%	6.5%	9.5%	5.9%	10.7%	11.0%	10.5%	3.6%
SNAP	11.9%	14.5%	11.9%	15.0%	16.3%	11.2%	18.8%	13.2%
<b>Medicaid</b>	20.2%	33.1%	29.9%	33.7%	39.0%	27.0%	45.0%	28.9%
<b>Housing</b>	14.5%	11.3%	7.0%	12.9%	6.9%	5.7%	7.7%	16.6%
Weighted N	110,818,663	19,125,092	3,268,364	15,856,728	7,855,482	2,603,500	5,251,983	11,269,609
Sample Size	22,435	3,780	3,170	610	1,580	486	1,094	2,200


**Source:** 2018 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
<sup>1</sup> Arrived in 2009 or later.  
<sup>2</sup> Arrived before 2009.

Currently, the most recent version of this report is for the year 2022, and again we see that the same pattern holds ([Camarota & Zeigler, 2023a](#)):


**Table 267 : Welfare use by nativity and structure (2023)**

Programs	All Households Included				Nuclear-Family-Only Households <sup>1</sup>			No U.S.-Born Adults in Households <sup>2</sup>		
	U.S.-Born-Headed Households	Immigrant-Headed Households	Non-Citizen-Headed Households	Naturalized Citizen-Headed Households	U.S.-Born-Headed Households	Immigrant-Headed Households	Non-Citizen-Headed Households	Immigrant-Headed Households	Non-Citizen-Headed Households	Naturalized Citizen-Headed Households
<b>Any Welfare</b>	39.0%	53.5%**	58.6%**	50.2%**	35.5%	48.8%**	53.9%**	49.9%**	53.9%**	47%**
Any Welfare (excluding EITC)	35.9%	50.4%**	55.2%**	47.2%**	32.7%	45.8%**	50.3%**	47.5%**	51.4%**	44.7%**
<b>Cash</b>	16.4%	22%**	22%**	22%**	14.0%	19.2%**	18.8%**	20.8%**	19.1%**	22.2%**
Cash (excluding EITC)	6.1%	7.5%**	4.9%**	9.3%**	5.1%	6.2%**	3.4%**	7.2%	3.5%**	10.1%**
EITC	11.5%	16.3%**	18.7%**	14.7%**	9.9%	14.5%**	16.4%**	15.1%**	16.7%**	14.1%**
SSI	5.2%	6.5%**	3.9%**	8.3%**	4.3%	5.4%**	2.7%**	6.2%	2.8%**	8.9%**
Tanf	0.7%	0.3%**	0.7%	0%**	0.4%	0.2%**	0.4%	0.3%**	0.5%	0%**
<b>Food</b>	24.5%	36.3%**	42%**	32.5%**	22.1%	33.4%**	39%**	35.9%**	41.2%**	31.9%**
School Lunch/Breakfast	13.7%	24.6%**	32.3%**	19.5%**	12.5%	22.7%**	29.8%**	24%**	32.2%**	17.9%**
WIC	2.5%	6.4%**	10.4%**	3.7%**	2.1%	5.2%**	9.1%**	6.4%**	10.4%**	3.2%
SNAP	13.9%	16.3%**	17.1%**	15.7%**	12.2%	15.1%**	16.2%**	16.9%**	17.2%**	16.9%**
<b>Medicaid</b>	25.1%	37%**	42.1%**	33.6%**	21.9%	32.2%**	37.1%**	34%**	37.1%**	31.9%**
<b>Housing</b>	4.9%	5.2%	3.9%	6.0%	5.0%	5.9%	4.5%	6.9%**	4.8%	8.3%**
Avg. Number of Programs <sup>3</sup>	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2
Share Using 3 or More Programs <sup>4</sup>	29.4%	33.2%**	37.6%**	29.8%	27.7%	32.4%**	36.4%**	37%**	39.5%**	35%**
Weighted N	114,656,455	18,821,168	7,535,660	11,285,508	101,433,169	15,365,087	5,996,839	12,380,630	5,286,961	6,907,917

**Source:** 2022 Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
\* 90% significance level difference with U.S.-born.  
\*\* 95% significance level difference with U.S.-born.  
<sup>1</sup> All individuals are spouse/partner of household head or are a child of the head. Does include single-person households.  
<sup>2</sup> Adults defined as 21 and older.  
<sup>3</sup> Only for those households using at least one welfare program.  
<sup>4</sup> Immigrant rate significantly higher than U.S.-born.  
Immigrant rate significantly lower than U.S.-born.




This report is unique in that it examines impoverished households' welfare use separately. As expected, when welfare use is much higher among both natives and migrants who are 250% below poverty, immigrants' welfare use remains higher:





Another interesting aspect of this report is that it divides welfare use among natives and immigrants by the age of household heads, which is useful because the age composition of natives and immigrants differs, allowing us to investigate whether or not age differences explain the higher rate of welfare use among migrants, which does not appear to be the case.



For the most part, it appears that immigrants' welfare use is always higher than their native counterparts, with the exception of cases where the heads are under the age of 25, but the catch is that very few households are actually this young, with only about 4.5% of native households and 2.8% of immigrant households having a head under the age of 25.

And, as before, guess who uses the most welfare when broken down by race? Once again, blacks and Hispanics, completely unsurprising.

Table 268 : Welfare use by nativity and race

Welfare by the Nativity and Race of the Household Head										
	All Natives					All immigrants				
	Hispanic	White	Black	Asian	All	Hispanic	White	Black	Asian	All
Any Welfare	57.1%	33.7%	54.5%	33.8%	39.0%	68%**	36.0%	54.5%**	42.5%	53.5%**
Any Welfare (excluding EITC)	52.9%	30.6%	51.5%	30.8%	35.9%	64.7%**	33.2%	51.9%**	39.3%	50.4%**
Cash	27.3%	12.9%	28.2%	10.4%	16.4%	28.4%**	15.4%	24.8%**	15.6%	22%**
Cash (excluding EITC)	9.6%	4.4%	13.4%	3.7%	6.1%	9.2%**	5.9%	6.2%	6.5%	7.5%**
EITC	20.1%	9.4%	17.7%	7.8%	11.5%	21%**	11.5%	22.7%**	10.0%	16.3%**
SSI	8.1%	3.6%	12.0%	2.5%	5.2%	8%**	5.3%	3.5%	6.0%	6.5%**
Tanf	1.2%	.4%	1.4%	.9%	.7%	.6%	0%**	0%**	0.1%**	0.3%**
Food	41.1%	19.7%	39.4%	17.3%	24.5%	48.6%**	20.2%**	42.8%**	25.6%	36.3%**
School Lunch &/or Breakfast	25.6%	11.4%	17.9%	13.4%	13.7%	34%**	10.6%**	28.2%**	18.2%**	24.6%**
WIC	6.6%	1.6%	4.9%	1.8%	2.5%	9.2%**	1.9%	12.9%**	2.6%	6.4%**
SNAP	23.3%	9.7%	30.2%	4.0%	13.9%	22%**	11.1%**	23.7%**	8%**	16.3%**
Medicaid	39.5%	20.4%	38.9%	22.1%	25.1%	49.7%**	24.4%	36.1%**	25.8%	37%**
Housing	6.0%	3.1%	13.7%	1.5%	4.9%	6.8%**	3.2%**	6.0%	3.4%**	5.2%
Avg. Number of Programs (a)	2.3	1.8	2.5	1.6	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.5	1.8	2.1
Share Using 3 or More Programs (a)	40.8%	22.2%	45.4%	16.3%	29.4%	38.5%**	25.5%	38.2%**	22%**	33.2%**
Weighted N	11,041,481	83,693,101	15,165,803	2,275,950	114,656,454	8,238,112	3,545,970	1,829,599	4,986,886	18,821,168
	Non-citizens					Naturalized citizens				
	Hispanic	White	Black	Asian	All	Hispanic	White	Black	Asian	All
Any Welfare	74.8%**	32.5%	51.3%**	33.2%**	58.6%**	60.2%**	37.0%	55.7%**	47.6%**	50.2%**
Any Welfare (excluding EITC)	71.4%**	29.5%	47.4%**	30.5%**	55.2%**	57.2%**	34.2%	53.6%**	44.1%**	47.2%**
Cash	30%**	8%**	23.3%	8.4%**	22%**	26.5%**	17.6%	25.3%**	19.5%	22%**
Cash (excluding EITC)	6.6%	0.6%**	4.8%	2.8%**	4.9%**	12.2%**	7.4%	6.7%	8.5%	9.3%**
EITC	25.7%**	7.4%	21.1%**	6%**	18.7%**	15.7%**	12.7%	23.3%**	12.2%	14.7%**
SSI	5.2%	0.6%**	2.5%	2.5%**	3.9%**	11.2%**	6.7%	3.9%	8%**	8.3%**
Tanf	1.1%	0%**	0%**	.4%	0.7%	0.1%**	0%**	0%**	0%**	0%**
Food	57%**	15%**	42.5%**	17.4%**	42%**	39%**	21.8%	42.9%**	30.2%**	32.5%**
School Lunch &/or Breakfast	44.6%**	10.3%	30.3%**	12.5%	32.3%**	21.9%**	10.6%**	27.4%**	21.3%**	19.5%**
WIC	14.4%**	3.9%	15.8%**	2.1%	10.4%**	3.4%	1.4%**	11.9%**	2.9%	3.7%**
SNAP	23.6%**	4.6%**	25.4%**	4.8%**	17.1%**	20.2%**	13.0%	23.1%**	9.7%**	15.7%**
Medicaid	56.1%**	21.4%	33.9%	20.1%**	42.1%**	42.4%**	25.2%	36.9%**	28.9%	33.6%**
Housing	4.6%	1.5%**	8.2%	2%**	3.9%	9.4%**	3.7%	5.2%	4.2%	6.0%
Avg. Number of Programs (a)	2.4	1.5	2.7	1.5	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.4	1.8	2.0
Share Using 3 or More Programs (a)	42.5%**	10.3%**	51.6%**	16.4%**	37.6%**	32.8%	29.4%	33.6%	24.1%	29.8%
Weighted N	4,389,383	798,583	499,771	1,774,657	7,535,660	3,848,729	2,747,386	1,329,828	3,212,229	11,285,508

Source: 2022 Survey of Income and Program Participation.

Figures for white, Black, and Asian are only for single race, excluding Hispanics. Hispanics are a discrete category and can be of any race.

Immigrants by race are compared to all U.S.-born.

\* 90% significance level difference with U.S.-born.

\*\* 95% significance level difference with U.S.-born.

(a) Only for those households using at least one welfare program.

Immigrant rate significantly higher than U.S.-born.

Immigrant rate significantly lower than U.S.-born.

All of these estimates were based on data from the Survey for Income Participation Program (SIPP). This is important because different surveys will yield different results. The Cato Institute, for example, used the Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplements (ASEC) in its [2013 report](#), claiming that immigrant welfare recipients consume fewer welfare dollars than native welfare recipients. However, [Richine \(2016b\)](#) explains that the ASEC suffers from recall bias as a result of its design:

*The ASEC is a simple cross-sectional dataset widely used in labor market research. However, the ASEC substantially undercounts welfare participation, in part because it*

asks respondents to recall their welfare use over a period between three and 15 months before the interview takes place. To address the undercount problem, CIS used a more complex dataset called the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). As the name implies, the Census Bureau specifically designed the SIPP to measure participation in government programs. In addition, the SIPP is a "longitudinal" dataset, meaning it follows the same respondents over time, asking them about their monthly program participation in three different interview "waves" throughout the year. The result is a much more complete picture of welfare participation compared to what the ASEC provides.

Furthermore, because this Cato report only examined low-income individuals, it does not account for welfare use among all immigrants and natives. As a result, the Center for Immigration Studies' estimates of welfare use are much more reliable. The following is a comparison of the estimates derived from using the SIPP versus the ASEC in 2012.

**Table 269 : Welfare participation rates in the SIPP and the ASEC**

Program	Native Households			Immigrant Households		
	SIPP	ASEC	Ratio	SIPP	ASEC	Ratio
Any Welfare	30.2%	24.0%	1.26	51.3%	38.5%	1.33
Cash	9.5%	5.3%	1.80	11.9%	6.3%	1.88
SSI	7.1%	4.2%	1.69	9.0%	4.5%	1.99
TANF	1.7%	1.3%	1.33	2.1%	2.0%	1.05
Food	21.8%	14.7%	1.49	40.3%	25.6%	1.58
School Lunch	12.4%	6.8%	1.82	30.0%	17.3%	1.73
WIC	4.2%	2.5%	1.67	10.9%	5.9%	1.84
SNAP	15.6%	10.7%	1.46	20.8%	13.5%	1.54
Medicaid	22.8%	17.9%	1.27	41.6%	29.9%	1.39
Housing	5.9%	4.3%	1.38	6.0%	5.2%	1.15
Public	5.0%	3.0%	1.67	5.0%	3.5%	1.43
Subsidized	1.7%	1.3%	1.27	1.6%	1.6%	0.98

**Source:** Camarota, "Welfare Use by Immigrant and Native Households", Table A1. The ASEC is the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey. The SIPP is the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Ratio is the SIPP participation rate divided by the ASEC participation rate. In this table, the Cash category includes several miscellaneous programs such as state general assistance and veterans' compensation. In the rest of this paper, Cash refers exclusively to SSI and TANF. See the Appendix for more details.



Now, this may raise the question of how much immigrants contribute to the economy. Okay, they may use a lot more welfare than natives, but surely this would not be a problem if they compensated for it, right? So, do they? The answer appears to be "no." [Camarota \(2004\)](#) discovered that if illegal immigrants were legalized and began to pay taxes and use services like legal immigrants with the same education levels, the annual net fiscal deficit would rise to \$29 billion, or \$7,700 per household at the federal level. Aside from that report, [Camarota \(2013b\)](#) analyzed the fiscal and economic impact of immigration, and the results are extremely negative, as you can see below:

### ***Impact on Aggregate Size of Economy***

- *George Borjas, the nation's leading immigration economist estimates that the presence of immigrant workers (legal and illegal) in the labor market makes the U.S. economy (GDP) an estimated 11 percent larger (\$1.6 trillion) each year.,*
- *But Borjas cautions, "This contribution to the aggregate economy, however, does not measure the net benefit to the native-born population." This is because 97.8 percent of the increase in GDP goes to the immigrants themselves in the form of wages and benefits.,*

### ***Impact on Wages and Employment***

- *Using the standard textbook model of the economy, Borjas further estimates that the net gain to natives equals just 0.2 percent of the total GDP in the United States — from both legal and illegal immigration. This benefit is referred to as the immigrant surplus.,*
- *To generate the surplus of \$35 billion, immigration reduces the wages of natives in competition with immigrants by an estimated \$402 billion a year, while increasing profits or the incomes of users of immigrants by an estimated \$437 billion.,*

- *The standard model predicts that the redistribution will be much larger than the tiny economic gain. The native-born workers who lose the most from immigration are those without a high school education, who are a significant share of the working poor.,*
- *The findings from empirical research that tries to examine what actually happens in response to immigration aligns well with economy theory. By increasing the supply of workers, immigration does reduce the wages for those natives in competition with immigrants.,*
- *Economists have focused more on the wage impact of immigration. However, some studies have tried to examine the impact of immigration on the employment of natives. Those that find a negative impact generally find that it reduces employment for the young, the less-educated, and minorities.*

### ***Immigrant Gains, Native Losses***

- *Recent trends in the labor market show that, although natives account for the majority of population growth, most of the net gain in employment has gone to immigrants.,*
- *In the first quarter of 2013, the number of working-age natives (16 to 65) working was 1.3 million fewer than in the first quarter of 2000, while the number of immigrants working was 5.3 million greater over the same period. Thus, all of the employment growth over the last 13 years went to immigrants even though the native-born accounted for two-thirds of the growth in the working age population.,*
- *The last 13 years have seen very weak employment growth, whether measured by the establishment survey or the household survey. Over the same time period 16 million new immigrants arrived from abroad.<sup>6</sup> One can debate the extent to which immigrants displace natives, but the last 13 years make clear that large-scale immigration does not necessarily result in large-scale job growth.*

As with welfare use, different approaches will yield different outcomes. Again using the Cato Institute as an example, their approach is blatantly deceptive. For example, [Cato's 2023 report](#) on the fiscal impact of immigrants in the United States counts immigrant children as natives and analyzes immigrants as individuals rather than households. This is problematic because children will undoubtedly be a financial burden at first and won't be able to contribute to the economy until they are adults, which will be several years later. Additionally, they are a cost that only arrived because their parents were initially granted entry into the nation. Furthermore, there are, at least in theory, restrictions on new arrivals' access to welfare programs, but these restrictions do not apply to their legally native children. Therefore, if immigrants were gaining access to welfare programs through their children, Cato's analysis would count this codependency as a cost to natives, and it is easy to see why this is dishonest. Naturally, Cato has reasons for this, but they aren't very strong, especially considering that those who truly comprehend this are more concerned with race than legal status, legal status isn't some magic wand that instantly transforms poor, stupid people from failed states into elite human capital.

However, the issue with all of these reports to date is the inclusion of certain services in the fiscal impact calculation. Theoretically, fiscal impact is as easy as subtracting taxes from the services rendered, but what exactly are services? Is welfare based solely on means? Any government initiative that causes wealth to be redistributed? Perhaps a third approach that better captures the reality is to define "services" as anything the government offers that has a fee associated with it, rather than just formal initiatives meant to redistribute wealth. In the real world, a person's expenses aren't solely determined by their welfare utilization; for example, if a criminal is incarcerated, prison maintenance is an expense they have incurred. The same would apply to public transportation, law enforcement, and courts. Additionally, since race is probably going to have a much bigger impact than legal status, we might want to look at the fiscal impact by race instead. By incorporating government services in addition to welfare programs, [Faulk \(2020\)](#) examined the fiscal impact by race in 2018 and discovered that, overall, Blacks and

Hispanics are responsible for the US budget deficit. The outcome is in the billions of dollars:

**Table 270 : Fiscal impact by race**

Race / Ethnicity	Government Usage	Tax Revenue	Net Effect
Whites	4,417.4	4,729.7	+312.3
Blacks	1,158.3	497.6	-660.7
Hispanics	1,185.8	851.8	-334.0
Asians	343.33	636.3	+292.97

Here, it is very evident that while whites and Asians are a net positive, Blacks and Hispanics are a huge net negative. When people worry about immigrants, they typically think of Latin Americans rather than Norwegians or Japanese, and for that reason, they have nothing wrong with their worries. Ryan's analysis reveals something very telling: they would still have a small budget surplus even if all military spending expenses were attributed to white people.

**Table 271 : Fiscal impact of Whites including all military expenses**

Race	Government Usage	Tax Revenue	Net Effect
Whites	4,673.3	4,729.7	+56.4

The American economy would most likely be stronger today and the debt would be much easier to manage if the 1965 Hart-Celler Act had never been passed and we had not welcomed the invasion of the third world.


In a 2016 report (revised in 2017), the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine came to the conclusion that "immigration has an overall positive impact on long-run economic growth in the U.S." However, as CIS (2016) demonstrates, their own findings call for a far more cautious and nuanced conclusion. First of all, immigrants have a negative fiscal impact in each of their eight scenarios, with the drain reaching \$299 billion. This report also identifies second- and third-generation immigrants as net fiscal deficits. Immigrants continue to be a net burden while natives are not, even when considering it at the state and local levels where the budget is more balanced. If we average out the estimated lifetime fiscal impact of immigrants based on their educational attainment and apply it to the educational level of illegal immigrants, we would find that each illegal would cost \$65,292 (not including expenses for their children, mind you). A total lifetime fiscal drain of \$746.3 billion results from assuming that there were 11.43 million illegal immigrants in the country in 2017, the government's estimate at the time. Comparatively speaking, deportations would cost roughly \$124.1 billion in total ([Camarota, 2017a](#)). This report's estimate that the actual benefit of immigration to the native-born population could be \$54.2 billion annually is one of its most notable features. But hold on, what does "benefit" mean in this context? CIS performed some quick calculations in the following manner:


*The report states that the economy (GDP) is \$17.5 trillion and 65 percent is labor. Immigrants are 16.5 percent of labor so natives are 83.5 percent of labor (p. 128). This means that the total labor income of natives is \$9.498 trillion (\$17.5 trillion times 65 percent times 83.5 percent). A 5.2 percent reduction in native wages equals \$493.9 billion and the benefit to employers is 548.1, for a surplus of \$54.2 billion.*

Stated differently, the "benefit" to natives would be \$439.4 billion a year in lower wages for native workers who compete with immigrants, but businesses would benefit \$548.1 billion, giving natives a net "benefit" of \$54.2 billion. However, whether or not the majority of people would genuinely view this as advantageous may be a slightly different matter. Interestingly enough, this report also projects the fiscal impact of immigrants over the next 75 years using eight different scenarios. Four of these return negative results, while the other four do not.


They make assumptions about the future that cannot be safely argued to be true, such as that future immigrants will be more skilled than current ones or that federal spending will be restrained. This is the problem with their scenarios where the fiscal impact of immigrants is projected to be positive in the future.

Regarding the possibility of limiting federal spending, the issue is that the more immigrants we bring in, the less likely it is that welfare spending will be cut because non-white people are more likely than white people to support wealth redistribution and larger government. Their presence in the country and their voting behavior will make it harder to solve the budget deficit over time ([Cox et al., 2013](#); [Faulk, 2016a](#)).






The issue with future immigrants' skill is that they are arriving at older ages. Between 2000 and 2019, the number of immigrants 65 and older grew by 126%, which is significantly greater than the 42% increase in the number of working-age immigrants between the ages of 18 and 64. The proportion of green card holders who are 50 years of age or older has grown over time ([Camarota & Zeigler, 2021a](#)):



Additionally, the proportion of immigrants in the American population aged 50 and 60 has grown over time:



In other words, we should anticipate that future immigrants to the United States will be less productive than current ones. Based on the evidence currently available to us regarding the anticipated trends for the future, we have no reason to believe that immigrants will become a net fiscal surplus in the future, and we most definitely have no reason to believe that they would become more advantageous to the economy than natives would.



#### 4.4 — Wages and worker displacement

One of the most frequently debated impacts of immigration is on wages. Well, a [1998 report](#) from the Center for Immigration Studies includes several findings on this, which are listed below:

- *Looking at all natives in the work force, the results indicate that a one percent increase in the immigrant composition of an individual's occupation reduces the weekly wages of natives in the same occupation by about .5 percent. Since roughly 10 percent of the labor force is composed of immigrants, these findings suggest that immigration may reduce the wages of the average native-born worker by perhaps 5 percent.,*
- *In low-skilled occupations the effects of immigration are much stronger. For the 23 percent of natives employed in these occupations (about 25 million workers), a one percent increase in the immigrant composition of their occupation reduces wages by .8 percent. Since these occupations are 15 percent immigrant, this suggests that immigration may reduce the wages of the average native in a low-skilled occupation by perhaps 12 percent, or \$1,915 a year.,*
- *The effect of immigration on the wages of natives is national in scope, and is not simply confined to cities or states with large concentrations of immigrants.,*
- *The findings indicate that immigration is likely to have contributed significantly to the decline in wages for workers with only a high school degree or less in the last two decades.,*
- *The presence of immigrants does not appear to have a discernible negative effect on the wages of natives employed in high-skilled occupations and may even increase wages in these occupations.,*
- *Native-born blacks and Hispanics are 67 percent and 37 percent, respectively, more likely to be employed in lowskilled occupation than are native-born whites.*

*Therefore, a much higher percentage of minorities are negatively affected by immigration.*

*Because native-born blacks and Hispanics in the negatively affected occupations earn on average 15 and 14 percent less than whites, the wage loss resulting from immigration is likely to represent a more significant reduction in material prosperity for these groups.,*

*Immigrants are 60 percent more likely to be employed in lowskilled occupations than native-born workers. Therefore, like native-born minorities, a larger percentage of immigrant workers are negatively affected by competition with their fellow immigrants*

It's worth noting that the pro-open borders [Cato Institute](#) frequently quotes economist Giovanni Peri, who regularly captures the effects of immigration on native wages using the "shift-share instruments" measurement technique and frequently finds that the effects are negligible or nonexistent. However, as [Jaeger et al. \(2018\)](#) noted, shift-share instruments always understate the actual impact of immigration since they capture both the impact of recent arrivals and the recovery from earlier immigration waves. Because the authors cited 12 of Peri's works as instances of earlier research that employed this faulty methodology and understated the effect of immigration on native prospects, Peri has earned a spot on the wall of shame.

Nevertheless, it is true that there is much debate regarding the effect of immigration on wages, and pro-immigration activists will probably try to point to research that indicates a positive correlation between immigration and wages. However, these research frequently rely on subpar methodology, much like Giovanni Peri's works do. One specific concern is heterogeneity, or the possibility that various native groupings may experience varied effects of immigration on their prospects. One study, for example, discovered that the only two reasons for the positive correlation between immigration and native salaries at the local level are selective native immigration and the departure of natives whose prospects were negatively impacted by

migrants. When this is taken into account, the positive correlation vanishes, and people who were initially employed in these labor markets did not see increases in their earnings ([Price et al., 2023](#)).

Additionally, the authors discovered that the natives who left experienced a continuous loss of income, indicating that the impact of migrants' wages on natives is not always temporary. In addition, [Kim and Sakamoto \(2013\)](#) have criticized the spatial method of calculating the wage gap between native-born workers and immigrants. The spatial approach is flawed because it ignores the reality that immigrants choose their new location based on local economic opportunities rather than moving to any old place in search of employment. In other words, immigrants choose nice areas rather than random ones, which is why this approach tends to find negligible negative effects of immigration on wages. This illustrates how the spatial method would result in a positive association between earnings and the number of immigrants:




FIGURE 1 Change in Log Hourly Wage by the Change in the Proportion Immigrant across States, 1994–2006 (color figure available online).

However, this positive association not only vanishes but also changes into a negative one when we apply the occupational approach:




FIGURE 2 Change in Log Hourly Wage by the Change in Proportion Immigrant across Occupations, 1994–2006 (color figure available online).

Last but not least, the occupational approach outcomes from the same article are as follows, and they are obviously detrimental, at least for low-skilled workers:

Table 272 : Effects of immigration on the wages of native workers

TABLE 3  
Effects of Immigrants on the Wages of Native Workers across Detailed (3-digit) Occupations, 1994 to 2006<sup>a</sup>

	<i>Target Populations: Whole Occupations</i>				<i>Model 11</i>	<i>Model 12</i>
	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>	<i>Model 9</i>	<i>Model 10</i>	<i>Low Skilled</i>	<i>High Skilled</i>
	<i>Coeffi. Sig.</i>	<i>Coeffi. Sig.</i>	<i>Coeffi. Sig.</i>	<i>Coeffi. Sig.</i>	<i>Coeffi. Sig.</i>	<i>Coeffi. Sig.</i>
Immigrant	-.0530*				-.0782**	.0650
Low Skill Immigrant		-.1113***		-.1108***		
High Skill Immigrant			.0648	.0633		
Labor Force Share	-.0006	-.0009	-.0003	-.0009	.0061**	-.0135***
Less Than High School	-.1985***	-.2014***	-.1946***	-.2008***	-.1789***	-.5623**
BA	.3834***	.3791***	.3810***	.3767***	.2615***	.4703***
Graduate Degree	.6321***	.6275***	.6254***	.6234***	.5133***	.6783***
Age 25–34	.2340***	.2362***	.2385***	.2386***	.2279***	.3150***
Age 35–44	.3258***	.3273***	.3268***	.3281***	.2904***	.4733***
Age 45–54	.3636***	.3638***	.3653***	.3646***	.3347***	.4993***
Age 55–64	.3086***	.3058***	.3100***	.3053***	.1806***	.6853***
Female	-.1750***	-.1775***	-.1746***	-.1782***	-.1978***	-.1258***
African American	-.1240***	-.1252***	-.1189***	-.1237***	-.1180***	-.1066
Married	.1207***	.1183***	.1216***	.1178***	.1595***	.0152
Metropolitan	.1503***	.1493***	.1498***	.1488***	.1469***	.1260*
Southern State	-.1098***	-.1119***	-.1103***	-.1129***	-.0739***	-.1723***
Manufacturing	.1059***	.1017***	.1064***	.1004***	.1127***	.0643
Union Member	.2784***	.2768***	.2781***	.2762***	.3090***	.1008
Part-time Worker	-.1234***	-.1203***	-.1263***	-.1203***	-.1566***	-.0739
Constant	1.5103***	1.5166***	1.5003***	1.5150***	1.4608***	1.5603***
R-squared	.5126	.5141	.5122	.5144	.5474	.5089
N	3355	3355	3355	3355	2315	1040

Note. <sup>a</sup>Coefficients for yearly dummy variables are omitted. The number of total occupations is 304; the number of low-skilled occupations is 213; the number of high-skilled occupations is 91.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$  (two-tailed test).

The Mariel Boatlift, the 1980s surge of Cuban exiles to Miami, is a case study frequently cited by pro-immigration proponents. According to economist David Card's [preliminary analysis](#), the incident had no detrimental consequences on native earnings. In contrast, [Borjas \(2017\)](#) reanalyzed the same data and discovered that native high school dropouts experienced a pay shock as a result of the migrant influx during this event, which resulted in a 10–30% decrease in their salaries. As anticipated, there was opposition to this discovery. One critique of Borjas was that the wage deflation he discovered was merely an artifact brought on by shifts in the racial composition, and that the March CPS dataset he

used accurately reflected the increasing proportion of African-Americans during this time period ([Clemens & Hunt, 2019](#)).

This has already been addressed by Borjas, who showed that the wage fall does not correspond with the shift in the March CPS's racial composition and that the wage depression impact persists even after adjusting for racial composition ([Borjas, 2019](#)). [Peri & Yassenov \(2019\)](#) offered yet another critique of Borjas, claiming that the results of the study are the consequence of measurement error due to the use of a non-Hispanic high school dropout sample that is too small and limited. Because Peri & Yassenov decided to take a broader view of non-Cubans, their analysis featured a considerably larger sample and significantly more subgroups. They used the synthetic control method as well, but it had no effect.

Although Peri & Yassenov's approach may be more precise, is it more accurate? Doubtful, as [Monras \(2021\)](#) points out that for instance instance, synthetic control was probably used inappropriately:

*As argued in Abadie (2020), synthetic control groups work best when the preshock period is long and the pool of donors is large. In this case, the options are a preperiod length that spans 1973–79, with a pool of donors of 33 metropolitan areas, and a preshock period of 1976–79, with a pool of donors of 43 metropolitan areas. Moreover, the number of observations in many of these metropolitan areas is small, and, hence, preshock variables are measured with error, which further complicates the use of synthetic control methods in this episode.*

Furthermore, the use of synthetic control in the Mariel case requires that the control cities be as similar to Miami's circumstances as possible, *ceteris paribus*, or "all else equal," as it were, with the obvious exception of immigration. However, political scientist Steve Sailer noted that this might not be the case for Miami in the 1980s because of a huge cocaine boom that occurred around the same time as the boatlift.


This boom could have created a false impression by counteracting the wage shock that immigration would have brought.

An additional question that may be worth posing is whether or not the fact that natives who suffer because of immigrants' propensity to relocate elsewhere also contributes to the analysis of the Mariel Boatlift, and the answer appears to be "yes." Monras (2021) discovered exactly this: around half of the wage recovery in Miami during the 1980s was explained by the internal mobility of natives whose prospects had been harmed by immigration (Table 5). Additionally, it is evident from this that the impact of the Miami refugees on native salaries was adverse when internal migration is taken into consideration:


**Table 273 : Causal effects of Cuban immigration on wages**

TABLE 1 ESTIMATION OF THE CAUSAL EFFECT OF CUBAN IMMIGRATION ON WAGES								
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	ln Wage	ln Wage	ln Wage	ln Wage	ln Wage	ln Wage	ln Wage	ln Wage
A. Wages of Low-Skilled Workers, March Supplement (OLS)								
Post × Miami	-.239 (.0828)	-.273 (.0891)	-.330 (.110)	-.222 (.0893)	-.0992 (.0805)	-.119 (.0902)	-.197 (.109)	-.140 (.0951)
Observations	14,105	1,755	855	2,330	14,105	1,755	855	2,330
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Comparison to	All MSAs	Card control	Borjas control	Peri-Yasenov control	All MSAs	Card control	Borjas control	Peri-Yasenov control
B. Wages of Low-Skilled Workers, ORG files								
Post × Miami	-.0915 (.0444)	-.0724 (.0484)	-.145 (.0510)	-.0991 (.0468)	-.0670 (.0422)	-.0271 (.0468)	-.0969 (.0491)	-.0646 (.0446)
Observations	19,240	2,388	1,213	3,232	19,240	2,388	1,213	3,232
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Comparison to	All MSAs	Card control	Borjas control	Peri-Yasenov control	All MSAs	Card control	Borjas control	Peri-Yasenov control

Panel A: Wages



Panel B: Internal migration





"This estimate implies that an increase in a metropolitan area—skill cell equivalent to 10% of the native workforce in that cell reduces wages by around 10% on impact," according to Monras (p. 223). This is in direct opposition to David Card's own research, which found that immigration does not significantly reduce native outflows ([Card & DiNardo, 2000](#)). Because, as Monras explains, "internal migration responses to local shocks are related to two facts," Card & DiNardo employed the "immigrants-networks instruments" measurement technique, which is known to find very small effects on native wages and employment rates. This is the reason for these discrepancies in findings. On the one hand, we demonstrate that natives can easily adapt to immigrant shocks by moving to more expensive areas. However, compared to other identification procedures, the immigrant-networks instrument tends to give weight to small metropolitan areas along the Mexican border, which results in lower internal mobility estimates (Monras, 2021, p. 208). [Anastasopoulos et al. \(2021\)](#), another study that examined the Mariel Boatlift, used a historical database of job postings called the Help-Wanted Index and discovered that the event caused a significant drop in low-skill job openings, though recovery did eventually take place after enough time had passed.

Aside from empirical evidence, we can also tell that immigration most likely lowers native wages when those who make such claims change their minds. [Camarota \(2023\)](#) provides a number of excellent examples:

Former Walmart CEO [Bill Simon](#) has complained that the company now has to pay \$14 an hour. He has also called for more immigration to reduce wages and lower inflation. There are a number of problems with the increase-immigration-to-reduce-inflation argument. But what is perhaps most striking is that advocates now openly admit that immigration reduces wages for the working class, an idea they used to dismiss.

The latest immigration advocate to call for more immigration to lower wages is George Mason professor Justin Gest. Drawing [on research](#) he did for the immigration advocacy group Fwd.us, he recently wrote in the [Wall Street Journal](#) that the country needs more

immigration to reduce wages and stem inflation in high-growth cities, particularly in sectors such as hospitality and construction. But Fwd.us explicitly states on [its website](#) that it is a “myth” that immigration “drives down wages.”

Gest and Fwd.us are not alone in having a change of heart when it comes to the impact of immigration. The National Immigration Forum, another leading advocacy group, now [argues](#) wages are too high and that we need more immigration to bring them down, contradicting its prior position that any concerns that immigration reduces wages “[are largely overblown](#).” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which used to argue that “[data do not support](#)” the idea that immigration has a sizable impact on wages, [now says](#) that doubling immigration “might be the fastest thing to do to impact inflation” by keeping wages down.


In an article for [Foreign Affairs](#), prominent economists Gordon Hanson and Matthew Slaughter called for significantly increasing immigration to “limit wage and price growth” and help “defeat inflation.” Strangely, later in the same article, they state that immigration has only “a modest effect on the wages of native-born workers.”

Davis, economist Giovanni Peri argued that more immigration would keep wages down and alleviate inflation. This is in stark contrast to his [prior position](#) that immigration’s impact on wages was “small and, on average, essentially zero.”

Apparently, what was once a negligible impact on wages is now a large and desirable one. In truth, there has always been ample evidence that immigration reduces wages. A comprehensive 2016 report by the [National Academies of Science](#) cites over a dozen studies showing a negative impact of immigration on wages for competing workers, particularly those with low levels of education. Subsequent [research](#) has come to the same conclusion. The only difference now is that inflation is a hot political topic, and immigration advocates are happy to offer their cause as a solution — even if it contradicts their prior talking points.

Regarding working visas, this discussion has a pertinent subtopic. To begin with, they are not, by any means, the bulk of new immigrants in terms of employment-based green cards. [The Department of Homeland Security's data](#) should be sufficient to put an end to this debate.

Those foreign workers with H-1B visas—what about them? Those "high-skilled" foreigners touted by pro-immigration advocates? Well, if we are really comparing apples to apples, then even among them, the compensation is lower than for native workers. It's true that H-1B workers appear to earn more than Americans when medians are compared alone.



However, H-1B workers are brought over here precisely because different firms want them, and they work in a more limited range of jobs than Americans. As a result, this comparison is not entirely accurate. Is it possible to perform better? Indeed. According to a [2018 Migration Policy Institute analysis](#), employees with H-1B dependents make, on average, \$30,000 less than employees without H-1B dependents at the top 20 businesses.

Furthermore, compared to 55% of workers who were not H-1B dependent, just 27% of H-1B dependent individuals hold at least a master's degree.

**Table 275 : Average salaries for H-1B workers by H-1B dependency**

H-1B Dependent		Not H-1B Dependent	
	Average Salary		Average Salary
Cognizant Tech Solutions US Corp.	\$85,429	Deloitte Consulting LLP	\$106,797
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd.	\$73,505	Accenture LLP	\$83,573
Infosys Limited	\$85,717	Amazon Corporate LLC	\$118,637
Wipro Ltd.	\$75,082	Microsoft Corporation	\$130,259
Tech Mahindra Americas Inc.	\$78,443	IBM India Private Ltd.	\$79,916
HCL America Inc.	\$87,978	Ernst & Young U S LLP	\$105,794
Capgemini America Inc.	\$84,667	Google Inc.	\$134,419
Syntel Consulting Inc.	\$70,258	Intel Corporation	\$104,691
Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd.	\$78,737	Apple Inc.	\$142,974
Facebook Inc.	\$144,812	Cisco Sys Inc.	\$128,389
Average salary of the above, weighted by petitions approved	\$82,788	Average salary of the above, weighted by petitions approved	\$110,511

*Note:* Averages can also vary between companies based on the cost of living in the worksite locations and needed skill levels.

*Source:* USCIS, "Approved H-1B Petitions by Employer, Fiscal Year 2017," October 25, 2017, [www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/BAHA/Approved\\_H1B\\_2017\\_Employers\\_3.2.18.pdf](https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/BAHA/Approved_H1B_2017_Employers_3.2.18.pdf).

**Table 274 : Educational levels of H-1B workers by H-1B dependency**

H-1B Dependent		Not H-1B Dependent	
	Share of H-1Bs with Master's Degree or More (%)		Share of H-1Bs with Master's Degree or More (%)
Cognizant Tech Solutions US Corp.	23	Deloitte Consulting LLP	35
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd.	20	Accenture LLP	27
Infosys Limited	24	Amazon Corporate LLC	72
Wipro Ltd.	39	Microsoft Corporation	59
Tech Mahindra Americas Inc.	36	IBM India Private Ltd.	38
HCL America Inc.	38	Ernst & Young U S LLP	65
Capgemini America Inc.	31	Google Inc.	73
Syntel Consulting Inc.	34	Intel Corporation	92
Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd.	18	Apple Inc.	67
Facebook Inc.	70	Cisco Sys Inc.	63
Average percentage, weighted for petitions approved	27	Average percentage, weighted for petitions approved	55

*Source:* USCIS, "Approved H-1B Petitions by Employer, Fiscal Year 2017."

Technically speaking, it is true that laws are in place to guarantee that businesses are paying these people the same as native-born workers. Still, "a giant loophole makes companies paying \$60,000 and above per employee, or hiring employees with master's degrees, exempt from this rule," as [D'Souza \(2020\)](#) clarified. Additionally, she cited [a 2015 Economic Policy Institute research](#) that found that "hiring Indians instead of Americans allowed companies to save more than \$20,000 a year per worker."

In addition to that article and the studies it references, a [more recent 2021 report](#) from the Economic Policy Institute found that H-1B dependent workers at large corporations like Google, FedEx, Disney, and others had received at least \$95 million in underpayment. A study by [Doran et al. \(2022\)](#) provides additional evidence against the overhype of H-1B dependent workers. The study took advantage of the lottery system for H-1B visas after the number of applicants exceeded the cap and discovered that companies that won the lottery for H-1B visas not only did not see an increase in employment compared to the firms that did not win, but that there was actually a crowd-out effect of 1.5 workers for every H-1B visa. Additionally, the academics discovered no statistically significant correlation between corporate innovation and lottery winnings. The question of employment itself is another. Despite what many people believe, it is never written that a company must try to acquire native workers before submitting a visa application. All that is required is the completion and submission of a [labor condition application](#) form for evaluation. This is only relevant if a company is deemed an H-1B dependant or has a history of deliberate violations of the rules. How does this review procedure operate, then? The following is stated in [8 U.S.C. § 1182\(n\)\(1\)\(G\)](#), therefore it is brief and not very thorough:

*The Secretary of Labor shall review such an application only for completeness and obvious inaccuracies. Unless the Secretary finds that the application is incomplete or obviously inaccurate, the Secretary shall provide the certification described in section 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of this title within 7 days of the date of the filing of the application.*

Theoretically, firms are required to pay their visa workers the going rate for the occupation in the designated area (with the previously mentioned exclusions), but how can the Secretary of Labor be sure that a company submitted a truthful prevailing wage claim? The good news is that they don't! Up until a controversy occurs years later, they simply hope the company is being honest in the application and approves them. Not surprise, this doesn't turn out very well. To no one's surprise, the most frequent infraction of the H-1B visa program was failing to pay the prevailing rate, according to a [2011 report](#) from the US Government Accountability Office.

**Table 276 : Most common H-1B violations**

<b>Violation*</b>	<b>Number of cases in which violations occurred</b>	<b>Number of occurrences</b>
Failure to pay employee required wage rate	114	977
Failure to post notice of LCA filings for 10 days in two locations at each place of employment where H-1B will be employed	39	315
Failure to comply with the attestations made in the LCA	34	170
Required or accepted payment of the additional petition fee by employee	34	78
Failure to maintain documentation as required	28	180
Failure to make available for public examination any of the required records	23	290
Willfully failed to pay employee required wage rate	10	63
Misrepresented rate of pay on LCA	9	33
Misrepresented place of intended employment on LCA	6	24
Failure to provide H-1B worker copy of LCA	7	7

Source: Labor's Wage and Hour Division.

\*These categories were determined by Labor's Wage and Hour Division officials. Because categories could not be aggregated by larger topics due to potential duplication, additional violations, such as misrepresenting facts on the LCA, may occur more frequently but are not reflected in this table.

The salary distribution of accepted applications is also visible. Levels 1 and 2 were the most prevalent, with 54% and 29%, respectively.

**Table 277 : Frequency of wage levels reported****Table 5: Frequency of Wage Levels Reported on Approved LCAs, June 1, 2009–July 30, 2010**

<b>Wage level reported on LCA</b>	<b>Number of records</b>	<b>Percentage of total wage levels reported</b>
I: Entry Level (basic understanding of duties and perform routine tasks requiring limited judgment)	130,528	54%
II: Qualified (have good understanding of occupation and perform moderately complex tasks that require limited judgment)	69,806	29
III: Experienced (experienced with special skills or knowledge and sound understanding of occupation)	26,731	11
IV: Fully Competent (competent with sufficient experience and will require a high level of independent judgment)	14,617	6
<b>Total reported</b>	<b>241,682</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Labor's Employment and Training Administration.

Now, doesn't this seem a little odd? Why are firms reporting wage levels that are so skewed towards the bottom end of the wage scale when H-1B workers are supposed to be highly qualified individuals who are here to fill highly specialized roles? [The Economic Policy Institute's 2020 report](#) concludes the same:

### Most H-1B positions are certified at wage levels below the median wage

Frequency of wage levels reported on approved H-1B Labor Condition Applications (LCAs), June 1, 2009, to July 30, 2010, and fiscal years 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019

Wage level	Percentile of surveyed wages by occupation & region	Description of wage level	June 1, 2009–July 30, 2010	Fiscal 2015	Fiscal 2017	Fiscal 2018	Fiscal 2019
1	17th	Entry-level	54%	41%	32%	16%	14%
2	34th	Qualified	29%	39%	30%	47%	46%
3	50th	Experienced	11%	10%	11%	19%	19%
4	67th	Fully competent	6%	5%	6%	10%	12%
Other	N/A	Other wage surveys, including privately financed surveys	N/A	5%	21%	8%	9%

**Notes:** Table adapted from U.S. Government Accountability Office table. For full descriptions of wage levels from U.S. Department of Labor guidance, Employment and Training Administration, “[Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs](#)” (revised November 2009).

**Sources:** Authors’ analysis of U.S. Government Accountability Office, *H-1B Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of Current Program*, GAO-11-26, January 2011, “Table 5: Frequency of Wage Levels Reported on Approved LCAs, June 1, 2009–July 30, 2010,” at page 58; U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, [Labor Condition Applications](#) for fiscal years 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Disclosure Data tab)

Economic Policy Institute

Using the occupational approach, [Nickell & Saleheen \(2015\)](#) examined data from England and also discovered a net negative outcome. When [Merel and Rutledge \(2017\)](#) examined the construction industry, they discovered far more significant adverse effects.

*We find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of immigrant workers reduces annual earnings of US-born construction workers by at least 4.1%, with workers in immigrant-prone trades experiencing earnings reductions in excess of 7.2%.*



Given that 39% of construction workers are immigrants, this is extremely important ([Richwine 2025](#)). According to this data, immigration is causing construction workers to lose thousands of dollars in their annual pay.

### Most H-1B positions are certified at wage levels below the median wage

Frequency of wage levels reported on approved H-1B Labor Condition Applications (LCAs), June 1, 2009, to July 30, 2010, and fiscal years 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019

Wage level	Percentile of surveyed wages by occupation & region	Description of wage level	June 1, 2009–July 30, 2010	Fiscal 2015	Fiscal 2017	Fiscal 2018	Fiscal 2019
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<b>2</b>	34th	Qualified	29%	39%	30%	47%	46%
<b>3</b>	50th	Experienced	11%	10%	11%	19%	19%
<b>4</b>	67th	Fully competent	6%	5%	6%	10%	12%
<b>Other</b>	N/A	Other wage surveys, including privately financed surveys	N/A	5%	21%	8%	9%

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Pick your poison: either they are genuinely not that skilled, or employers simply take advantage of the system. The bulk of the top 30 H-1B firms, who together account for almost 25% of all petitions that are approved, adopt an outsourcing business model, according to the report:

## The top 30 H-1B employers account for more than one in four H-1B petitions approved by USCIS

Top 30 H-1B employers by number of approved petitions, fiscal year 2019

Rank	Employer name	Total H-1B petition approvals	Outsourcing/offshoring business model?
1	Cognizant Technology	13,466	Yes
2	Deloitte Consulting LLP	7,690	Yes
3	Tata Consultancy	7,620	Yes
4	Amazon.com Services	7,337	—
5	Google LLC	6,054	—
6	Infosys Ltd.	5,546	Yes
7	Microsoft Corp.	5,275	—
8	Capgemini America Inc.	3,695	Yes
9	Facebook Inc.	3,552	—
10	Larsen & Toubro Infotech	3,495	Yes
11	Apple Inc.	3,469	—
12	Wipro Ltd.	3,131	Yes
13	Accenture LLP	3,120	Yes
14	Intel Corp.	2,992	—
15	IBM Corp.	2,966	Yes
16	Ernst & Young US LLP	2,910	Yes
17	Tech Mahindra Americas	2,866	Yes
18	HCL America Inc.	2,431	Yes
19	Cisco Systems Inc.	2,098	—
20	Oracle America Inc.	2,005	—
21	PricewaterhouseCoopers	1,735	Yes
22	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	1,697	—
23	Qualcomm Technologies	1,620	—
24	Walmart Associates Inc.	1,518	—
25	Salesforce.com Inc.	1,310	—
26	Mphasis Corp.	1,303	Yes
27	Amazon Web Services	1,283	—
28	Syntel Inc.	1,196	Yes
29	Uber Technologies Inc.	1,160	—
30	Randstad Technologies	1,120	—
<b>Total H-1B petition approvals, top 30</b>		105,660	
<b>Total H-1B petition approvals, all employers</b>		389,323	
<b>Top 30 share of total H-1B petition approvals</b>		27%	

**Notes:** H-1B petition approvals include approved petitions for initial and continuing employment. Petitions are approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

**Source:** Authors' analysis of USCIS [H-1B Employer Data Hub](#), fiscal year 2019 data

As I mentioned before, it is not an apples-to-apples comparison to compare the median wage of H-1Bs to that of all Americans. Thankfully, this report provides us with a great deal of assistance by displaying the wage distribution of H-1B employees among H-1B businesses. It is evident from this that the wage levels of these employees tend to trend toward the bottom two:

**Table 278 : Share of H-1B workers at each wage level**

Share of H-1B certified positions at each wage level, top 30 H-1B employers, and totals for all employers, fiscal 2019

	Employer name	Wage level 1 (17th percentile)	Wage level 2 (34th percentile)	Wage level 3 (50th/median)	Wage level 4 (67th percentile)	Other wage surveys	Share at wage levels 1 & 2
1	Cognizant Technology	3%	57%	29%	10%	2%	60%
2	Deloitte Consulting LLP	34%	36%	20%	5%	5%	70%
3	Tata Consultancy	0%	91%	8%	<1%	1%	91%
4	Amazon.com Services	34%	51%	10%	1%	3%	86%
5	Google LLC	<1%	54%	30%	7%	8%	55%
6	Infosys Ltd.	<1%	78%	15%	7%	1%	78%
7	Microsoft Corp.	35%	42%	18%	3%	1%	77%
8	Capgemini America Inc.	2%	60%	31%	6%	1%	62%
9	Facebook Inc.	<1%	10%	25%	16%	49%	10%
10	Larsen & Toubro Infotech	<1%	92%	7%	<1%	1%	92%
11	Apple Inc.	2%	32%	32%	34%	<1%	34%
12	Wipro Ltd.	0%	93%	7%	<1%	<1%	93%
13	Accenture LLP	1%	58%	29%	12%	1%	59%
14	Intel Corp.	0%	33%	29%	1%	36%	33%
15	IBM Corp.	<1%	62%	26%	12%	1%	62%
16	Ernst & Young US LLP	12%	45%	31%	9%	3%	57%
17	Tech Mahindra Americas	<1%	98%	1%	<1%	1%	98%
18	HCL America Inc.	6%	43%	32%	15%	4%	49%
19	Cisco Systems Inc.	<1%	25%	21%	25%	28%	25%
20	Oracle America Inc.	<1%	12%	<1%	43%	45%	12%
21	PricewaterhouseCoopers	25%	52%	4%	18%	2%	77%
22	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	4%	30%	25%	19%	22%	34%
23	Qualcomm Technologies	4%	38%	29%	20%	9%	42%
24	Walmart Associates Inc.	15%	34%	39%	11%	1%	49%
25	Salesforce.com Inc.	2%	37%	26%	32%	2%	40%
26	Mphasis Corp.	15%	80%	2%	0%	3%	96%
27	Amazon Web Services	47%	36%	13%	1%	4%	83%
28	Syntel Inc.	9%	88%	2%	0%	1%	97%
29	Uber Technologies Inc.	<1%	53%	34%	13%	<1%	53%
30	Randstad Technologies	<1%	35%	65%	<1%	<1%	35%
<b>Totals for top 30 H-1B employers</b>		12%	48%	21%	11%	7%	60%
<b>Totals for all H-1B employers</b>		14%	46%	19%	12%	9%	60%

**Notes:** "Top 30" is defined as the 30 employers with the largest number of approved H-1B petitions, according to data from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Top 30 H-1B rankings are based on fiscal year 2019 H-1B Employer Data Hub total approvals.

**Source:** Authors' analysis of USCIS [H-1B Employer Data Hub files](#), fiscal year 2019, and U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, [Labor Condition Applications](#) for fiscal year 2019 (Disclosure Data tab)

This situation is similar to Simpson's paradox, which states that although H-1B employees typically make less than native workers within a particular employer, the overall result shows that H-1B employees make more than natives because H-1B visas are typically used by very large employers who pay better. Naturally, we may now discuss whether or not paying H-1B workers less entails paying current native workers in the same location and occupation less. It is undeniable, though, that the current visa program discourages firms from hiring Americans. It's often regarded as awful to be paid less than you would otherwise be when working, but it's also horrible to not be hired at all because someone else took your place. All of this makes it abundantly evident that companies are abusing H-1B visas to profit themselves at the expense of domestic workers, and there is no justification for acting otherwise.

Even highly qualified immigrants have the potential to pose issues for natives when it comes to the topic of immigrants in general. Because of this, attempting to recruit high-skilled immigrants by using education as a proxy may backfire and harm low-skilled natives. This is because the correlation between education and earnings is weaker for immigrants than for natives. For example, when a highly educated immigrant is chosen at random, they will typically earn less than a less educated immigrant from the same country 24.7% of the time, compared to 13.8% for natives ([Bertoli & Stillman, 2019](#)). Since college-educated immigrants are more likely to work in low-skilled professions than native-born individuals, there is no need to use the word "might" in this case because we already know that it does ([Richwine, 2018a](#)). This can be partially explained by the fact that immigrants are more likely to perform worse on tests of computer operation, literacy, and numeracy than natives with the same level of education. This suggests that the skills gap between natives and immigrants is at least partially responsible for the earnings gap between the two groups ([Richwine, 2022](#)). This is in line with the reality that recent immigrants, particularly those from Latin America, have not improved on measures of income, poverty, or welfare consumption despite faster improvements in education ([Camarota & Zeigler, 2018a](#)).

Even decades later, it's highly likely that the immigration and native wage issue will never be resolved, but at least this shows that the situation isn't as clear-cut as pro-immigration activists like to portray it, and the data isn't as in their favor.

#### **4.5 — Future generations**

The optimism expressed for immigrant children is arguably one of the more compelling justifications for more immigration. The two most prevalent variations of this argument often proceed as follows:


1. There is no need to fear because the subsequent generations of immigrants cover their parents' original expenses.
2. Immigrant children will continue to perform remarkably better and will ultimately contribute significantly to society.

For the most part, most people agree that the performance of the second and third generations of immigrants is superior than that of the first generation. This does not, however, imply that they no longer have an adverse effect on American culture; rather, it just indicates that their repercussions extend beyond the immediate and direct economic consequences. Allowing individuals who perform worse than the native population to enter has very significant repercussions, and this can be viewed in a variety of ways. For instance, because the new average on many indicators will be lower than the previous one, policy modifications made to accommodate those who are doing below average in almost everything will hurt everyone else. There are numerous diversity efforts and programs that continuously cater to Black and Hispanic people.

Leftists always complain about how this or that institution is "racist," but they never take into account the possibility that non-white people just do worse than white people on measures like crime, educational achievement, unwed births (as seen before), etc., and that these are caused, at least in part, by innate differences. Consider


this: even if we accept that first-generation Hispanics actually have a lower crime rate than native-born Hispanics, given the evidence that they "catch up" to natives, what do you think the crime rates of second and third-generation Hispanics will resemble? Indeed, they will commit crimes at a rate comparable to that of native-born Hispanics. Since Hispanics generally commit more crimes than white people, we would now have to cope with higher crime rates and the need for additional security and policing. Naturally, if that were the case, the native-born non-white population should be performing at about the same pace as whites, but they aren't, and they're doing significantly worse. As a result, foreign-born non-whites eventually catch up to their native-born non-white counterparts, not whites. In the long run, it is not possible to overlook the decline in general quality that occurs when you bring in individuals of lesser quality.

According to a [2019 study](#), non-white people routinely perform worse on the job than white people, even when their credentials claim to be similarly qualified. This implies that hiring a lot of Black and Hispanic people will eventually reduce efficiency in many fields. Whites and non-whites who are, on paper, equally qualified do not actually perform at the same level on the job because of the unequal requirements for the same qualifications that result from affirmative action and diversity programs, as Last explains. This is because the threshold for non-whites is lower. This is how the difference will appear:




He also shows that Blacks and Hispanics perform poorer than whites on work-related cognitive capacities at the same educational level, as illustrated below:


#### PROSE



#### DOCUMENT



#### QUANTITATIVE



If a cardiac surgeon was hired because they were non-white and had lower-than-normal medical school scores, how much would you trust that they wouldn't unintentionally send you to the afterlife? We can make some educated predictions



despite the lack of ideal data. For starters, in the same occupations, Black and Hispanic people routinely score lower on IQ tests than white people ([Murray, 2021](#)).

**Table 279 : Race differences in IQ within occupations**

Occupation	Mean IQ			Race Differences in SDs	
	European	African	Latin	European– African	European– Latin
Accountants	111	100	104	0.96	0.60
K–12 teachers	110	95	101	1.35	0.76
Registered nurses	109	94	105	1.49	0.42
Social workers	105	95	93	0.93	1.09
Retail sales workers	102	89	93	1.17	0.80
Childcare workers	102	83	85	1.55	1.34
Secretaries & AAs	102	90	93	0.96	0.72
Vehicle mechanics	94	83	87	0.85	0.57
Janitors & bldg. cleaners	92	79	82	1.10	0.78
Median	102	90	93	1.10	0.76
Mean	103	90	94	1.15	0.79

Table 280 : Race differences in occupations grouped by the European mean

IQ Group	Mean			Difference in Standard Deviations	
	European	African	Latin	European– African	European– Latin
90–94	93	82	85	0.98	0.67
95–100	97	85	88	1.02	0.70
100–105	103	88	93	1.15	0.77
105–109	107	95	97	1.02	0.83
110–114	113	99	104	1.21	0.73
115+	118	105	112	1.11	0.53

Additionally, data from California indicates that, in comparison to white and Asian physicians, Black and Hispanic physicians are more likely to face complaints, investigations, and disciplinary action:

Table 281 : Bad behavior among physicians by race

	California Physicians			
	European	African	Latin	Asian
Physicians with Complaints	28.0%	43.0%	36.5%	24.7%
Physicians with Investigations	6.7%	11.7%	9.7%	5.3%
Physicians Disciplined	1.0%	1.5%	1.9%	0.8%

Since a large percentage of non-white people originate from the Americas and Africa, accommodating them in the hopes that their results will someday be on par with white people just makes matters worse for everyone. This trend will only increase as more immigrants are admitted at this time. It is just idiotic to think that we can simply relocate third-worlders to first-world countries, increase their earnings, and ensure that no one suffers any negative effects. Additionally, a larger bureaucracy will be necessary to manage the increased population brought about by immigration. This means that we will have to gradually reduce the quality of government employees and staff in order to fill the new positions by hiring immigrants. The rate of this decline will vary depending on how much more diversity bullshit is implemented, but we can be pretty sure that the more immigrants we have, the more of it there will be.

## **2<sup>nd</sup> argument**

This particular iteration of the same argument is merely an assumption, and it isn't even accurate. In their 2020 study of Asian and Hispanic students in Florida, [Özek and Figlio](#) discovered that first-generation immigrants who came to the US early outperform second-generation immigrants in reading and math, and second-generation immigrants outperform third-generation immigrants. Later generations of immigrants typically perform worse on these metrics, according to [North's \(2009\)](#) comparison of first, second, and third generation Mexican immigrants on a number of outcomes.

Table 282 : Academic achievement over Mexican generations

Variable	Generation 2	Generation 3	Generation 4
<b>Years of Education</b>	13.1	13.1	12.4
<b>High School Graduate</b>	84 %	87 %	73 %
<b>College Graduate</b>	13 %	14 %	6 %

**Source:** Edward E. Telles and Vilma Ortiz, *Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2008, Table 5-2. Data are based on surveys taken in 2000 of several generations of U.S.-resident-descendants of immigrants identified in the 1965 Mexican American Study Project, conducted by UCLA.

**Note:** In this Table and in Tables 3 and 4 the second generation are the children of immigrants, the third generation are the grandchildren, and the fourth generation consists of great-grandchildren.

Table 283 : Earnings through 3 Mexican generations

Variable	Generation 2	Generation 3	Generation 4
<b>Personal Earnings</b>	\$36,343	\$37,615	\$30,559
<b>Family Income</b>	\$53,174	\$53,634	\$43,891
<b>Percent Below Poverty<sup>1</sup></b>	17%	14%	21 %
<b>Percent High Family Income<sup>2</sup></b>	47 %	47 %	36 %

**Source:** Edward E. Telles and Vilma Ortiz, *Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2008, Table 6-3. Data are based on surveys taken in 2000 of several generations of U.S.-resident-descendants of immigrants identified in the 1965 Mexican American Study Project, conducted by UCLA.

<sup>1</sup> Includes earnings and interest, dividends, pensions, and government assistance.

<sup>2</sup> More than \$50,000 in 2000 family income.







**Table 284 : Home ownership over three Mexican generations**

Variable	Generation 2	Generation 3	Generation 4
<b>Owns Own Home</b>	59 %	58 %	49 %
<b>Owns more than One Home</b>	14 %	12 %	10 %
<b>Net Worth*</b>	\$48,424	\$44,617	\$38,364

**Source:** Edward E. Telles and Vilma Ortiz, *Generations of Exclusion: Mexican Americans, Assimilation, and Race*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2008, Table 6-7. Data are based on surveys taken in 2000 of several generations of U.S.-resident-descendants of immigrants identified in the 1965 Mexican American Study Project, conducted by UCLA.

\* According to the cited table, net worth is based on equity in home(s) and financial assets minus debts.

According to [Camarota \(2022\)](#), there is no indication that immigrants' socioeconomic status has significantly improved with each new generation, and the socioeconomic status of second- and third-generation immigrants is fairly similar (second-generation immigrants perform slightly better on some measures while third-generation immigrants perform better on other measures, though the differences are slight).

**Table 285 : Socio-economic status by generation****Socio-Economic Status of the U.S.-Born, Ages 25 to 29, by Generation in 2021****Figure 1. Poverty, Near Poverty, and Medicaid Use****Figure 2. Share with a Bachelor's Degree and Labor Force Participation****Figure 3. Mean Income from All Sources by Generation****Figure 4. Poverty, Near Poverty, and Medicaid Use****Figure 5. Share with a Bachelor's Degree and Labor Force Participation****Figure 6. Mean Income from All Sources by Generation**

Source: 2021 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey. The second generation are those with at least one immigrant parent; the third generation are those with two U.S.-born parents. Whites are non-Hispanic and of a single race. Hispanics can be of any race and are excluded from the white category. In or near poverty is less than 200 percent of the poverty threshold. Labor Force participation measures the share of the age group working or looking for work.

First-generation immigrants frequently do not reach their full potential when they first arrive in the United States because they were raised in less favorable circumstances and usually arrive at working age. Since the resources needed to reach their full potential are available to second and third generation immigrants, it makes sense that after the second generation, progress stalls because immigrants' full potential has already been reached. Additionally, since the two generations do not initially have equal access to the same opportunities, it is false to believe that second-generation immigrants are "better" than first-generation immigrants. However, if we only consider the result and not the circumstances, then it is true that second-generation immigrants do perform better than their first-generation counterparts. The question is, however, whether we can anticipate this trend to hold true for each subsequent generation. It doesn't appear to be. According to a 2013 report by the [Pew Research Center](#) on the characteristics of immigrants by generation, second-generation immigrants perform better than their parents, and then things appear to level off in the third generation:



**Table 286 : Characteristics of immigrants by generation****Characteristics of Adults by Immigrant Generation, 2012***% (unless otherwise noted)*

	<b>Generation</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>1st</b>	<b>2nd</b>	<b>3rd+</b>	
<b>Population (<i>in millions</i>)</b>	37.4	19.7	177.7	234.7
<b>Share of population</b>	16	8	76	100
<b>White share of generation</b>	20	46	78	66
<b>Black share of generation</b>	8	4	13	11
<b>Hispanic share of generation</b>	47	35	6	15
<b>Asian share of generation</b>	25	12	<0.5	5
<b>Median age (<i>in years</i>)</b>	43	38	47	46
<b>Married</b>	63	42	53	54
<b>Fertility (<i>women ages 15-44</i>)</b>				
Had a birth in the past 12 months	9	6	6	7
Of these, % unmarried	23	41	40	36
<b>Educational attainment (<i>ages 25+</i>)</b>				
Less than high school	28	10	9	12
Bachelor's degree or more	29	36	31	31
<b>Median household income (\$)</b>	45,800	58,100	60,600	58,200
<b>Average household size (<i>persons</i>)</b>	3.1	2.4	2.4	2.5
<b>Homeownership (<i>householders</i>)</b>	51	64	68	65
<b>Persons in poverty</b>	18	11	12	13

Notes: Asians include Hispanics; all other races include non-Hispanics only. Unmarried women include those who are divorced, separated, widowed or never married. Annual income figure is adjusted and standardized to a household size of three; see Methodology. Population does not add to total due to rounding.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Current Population surveys, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) files; fertility data from 2004-2010 CPS and all other data from 2012 CPS

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This isn't always the case, though. For instance, third-generation Asian immigrants' incomes and homeownership rates do increase significantly:

**Table 287 : Characteristics of Asian Americans by generation**

### Characteristics of Asian-American Adults by Immigrant Generation, 2012

% (unless otherwise noted)

	Generation			Total
	1st	2nd	3rd+	
<b>Population (in millions)</b>	9.2	2.4	0.9	12.4
<b>Share of population</b>	74	19	7	100
<b>Median age (in years)</b>	44	30	43	42
<b>Married</b>	72	37	56	64
<b>Fertility (women ages 15-44)</b>				
Had a birth in the past 12 months	8	4	5	7
Of these, share unmarried	10	***	***	16
<b>Educational attainment (ages 25+)</b>				
Less than high school	12	7	5	11
Bachelor's degree or more	50	55	53	51
<b>Median household income (\$)</b>	65,200	67,500	91,600	67,400
<b>Average household size (persons)</b>	3.1	2.6	2.7	2.9
<b>Homeownership (householders)</b>	58	51	65	57
<b>Persons in poverty</b>	12	12	8	12

Notes: Includes only single-race Asians, including Hispanics. The symbol \*\*\* indicates insufficient number of observations to provide a reliable estimate. Unmarried women include those who are divorced, separated, widowed or never married. Annual income figure is adjusted and standardized to a household size of three; see Methodology.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Current Population surveys, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) files; fertility data from 2004-2010 CPS and all other data from 2012 CPS

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This isn't the case for Hispanics, though, as third-generation immigrants actually perform worse than second-generation immigrants on metrics like poverty, median household income, and educational attainment:

Table 288 : Characteristics of Hispanics by generation

### Characteristics of Hispanic Adults by Immigrant Generation, 2012

% (unless otherwise noted)

	Generation			Total
	1st	2nd	3rd+	
<b>Population (in millions)</b>	17.5	7.0	10.2	34.7
<b>Share of population</b>	51	20	29	100
<b>Median age (in years)</b>	41	28	39	38
<b>Married</b>	60	34	41	49
<b>Fertility (women ages 15-44)</b>				
Had a birth in the past 12 months	9	7	7	8
Of these, share unmarried	29	52	49	39
<b>Educational attainment (ages 25+)</b>				
Less than high school	47	17	21	35
Bachelor's degree or more	11	21	17	15
<b>Median household income (\$)</b>	34,600	48,400	43,600	39,200
<b>Average household size (persons)</b>	3.5	3.1	2.8	3.2
<b>Homeownership (householders)</b>	43	50	49	46
<b>Persons in poverty</b>	23	16	20	21

Notes: Unmarried women include those who are divorced, separated, widowed or never married. Annual income figure is adjusted and standardized to a household size of three; see Methodology.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Current Population surveys, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) files; fertility data from 2004-2010 CPS and all other data from 2012 CPS

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
This seems to indicate that different immigrant groups have varying potential and, as a result, develop to their full potential at varying times. Ethnic attrition is a potential worry in this situation. With each generation, a subset of racial minority groups loses the likelihood of identifying as their own race or ethnicity, and this selection effect may skew the findings. Although there is currently little research on this topic, [Richwine \(2018b\)](#) conducted a small study that used the cross-sectional section of the NLSY-97 to account for ethnic attrition and compared Hispanics and white Americans on educational attainment, test scores, work time, and earnings.

**Table 289 : Mexican assimilation across generations**

Table 1. Mexican-American Assimilation Across Generations as Measured by Education, Test Scores, Work, and Income							
	Row	Group	High School or More (%)	College or More (%)	AFQT (percentile)	Annual Weeks Worked	Weekly Earnings (\$)
Mexican Americans by Generation	1	Mexican 1.5 generation	61.5 (4.2) n=199	8.6 (2.0) n=199	26.8 (3.6) n=95	36.7 (1.5) n=184	572 (37.9) n=146
	2	Mexican 2nd generation	76.2 (2.7) n=415	13.5 (2.2) n=415	35.3 (2.0) n=297	39.8 (0.9) n=386	691 (28.3) n=332
	3	Mexican 3rd generation CROSS-SECTION <i>Some respondents do not self-identify as Mexican/Hispanic</i>	85.1 (3.8) n=81	23.7 (4.7) n=81	42.0 (3.5) n=73	40.1 (2.1) n=76	694 (43.8) n=68
	4	Mexican 3rd generation ETHNIC SAMPLE <i>All respondents self-identify as Mexican/Hispanic</i>	84.6 (2.8) n=147	18.4 (3.5) n=147	40.2 (2.7) n=128	41.7 (1.5) n=139	750 (44.5) n=123
Comparison Groups	5	White 4th+ generation	85.5 (0.9) n=2,705	38.0 (1.2) n=2,705	57.3 (0.9) n=2,289	40.2 (0.4) n=2,529	866 (13.6) n=2,179
	6	Black 4th+ generation	72.7 (1.6) n=1,547	18.3 (1.3) n=1,547	29.6 (1.3) n=1,224	35.1 (0.6) n=1,506	612 (17.4) n=1,179
Differences	7	Row 5 minus Row 3, with 90% confidence interval	0.3 ± 6.3	14.3 ± 7.8	15.3 ± 6.0	0.1 ± 3.4	173 ± 77
	8	Row 5 minus Row 4, with 90% confidence interval	0.9 ± 4.8	19.7 ± 6.0	17.1 ± 4.8	-1.4 ± 2.5	116 ± 78

**Source:** National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 panel.  
All respondents were born between 1980 and 1984.  
Standard errors are in parentheses, sample sizes are in the form of “n=”.  
AFQT stands for Armed Forces Qualification Test, which measures math and verbal ability.  
Weeks worked and earnings are averaged over the years 2011, 2013, and 2015; earnings are adjusted to constant 2015 dollars.

Thus, Hispanics catch up to whites in terms of finishing high school and working, but they still fall behind in all other areas. The fact that third-generation Hispanics' earnings actually decline when ethnic attrition is taken into account is especially damning. It's also critical to remember that not all groups experience ethnic attrition in the same way. While it appears to somewhat understate the socioeconomic advancement of Hispanics, the opposite is true for a group such as Nigerians, who are more likely to be poorer on measures of socioeconomic well-being if they stop identifying as such and instead choose to simply identify as Black ([Emeka, 2018](#)). The idea that immigrants are becoming better every generation and will eventually catch up to natives is obviously untrue. Let's review the 2016 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report once more to see how immigrants affect the economy:



**FIGURE 8-18** Net fiscal impact in 2012, per capita, including all levels of government, by age and immigrant generation.

SOURCE: Data are from the 2011-2013 March Current Population Surveys, normalized to program totals.

Isn't that fascinating now? The fiscal impact of second-generation immigrants is significantly greater than that of first-generation immigrants; however, the fiscal impact of third-generation immigrants appears to be in the middle, resembling a regression towards the mean. This is important because, if it were true—and it would seem plausible—that immigrant populations experience some degree of regression towards the mean, we most likely cannot expect them to be beneficial in the long run. Additionally, because different populations have different means for different traits, the amount of regression that takes place will vary and must also be taken into consideration (for instance, if both an African and a European immigrant have an IQ of 130, the regression in the African immigrant's child will be significantly larger than in the European immigrant's). The key takeaway from this is that immigrants do not get better with each new generation; this is a complete myth that needs to be put to an end.

#### 4.6 — Predicting immigration outcomes in economy

In this section we'll be reviewing several studies who have attempted to predict immigration outcome in economy based on national IQ.

Garett Jones and W. Joel Schneider's study, *[IQ in the Production Function: Evidence from Immigrant Earnings](#)*, examines the connection between the economic outcomes of immigrants in the United States and the national average IQ. The study shows empirically that, even after controlling for age and education, the national average IQ is a reliable indicator of immigrant earnings. The results imply that IQ tests measure crucial components of labor quality, which has wider ramifications for comprehending income inequality around the world. Two main datasets are used in the study. First is Hendricks's (2002) examination of the 1990 U.S. Census, which contains information on the age, income, and educational attainment of 106,263 immigrants from 76 different nations. These immigrants arrived as adults, worked full-time in the United States, and ranged in age from 20 to 69. In order to isolate "unmeasured worker skill," a factor that explains wage differences apart from formal education and experience, Hendricks corrected the

wage data for age and education. The second dataset is from Lynn and Vanhanen (2006), who used a range of IQ tests to compile national average IQ scores for 113 countries. 59 countries with national average IQs ranging from 71 to 108 were available for analysis.

The study examines the connection between immigrant wages and the national average IQ using a regression-based methodology. After adjusting for age and education, the main regression models log unmeasured worker skill (the adjusted wage measure) on the national average IQ. The semi-elasticity measures the percentage change in wages that occurs when IQ rises by one point. To make sure the results are stable, the study also performs robustness checks.

According to the study, there is a substantial and statistically significant correlation between immigrant wages and the national average IQ. According to microeconomic studies that show comparable effects within nations, a one-point increase in the national average IQ is predicted to result in a 1% increase in wages. The regression coefficient ( $\gamma$ ) is 0.95 with a standard error of 0.31, and the correlation between IQ and unmeasured worker skill is 0.47. Even after adjusting for education, this result remains consistent. When regional dummies are taken into account, the relationship is still significant and robust to outliers like high-wage South African immigrants or low-wage East Asian immigrants.

According to the development accounting exercise, variations in national average IQ account for roughly sixteen percent of the variation in log GDP per worker between nations. This suggests that a significant amount of global income inequality can be attributed to the influence of IQ on labor productivity. Assuming  $\gamma = 1$ , for example, a nation's output per worker would increase by 50% if its national average IQ moved from the 5th to the 95th percentile (a 38-point difference). Although this effect is noteworthy, it is insufficient to fully account for the magnitude of the global income disparities, which vary by a factor of thirty. The study also looks at reverse causality



and finds little proof that IQ increases are caused by economic growth. For instance, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries did not show notable IQ increases despite rising incomes, while East Asian nations with rapid economic growth had high IQ scores throughout the 20th century.

The study supports the validity of IQ tests as indicators of labor quality by showing that the national average IQ is a strong predictor of immigrant wages in the United States. According to the results, cognitive abilities are essential for economic productivity on both a personal and a societal level.

[Vinogradov 2010](#) showed that immigrants from various countries of origin differ greatly in their degree of self-employment. The aim of this study is to investigate the correlation between self-employment rates among first-generation immigrants in Norway and national intelligence in their home country. The study used empirical secondary data on self-employment among immigrants living in Norway in 2008 from 117 different countries. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the pertinent hypothesis. It was discovered that self-employment was substantially positively correlated with the immigrants' national intelligence.

[Kierkegaard \(2014d\)](#) examines the relationship between the socioeconomic outcomes of immigrant groups in Denmark and national IQ and other country-of-origin factors. The study is based on the spatial transferability hypothesis, which postulates that immigrants' economic and social integration in the host nation is influenced by the characteristics they bring from their home countries, including cognitive abilities. Along with GDP per capita, Islam rates, and average height, the study focuses on how well national IQ predicts differences in education, income, welfare dependency, and crime rates among immigrant populations.

The sample is drawn from official Danish statistics for 2012 and includes the 70 largest immigrant groups in Denmark. A wide range of cultural and economic backgrounds are represented by the immigrant groups, which come from a variety of geographical areas,

including the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Asia. National IQ estimates from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), GDP per capita from the International Monetary Fund, Islam rates from Pew Research, and average height from publicly accessible datasets are examples of country-of-origin variables. To evaluate the relationships between these predictors and immigrant outcomes, the study employs multiple regression, principle component analysis (PCA), and correlational analysis.

The data indicates a robust correlation between important socioeconomic outcomes and national IQ. greater national IQ predicts greater immigrant income levels, higher rates of advanced tertiary education, and lower rates of basic schooling. For example, a one-point increase in national IQ is associated with a rise in advanced degree holders and a decrease in the proportion of immigrants with only a basic education. Islam rates have a substantial negative link with socioeconomic success, implying that immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries have poorer outcomes in Denmark, but GDP per capita emerges as a key predictor, particularly for income levels.

Through PCA, which accounts for the shared variance across income, education, welfare use, and crime rates, the study determines a general socioeconomic factor. Islam rates, GDP, and national IQ all significantly predict this factor, with Islam being the most reliable predictor. Although its effects are entwined with economic and cultural factors from the country of origin, the findings indicate that cognitive ability, as measured by national IQ, plays a crucial role in immigrant integration.

By using partial correlations and subgroup analyses, the study also takes into account possible confounding factors like regional variations and selective migration. For example, even after adjusting for national IQ and GDP, the predictive power of Islam is still significant, indicating that Islamic-related institutional or cultural factors may have an independent impact on immigrant outcomes. On the other hand, when



adjusting for Islam, national IQ maintains its predictive validity, showing that cognitive differences are more than just markers for cultural or religious influences.

The study concludes by showing that the socioeconomic outcomes of immigrants in Denmark can be strongly predicted by national IQ, GDP, and Islam rates.

[Kierkegaard \(2014f\)](#) examines how country-of-origin characteristics, particularly national IQ, influence socioeconomic results among immigrant groups in Norway and Finland. The study is based on the spatial transferability hypothesis, which states that immigrants retain psychological and behavioral characteristics from their home countries, influencing their integration and success in host countries. The study looks at crime rates, income levels, educational attainment, and employment, and finds a high correlation between these results and national IQ, GDP, and Islam prevalence in immigrants' home countries.

The sample covers immigrant groups from Norway and Finland, with data obtained from government statistics agencies. In Norway, the study examines income after tax, unemployment rates, and higher education attainment among 23 to 120 immigrant groups, depending on the variable. Finnish data focuses on crime rates, comparing violent and property crime among different immigrant groups. Country-of-origin predictors include Lynn & Vanhanen's (2012) national IQ estimations, GDP per capita, Islam prevalence, and a general socioeconomic (S) component generated from global rankings.

The study uses correlational analysis, principal component analysis (PCA), and the correlated vectors method to investigate predictor-outcome correlations. Key findings show that national IQ is a strong predictor of immigration outcomes. Higher national IQ is associated with lower crime rates, higher income, more educational achievement, and reduced unemployment. For example, a one-point rise in national IQ is linked to lower violent crime rates and greater income levels among immigrant populations. Islam prevalence also emerges as a key predictor, with negative associations with socioeconomic

performance, notably female unemployment, which is most likely attributable to cultural and institutional problems in mostly Muslim countries.

A key finding is the identification of a common socioeconomic factor (S factor) among immigrant groups in Norway and Denmark. This latent factor, derived using PCA, reflects shared variance among crime, income, education, and employment variables. The S factor is highly predictable from country-level characteristics, with national IQ and Islam prevalence exhibiting significant connections. The study discovers that the S factor in Norway and Denmark is surprisingly consistent, with nearly complete alignment between the two countries, implying that immigrant performance is influenced by underlying characteristics transferred from their home countries.

The correlated vectors method reveals that the general S factor, not residual variance, drives the correlations between predictors and outcomes. This lends support to the spatial transferability theory, which proposes that cognitive and cultural qualities from immigrants' home countries endure and impact their integration outcomes. The study also uses several imputation approaches and robustness tests to overcome potential biases including missing data and sampling error.

To summarize, the study demonstrates that national IQ, GDP, and Islam prevalence are strong determinants of immigrant socioeconomic results in Norway and Finland.

[Kierkegaard \(2017\)](#) analyzes the predictability of employment rates among immigrant groups in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden using country-of-origin characteristics, namely national IQ and the fraction of Muslims in the origin countries. The study examines data from 2014, concentrating on first-generation immigrants aged 20 to 64 from 11 different origin countries.

Key findings indicate that employment rates are highly predictable, with an adjusted multiple  $RR$  of .93, primarily due to the origin country's characteristics ( $\eta = .89$ ). Host country ( $\eta = .20$ ) and sex ( $\eta = .25$ ) had smaller but still significant effects. National IQ of the origin countries showed strong positive correlations with employment rates across all host countries (ranging from 0.66 to 0.75), while the Muslim percentage in the origin countries exhibited strong negative correlations (ranging from -0.58 to -0.80). These results suggest that cognitive ability and cultural/religious factors in the origin countries are major determinants of immigrant employment outcomes in Scandinavia.

The study also investigates the relative importance of host country policies, concluding that, while host country effects exist, they are outweighed by origin country features. For example, Norway had somewhat higher immigrant results, which could be attributed to stronger immigrant selection or better integration measures. However, the total impact of host country variables was minor when compared to the influence of origin country features.

The study suggests that national IQ and Muslim percentage are strong indicators of employment rates among immigrant groups in Scandinavia, consistent with earlier research on immigrant outcomes.

[Kierkegaard \(2017c\)](#) examines the relationship between the net fiscal contributions of immigrant groups in Denmark and Finland and two crucial variables: average cognitive ability (national IQ) and the number of Muslims in their home countries. The study examines data from 2014, including 32 immigrant groups in Denmark and 11 in Finland.

The data show a substantial link between immigrant groups' net fiscal contributions in Denmark and Finland, with a correlation coefficient of 0.89, indicating consistent economic performance across host nations. The national IQ of the origin nations was a strong predictor, with positive correlations of 0.89 in Denmark and 0.69 in Finland. Conversely, the percentage of Muslims in the origin nations had strong negative

relationships (-0.75 in Denmark and -0.73 in Finland), showing that larger Muslim populations were associated with lower fiscal contributions.

The study also introduces the concept of the S factor, a generic socioeconomic performance statistic derived from component analysis. The S factor scores for Denmark were virtually perfectly correlated with fiscal contributions ( $r = 0.86$ ), supporting the notion that socioeconomic outcomes for immigrant groups are inextricably linked to origin-country characteristics. The monetary impact of these predictors was also calculated: a 1-point rise in national IQ was connected with an average increase of 694 euros per person per year, but a 1% increase in Muslim population was associated with a deficit of 137 euros per person per year.

The study shows that cognitive capacity and cultural-religious characteristics in the home country are strong determinants of immigrant economic performance.

### ***Conclusion***

Emil O. W. Kirkegaard's research, which includes studies on employment rates in Scandinavia and net fiscal contributions in Denmark and Finland, repeatedly shows that national IQ is one of the most reliable predictors of immigrant economic performance. These findings demonstrate a clear pattern: immigrants from countries with higher average cognitive capacity integrate substantially better into the labor market, have higher employment rates, and make greater fiscal contributions to their host countries.

In Scandinavia, first-generation immigrants' employment rates were substantially connected with the national IQ of their home countries, with correlations ranging from 0.66 to 0.75 in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. This shows that cognitive capacity is an important predictor of economic success, independent of host-country policy or integration attempts. Similarly, analyses of net fiscal contributions in Denmark and Finland revealed nearly identical patterns, with national IQ predicting fiscal impact ( $r$

= 0.89 in Denmark, 0.69 in Finland). Immigrants from higher-IQ nations contributed more to state budgets, whilst those from lower-IQ nations frequently imposed net expenses.

The studies also emphasize the importance of cultural and religious elements, specifically the number of Muslims in their home countries, which consistently associated negatively with economic performance ( $r = -0.80$  in Denmark). However, national IQ continued to have the most predictive power, emphasizing its importance in predicting immigrant performance. The development of the S factor, a composite measure of socioeconomic success, reinforced these trends by demonstrating that broader immigrant results (education, income, crime) are also linked to cognitive capacity in the origin nation.

These findings challenge traditional narratives that blame immigrant income gaps primarily on host-country prejudice or policy failings. Instead, they argue that intrinsic group inequalities in cognitive capacity, as measured by national IQ, play a significant and measurable effect in determining economic results.

#### **4.7 — Housing prices and rents**

[Saiz \(2001\)](#) analyzes the impact of immigration on housing markets, with a special focus on rental costs in major urban regions in the United States. The study uses the exogenous shock of the 1980 Mariel boatlift, a sudden inflow of Cuban immigrants into Miami, to isolate the causal effects of immigration on housing costs. The study found that immigration significantly boosts rental prices, especially for lower-quality homes.

The study primarily relies on data from the National and SMSA Annual Housing Survey (AHS) for the years 1974-1983, which gives precise information on rental units in U.S. metropolitan areas. The Miami SMSA sample is especially useful for this research since it includes observations before and after the Mariel boatlift. The study also uses data from the United States Census Bureau, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and other sources to examine population trends, income levels, and housing supply. To account for regional trends and isolate Miami-specific impacts, the

comparison groups include other Florida metropolitan regions, Sunbelt cities (e.g., Atlanta, Phoenix), and the larger U.S. metropolitan sample.

The study uses a differences-in-differences (DID) approach to examine changes in rental costs in Miami before and after the Mariel boatlift to those in other cities during the same time period. This quasi-experimental strategy addresses endogeneity problems by leveraging the exogenous nature of the immigration shock. The analysis employs fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved unit-level factors, as well as sample selection corrections to account for potential biases caused by non-random attrition in the housing sample. Furthermore, the study investigates pricing heterogeneity across different segments of the housing market, such as low-quality versus high-quality units and areas with diverse ethnic makeup.

Several major findings emerge from the data. First, between 1979 and 1981, the Mariel boatlift resulted in an 8-11% increase in Miami rental prices when compared to other cities. By 1983, the differential growth had maintained at 7%, indicating a steady although somewhat diminishing effect. This rent increase was focused in lower-quality rental units, which were more likely to be sought after by immigrants, while higher-quality flats had no substantial price adjustments. This lends weight to the concept of a segmented housing market, with immigration predominantly affecting the lower end of the rental spectrum.

Second, the study discovered that rental prices climbed disproportionately in low-income, Spanish-speaking districts, with a 6% rise above other low-income areas. This shows that immigrants clustered in specific neighborhoods, increasing demand and costs. The short-term adjustment in the housing market was driven mostly by higher residential density, more inhabitants per unit, rather than new development, as the supply of rental units remained inelastic. By 1983, vacancy rates had increased, indicating some market adjustment; nevertheless, new housing permits remained below pre-boatlift levels, indicating slow supply adjustments.

Third, the study shows that Miami's demographics changed significantly as a result of the immigration shock. Native-born, non-Hispanic residents, particularly older and higher-income individuals, began to leave the city, resulting in a gradual alleviation of rent pressures in the medium term. However, this out-migration reflected broader societal dynamics, including perceived unfavorable aspects of the immigrant surge, such as changes in neighborhood mix and cultural tensions.

Fourth, the analysis identifies a paradox in long-term housing market trends. While short-term rents rose, Miami's home costs gradually fell in comparison to other cities. This is explained by projections of lower future demand due to native out-migration and slower income growth. Furthermore, intra-city rent patterns evolved, with initial immigrant-heavy regions seeing slower rent rise as immigrants moved to cheaper locations.

The study proposes a theoretical model of segmented housing markets in which unskilled immigrants compete with low-income natives for lower-quality rental apartments. The model predicts that immigration shocks have a disproportionate impact on rents for lower-quality housing due to inelastic short-term supply and concentrated demand in specific market sectors. In the long run, native out-migration and filtering, the availability of higher-quality units to lower-income groups, can reduce pricing effects, but this is dependent on immigrant populations' perceived amenity value.

In conclusion, the analysis shows that immigration has a considerable short-term impact on rental prices, particularly in lower-quality housing categories, due to inelastic supply and concentrated demand. These findings highlight the distributive effects of immigration, since rising rents diminish the real consumption incomes of low-income locals.

[Saiz \(2006\)](#) explores the economic impact of immigration on housing costs in major U.S. metropolitan areas. The primary focus is on how immigration inflows affect housing rents and prices, with empirical evidence indicating that immigration dramatically raises housing costs in destination cities.

The study is prompted by the observation that immigrants tend to congregate in select metropolitan regions, such as New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco, raising concerns about the local economic effects of this concentration. While earlier research have largely investigated the labor market consequences of immigration, with minor pay impacts, this study focuses on the housing market. According to Saiz, immigration boosts demand for housing, resulting in increased rents and housing prices, which is substantially larger than the labor market effects found in previous work.

The study uses several datasets to calculate immigration and housing costs. For immigration, it relies on two key sources: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data on legal permanent residents (1983-1997) and decennial Census data on the foreign-born population (1970-2000). The INS data show specific annual inflows of immigrants by metropolitan region, but the Census data provide a more comprehensive count of all foreign-born residents, including unauthorized immigrants. The study uses multiple indicators to calculate housing expenses, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Fair Market Rent series, the American Housing Survey (AHS), Census median rents and property values, and the Freddie Mac Repeat Sales Price Index. These varied sources enable cross-validation of the results.

To account for potential endogeneity, such as immigrants being drawn to locations with rising rents or other unobserved factors, the study applies instrumental variables (IV) methodologies. One IV approach employs a "shift-share" method, which forecasts immigration inflows based on the national level of immigration and immigrants' previous settling patterns in 1983. Another IV technique uses characteristics of immigrants' home countries, such as income, population, currency rates, and political instability, to forecast immigration flows by nationality and year. These instruments



aid in isolating exogenous variation in immigration, which strengthens the causal interpretation of the findings.

The study also used fixed-effects regressions to account for time-invariant city-specific characteristics, thereby harnessing within-city variance in immigration over time. This strategy also alleviates concerns about omitted factors biasing the results. Furthermore, the study evaluates the influence of housing quality using microdata from the AHS, guaranteeing that the observed rent increases are not just due to improvements in housing quality in immigrant-receiving cities.

The findings consistently demonstrate a positive and statistically significant association between immigration and housing expenses. According to the study, an immigrant intake of 1% of a city's population results in a 1% increase in average rentals and a somewhat bigger increase in home values. These findings are consistent across diverse datasets, time periods, and analytical methods, such as OLS, IV, and fixed-effects models. The strength of the findings highlights the pervasive impact of immigration on housing markets.

The study also investigates the factors underlying this link. A simple theoretical model is presented, demonstrating how immigration raises short-term housing demand, resulting in increased rents. In the long run, housing supply may adjust, but the model indicates that rents will remain high due to ongoing demand pressures. The model also takes into account native out-migration as a potential mitigating factor, however empirical results show that native displacement does not entirely offset the demand shock from immigration, especially in places with inelastic housing supply.

One striking conclusion is that immigration's effects on the housing market are orders of magnitude bigger than the labor market effects revealed in previous research. For example, whereas a 1% increase in the immigrant population may cut earnings by only 0.03% (which we have seen to be higher earlier), the same influx raises rents by around

1%. This mismatch emphasizes the necessity of taking housing markets into account when measuring the economic impact of immigration on local communities.

The analysis shows that immigration has a significant and causal impact on housing costs in American communities. The findings show that policymakers and researchers should consider housing market dynamics when assessing the overall economic impact of immigration. The findings also suggest that native people in places with high immigration may experience higher housing expenses, which could affect their mobility decisions and general well-being.

When analyzing data from Spain, [Guarner \(2023\)](#) discovered that immigration had a significantly greater effect on housing prices.

*I find that a one percentage point increase in the immigration rate raises average house sale prices by 3.3%.*

## 4.8 — Effect of immigrants on education

In this section I'll review impact immigration has on the education.

### *United States*

United States is the country with the most selective immigration policies compared to most European countries. However, as [Bandyopadhyay \(2017\)](#) showed, much more immigrants lack a high-school diploma compared to natives (27.7% vs 9.3%). The selectivity of immigration policies in the USA compared to Western Europe can be seen by the difference between high education and low education immigrants by region of origin:




Thus, except for Mexicans and Latinos, immigration is always more positive for education in the United States than in Europe. This can be used as an argument to say that selective immigration policies are efficient, however as we've seen earlier in many sections, immigration is not specifically benefitful for the American system, and the

phenomena of regression to the mean is a sufficient evidence that selective immigration, on the long term, when considering immigrants' children, is not a good policy. We're also going to talk about the case of Indians in the United States in another section.


The level of intelligence of the average PhD student keeps decreasing since 1995, meanwhile programs have made it easier for minorities to pursue a PhD degree, increasing the enrollment :

FIGURE 14: PhD ENROLLMENT AND AVERAGE PhD ENROLLEE IQ (FACT 9)



Source: DST, Note: This figure plots the enrollment (RHS y-axis) and IQ of enrollees with a three-year moving average (LHS y-axis) from 1995-2015.

This generalizes with all educational attainment :



### *PISA scores*

There is a significant difference in PISA maths score between immigrants and natives, even after adjusting for socio-economic status :

**Table 290 : Difference in PISA mathematics score between natives and immigrants**

Country	Difference in PISA 2012 Mathematics Score
Denmark	-40
Finland	-65
Switzerland	-42
Belgium	-52
Austria	-33
Germany	-25
Netherlands	-35
Sweden	-40
Norway	-29
France	-37
Russia	-19
OECD Average	-21
Italy	-32
Spain	-36
United Kingdom	-6
Portugal	-39
Iceland	-31
Estonia	-30

A cross-classified [multilevel regression analysis](#) in Belgium showed that, after controlling for background variables, newly arrived immigrants still show higher probabilities of failing a year and of dropping out. Moreover, the impact of SES is stronger for native students than for newly arrived immigrants.

### *France*

In PISA 2018, children with immigrant background scored on average 52 points less than natives. After adjusting for socioeconomic level, that difference is still of 13 points.

After adjusting for socioeconomic level, the difference in mathematics is much greater, 37 points. According to PISA, this gap corresponds with a full school year of difference.

In a national exam every 13-14 year olds pass, the average grade for natives is 12.5/20, that grade is of 10.1 for immigrants from Subsaharan Africa and 10.7 for immigrants from Maghreb. Whereas, immigrants from Asia score 12.6.

According to INSEE, 32% of those whose native language is French but who were schooled in another country than France have difficulties in writing, against 6% of those who attended school in France all the way.

41% of immigrants who arrived in 2018 do not have the baccalaureate and 26% of them do not have the level of a Year 9 student.

The disparities in education varies by the region of origin. 60% of immigrants from the Sahel stopped their education before Year 12.

There is an observable negative Flynn effect in Western countries in the last decades, which is likely due to immigrants having much lower IQ than natives :

**Table 291 : IQ decline in the West**

Country	Age	Test	Years	<b>IQ Decline per Decade</b>	Reference
<b>Norway</b>	18–19	General Ability	1996–2002	0.38	Sundet, Barlaug, and Torjussen
<b>Australia</b>	6–11	CPM	1975–2003	1.07	Cotton et al. (2005)
<b>Denmark</b>	18–19	Borge Priene's Prove	1998–2003/4	2.70	Teasdale and Owen (2008)
<b>Britain</b>	11–12	Piagetian	1975–2003	4.30	Shayer and Ginsburg (2007)
<b>Britain</b>	13–14	Piagetian	1976–2006	2.50	Shayer and Ginsburg (2009)
<b>Britain</b>	14–15	SPM	1979–2008	0.64	Flynn (2012), p.232
<b>Sweden</b>	18–19	General Ability	1992–1993	0.26	Rönnlund, Carlstedt, Blomstedt, Nilsson, and Weinehall (2013)
<b>Netherlands</b>	Adults	CATB	1975–2005	1.35	Woodley and Meisenberg (2013)
<b>Finland</b>	18–19	Peruskoe	1998–2009	2.0	Dutton and Lynn (2013)
<b>France</b>	Adults	WAIS	1999–2009	3.8	Dutton and Lynn (2015)

Indeed, the IQ of immigrants in Germany is much slower than natives :

**Table 292 : Mean IQ scores of immigrants by country of origin in Germany**

**Table 3:** Mean scores of immigrants by country and compared to scores in country of origin based on student assessment studies and psychometric intelligence tests.

Group	N	Current immigrant study			Previous country-level studies			
		Percentage of Sample	BOMAT Mean (SD, SE)	Cognitive ability (Rindermann)	SAS-IQ (Rindermann)	Intelligence (Lynn & Becker)	Learning (Lim et al.)	Human Capital (Angrist et al.)
Afghanistan	21	4.94%	83.52 (15.26, 3.33)	81.90	—	—	78.95 (388)	69.19 (315)
Eritrea	39	9.18%	75.32 (10.42, 1.67)	66.85	—	68.77	78.60 (385)	—
Greece	8	1.88%	97.64 (11.10, 3.92)	93.14	94.46	86.45	95.75 (500)	94.27 (483)
Iran	21	4.94%	95.80 (16.85, 3.68)	82.22	83.75	78.88	86.98 (441)	86.42 (430)
Iraq	18	4.24%	85.08 (11.89, 2.80)	89.17	—	89.28	81.07 (402)	71.55 (331)
Jordan	6	1.41%	101.29 (14.24, 5.81)	83.97	85.70	77.97	86.35 (430)	84.55 (418)
Kazakhstan	10	2.35%	90.00 (11.84, 3.75)	90.17	92.85	84.27	95.91 (501)	95.16 (489)
Morocco	11	2.59%	86.29 (12.32, 3.72)	69.51	71.36	68.73	77.52 (378)	74.13 (348)
Palestine	5	1.18%	90.19 (6.97, 3.12)	81.11	81.03	79.66	82.62 (412)	82.41 (404)
Poland	24	5.65%	91.48 (15.43, 3.15)	97.48	98.35	94.62	99.63 (526)	99.30 (516)
Russia	7	1.65%	100.57 (8.28, 3.13)	96.94	98.59	92.95	101.28 (537)	99.52 (518)
Somalia	6	1.41%	77.77 (9.86, 4.03)	66.23	—	67.67	76.87 (374)	—
Syria	223	52.47%	91.08 (14.19, 0.95)	77.56	80.02	72.99	83.48 (418)	82.41 (404)
Turkey	16	3.76%	92.46 (18.48, 4.62)	86.86	88.78	86.66	92.28 (477)	91.25 (463)
Ukraine	10	2.35%	102.03 (14.59, 4.61)	91.90	93.48	88.61	94.91 (494)	93.63 (478)
<b>All together</b>	<b>425</b>	<b>(100%)</b>	<b>89.65 (14.98, 0.73)</b>	<b>80.00</b>	<b>83.28</b>	<b>76.68</b>	<b>84.98 (428)</b>	<b>83.81 (413)</b>

### *Racism*

We know from social psychology that various political groups prefer different persons. In Western countries, teachers are typically women who are politically left of center. According to [this tool](#), in the United States, teachers are 80% Democrats and 20% Republicans. Other statistics suggest that teachers are woke, which means they have a positive attitude toward non-Whites, women, sexual minorities, immigrants, and other left-wing groups. Teachers must teach everyone's children, therefore we can assume they perform marginally worse for students from demographics they dislike. More significantly, given that grade judgments are inherently subjective, they may slightly bias them against such groups.



Based on this, we can expect grades to be slightly prejudiced against boys, ethnic minorities, and so on. This theory was put to the test in a recent German study. They genuinely attempted to find bias against immigrants but discovered the opposite.

[Bredtmann et al.](#) analyzes if teachers in German primary and secondary schools have grading biases toward ethnic minority students. The study draws on extensive data from the Institute for Quality Development in Education (IQB), comparing students' performance on standardized, anonymously graded tests to non-anonymous teacher assessments. The findings reveal an unexpected trend: teachers are positively prejudiced toward minority students, giving them higher grades based on their standardized test scores than their majority peers.


The study discovered that, on average, ethnic minority pupils performed significantly lower on standardized tests than their majority peers, with differences of 0.62 standard deviations (SD) in German and 0.46 SD in Math. However, when teachers analyzed these inequalities, they closed significantly. When teachers graded instead of standardized tests, the performance gap between minority and majority students narrowed by 0.26 SD in German and 0.20 SD in Mathematics. This shows that teachers modify their ratings to assist minority pupils, effectively reducing observed achievement gaps.

The researchers investigated possible explanations for the favorable bias. One hypothesis was that language obstacles would disadvantage minority pupils in standardized exams rather than classroom assessments. However, even when the research was limited to children who spoke solely German at home or were second-generation immigrants, the positive scoring tendency continued. Furthermore, the study looked at English, a subject where German language proficiency should not affect performance, and discovered a similar pattern of advantageous marking for minority students.

Further investigation demonstrated that the positive bias goes beyond ethnicity to socioeconomic level. Teachers also gave higher ratings to the majority of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds compared to their standardized test scores, indicating a

broader inclination to compensate for perceived disadvantages. The bias was more noticeable among teachers who reported lowering their expectations for low-performing students, implying that intentional or unconscious changes in grading standards may play a role.

The study also discovered changes in bias across different circumstances. For example, the positive grading effect was more pronounced in classrooms with a higher proportion of minority students and among high-achieving minority students. Notably, teachers did not appear to manipulate grades solely to push minority pupils over the passing threshold, as the prejudice was more prevalent at higher grade levels.



**Figure 1:** Distribution of Grades and Test Scores

**Table 293 : Association between minority status and students' grades****Table 1:** Estimated Association between Minority Status and Students' Grades

	German			Math		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef/StdE	Coef/StdE	Coef/StdE	Coef/StdE	Coef/StdE	Coef/StdE
<b>Minority student</b>	-0.357 <sup>†</sup> (0.013)	-0.123 <sup>†</sup> (0.012)	0.032*** (0.010)	-0.261 <sup>†</sup> (0.014)	-0.050 <sup>†</sup> (0.013)	0.049 <sup>†</sup> (0.010)
Test score	—	—	0.650 <sup>†</sup> (0.006)	—	—	0.787 <sup>†</sup> (0.006)
Constant	0.093 <sup>†</sup> (0.021)	5.927 <sup>†</sup> (0.343)	2.548 <sup>†</sup> (0.281)	0.063 <sup>†</sup> (0.015)	5.759 <sup>†</sup> (0.372)	1.405 <sup>†</sup> (0.269)
Controls	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Wave FE	yes	no	no	yes	no	no
Class FE	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
Observations	92,937	92,937	92,937	81,022	81,022	81,022
Clusters	4,985	4,985	4,985	6,221	6,221	6,221
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.263	0.476	0.014	0.184	0.545

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the class level. Individual weights are applied. Significance level: <sup>†</sup> 0.1%, \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

In conclusion, the study provides compelling evidence that teachers in German schools have a positive grading bias toward ethnic minority students, mitigating some of the disparities observed in standardized testing.

#### 4.9 — Predicting immigration outcomes in education

Now we're going to see how IQ can predict the outcome of immigration in education.

[Kierkegaard \(2013\)](#) analyzes if the average IQ of Danish immigrant communities can be predicted using Lynn and Vanhanen's compilation of national IQ scores from their home countries. The study seeks to confirm the stability and predictive potential of national IQ estimations by comparing them to actual IQ measures from Danish military conscription data. The data indicate a substantial association between expected and observed IQ scores among immigrants, supporting the notion that national IQ metrics can be trustworthy markers of cognitive capacity across communities.

To validate the predictions, the author used IQ data from a 2005 Danish military draft assessment that assessed conscripts on four cognitive domains: letter matrices, word relations, number sequences, and figure reasoning. The military data included raw scores for native Danes and immigrants, allowing for comparisons. The immigrant sample in the draft study was primarily made up of second-generation immigrants, as testing was done at the age of 18.

Kierkegaard used weighted averaging to estimate the mean IQ of Denmark's immigrant population. The number of immigrants from each country of origin was multiplied by its national IQ score, and the results were combined to calculate the overall expected IQ. Adjustments were made to adjust for certain biases, such as the exclusion of Western countries (e.g., Switzerland, North America) from the military draft's definition of "immigrants."

The anticipated IQ was then compared to the IQ obtained from the military draft statistics. To standardize the comparison, the native Danish mean score was set to 100, and the immigrant mean was determined in standard deviation units (Cohen's *d*), which were then converted to IQ points. The study also addressed timing differences between

the datasets (military data from 2003 vs. immigration data from 2013) by repeating the analysis using older immigration estimates from 2003.

The study's main conclusion was the near matching of expected and observed immigrant IQs. Initially, 2013 immigration data anticipated an average immigrant IQ of 89.9, but military draft data assessed it at 86.3. After accounting for methodological discrepancies, such as omitting Western immigrants and using older immigration statistics, the gap dropped dramatically. The resulting adjusted mean (86.7) deviated from the observed IQ by only 0.4 points, a minor difference.

The findings indicate that national IQ ratings are highly predictive of immigrant cognitive performance, even after adjusting for potential confounding factors such as language bias or selective migration. The study also discovered that the IQ disparity between immigrants and native Danes maintained across generations, despite previous research (e.g., Dutch studies cited in the publication) showing minor improvements for second-generation immigrants.

In conclusion, Kirkegaard's research shows that national IQ ratings can effectively predict the cognitive performance of immigrant populations.

[Fuerst \(2014a\)](#) examines whether national IQ scores, as compiled by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), may predict cognitive capacity and academic success for immigrants in the United States. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Freshmen (NLSF), the authors test the "spatial transferability hypothesis," which proposes that immigrants inherit cognitive traits from their home countries, and the "generational transferability hypothesis," which proposes that these traits persist across generations. The data give strong evidence that national IQs are substantially related to immigrant test scores (SAT/ACT) and academic performance (GPA), supporting the notion that cognitive disparities between populations are spatially and generationally permanent.

The study examines a cohort of 1999 freshmen from 28 selective U.S. colleges and universities, which includes first-generation immigrants (born abroad with at least one foreign-born parent), second-generation immigrants (born in the United States with at least one foreign-born parent), and third-generation students. Key variables include national IQs based on Lynn and Vanhanen's (2012) global IQ estimations, composite SAT/ACT scores for first- and second-generation immigrants organized by parents' countries of origin, and cumulative GPA. The study additionally controls for parental education to account for selective migration, and skin color correlations are used to measure ethnic representativeness.

Methodologically, the study uses correlational and regression analyses to investigate the link between national IQs and immigrant cognitive outcomes. At the group level, immigrants are classified by their parents' countries of origin, and national IQs are assigned to these groups. Weighted averages are utilized when parents are from different nations. To analyze individual-level connections, each student is assigned a parental national IQ, which is determined by averaging mother and paternal national IQs. Testing alternative national IQ datasets, controlling for parental educational selectivity, and validating ethnic representativeness using skin color correlations are all examples of robustness assessments.

The findings show that national IQ levels strongly predict immigrant test scores. At the group level, national IQs have a substantial correlation with immigrant SAT/ACT results (Pearson's  $r = 0.37$ ). This link applies to both first- and second-generation immigrants, with no notable generational decline. The association between national IQs and GPA is equally positive and significant, albeit slightly less ( $r = 0.29$ ). These relationships remain strong even after controlling for parental education, indicating that selective migration does not entirely explain the observed patterns.

The study also discovers that national IQs predict academic performance in similar ways across generations, lending credence to the generational transferability

hypothesis. Second-generation immigrants' GPAs, for example, continue to be influenced by their parents' national IQs, demonstrating that cognitive inequalities exist even among immigrant children born in the United States. The authors also point out that utilizing alternative IQ measures, such as those presented by Wicherts et al. (2010), does not reduce the predictive potential of national IQs, bolstering the strength of their findings.

Ethnic representativeness is corroborated by the excellent correlations between migrant skin color and national skin reflectance scores ( $r = 0.71$ ), demonstrating that the immigrant sample is ethnically representative of their home countries. This discovery eliminates the likelihood that the results were influenced by unrepresentative sample. Furthermore, correcting for parental educational selectivity strengthens the national IQ-cognitive ability link, implying that migrants from higher-IQ nations are positively selected for schooling, but this does not invalidate the underlying relationship.

In conclusion, the study provides solid evidence that national IQs predict cognitive capacity and academic success among immigrants in the United States. The spatial and chronological stability of these associations lends credence to the notion that cognitive differences between groups are long-lasting and transferable across borders and generations.

[Kierkegaard \(2014d\)](#) explores the link between national IQ, intellectual ability, and educational performance among Danish immigrant groups. The study focuses on 70 immigrant groups and examines how their countries of origin's national IQ, among other factors, effects their academic results in Denmark. The study is based on the spatial transferability hypothesis, which proposes that immigrants retain characteristics from their home country, such as cognitive talents and socioeconomic activities.

The sample includes the top 70 immigrant groups in Denmark, with data sourced from official Danish statistics for 2012. The databases include information on the greatest level of formal education attained, average income levels, and the percentage of people receiving social benefits, all stratified by age group. The predictor variables include national IQ

values from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), GDP per capita, the fraction of the population who practice Islam, and average height in the countries of origin. The study focuses on educational attainment, as indicated by the fraction of immigrants with only basic schooling vs those with advanced tertiary education.

The approaches for identifying latent variables include correlational analyses and principal component analysis (PCA). The correlational study demonstrates a strong link between national IQ and educational attainment. For example, national IQ has a negative association with the fraction of immigrants with only basic education, particularly in the age ranges 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49, with Pearson correlations ranging from -0.544 to -0.674. This suggests that immigrants from nations with higher national IQs are less likely to receive a basic education. In contrast, national IQ correlates positively with the fraction of immigrants who have advanced postsecondary education, with correlations ranging from 0.380 to 0.547, implying that higher national IQ predicts better educational achievement.

The PCA yields a general educational attainment factor (PC1), which explains 61.39% of the variation. This component has a considerable impact on variables related to basic and higher education, confirming the existence of a latent educational trait impacted by national IQ. The correlations between national IQ and PC1 are strong, with Pearson and Spearman correlations of -0.494 and -0.641, respectively, highlighting national IQ's predictive value for educational results.

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The findings show that national IQ is a strong predictor of cognitive capacity and educational performance among immigrants in Denmark. Immigrants from countries with higher national IQs tend to have a greater level of education, whilst those from countries with lower national IQs are more likely to have only basic schooling.

[Kierkegaard \(2017f\)](#) examines the association between national IQ and cognitive capacity and educational success among immigrant populations in Norway and Finland, with further comparisons to Denmark. The study is based on the spatial transferability hypothesis, which holds that immigrants retain psychological qualities, including cognitive talents, from their countries of origin, influencing their socioeconomic outcomes in host nations. The study examines how national IQ affects educational attainment among immigrant groups, utilizing data from Norway and Finland's official statistics bureaus.

The sample includes immigrant groups from Norway and Finland, based on statistics from Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB) and other official sources. The study looks at indicators including tertiary educational attainment, income, and unemployment rates, all stratified by country of origin. The predictor variables are national IQ estimates from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), GDP per capita, Islam prevalence, and Altinok's educational attainment scores. The study focuses on educational achievement, as defined by the percentage of immigrants with higher education, to determine the prediction power of national IQ.

The methods use correlational analysis to investigate the association between national IQ and educational attainment. The study employs principal component analysis (PCA) to discover latent variables, such as a generic socioeconomic factor (S factor), which accounts for shared variance among socioeconomic outcomes. The analysis also uses the correlated vectors approach to examine if the relationships between national IQ and educational attainment are influenced by the general factor or residual variance. Missing data are handled via multiple imputation to make the best use of available information while reducing bias.

The findings show that national IQ is a strong predictor of educational performance among immigrant populations. For example, national IQ correlates positively with tertiary educational attainment in Norway, with Pearson correlations ranging from 0.35 to 0.47. This suggests that immigrants from nations with higher national IQs are more likely to complete higher levels of schooling in Norway. National IQ has strong predictive power across samples and remains significant even after controlling for other variables like GDP and Islam prevalence.

The PCA reveals a high general socioeconomic component (S factor) among immigrant groups in Norway, which explains a large percentage of the variation in educational attainment and other socioeconomic outcomes. The S factor has a strong correlation with national IQ ( $r = 0.59$  in the total cases dataset), implying that cognitive capacity, as assessed by national IQ, is an important predictor of educational achievement among immigrants. The correlated vectors method indicates that the general component drives the link between national IQ and educational achievement, with correlations close to unity ( $r = 0.97$  in the Norwegian sample). This suggests that the predictive potential of national IQ is not related to residual variance, but rather to a broad, underlying cognitive capacity factor.

The paper also compares the Norwegian findings to data from Denmark, revealing comparable patterns. In Denmark, national IQ has a good correlation with the general socioeconomic factor ( $r = 0.54$ ), supporting the notion that cognitive ability is a consistent predictor of educational outcomes across immigrant populations. The significant intercorrelations between predictor vectors (mean  $r = 0.92$ ) indicate that national IQ, GDP, and other predictors are broadly interchangeable in their ability to predict educational attainment, lending support to the spatial transferability theory.

In conclusion, the study shows that national IQ is a strong predictor of cognitive capacity and educational performance among immigrant groups in Norway and Finland.

[Kierkegaard \(2015\)](#) looked into the impact of immigration on cognitive ability and socioeconomic inequality in Denmark, with a particular emphasis on the significance of national IQ as a predictor of immigrants' cognitive ability. The research is based on the spatial transferability hypothesis, which holds that immigrants retain cognitive qualities from their home nations, influencing their socioeconomic outcomes in the host country. The study looks at how disparities in national IQ affect the mean and dispersion of cognitive ability (g) in Denmark, as well as the socioeconomic ramifications.

The sample is made up of demographic data from Denmark, including population statistics by country of origin, sourced from Statistics Denmark. The study examines the immigrant population over a 34-year period, noting changes in composition and size. The major immigrant groups transitioned from predominantly Western countries in 1980 to more diversified, non-Western origins by 2014, with significant increases in populations from Turkey, Iraq, and Somalia. The study also uses national IQ values from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), updated by Jason Malloy, to assess immigrants' cognitive abilities based on their countries of origin.

The methods include developing a demographic model to replicate the effects of immigration on the distribution of cognitive ability in Denmark. The model assumes that immigrants retain their home nations' average IQ, and treats each group as a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 15. The study computes the composite IQ distribution for Denmark by combining the native and immigrant populations and employing interval-based approximations to estimate changes in mean IQ and standard deviation across time. Three scenarios of immigrant cognitive gains (weak, medium, and robust) are also considered to account for prospective IQ growth after migration.

The findings show that immigration has reduced Denmark's mean IQ from 97.1 in 1980 to 96.4 in 2014, while increasing the standard deviation of IQ from 15.04 to 15.40. These trends reflect the increasing diversity of the immigrant population, particularly the migration of people from countries with lower national IQs. According to the study, the

mean IQ of the immigrant population fell until roughly 2003, when it stabilized at about 90, but the standard deviation of immigrant IQ grew before plateauing.

The study also compares model projections to actual data from Danish military draft examinations, which include cognitive assessments for young men. The results demonstrate that the standard deviation of IQ among non-Western immigrant groups is larger than predicted, implying additional heterogeneity or selective migratory effects that the model does not account for. This disparity raises concerns regarding potential differences in cognitive ability among immigrant groups, presumably due to differing selection pressures (e.g., refugees vs. economic migrants).

One significant discovery is the effect of higher IQ dispersion on socioeconomic inequality. According to the study, increased variability in cognitive ability results in greater differences in outcomes such as school attainment, income, and employment. For example, the number of those with IQs below 70 (intellectually impaired) increased faster than the reduction in those with IQs over 130 (intellectually gifted), resulting in a 30% shift in the ratio of disabled to brilliant individuals over the research period. This trend has ramifications for social welfare systems, since people with lower cognitive abilities are more likely to need assistance, whilst those with greater abilities contribute disproportionately to tax collections.

In conclusion, the study shows that national IQ is a strong predictor of immigrants' cognitive capacity, and that immigration from low-IQ nations has contributed to greater cognitive and social disparity in Denmark.

[Kierkegaard \(2015b\)](#) analyzes the association between national IQ and educational performance of Danish immigrant pupils, with a focus on primary school grade point averages (GPA). The study is based on the spatial transferability hypothesis, which states that immigrants retain cognitive and behavioral characteristics from their home nations, influencing their academic performance in the host country. The study seeks

to examine whether national IQ and other country-level characteristics can predict the GPA of immigrant students in Denmark.

The sample is divided into two datasets: one with GPA data for students based on their mothers' country of origin (N=19), and another with GPA data for second-generation immigrants based on their parents' country of origin (N=13). GPA data were gathered from Danish public school exams administered at the conclusion of the ninth grade, spanning the years 2007-2009 and 2009-2014. To assure statistical reliability, the datasets cover nations with at least 100 students each. The study also includes national IQ estimates from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), which were adjusted by Jason Malloy and the author, as well as other country-level predictors such as historical numeracy (age heaping in 1900), average years of schooling, Islam prevalence, and general socioeconomic factors (S factors) from Denmark and around the world.

The methods include correlation studies to determine the prediction ability of these variables for immigrant GPA. Pearson and Spearman correlations were used to account for any potential non-normality in the GPA data. The study also looks at the amount of GPA discrepancies between immigrant groups and native Danish students, normalizing them into Cohen's d values and comparing them to national IQ gaps. In addition, the study investigates the impact of omitting Denmark from the analysis and merges the two GPA datasets to reduce sampling error and improve robustness.

The findings show a substantial link between national IQ and immigrant GPA. For the larger dataset (N=19), national IQ correlates with GPA at 0.64 (Pearson) and 0.66 (Spearman), but the smaller sample (N=13) has correlations of 0.40 and 0.35, respectively. The difference in strength between the two datasets is due to sampling error and the smaller sample's limited range. Other factors with significant correlations with GPA include average years of schooling (0.74), the worldwide S factor (0.68), and the local S factor in Denmark (0.87). Islam prevalence has a substantial negative association (-0.75), indicating

that higher proportions of Muslims in the nation of origin are linked to poorer GPAs among immigrant students.

The study then examines the GPA discrepancies between immigrant groups and native Danish students, discovering that these gaps are reasonably consistent with the expected variances based on national IQ. For example, students from Lebanon and Turkey, with national IQs of 84.6 and 89.4, respectively, have GPA discrepancies of -0.65 and -0.52 standard deviations when compared to Danish students. The correlation between IQ and GPA discrepancies is 0.64 in the larger dataset and 0.40 in the smaller one, indicating that cognitive ability variations account for a significant percentage of academic performance disparities. The study also finds that second-generation immigrants outperform first-generation immigrants, yet the cognitive ability gap stays unchanged, probably due to variables such as language acquisition or cultural adaptability.

When the two GPA datasets are combined, the correlations remain strong, with national IQ showing a correlation of 0.62-0.63, highlighting the predictive usefulness of country-level cognitive tests. The paper also addresses the methodological question of whether Denmark should be included or excluded in the analysis. While omitting Denmark decreases the relationships in the smaller dataset, the larger dataset is unaffected, demonstrating that including native students does not greatly influence the results.

In conclusion, the study provides compelling evidence that national IQ and other country-level characteristics are significant determinants of educational performance among Danish immigrant students.

Whitaker (2017) found :

*The European Union has seen an increased number of asylum seekers and economic migrants over the past few years. There will be request to assess some of these individuals to see if they have an intellectual disability (ID). If this is to be done using the current internationally recognized definitions of ID, we will need to be confident that the IQ tests we have available are able to accurately measure the IQs of people from developing countries. The literature showing substantial differences in the mean measured IQs of different countries is considered. It is found that, although there are numerous problems with these studies, the overall conclusion that there are substantial differences in mean measured IQ is sound. However, what is not clear is whether there are large differences in true intellectual ability between different countries, how predictive IQ scores are of an individual from a developing country ability to cope, and whether or not an individual's IQ would increase if they go from a developing country to a developed one. Because of these uncertainties, it is suggested that a diagnosis of ID should not be dependent on an IQ cut-off point when assessing people from developing countries.*

#### **4.10 — Other arguments for immigration**

In this section I'm going to review some other arguments usually raised to say that immigration is needed.

##### ***Declining birth rates***

A typical argument in support of more immigration is that the native fertility rate is declining, and that bringing in immigrants will help to compensate for this problem. However, considering all of the other issues with immigration that I've discussed, is this a realistic assertion to make? Okay, let's find out. To begin with, immigrants' fertility rates are also declining. In 2008, Hispanics (the largest immigrant group) had already peaked in fertility before falling precipitously, while Asian numbers continued to fall steeply over

**Table 294 : Fertility rates by race and year**

	Total Population												
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total	2.08	2.07	2.18	2.12	2.01	1.98	1.87	1.85	1.82	1.85	1.84	1.81	1.76
White	1.95	1.93	2.02	1.94	1.83	1.85	1.77	1.77	1.75	1.77	1.76	1.75	1.70
Black	2.17	2.05	2.24	2.22	2.15	1.96	1.85	1.84	1.81	1.90	1.92	1.87	1.78
Asian	1.79	1.86	2.14	1.99	1.87	1.91	1.80	1.76	1.67	1.72	1.73	1.69	1.59
Other	2.07	2.25	2.11	2.22	2.01	2.05	1.89	1.74	1.87	1.87	1.72	1.78	1.71
Hispanic	2.50	2.58	2.68	2.61	2.45	2.34	2.13	2.12	2.05	2.03	2.01	1.95	1.91
	Native-Born Population												
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total	2.00	1.97	2.07	2.00	1.90	1.88	1.79	1.78	1.75	1.78	1.76	1.74	1.69
White	1.95	1.91	2.00	1.92	1.81	1.83	1.76	1.76	1.74	1.76	1.74	1.73	1.69
Black	2.11	1.99	2.19	2.15	2.07	1.87	1.76	1.74	1.69	1.77	1.81	1.75	1.68
Asian	1.44	1.69	1.79	1.72	1.49	1.78	1.59	1.53	1.59	1.53	1.44	1.58	1.42
Other	2.08	2.19	2.14	2.15	1.92	2.04	1.85	1.71	1.83	1.82	1.66	1.77	1.64
Hispanic	2.17	2.25	2.36	2.25	2.15	2.07	1.93	1.94	1.85	1.89	1.85	1.77	1.77
	Foreign-Born Population												
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total	2.49	2.58	2.75	2.70	2.52	2.45	2.22	2.20	2.16	2.15	2.18	2.15	2.02
White	1.97	2.12	2.29	2.20	2.08	2.01	1.94	1.90	1.99	1.99	2.13	2.09	1.89
Black	2.46	2.45	2.51	2.59	2.54	2.57	2.35	2.37	2.56	2.65	2.58	2.63	2.24
Asian	1.88	1.95	2.25	2.09	2.02	2.02	1.93	1.88	1.76	1.82	1.89	1.77	1.71
Other	1.99	2.58	1.80	2.72	2.45	2.04	2.06	1.97	2.16	2.21	2.09	1.80	2.19
Hispanic	2.90	2.99	3.15	3.11	2.86	2.77	2.46	2.46	2.38	2.33	2.33	2.34	2.24


**Source:** Public-use files of the 2006 to 2019 American Community Surveys, except 2012. The Census Bureau reports a problem with the fertility variable in 2012.

The Total Fertility Rate reports the number of children a woman can be expected to have in her lifetime based on current patterns.



## For foreign-born and U.S.-born Hispanics, big drops in birth rates

*Birth rates per 1,000 women ages 15-44, by nativity and race/ethnicity*



Note: Hispanics are of any race. Blacks, whites and Asians include only non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders.


Source: Pew Research Center analysis of National Center for Health Statistics data.

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Furthermore, in 2019, the fertility rate among immigrants fell below the replacement rate of 2.1 (Camarota & Zeigler, 2021b):

**Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate, 2008 to 2019**

The total fertility rate of immigrants has declined more than it has for natives.  
The presence of immigrants only slightly increases the total fertility rate in the U.S.




**Source:** Public-use files of the 2008 to the 2019 American Community Survey, except 2012. The Census Bureau reports a problem with the fertility variable in 2012. The total fertility rate reports the number of children a women can be expected to have in her life time based on current patterns.

In fact, Hispanic fertility has experienced the greatest rate of drop in the United States ([Stone, 2019](#)):


### Percent Change in Total Fertility Rates, 2007-2018

CDC Single-Race Definition



Created with Datawrapper


Migrant children have lower fertility rates than their parents, which is not specific to the United States. We also have data from Denmark that show that the fertility disparity between first generation immigrants and natives closes after around one generation, and second-generation immigrants have the same fertility rate as natives ([Kirkegaard, 2018](#)).



There is also evidence that immigration reduces native fertility, albeit in the short term ([Seah, 2018](#)). However, keep in mind that immigrants are always entering the country; there is no 'break' in immigration, thus it makes perfect sense for this effect to persist and drag on. Furthermore, as previously said, immigrants displace native workers and lower their quality of living (see section "Wages and Worker Displacement"), this will disincentivize even more natives and cause them to have fewer children. The final point to consider is that, as previously stated, immigrants are entering the country at an older age,

which means that fewer of them will have children, but also consider the fact that the age gap between natives and new immigrants is closing (Camarota & Zeigler, 2021a).

**Figure 9. The difference between the average age of new immigrants\* and natives narrowed between 2000 and 2019.**




**Source:** Public-use files of the 2000 census and the 2001 to 2019 American Community Surveys.

\*Immigrants who have lived in the United States for 1.5 years or less at the time of the survey.

Furthermore, when we look at immigrants in general, we can see that they are not only older than natives, but they are also aging faster.


Figure 10. The nation's overall immigrant population is aging more rapidly than the native-born population (2000 to 2019).



Source: Public-use files of the 2000 census and the 2001 to 2019 American Community Surveys.

So, with that said, what impact does immigration have on population aging? It has a minimalist design. To maintain the working-age share of the population, we would need to quintuple our current immigration rate.

*IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE WORKING-AGE (16 TO 64 YEARS)  
SHARE OF THE U.S. POPULATION*



Source: Census Bureau projections and a projection model developed by Decision Demographics and the Center for Immigration Studies.

\*Keeps the working-age (16 to 64 years) share of the population roughly constant, at net migration rates of 5.5 million annually.

\*\*Indicates the level of net immigration assumed by the Census Bureau in its newest projections, 1.1 million annually.

The [UN](#) showed that, in order to keep the ratio between 65+ years old and 15-64 years old constant, France needed to welcome 2,3 millions of immigrants yearly from 2025 to 2050, the total population amounting to 187 millions. For Germany, they estimated that they shall welcome 5 millions per year, with their total population being 299 millions in 2050. We summarize their results in the following table :

**Table 295 : Immigration scenario to keep old/young ratio constant**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Yearly immigrants (2025-2050) in millions</b>	<b>Population in 2050 in millions</b>
<b>France</b>	2,3	187
<b>Germany</b>	5	299
<b>Italy</b>	3,2	193
<b>Japan</b>	16	818
<b>South Korea</b>	190	6200
<b>Russia</b>	6,6	422
<b>UK</b>	1,4	136
<b>USA</b>	14	1065
<b>Europe</b>	37	2346
<b>Netherlands*</b>	1,8	102

Another source was used for the Netherlands (Beek & al., 2023).

When you look at the overall picture, it's not shocking as the West is seeing population loss. Given the current circumstance, why would anyone want to invite more strangers into the country? Furthermore, even if migrant fertility may be employed to slow population decline, it is undesirable because it will come from less productive groups, which are more likely to be net drains on society than net gains. The assumption that adding more people will automatically make things better ignores reality's unequal distribution of productivity. Regardless, it does not address the continuing problem and will cause more harm than good in the future.

### ***Paying for social security***

Speaking of the long run, another prominent argument in favor of greater open immigration follows on from the fertility rate argument, namely that immigrants will help pay for the social security of an older population. First and foremost, the fertility argument is pure nonsense, since immigrants take more from the system than they give (see to the sections 4.2 and 4.3), therefore this argument already fails to hold up under inspection. However, the issue here is not whether or whether immigrants can contribute to social security; rather, the issue is social security itself, which is primarily a ponzi scheme.

Benefits surpass contributions, and recipients are discouraged from continuing to work by receiving up to 50 cents for every dollar earned, which explains why the retirement age in the United States has been lowering. Privatization would be a solution to this problem because it would better align benefits and payments, prevent people from retiring too soon, and they would likely receive more than they would under the existing system ([Rosenblum, 1997](#); [Dayaratna et al., 2018](#)).

**Table 296 : Comparison of social security to private accounts for male workers**

TABLE 1

## Comparison of Social Security to Private Accounts: Male Workers

AVERAGE EARNINGS, U.S. MALE WORKERS BORN IN 1995, FIGURES IN 2017 DOLLARS

Life Expectancy (Years)	Amount Paid Into Social Security	Amount to be Received in Social Security Benefits	Rate of Return from Current System	Amount Available if Payroll Taxes Were Invested in Private Accounts	Rate of Return from Private Accounts
70	\$404,377	\$53,266	-14.53%	\$1,241,153	4.79%
75	\$404,377	\$140,999	-5.08%	\$1,241,153	4.79%
80	\$404,377	\$227,513	-2.31%	\$1,241,153	4.79%
85	\$404,377	\$313,484	-0.90%	\$1,241,153	4.79%
90	\$404,377	\$399,544	-0.04%	\$1,241,153	4.79%

**NOTE:** Private accounts assume 50 percent of existing payroll taxes are invested in federal government bonds, the other 50 percent in large U.S. stocks. Differences in males and females rate of return for private accounts due to different lifetime earnings trajectories.

**SOURCE:** Heritage Foundation Social Security Rate of Return Model. See appendix for details.



Table 297 : Comparison of social security to private accounts for female workers

TABLE 4

**Comparison of Social Security to Private Accounts: Female Workers**

AVERAGE EARNINGS, U.S. FEMALE WORKERS BORN IN 1995, FIGURES IN 2017 DOLLARS

Life Expectancy (Years)	Amount Paid Into Social Security	Amount to be Received in Social Security Benefits	Rate of Return from Current System	Amount Available if Payroll Taxes Were Invested in Private Accounts	Rate of Return from Private Accounts
70	\$243,599	\$39,130	-13.19%	\$714,550	4.77%
75	\$243,599	\$103,582	-4.19%	\$714,550	4.77%
80	\$243,599	\$167,138	-1.54%	\$714,550	4.77%
85	\$243,599	\$230,294	-0.20%	\$714,550	4.77%
90	\$243,599	\$293,516	0.61%	\$714,550	4.77%

**NOTE:** Private accounts assume 50 percent of existing payroll taxes are invested in federal government bonds, the other 50 percent in large U.S. stocks. Differences in males and females rate of return for private accounts due to different lifetime earnings trajectories.

**SOURCE:** Heritage Foundation Social Security Rate of Return Model. See appendix for details.

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One counter-argument is that privatizing social security will harm low-income workers and exacerbate wealth inequality; however, social security as it currently exists already does this by siphoning away their meager wages into a ponzi scheme that is expected to go bankrupt before they retire. In truth, even low-income workers are likely to benefit from privatization because the private market yields significantly larger returns than the US Treasury.

**Table 298 : Benefits scenario : male workers earning half the male worker average**

	<b>CURRENT LAW</b> <i>10.6% payroll tax or personal savings contribution, Social Security benefit cuts beginning in 2035</i>		<b>TAX INCREASE TO MAINTAIN SCHEDULED BENEFITS</b> <i>13.28% payroll tax or personal account contribution, scheduled benefits remain</i>	
	<b>Social Security (Payable)</b>	<b>Private Account</b>	<b>Social Security (Scheduled)</b>	<b>Private Account</b>
Alabama	\$225,420	\$733,620	\$297,864	\$909,434
Alaska	\$263,183	\$767,074	\$348,292	\$950,906
Arizona	\$263,095	\$712,259	\$348,380	\$882,954
Arkansas	\$212,445	\$642,979	\$280,844	\$797,070
California	\$299,364	\$849,564	\$396,407	\$1,053,164
Colorado	\$284,943	\$819,775	\$377,215	\$1,016,237
Connecticut	\$320,066	\$941,180	\$423,766	\$1,166,737
D.C.	\$261,053	\$764,416	\$345,450	\$947,610
Delaware	\$309,444	\$1,113,471	\$409,242	\$1,380,318
Florida	\$283,133	\$781,910	\$374,936	\$969,297
Georgia	\$252,096	\$808,803	\$333,289	\$1,002,635
Hawaii	\$265,694	\$699,254	\$351,906	\$866,832
Idaho	\$249,652	\$695,513	\$330,452	\$862,195
Illinois	\$272,091	\$829,296	\$359,978	\$1,028,039
Indiana	\$233,982	\$710,849	\$309,418	\$881,206
Iowa	\$243,617	\$700,960	\$322,353	\$868,947
Kansas	\$242,013	\$706,080	\$320,185	\$875,295
Kentucky	\$230,299	\$748,669	\$304,339	\$928,090
Louisiana	\$239,551	\$775,092	\$316,622	\$960,844
Maine	\$231,004	\$667,273	\$305,598	\$827,187
Maryland	\$308,041	\$981,575	\$407,599	\$1,216,813
Massachusetts	\$314,172	\$969,162	\$415,826	\$1,201,425
Michigan	\$251,535	\$758,156	\$332,733	\$939,850
Minnesota	\$288,469	\$827,327	\$381,907	\$1,025,598
Mississippi	\$201,636	\$645,602	\$266,361	\$800,323
Missouri	\$245,096	\$750,976	\$324,141	\$930,949
Montana	\$236,456	\$654,209	\$312,944	\$810,992
Nebraska	\$245,645	\$702,838	\$325,060	\$871,275
Nevada	\$244,324	\$728,293	\$323,194	\$902,830
New Hampshire	\$303,453	\$927,210	\$401,585	\$1,149,419
New Jersey	\$297,049	\$894,658	\$393,137	\$1,109,065
New Mexico	\$248,951	\$686,711	\$329,546	\$851,283
New York	\$314,869	\$935,761	\$416,832	\$1,160,019
North Carolina	\$255,203	\$793,484	\$337,508	\$983,645
North Dakota	\$260,478	\$750,016	\$344,736	\$929,760
Ohio	\$236,158	\$719,692	\$312,295	\$892,168
Oklahoma	\$222,658	\$701,219	\$294,295	\$869,268
Oregon	\$264,430	\$771,645	\$349,942	\$956,572
Pennsylvania	\$256,858	\$780,171	\$339,774	\$967,141
Rhode Island	\$265,268	\$787,864	\$351,001	\$976,678
South Carolina	\$239,621	\$741,301	\$316,849	\$918,956
South Dakota	\$267,637	\$784,171	\$354,187	\$972,099
Tennessee	\$231,281	\$731,985	\$305,719	\$907,407
Texas	\$267,288	\$816,341	\$353,597	\$1,011,979
Utah	\$271,739	\$744,618	\$359,827	\$923,068
Vermont	\$247,680	\$705,184	\$327,776	\$874,183
Virginia	\$290,786	\$913,004	\$384,683	\$1,131,809
Washington	\$272,489	\$797,394	\$360,632	\$988,492
West Virginia	\$211,253	\$663,062	\$279,170	\$821,967
Wisconsin	\$262,470	\$764,025	\$347,348	\$947,126
Wyoming	\$261,053	\$764,893	\$345,450	\$948,201

**NOTE:** Data are for males born in 1995, with earnings = 0.5 times the mean. Figures in 2017 dollars.

**SOURCE:** Heritage Foundation Social Security Rate of Return Model. See appendix for details.

**Table 299 : Benefits scenario : female workers earning half the female worker average**

<b>CURRENT LAW</b> <i>10.6% payroll tax or personal savings contribution, Social Security benefit cuts beginning in 2035</i>			<b>TAX INCREASE TO MAINTAIN SCHEDULED BENEFITS</b> <i>13.28% payroll tax or personal account contribution, scheduled benefits remain</i>	
	<b>Social Security (Payable)</b>	<b>Private Account</b>	<b>Social Security (Scheduled)</b>	<b>Private Account</b>
Alabama	\$153,566	\$333,563	\$203,278	\$413,116
Alaska	\$173,903	\$367,163	\$230,375	\$454,728
Arizona	\$179,199	\$348,985	\$237,524	\$432,216
Arkansas	\$157,671	\$335,929	\$208,763	\$416,045
California	\$195,683	\$401,696	\$259,396	\$497,497
Colorado	\$183,489	\$378,854	\$243,162	\$469,208
Connecticut	\$199,732	\$423,791	\$264,740	\$524,862
Delaware	\$177,428	\$381,254	\$235,045	\$472,180
D.C.	\$229,438	\$565,859	\$303,992	\$700,812
Florida	\$184,316	\$354,731	\$244,351	\$439,331
Georgia	\$163,059	\$353,768	\$215,910	\$438,138
Hawaii	\$201,921	\$367,710	\$267,866	\$455,406
Idaho	\$161,055	\$315,191	\$213,366	\$390,361
Illinois	\$176,215	\$372,434	\$233,450	\$461,257
Indiana	\$156,465	\$317,534	\$207,216	\$393,264
Iowa	\$166,507	\$322,299	\$220,635	\$399,164
Kansas	\$160,503	\$319,860	\$212,612	\$396,144
Kentucky	\$157,392	\$349,602	\$208,341	\$432,980
Louisiana	\$147,857	\$306,746	\$195,732	\$379,903
Maine	\$168,616	\$347,045	\$223,370	\$429,813
Maryland	\$200,316	\$460,243	\$265,393	\$570,007
Massachusetts	\$192,227	\$411,157	\$254,741	\$509,215
Michigan	\$163,318	\$333,924	\$216,328	\$413,563
Minnesota	\$185,528	\$369,116	\$245,924	\$457,147
Mississippi	\$151,704	\$322,425	\$200,826	\$399,321
Missouri	\$164,510	\$352,575	\$217,857	\$436,661
Montana	\$165,874	\$336,538	\$219,738	\$416,799
Nebraska	\$166,864	\$333,465	\$221,073	\$412,993
Nevada	\$166,670	\$350,583	\$220,756	\$434,194
New Hampshire	\$178,839	\$371,762	\$236,964	\$460,425
New Jersey	\$192,242	\$414,359	\$254,749	\$513,180
New Mexico	\$170,612	\$334,234	\$226,086	\$413,946
New York	\$197,894	\$420,177	\$262,291	\$520,385
North Carolina	\$161,161	\$332,476	\$213,447	\$411,769
North Dakota	\$181,645	\$351,513	\$240,789	\$435,346
Ohio	\$158,445	\$328,639	\$209,825	\$407,017
Oklahoma	\$151,412	\$328,257	\$200,413	\$406,544
Oregon	\$174,979	\$364,705	\$231,825	\$451,685
Pennsylvania	\$172,532	\$362,010	\$228,559	\$448,347
Rhode Island	\$201,900	\$454,468	\$267,534	\$562,855
South Carolina	\$165,422	\$352,295	\$219,078	\$436,314
South Dakota	\$171,110	\$320,696	\$226,802	\$397,179
Tennessee	\$157,708	\$339,417	\$208,800	\$420,365
Texas	\$171,454	\$364,901	\$227,106	\$451,927
Utah	\$165,100	\$317,109	\$218,770	\$392,737
Vermont	\$176,639	\$363,743	\$234,048	\$450,493
Virginia	\$185,241	\$414,764	\$245,381	\$513,682
Washington	\$184,068	\$395,218	\$243,879	\$489,475
West Virginia	\$146,253	\$314,564	\$193,559	\$389,585
Wisconsin	\$172,836	\$342,474	\$229,033	\$424,151
Wyoming	\$162,061	\$325,115	\$214,676	\$402,652

**NOTE:** Data are for females born in 1995, with earnings = 0.5 times the mean. Figures in 2017 dollars.**SOURCE:** Heritage Foundation Social Security Rate of Return Model. See appendix for details.

It's also amusing that the potential of harming low-income workers is a concern when it comes to social security but not when it comes to importing more third-world for leftists, but consistency is the last thing they should be expected to provide. There are billions of recommendations to repair social security, many of which are intelligent, as opposed to pushing for massive population change, which is totally stupid. This ludicrous argument is largely based on the notion that illegal immigrants do not have access to social security, which is disputed. [Camarota \(2021b\)](#) examined several official sources and determined that almost 2.65 million illegal immigrants have valid social security numbers, which are classified into the following categories:

**Table 300 : Estimated population of illegal immigrants with valid Social Security Numbers**

DACA recipients	652,880
TPS recipients	411,326
Asylum applicants	441,943
Other aliens temporarily present without status under the Immigration and Nationality Act*	440,109
Illegal immigrants with stolen identities	700,000
Total illegal population who can receive stimulus money	2,646,258
<b>Other Categories of Illegal Immigrants with Social Security Numbers Who Might Receive Stimulus Checks</b>	
Former guestworkers who have overstayed	600,000
Illegal immigrants using SSNs and names that do not match	1,800,000
<p><b>Source:</b> Public-use USCIS tables on EADs issued in FY 2020 and Social Security Administration estimates of illegal immigrants working with SSNs. See text for more detail.</p> <p>* This includes, but is not limited to, adjustment of status and suspension of deportation applicants, as well as those given withholding of removal, deferred action (non-DA-CA), and parolees.</p>	

Second, in terms of immigrants in general, new immigrants will need their social security to be paid when they retire. This will necessitate additional immigrants, and so on, in a vicious circle. Using immigrants to solve the social security deficit is simply delaying and not addressing the problem, as opposed to getting to the root of the problem, which is that it operates as a ponzi scheme, and adding more immigrants to solve it will only make it worse by requiring even more immigrants. The problem will only worsen. Fuck the boomers anyway; they fucked America and Europe, taking advantage of a perfect era for them with economic prosperity and now complaining that they are responsible for the economy ruin we're going to suffer, so might as well them suffer and die.

### ***Unwanted jobs***

It has regularly been stated that immigrants primarily take jobs that Americans do not want. This is simply untrue. Everyone would choose a blue collar job rather than being unemployed. It's only that many of these jobs offer lower salaries due to competition from immigrants. [Beck \(1996, p. 102\)](#) gives a historical illustration of how the concept of 'unwanted jobs' is demonstrably false:

*In many cases, so-called immigrant occupations already have Americans working alongside foreigners. There are plenty of unemployed Americans who might take those jobs if they began opening up after a halt in immigration, especially if the workplace culture once again became American- and English-speaking. That was demonstrated in 1995 when immigration agents conducted massive arrests of illegal aliens, removing thousands from plants in six southern states. Within days, the majority of those vacant jobs were filled with American workers. "That says something about the oft-heard claim that illegal workers take only the jobs legal workers don't want," said Doris Meissner, head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Tens of millions of dollars in annual income was transferred overnight from aliens to Americans. If there were plenty of Americans to take the jobs illegal aliens had, one has to assume there would be even more willing to do the work that legal immigrants do.*



Oh so you mean that when immigrants leave, Americans will in fact take those jobs? Who could've guessed right? The book further explains:

*For other "immigrant jobs," there may not be a sufficient number of Americans who would take them as they now exist because the pay and working conditions are so deplorable-the meatpacking industry being a notable example. The presence of immigrants keeps those wages and conditions from improving to the point where Americans would take the jobs. Without the availability of new immigrants, though, employers would have to make innovations and improvements in their employment, and in doing so, most would find enough Americans to keep their business running. "You hear the myth so much that immigrant farmworkers take jobs Americans won't do, that Americans won't clean the streets, clean the rooms, wash the dishes," says economist Marshall Barry of the Labor Research Center of Boston and Miami. "But that isn't true. If you pay right, Americans will do everything."*

So, absolutely, immigration are the reason Americans do not want these occupations. Employers will gladly hire cheaper workers since it allows them to keep more of their earnings, even if the working conditions are poor. It makes sense when viewed rationally. Outside of the states that are flooded with migrants, who do you believe is doing all of the 'unwanted jobs'? Do you believe that states with few immigrants long for a flood of them so that someone can finally fill all of the positions that no natives will take? Perhaps the more probable reality is that in places with few migrants, natives are doing such occupations. [Gallup \(2015\)](#) conducted a poll in 142 nations on whether or not immigrants take wanted or unwanted employment, and the results are as follows:

**Table 301 : Perceptions about migrant job competition by country income***Perceptions About Migrant Job Competition Vary by Country Income*

Do you think immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country do not want (e.g., low-paying or not prestigious jobs), or mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want?

	<b>Global</b>	<b>High*</b>	<b>Upper middle*</b>	<b>Lower middle*</b>	<b>Low*</b>
Mostly take jobs that citizens in this country do not want	27%	58%	19%	20%	23%
Mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want	29%	17%	28%	34%	35%
Both (volunteered)	18%	17%	19%	17%	23%
Don't know/Refused	26%	8%	35%	29%	19%

Based on surveys in 142 countries between 2012 and 2014

\*World Bank income classifications

GALLUP®

Notice that the lower the income of those surveyed, the more likely they were to believe that immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want, and in fact, from the 'upper middle' category all the way to 'low', a greater percentage of people think that immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want rather than jobs that citizens in this country do not want. Why would this be the case?

Oh, I'm not sure. Perhaps it's because individuals with lower salaries are the most affected by competition with immigrants for jobs? Just a guess, but they're more likely to have firsthand experience with immigration jeopardizing their chances than the big affluent fucker living in his house. In reality, we don't have to guess, because [Camarota et al. \(2018\)](#) investigated the percentage of native population within vocations, and the following is a summary of the key findings:

*Of the 474 civilian occupations, only six are majority immigrant (legal and illegal). These six occupations account for 1 percent of the total U.S. workforce. Moreover, native-*

*born Americans still comprise 46 percent of workers in these occupations. There are no occupations in the United States in which a majority of workers are illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants work mostly in construction, cleaning, maintenance, food service, garment manufacturing, and agricultural occupations. However, the majority of workers even in these areas are either native-born or legal immigrants. Only 4 percent of illegal immigrants and 2 percent of all immigrants do farm work. Immigrants (legal and illegal) do make up a large share of agricultural workers — accounting for half or more of some types of farm laborers — but all agricultural workers together constitute less than 1 percent of the American work force.*

*Many occupations often thought to be worked overwhelmingly by immigrants (legal and illegal) are in fact majority native-born: Maids and housekeepers: 51 percent native-born*

*Taxi drivers and chauffeurs: 54 percent native-born*

*Butchers and meat processors: 64 percent native-born*

*Grounds maintenance workers: 66 percent native-born*

*Construction laborers: 65 percent native-born Janitors: 73 percent native-born*

*There are 65 occupations in which 25 percent or more of the workers are immigrants (legal and illegal). In these high-immigrant occupations, there are still 16.5 million natives — accounting for one out of eight natives in the labor force. High-immigrant occupations (25 percent or more immigrant) are primarily, but not exclusively, lower-wage jobs that require relatively little formal education. In high-immigrant occupations, 54 percent of the natives in those occupations have no education beyond high school, compared to 30 percent of the rest of the labor force.*

*Natives tend to have high unemployment in high-immigrant occupations, averaging 9.8 percent during the 2012-2016 period, compared to 5.6 percent in the rest of the labor force. There were a total of 1.8 million unemployed native-born*



*Americans in high-immigrant occupations. The stereotype that native-born workers in high-immigrant occupations are mostly older, with few young natives willing to do such work, is largely inaccurate. In fact, 34 percent of natives in high-immigrant occupations are age 30 or younger, compared to 29 percent of natives in the rest of labor force. Not all high-immigrant occupations are lower-skilled. For example, 38 percent of software engineers are immigrants, as are 28 percent of physicians. A number of politically influential groups face very little job competition from immigrants (legal and illegal). For example, only 7 percent of lawyers and judges and 7 percent of farmers and ranchers are immigrants, as are at most 9 percent of English-language reporters and correspondents.*

So, after decades of widespread migration and globalization, it appears that indigenous continue to make up a significant proportion of workers in 'unwanted jobs'; are they truly 'unwanted'? Indeed, the whole idea of immigrants taking 'unwanted jobs' is absurd, because presumably, the United States was doing just fine before it decided to import millions of Africans and Hispanics, and certainly, Northeast Asian countries like China, South Korea, and Japan are doing fine without having to heavily rely on the 'generous' assistance of immigrants to fill in some of the more grueling and unpleasant work.

In most European countries, natives are a majority in most jobs, and even among low-income job, construction workers etc.

## 4.11 — Indians in the US


In this section I'm going to talk about indian immigration the US as it's usually viewed as a positive immigration.

### *A model minority?*

First-order economic effects and crime are two examples of essentially apolitical topics that dominate American immigration discourse. In general, immigrants reduce wages, raise housing costs, displace Americans from productive hubs, are recipients and not contributors to public money, and, at least in the second generation and beyond, commit more crimes than white Americans. These facts fuel the public's anti-immigration sentiment. They are all closely related to the issue of national IQ, which is by far the best indicator of economic growth and is lowered by immigration in all Western nations with the exception of Australia, even though these terms are rarely used.

However, Indian immigration to the US is exempt from these problems. To begin with, Indian-Americans are a huge fiscal asset because they have the highest household income of any group in the nation, especially considering America's highly progressive tax and transfer system.

## Median Household Income in the United States by Ethnic Group



Source: US Census Bureau, 2013-15 American Community Survey | [equitablegrowth](#)

Furthermore, Indians are more than just white-collar workers who can be replaced. They are disproportionately overrepresented among innovators in general and founders of STEM companies in particular. About 5% of California's immigrant population is Indian, yet they found 20% of the state's immigrant-founded businesses. Additionally, despite making up less than 1% of the US population, foreign-born Indians account for about 7.5% of American innovators.


Indian-American crime rates are almost certainly significantly lower than the national or white average, even though there isn't much data on criminal offenses by national origin.

Asian-Americans have the lowest crime rates of any racial census category in the US, and Indians have exceptionally high socioeconomic status even among Asians.

Indian-Americans pay taxes, create STEM businesses, innovate, make a lot of money, and don't commit many crimes. Fantastic! Why don't we bring them all inside?

### ***Indian immigration is very selective***

Two factors make the present Indian-American population exceptionally well-chosen. First off, most Indian-Americans are first-generation legal immigrants who entered the country on [skilled-labor visas](#). There hasn't been much time for the chain migration based on family reunification that most US immigrants employ because the Indian diaspora is still relatively young.



Second, there are set annual caps per nation under US immigration policy. Given that India is the world's largest nation, immigration from larger nations is therefore by nature more selective.

As a result, Indian-Americans are chosen to an almost ridiculous extent. Several perspectives on this:

Of first-generation Indians, 34% hold a bachelor's degree and 43% hold some kind of postgraduate degree. Less than one percent are not high school graduates. This comes from a nation where only 29% of people complete high school and only 11% have any kind of higher education.

36% of the top 1000 Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) graduates leave their country, with 65% of them relocating to the US. This percentage rises to 62% among the top 100.

The best evidence points to a national IQ of about 83, despite the poor quality of testing data from India. The average second-generation Indian immigrant in the US has an IQ of 102 after one regression to the mean.

It's reasonable to assume that the median Indian immigrant in the US is between one and two standard deviations higher than the Indian norm, which is comparable to Harvard graduates in India.

Indian overperformance is not here to stay because of this amazing level of selection. Without intentional measures to stop it, the following three shifts in Indian immigration are very likely to occur:


A change in the primary immigration driver from skilled worker visas to family reunification, which is already the case for the majority of groups. Indian-Americans will soon drop from being significantly above the Indian average to at most slightly above it.

A decrease in selectivity due to an increase in the total number of Indian immigrants. Indian immigration is growing quickly each year, and there is a strong pro-Indian lobby, as will be covered later. There is an almost limitless pool of potential migrants, and immigration usually leads to more immigration.

illegal immigration and remigration from other nations, including Canada, Britain, and the United Arab Emirates (getting around the country caps), as opposed to the preponderance of legal immigration from India. Although the majority of Indian

immigrants enter the country legally, estimates for 2019 put the number of illegal Indians at about [500,000](#).

This will get worse if Indian immigration is purposefully increased.



The effects of these kinds of shifts are evident in other Anglosphere nations like Canada and Britain, where Indians are flooding into the [unofficial, borderline Third](#)



World "Deliveroo" sector and their IQ is around 93. In these nations, where housing prices have skyrocketed and GDP per capita has been declining recently, India is the top source of immigration. And that would just be the start. Canada's and Britain's immigration policies are also quite selective. The average immigrant will get closer to the Indian mean as Indian immigration increases. The receiving nation becomes more like the sending nation as a result of immigration. Should America be like India?

### *A political problem*

However, that isn't the main argument against Indian immigration. In a post-Malthusian world, economics is positive-sum; everyone could benefit, or at the very least, the winners could make more money than the losers. Politics is a zero-sum game, though. Involving other political actors diminishes your influence over the current and future state of society, which has a finite amount. Therefore, anyone bringing in external political players should ensure that they are in line with their own goals.


Immigrants will influence the politics of the nation they are entering unless they share exactly the same political beliefs. One of the most left-wing groups in the United States is the Asian community, and Indians in particular are extremely left-wing.

Vote For President By Ethnicity In 2016





Examining India, the most significant nation historically governed by Indian elites, offers another perspective on the political ramifications of elite Indian immigration to the United States. India, which had a quasi-socialist economy known as the License Raj, was a Soviet ally in all but name during the Cold War. Additionally, India's reservation system, which predates the American version by roughly 20 years, is the oldest and most comprehensive affirmative action system in the world. The political beliefs of Indian-Americans are influenced by the legacy of socialism and affirmative action.



***Ethnic conflict***

In addition to their ideological convictions, Indians frequently harbor animosity toward white people. According to [NYU professor Suketu Mehta](#), who is Indian by birth:

*It is every migrant's dream to see the tables turned, to see long lines of Americans and Britons in front of the Bangladeshi or Mexican or Nigerian Embassy, begging for a residence visa.*


Does this man seem like the kind of person you would want among the elite of America?

In a well-known lecture at Yale titled "[The Psychopathic Problem of the White Mind](#)," psychiatrist Aruna Khilanani declared with pride that she wanted to kill white people.

*I had fantasies of unloading a revolver into the head of any white person that got in my way, burying their body, and wiping my bloody hands as I walked away relatively guiltless with a bounce in my step. Like I did the world a fucking favor.*

Moving from anecdotes to polling data, [79% of non-Hindu Indians and 70% of Hindus think that white supremacy poses a serious threat](#) in the US. The clear implication is that minorities must cooperate to weaken white people in order to protect themselves because they are the "enemy."

## White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin




@ryanburge  
Data: CES 2020

It should come as no surprise that [Asians are the most likely racial group to believe that the United States' decreasing white population is a good thing.](#)

FIGURE 26  
**Experience with Discrimination**

*In the last 12 months, have you personally felt discriminated against because of any of the following reasons?*



N = 1,200 U.S. adult residents

SOURCE: 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey.

In the last 12 months, [half of Indians](#) say they have experienced personal discrimination. In the second generation, this percentage rises to 64%. Since the United States is involved, it is implied that white people are thought to be at fault, which naturally calls for a reaction.

Indian ethnic conflict extends beyond the perception of white people as possible competitors. With a caste system so rigid that it has preserved nearly perfect endogamy for thousands of years, India is the epicenter of ethnocentrism in the world. [Caste discrimination is pervasive](#) and perfectly reasonable; organizations that do not exclude qualified members of other groups see their institutions taken over and are subsequently excluded as well. This environment of fierce, zero-sum ethnic competition has shaped Indians' culture and genetic makeup, and they carry that mentality with them when they travel overseas. In the US, it's not uncommon for businesses to hire Indians to gain an advantage over rivals, only to have them take over and exclude non-Indians.

This kind of ethnic conflict has a negative-sum effect; it not only hurts non-Indians but also, over time, causes the market to become ethnically fragmented, which threatens meritocratic hiring and the expansion of businesses. Although it is essentially the norm in multiethnic market societies, India is the most extreme example of this phenomenon. Among the greatest advantages the West had over its rivals was a society where practically anyone could find employment in most niches.

Ethnic conflict can theoretically be resolved through intermarriage, in contrast to political, cultural, or skill differences, which are [extremely persistent and never truly go away](#). However, despite the large sex-skew and relatively small number of Indians, Indian-Americans [have the lowest rate of intermarriage](#) of any major immigrant group in the United States; 80% of them marry other Indians. Therefore, it is unlikely that this ethnic conflict will end anytime soon.

This phenomenon alone would support immigration restrictions, even if all Indians shared the same political views as the rest of America. Any reasonable immigration policy

should at the very least refrain from admitting people who have strong historical grievances against your race, tend to dislike you, and network among themselves.

### ***Why Indians?***

In addition to being left-wing and frequently anti-white, Indian immigrants are also significantly less intelligent than the typical American if the current strict level of selection is loosened. However, none of this is specific to them, as some of the charts I've included demonstrate. Why then concentrate on Indians instead of non-Western immigration in general?

Indian-Americans are more than just affluent and intelligent. They have a great deal of institutional power, particularly for a group that has largely only been around for the last 25 years. In the political sphere, the vice president is half Indian, and Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy, two of the main contenders in this year's Republican Party primary, are Indian. Obama came very close to appointing Sri Srinivasan, an Indian, to the Supreme Court.


By placing dozens of Indians in important positions, as Joe Biden would say, Indian-Americans are taking over the nation. Given that Indians have already ascended to the presidency in Britain and Ireland, it is conceivable that we will have a president of Indian descent within the next ten years, though this is unlikely.

Indians are better at becoming leaders in big organizations than East Asians. Indian CEOs eventually take over the leadership of American tech giants, which are typically founded by white Americans. As was the case with Twitter prior to Musk's takeover, they currently lead some of America's biggest and most significant corporations, such as Google (and YouTube), Microsoft, IBM, and World Bank Group—none of which were founded by Indians.

Indians have a great deal of power because of the companies' enormous significance to American life, especially Google, which is the country's top

information source. They also have access to enormous sums of money and have strong ties to the government.

Hindus are the least concerned group in the nation about tech censorship, which is not surprising given that they are disproportionately the censors.



@ryanburge  
Data: Nationscape January 2021

Take into consideration that large corporations like Google and Microsoft are run by members of an extremely left-wing and anti-white ethnic group when reading about their egregious anti-white practices, such as their policy of paying nonwhite employees more than white employees with the same title.

Numerous influential groups advocate for Indian immigration in particular. The Indian ethnic lobby itself is the first. The Indian ethnic lobby is powerful because it is [the second largest diaspora group](#) in the United States and [one of the wealthiest](#) and [most politicized](#). The foreign Indian ethnic lobby supports this; the Indian government strongly promotes immigration because it sees [its diaspora as a covert tool to influence the US](#) and other Western governments (for example, by including [increasing immigration as a prerequisite for a free trade deal with Britain](#)). India's position carries weight because of its significance in containing China, which gives it significant leverage over the US.

Big Tech comes in second. As was already mentioned, Indians are in charge of [many of the biggest and most influential tech companies in the US](#). Those that aren't usually have a large number of Indian workers in important roles like hiring. Additionally, in order to reduce their own labor costs, tech companies typically advocate for more H1B visas (approximately 75% Indian). These businesses have a lot of power and don't hesitate to [influence political decisions](#).

Third are pro-immigration commentators such as [Alec Stapp](#), who frequently argue that Indian immigration should be increased for the reasons outlined in the article's first section. These individuals aren't very common, but because they are knowledgeable, full-time political activists, they have a disproportionate amount of influence.

Due to these lobbying efforts, immigration restrictionists' natural equilibrium (without a conscious focus on Indians) is to increase legal Indian immigration while eradicating illegal immigration and severely limiting low-IQ immigration, as has been done in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain. The mainstream in the Republican Party [currently supports Indian immigration](#), and the [mainstream in other Anglosphere](#) countries is even more interested in Indians.



This stance ultimately backfires because highly skilled Indians ascend to positions of authority and seek to remove any limitations that earlier administrations imposed on the immigration of low-skilled Indians.

Last but not least, India is the most populous and impoverished nation in the world. It is essentially a limitless pool of prospective immigrants that could change America's demographics on its own.

### ***Conclusion***

Indian immigration poses a greater threat than that of any other nation and requires attention due to its elite status, potential population, and special interest lobbying. If restrictionism is not implemented, the United States' default course is similar to that of Canada. Institutions in America that are run by a group of people who share anti-white sentiments become even more anti-white than they already are. When the floodgates to India are eventually completely opened, we experience all of the negative effects of both elite replacement and low-IQ immigration.

However, this is not a given. Even though they make up only about 1% of the population, Indians are already very powerful, so restrictionism is still possible. In the United States, Indians are not deeply rooted. About 72% were not born in the US, and 44% have been here since 2010. The majority of people are foreign-born, even among citizens. Native-born Indians have some of the lowest fertility rates of any ethnic group in the nation, and they are not escaping persecution of any kind. Without continuous foreign reinforcements, Indian-American power will soon reach its zenith and then begin to wane.

A future immigration restrictionist government should prioritize taking the first steps in this direction by eliminating the H1B visa and drastically reducing the number of student visas available to Indian nationals. If there is a chance to completely overhaul the American legal immigration system, it should be done so with the intention of halting additional Indian immigration.

***Conclusion of Part II***

We have seen that immigrants generally harm the economy, are more prone to crime, deteriorate the education, drain the social welfare systems and that specific countries tend to be recurrent in exporting harmful immigrants.

These gaps between natives & immigrants also persist through generations, favoring a genetic cause rather than an environmental cause to these disparities.

We have also seen that country of origin IQ is a very robust predictor of how well immigrants from specific countries do in specific variables. This is due to IQ being an accurate predictor of intelligence and social success and it being hereditary.

## Part III — The cost of diversity


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We have already discussed the economic & criminal impact of immigration, explaining that this cannot be resolved as it is a direct consequence of the populations we welcome being much less intelligent than us. In this part I will discuss the social problems that mass immigration causes.

### Chapter 5 — The numerous drawbacks of diversity

#### 5.1 — Limited language proficiency

Another problem of immigration lies in the fact that immigrants have a limited proficiency in the language of their welcoming country. About half of the 41.3 million immigrants living in the United States in 2013 spoke English only mediocly. From 1990



to 2013, immigrants accounted for nearly all of the growth in the population with limited English proficiency ([Migration Policy Institute, 2015](#)):

For illustration, let's compare New Hampshire and California. According to [Perez et al. \(2023\)](#), 10.5 million immigrants made up 27% of California's total population in 2021, while 80,000 immigrants made up 6% of New Hampshire's population ([American Immigration Council, 2020](#)). California's literacy rate is 76.9%, while New Hampshire's is 94.2% ([World Population Review, accessed 2023](#)). The fact that immigrants typically reside in ethnically majority communities, which lessens the need for them to learn English in order to engage with society, helps to explain part of this trend ([Beckhusen et al., 2012](#)).

Even worse, as the number of immigrant students rises, more ESL classes are required, schools become overcrowded, which reduces the resources available per student, and uncomfortable situations arise where majority-foreign language-speaking immigrant students isolate native-born students. Instead, this American taxpayer money is being used to accommodate immigrants who will arrive in greater numbers if stricter immigration restrictions are not put in place. This money could have been used to improve the educational performance of native-born students. From a study called "[The Effect of Immigrant Children on Public Schools in America](#)":

*The California State Department of Education estimates that 16 new classrooms will need to be built every day, seven days a week, for the next 5 years. That's effectively one new school per day! The number of teachers will need to be doubled within ten years, meaning that 300,000 new educators will be required." That's just in California!*

This is the size that would be required to adequately accommodate immigrant children in our educational system, and it is not feasible at all. The need for taxpayer dollars is not limited to students; adult immigrants who struggle with English will probably need English instruction at nearby community colleges, for which local

governments must set aside funds. American taxpayers must pay for translation services at facilities like hospitals so that immigrants can receive care, so these are not the only burdens that non-native English speakers place on public services.

As a remedy, some have suggested bilingual education, but that is a bad idea. First of all, it costs a fortune. According to the same study, teaching a child a foreign language costs almost twice as much per person as teaching a native-born child English. Foreign language instruction is provided to around 5% of students in Californian school systems ([Mitchell, 2017](#)). Well, that's amusing. You say California? Once more, what was their literacy rate?

According to a [1998 Atlantic article](#), it appears to be a significant waste of public funds and to be ineffective as well:


*The final report of the [Hispanic Dropout Project](#) (issued in February) states, While the dropout rate for other school-aged populations has declined, more or less steadily, over the last 25 years, the overall Hispanic dropout rate started higher and has remained between 30 and 35 percent during that same time period ... 2.5 times the rate for blacks and 3.5 times the rate for white non-Hispanics. About one out of every five Latino children never enters a U.S. school, which inflates the Latino dropout rate. According to a 1995 report on the dropout situation from the National Center on Education Statistics, speaking Spanish at home does not correlate strongly with dropping out of high school; what does correlate is having failed to acquire English-language ability. The NCES report states, For those youths that spoke Spanish at home, English speaking ability was related to their success in school.... The status dropout rate for young Hispanics reported to speak English 'well' or 'very well' was ... 19.2 percent, a rate similar to the 17.5 percent status dropout rate observed for enrolled Hispanic youths that spoke only English at home*

Therefore, speaking English fluently is the problem, not even speaking a foreign language at home. Putting numbers aside, the argument against bilingual education is much simpler: a nation shouldn't have to kiss up to foreigners. Why is bilingual education

necessary? Immigrants should be responsible for assimilating into our society, not the other way around. They should at least be able to communicate in the local language if we are to allow them to enter the nation at all. Consider how great it would be to live in a community where no one speaks the same language.

Consider attempting to persuade the Japanese or Turks that they ought to accommodate foreigners and teach bilingualism for their benefit. They would make fun of us. Only those of us in the West are so incredibly perplexed and dimwitted as to be able to defend such a ridiculous thing. Hypocrisy at its best, these same individuals (white liberals) will tell you that diversity is great but then flee from it for their own personal gain ([Kaufmann, 2023a](#), [2023b](#)).

I would like to conclude by saying that, despite what I have said thus far, the problem is probably understated. This is due to the fact that assessing English proficiency in immigrants, particularly Hispanic ones, is more difficult than one may first believe. When self-assessment is used, the results are frequently more positive [and look like this](#):



Self-assessment has the drawback of being an inaccurate way to measure proficiency, and Hispanics in particular have a propensity to significantly overestimate their level of English proficiency. This is illustrated by the fact that they perform significantly worse than their self-assessed levels would indicate when proficiency is assessed through the actual administration of tests ([Richwine, 2017](#)).

**Table 302 : Average score of immigrant groups minus average score  
 of natives on the PIAAC literacy test**

**Table 4. Average Score of Immigrant/Hispanic Groups Minus Average Score of All Natives on the PIAAC Literacy Test**

	Hispanic Immigrants		Non-Hispanic Immigrants		All Immigrants		Hispanic Natives	
Speaks English:	<i>d</i>	Percentile	<i>d</i>	Percentile	<i>d</i>	Percentile	<i>d</i>	Percentile
Very well or well	<b>-0.90</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-0.14</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-0.38</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>-0.30</b>	<b>37</b>
Very well	<b>-0.42</b>	<b>33</b>	0.00	48	-0.08	45	<b>-0.21</b>	<b>40</b>
Well	<b>-1.15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>-0.43</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-0.79</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-0.89</b>	<b>18</b>
Not well	<b>-2.05</b>	<b>3</b>	N/A	N/A	<b>-1.87</b>	<b>4</b>	N/A	N/A
All English abilities	<b>-1.43</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-0.22</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-0.77</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-0.35</b>	<b>35</b>

**Source:** CIS analysis of the 2015 PIAAC Literacy Test.

*d* is the group's average score minus natives' average score, in standard deviations (SDs). For example, Hispanic immigrants who speak English "well" score 1.15 SDs lower than all natives.

Percentile is the place where the group's average score falls on the distribution of all native scores. For example, the average Hispanic immigrant who speaks English "well" scores better than about 13 percent of all natives.

Immigrants are foreign-born; natives are U.S.-born.

N/A indicates insufficient data.

**Bolded** figures are significantly different from the average native score with at least 95 percent confidence.

**Table 6. PIAAC English Literacy Test Scores of Second and Third-Plus Generation Americans**

**Table 303 : PIAAC English literacy test scores by generation of immigrants**

Below basic (%)	<b>22</b>	<b>10</b>	15	<b>24</b>	15
Elite (%)	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	15	<b>8</b>	14
<i>d</i>	<b>-0.36</b>	<b>0.29</b>	0.01	<b>-0.32</b>	0.00
Percentile	<b>34</b>	<b>60</b>	48	<b>36</b>	48

**Source:** CIS analysis of the PIAAC Literacy Test.

2nd generation means born in the U.S. with at least one foreign-born parent; 3rd-plus generation means born in the U.S. with two U.S.-born parents.

"Below basic" means scoring at or below Level 1, the lowest of the five skill levels.

"Elite" means scoring at Level 4 or 5, the highest of the five skill levels.

*d* is the group's average score minus the average score of all natives, in standard deviations.

Percentile is the place where the group's average score falls on the distribution of all native scores.

**Bolded** figures are significantly different from natives with at least 95 percent confidence.

It


must be really odd that there is always a Spanish option available whenever I use an automated phone call service if immigrants were actually learning English so well and there was nothing to worry about. This fact is suspicious. Naturally, if you don't assume that Hispanics and pro-immigration advocates are being entirely truthful about their proficiency, the answer is fairly straightforward.



## 5.2 — Assimilation


It goes without saying that language is not the only problem; increased immigration will also make assimilation more challenging. According to [Advani & Reich \(2015\)](#), a minority group will assimilate and absorb the dominant culture only if its population is small. However, if its population reaches a critical mass, they will self-segregate and preserve their unique culture instead of assimilation. This is consistent with the observation that the most segregated cities in the US are frequently the most racially diverse ([Silver, 2015](#)).

As a result of the racial demographic shifts that have been taking place in the United States for a number of decades, assimilation appears to be at an end at this time. Regardless of whether you ask respondents to describe [their perceptions of Americans](#) or just ask them to select [their level of patriotism](#), the first is that patriotism has been declining in the United States:



## In 1948, 50% of Americans thought most other Americans were generous. Today, just 12% do.

Different people have different impressions of what sort of place the United States is, based on what they see going on around them, things they read and hear, and so on. Which of these words might you use to describe your impression of the way most Americans are today? Select all that apply. (% of U.S. adult citizens)



Note: Responses of "don't know" are not included in this chart. The 1948 question ended with, "Can you tell me which of the words on the list you might use to describe your impression of the way most Americans are today?"


**YouGov**

YouGov: June 7 - 14, 2023 (1,000 U.S. adult citizens)  
Fortune/Roper: October 13 - 25, 1948 (3,986 U.S. adults)

According to [Cannon \(2021\)](#) and [YouGov \(2022\)](#), white Americans continue to be the most patriotic racial group. They are also the most likely to feel extremely patriotic.

### Self-Described Patriotism of the American Electorate

Do you consider yourself to be very patriotic, somewhat patriotic, not very patriotic, or not at all patriotic?



June 21-24, 2021; N=1,762 Registered Voters

Source: RealClear Opinion Research - [Get the data](#)

**Table 304 : Patriotism by race****1. How Patriotic**

How patriotic toward the United States would you consider yourself to be?

	Total	Gender		Age (4 category)				Race (4 category)			
		Male	Female	18-29	30-44	45-64	65+	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Very patriotic	45%	47%	43%	20%	35%	54%	68%	55%	29%	30%	16%
Somewhat patriotic	31%	33%	30%	36%	36%	32%	21%	28%	30%	37%	53%
Not very patriotic	10%	8%	13%	22%	11%	7%	5%	9%	12%	15%	16%
Not at all patriotic	5%	5%	6%	9%	9%	2%	1%	4%	9%	4%	6%
Not sure	4%	4%	4%	6%	7%	4%	1%	3%	13%	2%	4%
Prefer not to say	4%	3%	4%	6%	3%	2%	4%	1%	7%	12%	5%
Totals	99%	100%	100%	99%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Unweighted N	(997)	(459)	(538)	(204)	(226)	(355)	(212)	(722)	(121)	(84)	(70)

Inquiries may arise regarding whether these disparities are solely due to factors other than race, such as gender, age, and income. When these factors are taken into account, [Trende \(2021\)](#) discovered that the difference in patriotic sentiment between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites as the reference group is -17% for Hispanics, -48% for Blacks, and an overwhelming -89% for Asians.


We might anticipate that the idea of assimilation itself will become distorted as the nation's demographics shift. Republicans typically hold an idealistic view of minorities embracing Christianity, small government, traditional family values, etc., but these are no longer the prevailing values of the nation; instead, leftism is, and immigrants only serve to accelerate leftism by endorsing it. For instance, Asian Americans used to be [net Republicans](#), but that is no longer the case. Even Republican minorities, though, do not always hold the same views as white Republicans.

This is demonstrated by the fact that Hispanic Republicans are more likely than [non-Hispanic Republicans to support gun control](#) and amnesty, or that black Republicans are more likely than white Republicans to believe that discrimination against them exists and is a significant barrier ([Cox et al., 2022](#) vs. [Horowitz et al., 2019](#)).

---

## Black Republicans are less likely than Black Democrats to have strong ties to Black identity and other Black people

*% of Black adults who ...*



Note: Black adults include those who say their race is Black alone and non-Hispanic, Black and at least one other race and non-Hispanic, or Black and Hispanic.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Oct. 4-17, 2021.


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## White Democrats much more likely than white Republicans to say discrimination is a major obstacle for black people

*Among whites who say being black hurts people's ability to get ahead, % of **Republicans** and **Democrats** saying each is a major reason why black people in our country may have a harder time getting ahead than white people*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Jan. 22-Feb. 5, 2019.  
"Race in America 2019"


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## Hispanic Republicans are less likely than non-Hispanic Republicans to prioritize protection of gun rights

*% who say it is more important to ...*



Note: Share of respondents who didn't offer an answer not shown.

Source: National Survey of Latinos conducted Aug. 1-14, 2022, and survey of U.S. adults conducted June 27-July 4, 2022.


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## Among Republicans, Hispanics less likely than non-Hispanics to say increasing border security and deportations are important immigration policy goals

% who say \_\_\_ is a *very important* goal for U.S. immigration policy



Note: Order of policy goals based on responses from Hispanic Republicans and Republican-leaning independents.

Source: National Survey of Latinos conducted Aug. 1-14, 2022.


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Hispanic Republicans' support for amnesty in practice means that they favor allowing more migrants over those who are more likely to have leftist leanings. This is especially concerning because a significant amount of political alignment is due to selection (Hispanics with various characteristics and dispositions self-select into either party). Many people overlook this cost of immigration, despite the fact that it is equally problematic. The very real long-term cost of granting citizenship to immigrants and then having their offspring vote for civilization extinctionism is ignored, even if you accept that immigrants boost the economy. Since Asians have a remarkable ability to absorb shitlibbery, as I mentioned earlier, [you end up with this](#):

#### Policy Preference: Spending on Law Enforcement


Please tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?...Local governments should shift spending from law enforcement to programs that address economic and social issues for minorities



(Source: 2022 Asian American Voter Survey, N=1,610 respondents)

### Policy Preference: Gun Control

Please tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?...We should have stricter gun laws in the United States




(Source: 2022 Asian American Voter Survey, N=1,610 respondents)



### Policy Preference: Immigration

Please tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?...Undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity to eventually become U.S. citizens




(Source: 2022 Asian American Voter Survey, N=1,610 respondents)



**Policy Preference: Affirmative Action**

Do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs designed to help Black people, women, and other minorities get better access to higher education?



(Source: 2022 Asian American Voter Survey, N=1,610 respondents)

**APIA VOTE**  
ASIAN & PACIFIC ISLANDER AMERICAN VOTE

**A A P I**  
DATA

**ADVANCING JUSTICE**  
A A P I

Yes, you do recall that a minority does not necessarily share the views of white Republicans just because they identify as Republicans? The same findings, categorized by party identification, apply to Asians as well:

**Table 305 : Should spending shift to social issues for minority instead of law?**

**Table 525:** Q13Q13A: Now I'm going to read you a list of statements. For each statement, please tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?...Local governments should shift spending from law enforcement to programs that address economic and social issues for minorities

Q13Q13A	Asian Am	Democrat	Independent, Other party, Don't think in terms of party	Republican
Disagree strongly	15%	6%	20%	27%
Disagree somewhat	9%	6%	11%	9%
Neither agree nor disagree	24%	23%	23%	27%
Agree somewhat	24%	28%	22%	19%
Agree strongly	25%	35%	19%	16%
Don't know	3%	2%	4%	2%
N	1555	706	549	300

**Table 307 : Should gun laws be stricter ?**

**Table 527:** Q13Q13C: Now I'm going to read you a list of statements. For each statement, please tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?...We should have stricter gun laws in the United States

<b>Q13Q13C</b>	<b>Asian Am</b>	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Independent, Other party, Don't think in terms of party</b>	<b>Republican</b>
Disagree strongly	9%	6%	9%	15%
Disagree somewhat	4%	3%	4%	7%
Neither agree nor disagree	9%	7%	8%	16%
Agree somewhat	16%	10%	17%	24%
Agree strongly	61%	74%	59%	36%
Don't know	1%	1%	1%	1%
N	1557	707	550	300

**Table 306 : Should undocumented immigrants have the opportunity to become US citizens ?**

**Table 528:** Q13Q13D: Now I'm going to read you a list of statements. For each statement, please tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?...Undocumented immigrants should have the opportunity to eventually become U.S. citizens


<b>Q13Q13D</b>	<b>Asian Am</b>	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Independent, Other party, Don't think in terms of party</b>	<b>Republican</b>
Disagree strongly	13%	5%	17%	27%
Disagree somewhat	10%	7%	13%	12%
Neither agree nor disagree	16%	15%	15%	19%
Agree somewhat	28%	27%	28%	30%
Agree strongly	31%	44%	25%	12%
Don't know	1%	1%	1%	0%
N	1552	706	548	298

**Table 540:** Q16: Next, do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs designed to help Black people, women, and other minorities get better access to higher education?

Q16	Asian Am	Democrat	Independent, Other party, Don't think in terms of party	Republican
Favor	69%	82%	60%	56%
Oppose	20%	10%	27%	30%
Don't know	11%	8%	13%	14%
N	1519	696	535	288

We can see that among Asian Republicans, 35% are in favor of transferring funds from law enforcement to minority programs, 60% are in favor of stricter gun laws, 42% are in favor of giving illegal immigrants a path to citizenship, and 56% are in favor of affirmative action. Those figures are self-explanatory.

Additionally, we are aware that non-white people exhibit more in-group bias than white people ([Goldberg, 2018b](#)):




Additionally, white liberals are the only group that exhibits negative in-group bias, meaning that they despise their race. Perhaps this is why they are so eager to promote open borders—not out of altruism, but rather out of self-hatred. When you hear these individuals advocating anti-nativist discourse, it's important to bear this in mind. According to survey results, nonwhites are significantly more likely than whites to consider their race to be central to their identity, which is also consistent with the fact that white people exhibit the lowest levels of in-group bias overall among the races (Horowitz et al., 2019):



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## Black adults are more likely than other groups to see their race or ethnicity as central to their identity

*% in each group who say being \_\_\_\_ is extremely or very important to how they think about themselves*



\*Asians were interviewed in English only.


Note: White, black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are non-Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Jan. 22-Feb. 5, 2019.


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
The data demonstrating that white people are the only racial group more likely to identify with their nation than with their race is also consistent with this. With the exception of blacks, who identify much more strongly, non-whites identify with their race and the nation about as strongly as white liberals ([Data Depot, 2023](#)).








The attitudes that different races have toward one another may be more worrisome. On average, white people rated all races equally, making them the most egalitarian race. In contrast, all other races rated themselves highest, white people rated themselves lowest, and nonwhite people rated the various races more differently than white people ([Zigerell, 2021](#)).




The lack of bias among whites is demonstrated even in experimental evidence where the perceived race of the subject that the white participants believe they are dealing with is manipulated. One could argue that these results cannot be trusted because white Americans may be lying on surveys. On the other hand, pro-black bias is moderately present among Black participants ([Zigerell, 2018](#)).



Any sane person would be able to see by now that modern immigration is overwhelmingly detrimental. Supporting immigration would be suicide for Americans, who have far too positive and benevolent views about them and their country. I will address some of the frequently used flawed arguments in favor of immigration because there will always be some people who refuse to accept this obvious fact.

### 5.3 — Social trust

The effect of immigration on social trust in society is a less frequently discussed but no less significant consideration. Happiness ([Xu et al., 2023](#)), economic growth ([Bjørnskov, 2022](#)), and even higher government quality ([Stephen, 2000](#)) are all predicted by higher social trust. People who are surrounded by people who are similar to them, whether that similarity be religious, ethnic, ideological, or otherwise, are more likely to be trustworthy and cooperative, according to common sense. We would therefore anticipate that diversity would undermine social trust, and this is precisely what we observe. The most well-known examples of this can be found in Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American*, which discusses the decline in civic engagement in the US. The more diverse a community is, the less people vote and volunteer, the less confident people are in their local governments, local leaders, and local news media, the less they donate to charities and work on community projects, the fewer close friends and confidants they have, the less happy they feel, and the more time they spend watching television because that's all you can do when you have no friends, he found, even after controlling for socioeconomic status. Neighbors trust each other roughly half as much in the most diverse communities as they do in the most homogeneous ones. In other words, diversity was more likely to cause people to "bowl alone," as the book's title implies. [Goldberg \(2018a\)](#) confirms the findings once more, demonstrating a 0.66 correlation between demographic shifts and the gradual erosion of trust:



[Putnam \(2007\)](#) also discovered that diversity negatively predicts trust between neighbors, trust between races, and even trust within the same race, even after adjusting for socioeconomic status (this needs to be emphasized because leftists will always try to use it as their go-to explanation for everything). The large number of foreigners, with whom traitors could work together against them and the group's fitness, is feared by the local populace.

Figure 4. Racial Homogeneity and Trust of Neighbours.






Figure 3. Racial Homogeneity and Inter-racial Trust.




Scatter plot showing the relationship between Mean Herfindahl index of census tract ethnic homogeneity (X-axis) and Trust own race 'a lot' (%) (Y-axis). The plot includes a positive linear regression line and numerous labeled data points representing various US locations. The R-squared value for the linear fit is 0.578.

Location	Mean Herfindahl index (approx.)	Trust own race 'a lot' (%) (approx.)
East Bay (CA)	0.48	19.5
North Minneapolis	0.49	19.0
San Francisco	0.50	20.5
Silicon Valley	0.52	30.0
Los Angeles	0.55	25.0
Houston	0.58	24.0
San Diego	0.57	27.0
Denver	0.59	26.0
Boston	0.61	22.0
Yakima	0.62	26.0
Phoenix	0.63	29.0
Seattle	0.62	35.0
Charlotte	0.64	27.0
Greensboro	0.65	25.0
Atlanta	0.66	24.0
Winston-Salem	0.68	27.0
Chicago	0.69	27.0
Baton Rouge	0.71	25.0
National	0.73	31.0
Birmingham	0.74	33.0
Boulder	0.75	37.0
Kalamazoo	0.77	34.0
St. Paul	0.78	37.0
Rochester	0.79	36.0
Syracuse	0.80	35.0
Central Oregon	0.82	36.0
Indiana	0.83	33.0
Cincinnati	0.84	32.0
York (PA)	0.86	34.0
East Tennessee	0.87	32.0
Rural West Virginia	0.89	37.0
Fremont (MI)	0.90	40.0
Montana	0.91	42.0
New Hampshire	0.92	44.0
Bismarck	0.92	50.0
Lewiston (ME)	0.94	41.0
Rural South Dakota	0.96	62.0

The detrimental effects of racial diversity are also evident throughout Europe ([Lancee & Dronkers, 2008](#); Ziller, 2014), and Putnam's findings have also been confirmed in the Netherlands and the UK ([Laurence & Bentley, 2015](#)). More recently, [Dinesen et al. \(2020\)](#) compiled 87 studies on the subject of diversity and social trust and discovered that diversity had a negative relationship with social trust even after adjusting for contextual socioeconomic deprivation (e.g., mean income or unemployment), individual socioeconomic status (e.g., income or education), contextual crime, and individual minority status (e.g., being of immigrant origin or belonging to a racial minority).




But the harm doesn't end there; diversity increases conflict in addition to eroding social trust. In his book *Ethnic Conflicts: Their Biological Roots in Ethnic Nepotism*, researcher Tatu Vanhanen examined 176 nations and discovered that diversity, or what he refers to as "ethnic heterogeneity," accounts for about 66% of the variation in the estimated scale of ethnic conflict.



*Figure 4.1. The results of regression analysis of EEC on EH in the group of 176 countries*




It is unlikely that higher living standards will be able to counteract the increased levels of ethnic tensions caused by diversity. Vanhanen also attempted to determine whether a nation's socioeconomic development would lessen ethnic conflict, and the answer was partially yes. However, the relationship was so weak that socioeconomic development, which he measured using the Human Development Index, only explained 16% of the variance in the estimated scale of ethnic conflict.



*Figure 4.2. The results of regression analysis of EEC on HDI-2010 in the group of 176 countries*

Only about 5% of the variance was explained by democratization, making it an even weaker variable.



*Figure 4.3. The results of regression analysis of EEC on ID-2010 in the group of 176 countries*

However, some people continue to try to refute this notion in spite of the overwhelming evidence. According to a widely accepted theory called "contact theory," greater diversity will eventually lead to more interactions between ethnic groups, which will lessen prejudice and mistrust between them. This may sound lovely, but in practice, it isn't true. [Last \(2022\)](#) examined this and noted that the purported mediating role of contact on racial diversity and trust vanishes once publication bias is taken into account.

### *People like people who are similar to them*

One of the first things you will learn in a social psychology course is that people prefer those who are similar to them. People who are similar to each other get along better, become better friends, and make better spouses. Two types of evidence, correlational and experimental, support this position.

The consistent observation that friends and spouses are more alike than average in almost every way is the correlational evidence ([Bryne, 1971](#); [Myers, 2008](#), pg 399). Furthermore, spouses are less likely to file for divorce and are generally happier in their marriages when they are more similar ([Luo and Klohen, 2005](#); [Bryne, 1971](#); [Caspi and Herberner, 1990](#)).

The experimental evidence is fairly simple: before a meeting, researchers measure a variety of characteristics of people to see if pre-meeting similarity can predict who will end up liking whom. Numerous studies have found that people tend to like each other more when they are more alike (Bryne, 1971; [NewComb, 1961](#); Lee, 1996; Myers, 2008, pg 400).

These results contradict the intuitively sound notion that "opposites attract." Why wouldn't you be less likely to like someone if they don't share your interests, sense of humor, or other characteristics?

The part that genetics plays in this is perhaps less clear than the idea that attraction is bred by similarity. In particular, the genetic similarity between friends and spouses is

higher than usual ([Christakis and Fowler, 2013](#); [Domingue et al, 2014](#); [Rushton 1989](#)). Given that all phenotypes are partially heritable and that these friends and spouses have more phenotypical similarities than the norm, you might assume that this is to be expected. However, there is more to it than that: friends and spouses tend to share traits more closely when they are more heritable ([Rushton 1989](#)). Furthermore, according to [Russell and Wells \(1991\)](#), marital success is more accurately predicted by similarities in highly heritable traits than by similarities in less heritable traits. Furthermore, when asked to imagine someone who is similar to them in a variety of ways, people are more likely to predict that they will like the person they are imagining if the similarities are heritable (Abraham 1993).

### ***Ethnic diversity kills social cohesion***

Therefore, people who are similar to them tend to get along with each other. similar to co-ethnics. It is common for people to live close to, marry, and attend church with people of the same ethnicity. And during the first few months of life, this preference for coethnics starts to develop. To put it another way, people tend to associate with people of their own race when left to their own devices. It should come as no surprise, then, that a plethora of social science data indicates that ethnic diversity negatively impacts interpersonal harmony.

[Putnam \(2007\)](#) is the most well-known study in this field. Putnam, a Harvard political scientist, examined the relationship between ethnic diversity and different metrics of "social capital" by examining a set of more than 40 U.S. regions. The more ethnically diverse a region was, the lower its level of social capital was, he discovered using a regression model that held regional differences in age, poverty, crime, and other variables constant. Putnam discovered that the more diverse a community was, the less people voted, the less people donated to charities, the less people worked on community projects, the fewer friends people had, and the less people trusted their

neighbors and the media. Most remarkably, individuals in diverse communities reported lower levels of life satisfaction and general happiness.

Using data spanning 18 years, [Laurence and Bentley \(2015\)](#) replicated Putnam's findings in England and discovered that residents reported less neighborhood engagement and neighborhood liking the more diverse the neighborhood.

[Lancee and Drunkers \(2008\)](#) examined ethnic diversity and social capital in the Netherlands in a similar manner. They made use of information from a Danish survey that inquired about respondents' levels of neighbor trust. The study discovered that the more ethnically diverse a person's postal code, the less trust they had in their neighbors, even after adjusting for differences in gender, income, marital status, and educational attainment.

To be fair, this is not the case for every study. According to [Meer and Tolsma's \(2014\)](#) meta-analysis of 90 prior studies, 50% of the U.S. studies replicated Putnam's findings, while 20% did not. The remaining thirty percent were categorized as providing "mixed evidence." In comparison, only 26% of European studies were able to replicate Putnam's findings, 15% were unable to do so, and 59% of studies provided conflicting results.

Although these replication rates are low, they can be readily explained. A half-White, half-Black neighborhood and a half-British American, half-German American neighborhood would be considered equally diverse according to the methods used in many of these studies to measure ethnic diversity. More precisely, ethnic diversity was frequently quantified as the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals from the same area would belong to different ethnic groups if the list of potential ethnic groups comprised more than 100 ethnic groups rather than just 3-6 "races." Therefore, rather than focusing on racial diversity, many of these studies examined ethnic diversity. Ethnic groups are far more similar genetically (and phenotypically) than races, which makes this problematic. The second issue with this meta-analysis is that many of the studies that were cited took into account the ways in which social cohesion could be harmed by ethnic diversity. For

example, many studies adjusted for crime and income inequality. Such an analysis's findings will be deceptive since ethnic diversity may erode social cohesiveness by increasing income inequality and crime. Therefore, after adjusting for the effects of diversity, many of these studies came to the conclusion that diversity had no effect. Studies that genuinely adjusted for racial diversity are the worst of these. For example, both Andersen and Milligan (2011) and Aizlewood and Pendakur (2005) discovered that, after adjusting for the effects of variation in the size of the non-white population, ethnic diversity had either a positive or no effect on social cohesion, while the percentage of a neighborhood that is non-white had a negative correlation with its level of social cohesion! Meet and Tolsma classified a number of these studies as "failed replications." Considering how heavily the odds were stacked against successful replications, it should come as no surprise that less than 25% of studies were unable to replicate Putnam's findings.

In a number of "micro contexts," it has also been shown that social cohesiveness and ethnic diversity are negatively correlated. For example, [Martinez and Dougherty \(2013\)](#) examined 75,000 individuals in almost 400 church congregations and discovered that belonging to the dominant racial group of the congregation was associated with higher levels of church participation, friendships, and a sense of belonging. Similarly, people said they had a better experience in businesses when they dealt with a member of their own race as the customer service representative ([Montoya and Briggs, 2013](#)). Lastly, [Dinesen and Sonderskov \(2015\)](#) discovered a negative correlation between social trust and ethnic diversity within an 80-meter radius of an individual's home.

In addition to the previously provided correlational and longitudinal data, experimental evidence has shown a negative relationship between prosocial behavior and ethnic diversity. Glaeser et al. (2000), for example, asked participants to play an economic "game" in which one person sent another a certain amount of money. After

that, the money was doubled, and the recipient had the opportunity to return a portion of the money to the original donor. This is a very basic indicator of fairness, trustworthiness, and altruism. When paired with a person of a different race, the recipients sent back significantly less money, according to the researchers. Indeed, more than 90% of the instances where no money was returned involved pairs of people of different races.

Diversity reduces people's trust, according to studies on the positive effects of diversity in the workplace. This was the conclusion of [Levine and Stark \(2015\)](#), who showed that because members of diverse groups were less likely to trust or like one another, they were less prone to groupthink and conformity, which is why they were able to come up with better answers to hypothetical problems in their studies. Even though it might help with problem solving, this is clearly bad for society.

## 5.4 — Diversity & innovation

This has got to be the most ridiculous argument made in favor of more open immigration out of all of them. It has previously been stated that the rate of innovation in the United States will rise if we flood this nation with millions upon millions of people. I doubt I would need to explain that this is utterly absurd, but since so many people take this seriously, here we are. When talking about this aspect of the immigration debate, it is common to hear claims that immigrants are more inventive or that they can start their own businesses and thereby boost the American economy by generating new jobs. First, we should ask what types of jobs pro-immigration advocates mean when they say this. It's strange that when it comes to immigrants, there is no distinction made between jobs that pay well and jobs with third-world working conditions. According to [Camarota \(2012\)](#), if self-employment is a gauge of entrepreneurship, the rates of entrepreneurship among native-born people and immigrants are remarkably similar, at 11.7% and 11.5%, respectively. Therefore, this argument can be easily rejected because immigrants aren't very inventive. Race should also be examined because "immigrants" are not a homogenous group; therefore, we must examine the types of immigrants and their traits in particular. This is how it appears if we do this:



Table 308 : Self-employment by country of origin

Korea	26.2%
Canada	23.6%
United Kingdom	16.9%
Russia	16.5%
Peru	16.1%
Germany	15.7%
Cuba	14.0%
Colombia	13.2%
Vietnam	12.9%
Guatemala	11.9%
India	9.9%
China	9.2%
Mexico	8.9%
Ecuador	7.7%
Dominican Republic	6.3%
El Salvador	6.2%
Philippines	5.8%
Haiti	5.8%
Honduras	4.9%
Jamaica	3.1%
<hr/>	
Europe	17.7%
Middle East	16.9%
South America	14.4%
South Asia	12.8%
East Asia	11.6%
Sub-Saharan Africa	10.4%
Caribbean	8.2%
Mexico	8.9%
Central America (Excludes Mexico)	7.9%
<hr/>	
All Immigrants	11.5%
Hispanic	9.3%
Black	7.9%
Asian	11.6%
White	18.5%
<hr/>	
Has More than 10 employees	12.9%
Average Self-Employment Income	\$22,372
Part-Time Self-Employed <sup>1</sup>	1.3%
<hr/>	
All Natives	11.7%
Hispanic	6.0%
Black	5.1%
Asians	9.3%
White	13.2%
<hr/>	
Has More than 10 employees	16.7%
Average Self-Employment Income	\$21,116
Part-Time Self-Employed <sup>1</sup>	2.1%

As expected, Black and Hispanic people have the lowest rates of innovation, as you can see, but if you just lump all immigrants together, you can obviously act as though this uncomfortable reality doesn't exist. However, since we don't know what jobs the various races are self-employing in, self-employment might not be the best indicator of innovation. Thankfully, [Nager et al. \(2016\)](#) used R&D awards and triadic patents for large tech companies, life sciences, information technology, and material sciences to examine the issue of innovation in the US in greater detail. Europeans were the most inventive of the foreign-born, with Asians coming in second.

**Table 309 : % of innovators by region of birth**

**Table 8: Foreign-Born Share of U.S. Population and of Survey Respondents, by Region of Origin**

Region of Origin for Foreign-Born Innovators	Innovation Sample	United States Population	Rate of Representation
Europe	12.6%	1.5%	8.2
Asia	17.8%	3.9%	4.5
Mexico	0.4%	3.9%	0.1
Other Latin America	1.2%	3.2%	0.4
Other	3.5%	0.9%	3.8
<b>Total Foreign-Born</b>	<b>35.5%</b>	<b>13.5%</b>	<b>3.8</b>

White people continue to be more inventive than Asians among those born in the United States, Blacks and Hispanics lagging far behind :

**Table 310 : Innovators by ethnicity, US-born**

<b>Ethnicity of U.S.-Born Innovators</b>	<b>Percent of Innovation Sample</b>	<b>Percent of United States Population</b>	<b>Rate of Representation</b>
<b>White</b>	59.6%	59.2%	1
<b>Asian</b>	1.5%	1.8%	0.8
<b>Black or African American</b>	0.3%	11.3%	0.0
<b>Hispanic</b>	1.4%	11.5%	0.1
<b>Two or More Races</b>	0.9%	1.9%	0.5
<b>Native American</b>	0.9%	0.9%	1.1
<b>Total U.S.-Born</b>	64.5%	86.5%	0.7

Asians who were born in the United States are actually underrepresented in the field of innovation. Some may be surprised by this because Asian Americans tend to report higher IQs and better socioeconomic well-being metrics than white people. However, genius is more than just IQ (see [Dutton, 2022](#); [Kirkegaard, 2022](#)), which is consistent with the fact that Europeans invented the great majority of scientific discoveries ([Murray, 2003, 2.6](#)).


Therefore, your first instinct should be to ask, "Immigrants from where?" whenever you hear something like, "Immigrants were responsible for (insert high-skilled good thing)". due to the fact that race cannot be disregarded. Let's use the widely quoted assertion that "immigrants founded (insert whatever high percentage sounds good for your narrative) of Fortune 500 companies" to further illustrate this point. You have undoubtedly heard of this claim before. Would you guess where the majority of the founders are from based on a [comprehensive analysis](#) of their demographics published by the Center for American Entrepreneurship in 2017? The Anglosphere and Europe. Of the 116 first-generation immigrants who have founded Fortune 500 companies, 106 are from Europe or the Anglosphere (Canada, New Zealand, Australia), 6 from East Asia, 1 from South

America (a white Brazilian Jew), 1 from Central America (a white Cuban), 2 from Africa (one is Elon Musk, white, and the other is an Indian born in Zambia).

Even though there may be apparent benefits at the moment, it is crucial to keep in mind that immigration may eventually lower overall innovation (though even that is debatable). Using patents as a stand-in for innovation, [Faulk \(2016b\)](#) discovered that a nation's percentage of white people positively predicts the number of patents per 1,000 white people.

**Table 311 : Patents and % European in Latin countries**

Country	% European	Patents in 2013	Population	White Population	Patents per 1k whites
Brazil	82	4959	204.5	167.7	0.0296
Mexico	37	1210	121	78.44	0.0154
Columbia	60	251	48.2	28.92	0.0087
Argentina	97	643	41.45	40.21	0.0160
Peru	29	73	31.2	9.05	0.0081
Chile	49	340	18	8.82	0.0385
Portugal	98.1	647	10.5	10.3	0.0628
Spain	98.5	3026	46.8	46.1	0.0656



Data demonstrating that both white and black students do worse on standardized tests than when attending predominantly white schools are also included in the article, along with information about the direct and indirect waste of resources caused by diversity. Furthermore, the idea that racial diversity fosters innovation is simply untrue. Referring back to [Last \(2022\)](#), diversity has a negative relationship with overall performance and innovation:

In the same article, he also demonstrates that, when comparing nations with similar levels of economic development, greater ethnic diversity predicts lower future economic growth. There is also evidence that diversity is linked to higher suicide risks, negatively predicts schoolchildren's mental and emotional health, and is a better predictor of crime than factors like poverty, region, population density, age, unemployment, education, and divorce rates—all of which, I imagine, are not very good for innovation.

Racial diversity and team creativity and innovation are unrelated, according to a more recent meta-analysis ([Wang et al., 2019](#)). Therefore, at best, it is ineffective for people of different races to work together, and at worst, the team as a whole is less productive. What about different values? That appears to be more promising, though, as research indicates

that a variety of values can foster greater creativity ([Ramasamy & Yeung, 2016](#); [Wang et al., 2019](#)). Ironically, this is only true when ethnic polarization is low ([Zhan et al., 2015](#)), which makes real-world applications more challenging. The same is true of cultural diversity. For my part, I find it hard to understand how any sane person could believe that diversity fosters innovation. Is there a positive multiplier effect that I'm not aware of when a group of people from different ethnic backgrounds collaborate? If yes, could someone please show me the formula in mathematics?

Table 312 : Relationship between creativity and diversity

**Table 3**  
**Relationship Between Team Performance and Race, Sex, or**  
**Age Diversity**

Variable	<i>k</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>SWMr</i>	<i>SWSD</i>	VAR %	95% CI		$\rho$	<i>SD</i> $\rho$	VAR A %	<i>k<sub>fs</sub></i>
Race	31	5,298	-.10	.13	34.70	-.14	-.05	-.11	.12	34.28	31
Lab	15	886	.02	.11	100.00	-.03	.08	.02	.00	100.00	—
Variety	9	693	.00	.11	100.00	-.06	.07	.00	.00	100.00	—
Field	16 <sup>a</sup>	4,412	-.12	.12	25.25	-.18	-.06	-.13	.11	24.56	23
Variety	16	4,412	-.12	.12	24.57	-.18	-.06	-.13	.11	24.86	23
Efficiency	2	1,428	-.04	.02	100.00	-.07	-.01	-.04	.00	100.00	—
General	9	3,994	-.12	.11	16.74	-.20	-.05	-.14	.12	17.06	13
performance											
Creativity and innovation	3	205	-.17	.16	55.09	-.34	.01	-.18	.12	55.38	—
Sex	38	6,186	-.06	.11	47.14	-.09	-.02	-.06	.09	47.57	8
Lab	11	644	.01	.12	100.00	-.06	.09	.02	.00	100.00	—
Variety	6	365	.06	.07	100.00	.00	.11	.07	.00	100.00	—
Field	27	5,542	-.07	.11	40.90	-.11	-.02	-.07	.09	41.01	11
Separation	3	279	-.01	.14	57.26	-.17	.14	-.01	.10	57.26	—
Variety	23	5,155	-.08	.10	44.50	-.12	-.04	-.09	.08	44.69	14
Efficiency	4	1,689	-.08	.05	83.29	-.14	-.03	-.09	.02	83.99	2
General	12	4,354	-.05	.10	27.57	-.11	.00	-.06	.09	27.65	—
performance											
Creativity and innovation	5	380	-.15	.16	47.88	-.29	.00	-.16	.13	48.10	—
Age	40	10,953	-.02	.12	25.43	-.06	.01	-.03	.11	25.44	—
Lab	5	307	.06	.13	88.70	-.06	.18	.07	.05	88.76	—
Field	35	10,646	-.02	.12	23.44	-.07	.01	-.03	.11	23.45	—
Separation	7	688	.04	.19	28.56	-.10	.18	.04	.18	28.57	—
Variety	7	321	.01	.08	100.00	-.06	.07	.01	.00	100.00	—
Disparity	20	9,562	-.03	.11	16.78	-.08	.02	-.04	.11	16.80	—

## 5.5 — Diversity harms students

This section examines the ways in which diversity affects the quality of school experiences for kids.

### *School performance and cognitive ability*


Numerous lines of evidence indicate that cognitive ability is negatively impacted by ethnic diversity.

First, White people performed better on intelligence tests when their interviewer was White rather than Black, according to [research](#) from the [University](#) of Dartmouth.

Second, a seven-year [study](#) of about 3 million students revealed that when their teacher was of their own race, the students performed better on tests. Even when poverty, prior grades, and other potentially confounding factors were taken into account, this remained the case.

Thirdly, grades are significantly impacted by the racial makeup of a school's student body, according to a [2015 analysis](#) published by the US Department of Education. The study looked at students in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grades and how differences in the percentage of Black students in a school predicted the performance of Black and White students on standardized tests. The study discovered a negative correlation between the percentage of Black students and their academic achievement.





Both Black and white students experienced this detrimental effect on their test scores. It is more likely than not that racial diversity lowers academic achievement in light of these three lines of evidence.

### ***Bullying***

Additionally, white students who attend ethnically diverse schools are more likely to engage in violent, aggressive, and even criminal behavior.

Take, for example, the findings of [a study](#) that looked at more than 5,000 students in grades 6–8 from three nearby counties on the US East Coast. The main conclusions of the study are listed below.

Bullying by someone of a different race is twice as common among students in diverse schools as making friends with someone of a different race.

Bullying is more common among Black and Hispanic people than among white people (this finding has also been confirmed in other studies).

Bullies are more likely to target White people than Black or Hispanic people.

White people are more likely to bully Black people than Black people are to bully White people (and the same basic pattern is true for White people and Hispanic people).


Black people are the worst at bullying White people interracialy, with Hispanic people coming in second.

Almost nothing can be done to close the bullying offense gaps between Hispanics, Blacks, and Whites when socioeconomic status, family conflict, neighborhood disorder, low school achievement, depression, and respect for conventional authority are taken into account.

Blacks and Hispanics are much more popular at school as a result of bullying than White people are because of bully status.

Diversity in schools raises the likelihood that any student, regardless of race, will experience bullying.

Black, white, and Hispanic group differences cannot be explained by any of the "culture only" theories proposed to explain racial differences in bullying rates.



Students in fourteen Midwest primary schools were the subject of [another study](#). It was discovered that compared to children who attended predominantly White schools, White children who attended racially diverse schools were significantly more likely to become victims of bullying.

However, according to the same study, Black children were more likely to experience bullying in schools with a large Black student body than they were to experience the same kind of abuse in schools with a white student body. Even after adjusting for variations in poverty, these results remained consistent.

Finally, [research](#) on bullying conducted in Britain has confirmed that non-White people (except for East Asians) are more likely to be bullies than White people. Additionally, this study discovered that the disproportionate rates of bullying between Black people and white people in Britain were very similar to those in the US.

### ***Classroom behavior***


There is a comparable pattern in the data regarding classroom behavior. According to [US Department of Education data](#), Black and Hispanic students are significantly more

likely than white students to be suspended from school and to participate in on-campus or off-campus fights. According to data from the [Department of Education](#), racial tensions, verbal abuse of teachers, classroom disorder, student disrespect for teachers, gang activity, the prevalence of cult or extremist groups on campus, and the number of serious violent incidents reported on campus all rise as a school's racial diversity increases.

### *Adolescent crime*

Additionally, evidence supports our understanding of racial disparities in juvenile criminality. For example, according to [data from the US Department of Justice](#), Black ages 10 to 17 had twelve times the likelihood of being arrested for robbery, seven times the likelihood of being arrested for murder, four times the likelihood of being arrested for aggravated assault, three times the likelihood of being arrested for theft, property crime, and weapons violations, 2.4 times the likelihood of being arrested for rape, 1.6 times the likelihood of vandalism, and 1.4 times the likelihood of being arrested for drug abuse as of 2014.

**Arrests per 100,000 juveniles ages 10-17, 1980-2014**



Regretfully, Hispanics are viewed as white by the US Department of Justice. Therefore, when calculating its statistics on youth arrests, the DOJ includes Hispanics in the White category. Because of this, the actual crime gap between young Black and White people is most likely much greater than these figures suggest.

Thankfully, this same flaw does not affect the National Crime Victimization survey, which prevents bias in the criminal justice system from affecting the validity of the results. When it comes to the problem of interracial crime, this data demonstrates that there are startling group differences. Black people were the attackers in 85% of violent crimes involving Black people and White people in 2013, [according to the NCVS](#) (White people were only 15%). Additionally, [the NCVS](#) discovered that the likelihood of a violent crime being committed by a Black person against a White person was 27 times higher than the opposite. Furthermore, Hispanics were roughly eight times more likely than White people to commit violent crimes against them.

Therefore, the more Black and Hispanic students enrolled in a school, the greater the likelihood that White students will encounter bullying, disruptive classroom behavior, violence, and criminal activity.

### ***Diversity and social cohesion in schools***

It should come as no surprise, then, that studies on ethnic diversity in schools reveal that it negatively impacts students' social lives. For example, [a team of researchers](#) under the direction of Stanley Rothman thoroughly examined how diversity affected discrimination and school satisfaction and came to the following conclusion:

*As the proportion of Black students [in a school] rose, student satisfaction with their university experience dropped, as did their assessments of the quality of the educational environment and the work ethic of their peers. In addition, the higher the enrollment diversity, the more likely students were to say they personally experienced discrimination... The same pattern of negative correlations between educational benefits*

*and increased Black enrollment also appeared in the responses of faculty and administrators.*

Although researchers discovered that "diversity appears to increase complaints of unfair treatment among White students without reducing them among Black students," proponents of school diversity frequently claim that diversity makes Black students feel more at ease in their educational environment.

It's also important to note that schoolchildren have a very bad history of forming interracial friendships as a result of forced integration. An [extensive study](#) that examined how desegregation affected interracial friendships in Riverside, California, came to the following conclusion:

*after five years of desegregation, and, after most of the fourth to sixth-graders had been desegregated from the beginning of their schooling, minority children were less likely to be chosen as friends by Whites than at the beginning of desegregation.*

Lastly, [one study](#) discovered that a student's risk of suicide is considerably increased if they attend a school with a high minority population, regardless of race. This implies that sending White children to diverse schools will significantly raise their relative risk of suicide, as White people are already at a higher risk than other groups.

### ***Conclusion***


In conclusion, the pertinent empirical data shows that ethnic diversity in schools has detrimental effects on social cohesiveness and cognitive ability. It also increases the likelihood that children, particularly White students, will be bullied, experience a chaotic school environment, and be the victims of violent crimes.

## 5.6 — How good are ethnically diverse countries ?


It's common knowledge that ethnic diversity is a positive thing. We should therefore anticipate that diverse nations are superior to homogeneous ones in a number of ways. Let's examine the accuracy of this expectation.

I used data on national wealth, life expectancy, and life satisfaction from the [2016 World Happiness Report](#), as well as data on ethnic diversity from [Alesina et al. \(2003\)](#), to investigate this question empirically. The likelihood that two individuals chosen at random from a country will not belong to the same ethnic group is the conceptual definition of ethnic diversity.

It turns out that a country's population is generally less satisfied the more ethnically diverse it is. According to standard criteria, there is a moderately strong negative correlation (-.40) between diversity and national life satisfaction across 129 countries.




Moreover, ethnically diverse countries are typically poorer. By traditional standards, there is a strong negative correlation (-.55) between national wealth and diversity across 129 countries.



And lastly, health. A country's life expectancy tends to be lower the more diverse it is. There is a very strong negative correlation (-.66) between diversity and life expectancy across 130 countries. Data on life expectancy was available for one more country than data on wealth or life satisfaction.





Diverse countries are typically less wealthy, happier, and healthier than homogeneous ones. However, correlations are evidence (not proof) of a causal relationship, even though these are merely correlations. Here's a quick summary of one tenable theory that explains the relationship between these variables and has evidence from multiple studies to support it:

Ethnic diversity diminishes interpersonal harmony, according to [experimental](#), [longitudinal](#), and [correlational](#) data. In turn, a person's social life is considered to be a significant factor in [determining](#) their level of [happiness](#). This could be the cause of the negative correlation between national life satisfaction and ethnic diversity.

Ethnic diversity also reduces group productivity, according to [experimental and correlational data](#). Additionally, [correlational evidence](#) demonstrates that people's preference for government control over the economy rises when ethnic diversity fosters mistrust of others. Both of these are conceivable ways that diversity could reduce a country's wealth.

A further decline in national life satisfaction may follow from this decline in national wealth.

To explain life expectancy, we don't need to make any additional assumptions. Diversity may have a negative correlation with life expectancy because national poverty and unhappiness are bad for people's health.

To make a strong case for allowing our country (or your country) to become more diverse, proponents of diversity must claim that these correlations are somehow misleading and offer a stronger explanation for them than I have here.

Naturally, they won't. Instead, they will use accusations of racism to try to stifle logical discussion. However, the truth is that diversity appears to be a national weakness rather than a strength, regardless of whether liberals label them racist.

We have a plethora of studies showing the several drawbacks of an ethnically heterogeneous society :

According to a 2015 [Danish study](#), trust was negatively impacted by ethnic diversity when there was a high level of ethnic diversity in the residential area immediately surrounding it, but not when it was farther away. According to this interpretation, "interethnic exposure" undermines trust.

A 2019 [meta-review](#) examines the body of research on the connection between social trust and ethnic diversity by conducting a meta-analysis and narrative review of 1,001 estimates from 87 studies. The review tests key claims from the literature on the connection between social trust and ethnic diversity, clarifies key concepts, and highlights relevant debates. The meta-analysis yielded a number of noteworthy findings. In every study, we discover a statistically significant inverse relationship between social trust and ethnic diversity. When examined in more local contexts, the relationship is stronger when neighbors are trusted :

*The researchers looked investigated whether “continued immigration and the corresponding growing ethnic diversity” have positive impacts on social unity, cohesion, and togetherness. In short, the study found that “continued immigration and corresponding growing ethnic diversity” exerts the exact opposite effect on society. The results mean that it undermines and degrades social cohesion, unity, and togetherness.*

According to a [2003 review of several studies](#), greater ethnic heterogeneity in a community is linked to detrimental effects on a number of factors, including voting, volunteerism, organization participation, and census response rate.

Higher ethnic heterogeneity decreased the amount of individual donations to private charities, according to a [2011 Canadian study](#).

Higher ethnic heterogeneity in a community was linked to lower life satisfaction, according to a [2004 UK study](#).

According to a [2016 UK study](#), people who leave for more homogeneous areas with more members of their own ethnic group tend to be happier, while those who stay in an area with more "diversity" feel unhappy and more socially isolated.

Higher levels of ethnic diversity in a community have been linked to an increased risk of depression, according to [several studies](#).

According to a [2012 UK study](#), living in an area with a lower proportion of people of the same ethnicity raised one's risk of developing psychosis.

According to a [2003 study](#), a nation's ethnic heterogeneity was linked to a higher suicide rate.

According to [a 2012 study](#), older people with greater ethnic heterogeneity had higher rates of cancer and cardiovascular disease. According to a [2016 study](#), for 91 countries under investigation, greater ethnic heterogeneity was linked to worse health outcomes.

According to a [2010 study](#), the nations with the highest scores on the "Environmental Performance Index" were those with "moderate" levels of ethnic diversity, and greater ethnic diversity was linked to worse environmental performance.

Higher ethnic diversity in a nation was linked to worse performance on the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), according to a [2010 study](#).

Higher ethnic heterogeneity in US states was linked to lower public spending on higher education, according to a [2017 study](#).

According to a [2016 study](#), lower innovation was linked to greater ethnic diversity.

[Increased corruption](#) has been linked to an area's ethnic heterogeneity.

## 5.7 — On race mixing

The notion that people of mixed races are "healthier," "stronger," or "more fit" is being promoted by a large number of people. They refer to this new mixed-race population as "stronger" and "superior" in an oddly aggressive manner. In contrast to the "folk" focus of racial nationalist groups, it appears to be a form of mixed-race supremacism, but it makes very little attempt to find actual evidence to support its assertions.

### *Outbreeding and inbreeding depression*

People are aware of "inbreeding depression," which is the phenomenon whereby individuals who are too genetically similar to one another are more likely to produce multiple copies of recessive alleles that would not normally be expressed.

These numerous copies often cause harm. This is due to the fact that they are only expressed in inbreeding situations, such as cousin marriages, and were never sufficiently expressed throughout history for evolution to act upon them and for natural selection to eliminate the harmful ones.

This leads to the expression of genes that would never "pass the test of evolution" in circumstances such as cousin marriages. Because dominant alleles had to pass the "test of evolution," harmful dominant alleles eventually died off, which is why dominant alleles are typically more advantageous. However, because recessive alleles are rarely expressed, they can persist and linger in the background.

The only actual way that race-mixing **could** be advantageous in a semi-objective sense is by preventing the expression of genes that couldn't withstand the test of evolution, which is by preventing inbreeding depression.

Another strange statement I hear is that mixed-race individuals possess all of the "best" genes from each race. Naturally, they don't really consider why each child, regardless of race, doesn't receive the "best" genes from each parent, but this is obviously absurd because mitosis and recombination don't offer a way to "pick" the "best" genes.

Outbreeding depression is less well-known, probably for political reasons. Outbreeding depression can manifest in a variety of ways. The [breakdown of "co-adaptive gene complexes"](#) is the one in question.

The genome's genes communicate with one another. Therefore, your gene variants are more than just an additive factor.

For instance, gene X may be advantageous to Europeans, but it may be detrimental to Africans due to its interactions with some of their gene variants.

I'm not saying that one effect is generally greater or less. The negative effects of excessive inbreeding and outbreeding are explained theoretically, and that's all I'm saying. However, the only mechanism that has gained public attention is the inbreeding depression, for reasons we can only speculate.

Furthermore, since both have a mechanism, we must examine the evidence of actual effects in addition to the suggested mechanisms.

### ***Mixed race life expectancy***

#### **Hispanics in the USA**

Now, if I were to make the case for the advantages of racial mixing, I would cite the [average lifespan of Hispanic Americans](#). In the US, the life expectancy for "Latinos" is 82.8 years, while it is only 78.9 years for white people, 74.6 years for black people, and 86.5 years for "Asians."

Regretfully, I haven't come across any reliable research that focuses on determining the life expectancy of people of mixed races. I did, however, discover the [genetic admixtures of Hispanics in a number of states](#), and I was already aware of the life expectancies of those individuals:

**Table 313 : Genetic admixture and life expectancy**

<b>State</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Mesoamerican</b>	<b>African</b>	<b>Life Expectancy</b>
<b>California</b>	47.325	40.58	12.095	83.2
<b>Nevada</b>	33.95	58.87	8.19	84.7
<b>Florida</b>	71.98	19.91	8.12	83.1
<b>New Jersey</b>	84.49	9.14	6.38	84.7
<b>Pennsylvania</b>	82.88	0.23	17	85.3

Since there is currently little data, I compared the life expectancy of Hispanics in each state to the size of their largest genetic component in order to test the race-mixing benefit hypothesis.

Furthermore, it was discovered that there was a 0.13 correlation between life expectancy and genetic homogeneity. Yes, there is a slight correlation based on just six data points, but I don't have to "prove" that there are no advantages to racial mixing. Hispanics appear to be a strong case for racial mixing at first, but when the more homogeneous Hispanic populations turn out to live longer, a problem arises.

Another issue is that we don't know the pure-blooded Mesoamericans' genetic susceptibilities to longevity. Just to give you some ideas, the average lifespan of white-asian hybrids is expected to be 82.7 years if there is no inbreeding or outbreeding depression. This is because the midpoint between whites and Asians in the US is 82.7. Given that Hispanics are much more white than Mesoamerican, the Mesoamericans must be even more genetically inclined to live longer than Asians, or maybe a mix of Mesoamerican and Hispanic genes contributes to Hispanics' healthier lifestyles.

Or maybe, as the long lifespans of Hispanics in Pennsylvania and New Jersey indicate, there is no genetic influence at all and behavior is the determining factor.

### **Brazil**

I came across [a study](#) about the life expectancies of mixed-race, white, and black people in Brazil. The following were the life expectancies at birth:

White Males: 71.1 years

Mixed Males: 71.08 years

Black Males: 70.11 years

White Females: 77.54 years


Mixed Females: 78.8 years

Black Females: 76.32 years

Alright, so mixed females typically outlive white females by 1.26 years. Mixed individuals in this study's sample lived an average of 0.72 years longer. Naturally, the indigenous admixture is the first issue; how long do native Brazilians with pure blood expect to live? If it is longer, we would anticipate that mixed people would outlive white people solely due to the effects of native admixture, without any "hybrid vigor" effects.



This image effectively depicts the life expectancies of white, black, and mixed people in Brazil:



This is an amazing graph that accurately depicts the life expectancies of every group in Brazil.

## Scotland

Oddly enough, Scotland was one of the few studies I could find on the life expectancy of mixed-race populations. The life expectancies of several groups in Scotland between May 2001 and April 2004 were examined in a paper that was published in the British Medical Journal. According to the study's authors, people of mixed races in Scotland had the lowest life expectancy of any group:

**Table 314 : Life expectancy at birth by race in Scotland**

**Table 1**

Life expectancy at birth, by sex and ethnic group in Scotland

	Males					Females				
	Total deaths	Total linked census 2001 population	Expectation of life at birth	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI	Total deaths	Total linked census 2001 population	Expectation of life at birth	Lower 95% CI	Upper 95% CI
Scotland										
White Scottish	65 115	1 949 485	74.7	74.6	74.8	73 875	2 138 645	79.4	79.3	79.5
Other White British	4455	160 235	78.9	78.6	79.2	4840	174 750	82.6	82.3	82.9
White Irish	965	20 340	75.0	74.0	75.9	990	23 160	81.0	80.2	81.8
Other White	800	29 945	77.2	76.4	78.1	675	35 710	82.0	81.3	82.8
Any Mixed Background	65	5310	73.0	70.2	75.8	60	5800	79.3	76.6	82.0
Indian	55	6450	80.9	78.4	83.4	40	5890	83.3	80.7	85.9
Pakistani	100	12 930	79.3	76.9	81.6	50	12 700	84.6	82.0	87.3
Chinese	55	6530	79.0	76.5	81.5	45	6670	83.4	81.1	85.7

Total deaths (3 years of deaths occurring between May 2001 and April 2004) and total Census 2001 linked numbers are rounded to the nearest five for disclosure reasons.

### *Mixed IQ*

Here we look at all the data we can to prove the point that mixed people have an IQ in between their parents' races. This essentially implies that race mixing as an East Asian or an European is generally not positive when done with people of less intelligent races (Africans, South Asians, American Natives, Aboriginal people...).

### **Minnesota Transracial (MTAS) 1992**

Sandra Scarr conducted the Minnesota Transracial Adoption Study, which followed a sample of adoptees to white families who were white, black mulatto, and

"Asian/Indian." Since we don't know the exact number of each, the "Asian / Indian" sample is meaningless. The scores were as follows:

**Table 315 : MTAS results**

<b>Group</b>	<b>IQ age 7</b>	<b>IQ age 17</b>	<b>Number</b>
<b>Biological White</b>	116.7	109.4	143
<b>Adopted White</b>	111.5	105.6	25
<b>Adopted Mulatto</b>	109	98.5	29
<b>Adopted Black</b>	96.8	89.4	101
<b>Adopted Asian/Indian</b>	99.9	96.2	21

Scarr observed that mulattoes who looked and identified as "black" and those who looked lighter did not have different scores. Regretfully, she did not provide the numbers.

Scarr eventually stated that the data could be used to support either side after first attempting to manipulate it to support an environmental hypothesis:

*The test performance of the Black/Black adoptees [in the study] was not different from that of ordinary Black children reared by their own families in the same area of the country. My colleagues and I reported the data accurately and as fully as possible, and then tried to make the results palatable to environmentally committed colleagues. In retrospect, this was a mistake. The results of the transracial adoption study can be used to support either a genetic difference hypothesis or an environmental difference one (because the children have visible African ancestry). We should have been agnostic on the conclusions*

### **Owen 1992**

In 1992, K. Owen traveled to South Africa and used Standard Progressive Matrices to test 1,056 Whites, 1,063 Indians, 778 Coloreds, and 1,093 Blacks who were 15 years old. The outcomes were:

**Table 316 : Progressive matrices results, Owen 1992**

	<b>White score</b>	<b>Indian score</b>	<b>Colored score</b>	<b>Black score</b>
<b>Set A</b>	11.46	10.91	10.63	9.6
<b>Set B</b>	10.56	9.94	8.78	6.25
<b>Set C</b>	8.87	8.31	7.16	5.28
<b>Set D</b>	9.04	8.5	7.37	4.93
<b>Set E</b>	5.34	4.33	2.75	1.59
<b>Total</b>	45.27	41.99	36.39	27.65
<b>IQ conversion</b>	100	92.23	78.99	58.31

Because I'm just setting the white score to 100 and converting each group's raw scores to IQ using the white standard deviation, which is 6.34, this scoring is especially harsh. Everyone's scores would be significantly higher if the mean and standard deviations were used for the entire population.

Owen illustrates the common outcome of mulattoes scoring in the middle of black and white scores. The [score breakdown by question](#), however, is more instructive.

The difficulty of the questions increases with each set, and you can see that there is hardly any racial difference in the first few questions. However, racial disparities increase with the difficulty of the questions.

This is the reason why the gap's size of "15 points" isn't always significant. Simply make the test simple if you want to cheat and get black students to score the same as white students. The black-white gap would be minimal if each question were as simple as the first six in set A.

Because Progressive Matrices are multiple-choice, you can make the test challenging without making it so difficult that everyone is guessing if you want to widen the racial gap. If you wanted to maximize the racial gap, questions like numbers 52 to 56 would do just that. After that, the racial divide disappears and everyone is left to speculate.

[Codwell 1947](#)

**Table 317 : IQ by race, Codwell 1947**

<b>Race</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>Number</b>
<b>White</b>	100	—
<b>Mulatto</b>	91	284
<b>Blacks</b>	87	176

**Rowe 2002**

In his 2002 analysis of Wave 1 of the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health, David Rowe examined the PVT scores for white, mixed, and black students, among other things. These were the data:

**Table 318 : IQ by race, Rowe 2002**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Verbal IQ</b>	<b>Number</b>
<b>Black</b>	93.6	4,271
<b>Mixed</b>	102.5	116
<b>White</b>	105	10,315

Despite having a very high mixed score, the study still fits the generalization of "intermediate race, intermediate IQ."

**Fernandez 2001**

[Maria Fernandez](#) examined the IQs of 10-year-old "Asians," Whites, Browns (mestizos), and Blacks in Brazil in 2001.

**Table 319 : IQ by race, Fernandez 2001**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Raw Score</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>Number</b>
<b>"Asian"</b>	38.5	104.3	186
<b>White</b>	35.5	100	735
<b>Brown</b>	25.2	85.1	718

**Black** 15.8 71.6 223

In order to determine the scores for the other groups, these scores take Fernandez's raw scores, set the white score to 100, and then use the white standard deviation.

### **Claassen 1990**

Classen examined 1,561 11–14-year-old South African schoolchildren. Their "General Scholastic Aptitude Test" subtest results were as follows:

**Table 320 : IQ by race, Claassen 1990**

<b>Race</b>	<b>/</b>	<b>White</b>	<b>/</b>	<b>White</b>	<b>/</b>	<b>Colored</b>	<b>/</b>	<b>Colored</b>	<b>/</b>
<b>Language</b>		<b>English</b>		<b>Afrikaans</b>		<b>English</b>		<b>Afrikaans</b>	
<b>Number</b>		405		341		353		462	
<b>Word</b>									
<b>Analogies</b>		18.55		14.39		14.37		11.86	
<b>Word Pairs</b>		15.56		15.36		12.08		10.75	
<b>Verbal</b>									
<b>Reasoning</b>		17.38		16.53		14.81		11.14	
<b>Number</b>									
<b>Problems</b>		16.22		15.23		14.36		10.74	
<b>Number</b>									
<b>Series</b>		18.22		17.61		16.5		13.58	
<b>Figure</b>									
<b>Analogies</b>		18.67		17.83		16.01		12.36	
<b>Pattern</b>									
<b>Completion</b>		17.97		16.89		13.89		10.88	
<b>Total</b>		122.57		113.84		102.02		81.31	
<b>Non-Verbal</b>		71.08		67.56		60.76		47.56	
<b>Verbal</b>		51.49		46.28		41.26		33.75	
<b>Total IQ</b>		104.2		100		94.34		84.42	
<b>Non-Verbal</b>									
<b>IQ</b>		102.95		100		94.3		83.23	
<b>Verbal IQ</b>		105.82		100		94.39		85.99	


### **Eyferth 1961**


"The Eyferth Study" is notorious for demonstrating that black people have IQs that are extremely similar to white people's once they are not exposed to the racist American environment and/or toxic black culture.

The study examined the IQs of bastards who were born to German women who had been sexually assaulted by US forces during the occupation at the close of World War 2.

Since most Blacks scored the two lowest grades in Army test scores, we can estimate that the bottom 30% of Blacks in the US Army were expelled for failing a mental test, the best estimate of the median IQ of US Army Blacks in 1945 is 90.77. Simply subtracting IQs below 77.14 (the bottom 30%) from a black IQ bell curve allows you to determine the area above 77.14, which occupies 35% of the area under the curve and ends at 90.77.

For your convenience, I've included a visual explanation of what I did.





The median and the mean are not the same because this is a truncated normal distribution instead of a normal distribution. The mean will be higher in this instance. Because I don't know how to determine the mean of the section of a normal distribution, I'm not sure how much higher. However, I'm using the median because I know it won't allow me to overestimate the black IQ in this sample.

However, "20 to 25 percent" of the "African" rapists in this study were actually North Africans. We can estimate the IQ of Indians in the UK, or at least their "genotypic IQ," to be 93 based on a conservative estimate.

What would we anticipate the mixed-race bastards' IQs to be, then? Given that the average IQ of German women is 100, we would anticipate that the illegitimates would have an IQ of 95.66 or 95.61, depending on the proportion of North Africans present, which averages 95.635.

Approximately 3% of white soldiers were turned away due to their low IQs, raising their IQ to about 101.



That is what any hereditarian would predict (or fairly close to it) based only on demographic data and population exclusion, without any particular knowledge of the rapists' IQs.

In contrast to what hereditarians believe the numbers should be, this is the famous Eyferth study that disproves the hereditarian doctrine:

**Table 321 : IQ by race vs hereditarian prediction**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Eyferth IQ</b>	<b>Hereditarian "Prediction"</b>
<b>White Males</b>	101	100.5
<b>White Females</b>	93	100.5
<b>Mixed Males</b>	97	95.6
<b>Mixed Females</b>	96	95.6

The low white female score is the only factor contributing to the low white score. As a thought experiment, the IQs of the African rapists, both Sub-Saharan and North African combined, would need to be 93, or at the very least, a "genotypic IQ" of 93, in order for the hereditarian prediction to match the Eyferth results of 96.5. Apart from the peculiar IQ of white women, Eyferth is more of a support for heredity than a challenge to it.

### **Rushton 2007**

[Philippe Rushton](#) examined university students in South Africa in 2007. His findings were as follows:

**Table 322 : IQ by race, Rushton 2007**

<b>Group</b>	<b>IQ</b>	<b>Number</b>
<b>East Asians</b>	116	23
<b>Whites</b>	113	398
<b>South Asians (Indians / Pakistanis)</b>	106	212
<b>Coloreds</b>	103	36
<b>Blacks</b>	98	887

Since admission to a university requires a specific IQ, we would anticipate a compression effect for Blacks and mixed black-whites (coloreds), as more Blacks will not be intelligent enough to get in than coloreds. However, despite this compression effect, we still see colored images that fall somewhere between black and white.

### Udry 2003

[Richard Udry](#) examined the PVT and GPAs of various racial groups and combinations as part of his analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health. This includes mulattoes, whites, blacks, Asians, and whites and Asians:

**Table 323 : GPA & PVT by race, Udry 2003**

Race	% with “high GPA”	% with “high PVT score”	Number
White	32.27	26.98	46364
White / Asian	37.58	23.08	583
Asian	43.16	20.99	4133
Mulatto	24.19	18.2	416
Black	15.45	7.94	13530

Although I could probably locate the raw scores and use them as additional IQ data, this data is not IQ data. The White/Asian hybrids are the most intriguing aspect of this situation, but the "high PVT score" of Mulattoes relative to Blacks is merely a rough confirmation of heretarian views on all of this.

White people score higher on PVT and lower on GPA than Asians, despite the hybrids being in the middle of both categories. Furthermore, on PVT, the W/A hybrids performed worse than the whites but better than the Asians, and on GPA, they performed better than the whites but worse than the Asians.

### Conclusion

All of the mixed races studies we found showed that the cognitive ability of mixed people to be between the two races they were a mix of.

### *Mixed marriages*

In the US, mixed-race couples are [2.34 times more likely](#) than non-white couples and 2.94 times more likely than white couples to experience mutual assault.

**Table 324 : Relationship between couple's racial status and characteristics**

IPV Event Characteristics	Interracial Couple vs. Ethnic Minority Monoracial Couple	Interracial Couple vs. White Monoracial Couple
	Odds Ratios (95% CI)	Odds Ratios (95% CI)
Mutual assault	2.36 (1.73-3.21)***	2.94 (2.00-4.31)***
Substance use	1.32 (0.99-1.75) <sup>ns</sup>	0.54 (0.39-0.73)***
Victim injury	1.37 (1.03-1.84)*	1.73 (1.25-2.40)**
Arrest	1.71 (1.30-2.25)***	2.18 (1.58-3.00)***
Prior abuse	2.60 (1.89-3.59)***	1.98 (1.38-2.82)***
Children present	0.81 (0.62-1.17) <sup>ns</sup>	1.84 (1.34-2.52)***

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Furthermore, [the CDC reports](#) that being interracial is of the most significant factor that raises the likelihood that a marriage will end in divorce :

**Table 325 : Variables with high probability of marriage disruption**

Criteria	Probability of disruption after 10 years
Anxiety disorder	.42
High School dropout	.42
Interracial	.41
No work at time of marriage	.40

### *Other health outcomes of race mixing*

#### **Prenatal and Birth Outcomes**

According to [research](#), children of mixed races may be more likely than children of both White parents to experience unfavorable birth outcomes, such as low birthweight, stillbirths and preterm births. Nonetheless, compared to children of both Black parents, this risk is lower. It appears that maternal race has a greater impact, indicating that the

mother's upbringing is important. One study, for instance, discovered that biracial couples, that is, White mothers and Black fathers, had lower risks than Black-Black couples but higher risks than White-White couples.

### **Physical Health**

According to [some research](#), mixed-race children may be somewhat more likely than children of both White parents to have congenital abnormalities such as microtia (underdeveloped ear), polydactyly (extra fingers or toes), and anencephaly (a severe brain defect).

### **Mental Health**

Compared to monoracial people, multiracial people are probably more likely to suffer from mental health issues like mood swings, low self-esteem, and psychological distress, according to [research](#).

According to a [2014 study](#) conducted in the UK, mixed-race children and young people were more likely to experience mental health problems as a result of low self-esteem, hostile and rejecting relationships, and discrimination from both Black and White peers. They were overrepresented in the looked-after system, the juvenile justice system, and the child protection system.

### **Intimate partner violence**

According to a [1989 study](#), interracial marriages had a 7.7-fold increased risk of spouse homicide compared to intra-racial marriages, a 12.4-fold increased risk for White wives, and a 21.4-fold increased risk for White husbands.

Furthermore, according to the Council of Conservative Citizens, the risk is underestimated, especially for White women. This is due to [research](#) showing numerous instances of White women dying from drug overdoses while using drugs with Black men, being killed by other Black people while with a Black boyfriend, or

passing away due to "accidents" in general. Furthermore, numerous incidents of Black boyfriends murdering close friends or family members were reported. The young children of a mother who was seeing a Black man made up about half of these.

According to a [2009 study](#), Black men in interethnic relationships were more likely to commit partner violence than Black men in intraethnic relationships.

According to [a 2010 study](#), interracial couples were more likely than White and ethnic minority couples to experience intimate partner violence, including violence that results in physical harm and/or arrest.

According to a [2012 study](#), interethnic couples had the highest prevalence rate of intimate partner violence overall. Intimate partner violence was also more severe in interethnic couples. Compared to male partners in intra-ethnic couples, male partners in interethnic couples were more likely to experience alcohol problems and binge drinking.

According to a [2013 study](#), interracial couples showed a similar level of intimate partner violence to monoracial black couples and a higher level than monoracial white couples, including mutual intimate partner violence.

### ***Other studies***

According to a [2005 study](#), compared to endogamous members of the same groups, interracial marriage is associated with increases in severe distress for Native American men, white women, and Hispanic men and women married to non-white spouses. Women with Hispanic husbands and intermarried people with African American or Native American husbands or wives report higher levels of distress.

According to a [2008 study](#), compared to partners in same-ethnic unions, partners in interethnic unions typically reported lower levels of relationship quality. These distinctions applied to both married and cohabiting couples, as well as to women and men. More complicated relationship histories, more heterogamous unions, fewer shared values, and less parental support were the main factors that explained differences in relationship

quality. On the other hand, disparities in socioeconomic resources didn't seem to be a contributing factor.

Regardless of the respondent's race or whether the nonblack partner is the same or a different race from the respondent, [a 2011 study](#) found that nonblack people with black partners experience significantly more depressive symptoms and lower levels of relationship satisfaction than their counterparts with nonblack partners. Furthermore, relationship satisfaction plays a significant and partial mediating role in the association between partner race and depressive symptoms.

According to a [2012 survey](#) that also examined previous research, interracial marriages are generally more likely to end in divorce. The risk was highest for white females and non-white males.

According to a [2017 study](#), viewers of interracial couples' photos experienced a neural disgust response, activating a disgust-related brain region. "Our findings suggest that there may still be considerable affective and implicit bias against interracial couples [...] challenges the notion that bias against interracial relationships is largely a thing of the past," the study said, despite the fact that the majority of the existing evidence suggests that people in the U.S. are explicitly accepting of interracial romance (e.g., Wang, 2012). All things considered, the current research shows that prejudice against interracial romance is linked to disgust, that interracial couples do, in fact, make people feel disgusted, and that these disgusting sentiments result in the dehumanization of interracial couples. According to the current research, interracial couples are implicitly dehumanized, making them less likely than same-race couples to be classified as "human" and more likely to be classified as "animal." Given the detrimental effects of dehumanization, particularly antisocial behaviors like aggression and the commission of violence, these findings are significant.

According to the "[National Household Survey on Drug Abuse](#)" conducted in 1999, people who identified as mixed race reported the highest rates of drug use among the major racial/ethnic groups.

In [a 2002 study](#), the mean levels of three traits were compared among African American, White (European-descent), and Black/White mixed race American adolescents: verbal IQ, number of sexual partners, and birth weight. The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health's first wave provided the sample. 16 was the average age. The children, who were mixed race, looked African American to their interviewers. Compared to White adolescents, African American adolescents had more sexual partners, a lower verbal IQ, and a lower birth weight. The mixed race mean for each characteristic was in the middle of the two parental populations' means.

According to a [2003 study](#), the majority of previous research on mixed-race teenagers had discovered a higher risk of behavioral, emotional, and health issues. Identity issues were most frequently cited as the cause of low self-esteem, social exclusion, and family issues in mixed-race homes. According to the study, this was the first time a sizable, nationally representative sample was used. Adolescents of mixed races were frequently more likely to experience behavioral issues, substance abuse issues, and other health issues than their non-mixed counterparts. All race combinations had a generally higher risk for the majority of risks, despite variations amongst various mixed-race groups.

Multiracial adolescents are more likely to experience a range of issues, including violent behaviors, according to a [2006 study](#).

Multiracial Hispanic/Latino adolescents and multiracial non-Hispanic adolescents experienced more behavioral health issues than monoracial Hispanic adolescents, according to [another 2006 study](#) that looked at behavioral health.

According to a [2008 study](#), the percentage of mixed-race, black-white births has nearly tripled over the previous four decades. [...] Adolescents of mixed races fall between

whites and blacks on a variety of background and achievement characteristics, as one might anticipate. However, mixed-race adolescents are glaringly different from both black and white adolescents when it comes to engaging in risky or antisocial adolescent behavior. [...] Teenagers of mixed races who lack a natural peer group must take on riskier activities in order to fit in.

According to a [2008 study](#) of Chinese-, Filipino-, Japanese-, and Vietnamese-Caucasian people, biracial Asian Americans had twice the likelihood of receiving a psychological disorder diagnosis compared to monoracial Asian Americans.

According to a [2005 article](#), people of mixed races in South Korea frequently had worse educational outcomes, had trouble finding employment, were frequently day laborers, had trouble dating, were more likely to commit crimes, and 40% had tried suicide.

### ***Conclusion***

Race mixing generally can be considered bad for White people as it harms the child's health, education, while also being a high factor of disruption of marriage.



## 5.8 — Dysgenics

Dysgenics refer to the genetic deterioration of a population, based on an increase of the frequency of deleterious alleles in the same population. In this section I'm going to focus on alleles associated with intelligence, such as the ones seen in 1.2.

A very dangerous and not enough talked about problem the Western civilization is going to face in a not-so-distant future is a genetic deterioration of the population. Those societies have been built on the basis of a fairly intelligent population, and this dysgenic, caused by various reasons we will explore here, is going to be a major problem for those civilizations.


Because, based on all the factors we've seen previously, the reader might believe that legal immigrants from Africa and South Asia who work and contribute to society are a benefit. But this is not true, and pushing this "legal [African] immigration" narrative, will only accelerate this phenomena of dysgenics. Europeans have an advantage over Africans in the prevalence of intelligence-associated genes, and bringing in millions of them, allowing them to breed with native Europeans, is only going to increase the frequency of deleterious alleles of intelligence more rapidly. We have already talked about the concept of regression to the mean, so even bringing "high-IQ" people from lower IQ races will be a net drawback in the future.

### ***Dysgenics and the Roman Empire***

When you hear about the fall of the Roman civilization, you generally hear that the reasons include economic instability, reliance on slaves, political instability. However, recent studies have shown that another likely factor is dysgenics. The reason for these dysgenics to happen is that, during the Empire, *"Rome's population received net immigration from the Near East, followed by an increase in genetic contributions from Europe. These ancestry shifts mirrored the geopolitical affiliations of Rome and were accompanied by marked interindividual diversity, reflecting gene flow from across the*

*Mediterranean, Europe, and North Africa.*”, per [Antonio et al. \(2020\)](#). During the Empire, Romans were more mixed with North Africans and other “less intelligent” populations. As I’m going to talk about later, Romans in the Republic had a PGS of intelligence at about 1, similar to [that of Medieval Germans](#). During the Republic, the PGS fell to -.5, almost the level of Iron Age and pre-Iron Age in Italy.

[Kierkegaard et al. \(2023\)](#) analyzed trends in polygenic scores in Italy and the Roman civilization, with a sample of 127 ancient genomes. Their samples for the Roman Republic were from various regions and subcultures, thus there is likely no bias for the comparison of the two genomic datas. The authors found that the average educational attainment polygenic score (PGS) was much higher during the Republic than during the Empire:



**Figure 1:** Educational attainment (EA4) polygenic scores by period.

The authors also noted that this high polygenic score and the difference with other periods was far from being a chance level :

**Table 2:** Effect of period and ancestry on PGS.

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	-0.70 **	-0.33
	-0.23	-0.26
Period: Republic	1.52 ***	0.96 *
	-0.36	-0.38
Period: Imperial	0.47	0.18
	-0.27	-0.31
Period: Late Antiquity	0.94 **	0.46
	-0.3	-0.32
Period: Medieval	0.94 **	0.37
	-0.29	-0.31
PC1		0.28 **
		-0.1
N	127	124
R2	0.17	0.18

All continuous predictors are mean-centred and scaled by 1 standard deviation. \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ . Standard errors are shown below the Beta coefficient.

Therefore, dysgenics, as in the decrease of EA4 PGS in this case, is likely to be a major cause for the fall of the Roman Empire. If we discuss again the factors that were previously mentioned as causes of it, we can easily argue that economic, political instability is what we would expect from a dysgenic society in a system that was built by individuals with higher intelligence. Pretty sure we can extend this to a sociologist's fallacy.

### ***Recent evidences of dysgenics***

Firstly we'll look at genetic evidences of recent dysgenics and then at fertility rates for certain genotypes.

[Beauchamp \(2016\)](#) found that, analyzing polygenic scores for various variables including educational attainment, there are recent trends favoring lower educational attainment polygenic score, with an effect size of about 1.5 month of education less per generation :

*Recent findings from molecular genetics now make it possible to test directly for natural selection by analyzing whether genetic variants associated with various phenotypes have been under selection. I leverage these findings to construct polygenic scores that use individuals' genotypes to predict their body mass index, educational attainment (EA), glucose concentration, height, schizophrenia, total cholesterol, and (in females) age at menarche. I then examine associations between these scores and fitness to test whether natural selection has been occurring. My study sample includes individuals of European ancestry born between 1931 and 1953 who participated in the Health and Retirement Study, a representative study of the US population. My results imply that natural selection has been slowly favoring lower EA in both females and males, and are suggestive that natural selection may have favored a higher age at menarche in females. For EA, my estimates imply a rate of selection of about  $-1.5$  mo of education per generation (which pales in comparison with the increases in EA observed in contemporary times). Although they cannot be projected over more than one*


*generation, my results provide additional evidence that humans are still evolving—albeit slowly, especially compared with the rapid changes that have occurred over the past few generations due to cultural and environmental factors.*

[Kong et al. \(2017\)](#) replicated those findings on Icelanders, showing that the educational attainment polygenic score is on a decrease for the last century, declining at a considerable rate on an evolutionary timescale :

*Epidemiological and genetic association studies show that genetics play an important role in the attainment of education. Here, we investigate the effect of this genetic component on the reproductive history of 109,120 Icelanders and the consequent impact on the gene pool over time. We show that an educational attainment polygenic score,  $POLY_{EDU}$ , constructed from results of a recent study is associated with delayed reproduction ( $P < 10^{-100}$ ) and fewer children overall. The effect is stronger for women and remains highly significant after adjusting for educational attainment. Based on 129,808 Icelanders born between 1910 and 1990, we find that the average  $POLY_{EDU}$  has been declining at a rate of  $\sim 0.010$  standard units per decade, which is substantial on an evolutionary timescale. Most importantly, because  $POLY_{EDU}$  only captures a fraction of the overall underlying genetic component the latter could be declining at a rate that is **two to three times faster**.*

Thus, education polygenic scores (and consequently intelligence) go down. They're also associated with lower fertility according to Kong et al. (2017), creating an endless cycle.

[Hugh-Jones & Abdellaoui \(2021\)](#) found similar results in the United Kingdom where educational attainment polygenic scores consistently decrease with year of birth. Cognitive ability is also on the decrease, but on a lower effect size (still considered a “significant decrease”) :



**Figure 1:** Mean polygenic scores (PGS) by birth year in UK Biobank. Points are means for 5-year intervals. Lines are 95% confidence intervals. Green triangles show a significant linear increase over time ( $p < 0.05/33$ ). Red squares show a significant decrease.


*Natural selection has been documented in contemporary humans, but little is known about the mechanisms behind it. We test for natural selection through the association between 33 polygenic scores and fertility, across two generations, using data from UK Biobank ( $N = 409,629$  British subjects with European ancestry). **Consistently over time, polygenic scores associated with lower (higher) earnings, education and health are selected for (against). Selection effects are concentrated among lower SES groups, younger parents, people with more lifetime sexual partners, and people not living with***

**a partner.** The direction of natural selection is reversed among older parents (22+), or after controlling for age at first live birth. These patterns are in line with economic theories of fertility, in which higher earnings may either increase or decrease fertility via income and substitution effects in the labour market. Studying natural selection can help us understand the genetic architecture of health outcomes: we find evidence in modern day Great Britain for multiple natural selection pressures that vary between subgroups in the direction and strength of their effects, that are strongly related to the socio-economic system, and that may contribute to health inequalities across income groups.

This study also shows that among the polygenic scores, those associated with ADHD, smoking, depression, BMI and body fat are on a significant rise, while the ones for intelligence, educational attainment, height are decreasing. Thus, in other words, we are breeding for people with poor attention control, lower education and intelligence, who are fatter, shorter and just in general unhealthy. This obviously is alone as a fact to understand why the Western world will collapse.

## Fertility

According to [Sanjak et al. \(2018\)](#) :




**Fig. 2.** Predicted relative fitness as a function of height. Linear and quadratic selection gradients were converted into parameters of a Gaussian fitness function. Using the parameterized Gaussian fitness function, relative fitness values across the observed phenotypic range are predicted and shown by solid red (female) and dashed black (male) lines. The population means are indicated by vertical solid red (female) and dashed black (male) lines. Histograms of female (red) and male (gray) phenotypes are overlaid with an axis on the right-hand side. The horizontal dashed line indicates a relative predicted fitness of 1.



There is directional selection since the top (mode) of the probability distributions is located away from the means of either sex. Observe how the contrary is true: women are chosen for their lower stature, and males for their height. The genetic basis of height is linear-additive and primarily shared by the sexes; hence, total selection is minimal due to canceled out. The sex difference in height will, however, likely to widen with time to the degree that sex interacts genetically with height-causing variations.

The same scenario for every trait examined is depicted in the following figure:



**Fig. 1.** (A and B) Scatterplot showing the magnitude of (A) linear selection gradients  $\hat{\beta}$  and (B) quadratic selection gradients  $\hat{\gamma}$  for a selection of traits in females and males. Traits were selected on the basis of being significant ( $\text{FWER} \leq 0.05$ ) in at least one sex. Estimates are on the z-score scale for theoretical interpretation and consistency across traits. Points are labeled with the following abbreviated trait descriptions: age at menarche (AAM), age at first birth (AFB), age at menopause (AMP), body-fat percentage (BFP), bone mineral density (BMD), body-mass index (BMI), basal metabolic rate (BMR), birth weight (BW), diastolic blood pressure (DBP), educational attainment (EA), forced expiratory volume (FEV), fluid intelligence score (FIS), forced vital capacity (FVC), hip circumference (HC), hand grip strength (HGS), height (HT), mean time to correctly identify matches (MTM), neuroticism score (NS), peak expiratory flow (PEF), pulse rate (PR), pulse-wave arterial stiffness index (PWA), pulse-wave peak-to-peak time (PWP), pulse-wave reflection index (PWRI), systolic blood pressure (SBP), speech reception threshold (SRT) estimate, waist circumference (WC), waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), and weight (WT). Note that data on AFB, AMP, and AAM are not available for males and their regression values were set to zero.

According to Richard Lynn, the average IQ will drop by 4.4 points between 2000 and 2050 as a result of the influx of low-IQ individuals into the US. Since Canada and New Zealand receive comparatively more high-IQ Chinese immigrants, he anticipates milder declines there. Globally, IQ should drop by 1.29 points per generation between 2000 and 2050.



According to a [2013 study](#), the average reaction time in Western nations decreased significantly between 1889 and 2004. Since Victorian times, the decline was equal to – 13.35 IQ points, or – 1.16 IQ points per decade. An indirect indicator of IQ, specifically genotypic IQ, is reaction time.

According to a [2017 study](#), Scandinavian nations' average IQs were declining. Up until a turning point in 1995, Norwegians' IQ had been rising since 1950. Since then, Norwegians' IQ has been found to have decreased by an average of 0.21 percent per year, or 6.5 percent between generations. Over a [thirty-year period](#), losses in Nordic countries after 1995 averaged 6.85 IQ points. In other nations, the circumstances were different. A few developed nations displayed rising scores. In general, the study made the case that while lower losses or even increases may occur at low IQ levels, the biggest IQ losses may occur at high IQ levels.

According to [Lynn \(2007\)](#), he was pessimistic about the future of Western societies, especially because of the dysgenic effects of mass immigration to Western nations. If current trends continue, white populations will become minorities in their own countries before the end of the twenty-first century.

*Yet this huge demographic catastrophe has been barely noticed by the media, and anyone who mentions it is considered as a "far right racist". He even went as far as stating that "I believe the best hope for the future of civilization lies with the Chinese and Japanese. They have not been infected with the virus of Political Correctness, and they are not admitting large numbers of immigrants. They have low fertility but this is not too much of a problem for the present and can probably be corrected in the future by paying people to have children. These are highly intelligent peoples and will probably carry the torch of civilization when it is extinguished in the United States, Canada, and Europe.*

The IQ researcher Helmuth Nyborg [wrote in 2012](#) that :

*The bleak situation is characteristic of the rest of Europe too, perhaps with Eastern Europe as an exception. [...] Ethnic Europeans will soon be wiped out of their own countries by this ever-expanding colossal demographic transition. Their national average IQs go down in the process, and when an average national IQ of 90 is reached, down go also their democracies and welfare. This also happens to European-Americans in the US. [...] To sum up, not only Denmark but Europe and the US get dumber by internal dysgenic decay and by northbound mass-immigration. This will have catastrophic consequences for Western democracy and welfare, but non-Western countries will also suffer. Unfortunately, most ruling (left- or right-oriented) Western leaders are not only seriously misguided by the illusion of equality but also blatantly ignorant of biological realities, so they can't see the elephant in the room. They eventually will, but that will be beyond the point of no return.*

In 2018, Edward Dutton and Michael A. Woodley, two IQ researchers from Menie, wrote that in the close future

*"we won't be able to safely fly aeroplanes, or maintain a lavish system of social security, or keep the electricity on all of the time, or maintain law and order everywhere, or organise democratic government or have widespread use of the internet. Life is going to become more harsh, more dangerous, and simpler. To give an obvious example, many houses are now entirely reliant on electricity: no fireplace, no gas. What are these people supposed to do when electricity becomes unreliable? Many people now commute into London from 70 miles away or even more. How are they going to get work as trains become more and more sporadic? They need to live closer to work, just as we all once did. If we start planning for this—rather than kid ourselves that "things can only get better"—then things will run far more smoothly when the time comes."*

## Chapter 6 — White privilege

In this chapter I'm going to discuss the supposed White privilege White people benefit from in modern society and historically.

**Part I** provides evidence that, if anything, this privilege is due to Whites being smarter, historically more advanced (technologically and culturally), inventive.

### 6.1 — Colonization

In this section I'm going to discuss about the privilege Whites gained through colonization.

#### *The wealth of colonizers*

One common criticism of white nations is that their wealth results from their exploitation of other nations. Examining the performance of the "colonized" nations is one way to assess this.

However, there is more to the notion of Europeans as colonial exploiters than just where the "exploitation" took place. There ought to be some wealth on the other end if the colonists are taking advantage of all this wealth.

I took the population of a nation in 1940 and the population of its empires in 1940. The "colonization index" is calculated by dividing the population of the empire by the population of a nation. There would be one colonial subject for each citizen if the index was 1. At 10.46, there were 10.46 colonial subjects for every British citizen in the British Empire.

Then, thirty years later, in 1970, I compared their per capita GDPs. Since 1970 was the first year that West Germany was listed on Wikipedia's list of historical nominal per capita GDPs, I went with that year.

All of the European nations I selected for comparison were non-Communist; "Communist" was defined as belonging to the USSR, the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia, or Albania. Colonizers, who were all non-communist, would undoubtedly be richer than the average of all European nations if Communist nations were included. However, they are not wealthier than other European nations that are not communist.

**Table 326 : GDP per capita (1970) vs Colonization index**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Per Capita GDP</b>	<b>Colonization Index (1940)</b>
<b>United States</b>	\$4,998	0.13
<b>Sweden</b>	\$4,404	0
<b>Luxembourg</b>	\$4,254	0
<b>Canada</b>	\$4,047	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	\$3,648	0
<b>Denmark</b>	\$3,366	0
<b>Australia</b>	\$3,324	0
<b>Norway</b>	\$3,283	0
<b>France</b>	\$2,821	2.64
<b>Belgium</b>	\$2,734	1.24
<b>Holland</b>	\$2,711	8.06
<b>W. Germany</b>	\$2,687	0
<b>Iceland</b>	\$2,544	0
<b>Finland</b>	\$2,436	0
<b>New Zealand</b>	\$2,283	0
<b>United Kingdom</b>	\$2,243	10.46
<b>Austria</b>	\$2,055	0
<b>Italy</b>	\$2,030	0.3
<b>Ireland</b>	\$1,446	0
<b>Greece</b>	\$1,438	0
<b>Spain</b>	\$1,178	0
<b>Portugal</b>	\$884	1.31

It's not as if the "benefits of colonialism" started later because the story remains the same in 2013. Wealth and colonialism are still unrelated, and Portugal, one of the colonizers, is even lagging behind some former communist nations.

We can also compare Sub-Saharan Africa's per capita GDP to that of Haiti and Ethiopia, two racially African nations that have been independent since at least 1804:

**Table 327 : GDP per capita (2013) vs Colonization index**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Per Capita GDP</b>	<b>Colonization Index</b>
<b>Luxembourg</b>	\$91,048	0
<b>Norway</b>	\$64,893	0
<b>Switzerland</b>	\$56,939	0
<b>United States</b>	\$54,629	0.13
<b>Ireland</b>	\$47,804	0
<b>Holland</b>	\$47,130	8.06
<b>Austria</b>	\$46,164	0
<b>Germany</b>	\$45,615	0
<b>Sweden</b>	\$45,143	0
<b>Denmark</b>	\$44,862	0
<b>Canada</b>	\$44,088	0
<b>Australia</b>	\$43,901	0
<b>Iceland</b>	\$43,393	0
<b>Belgium</b>	\$42,725	1.24
<b>Finland</b>	\$39,755	0
<b>Britain</b>	\$39,137	10.46
<b>France</b>	\$38,851	2.64
<b>Italy</b>	\$34,758	0.3
<b>Spain</b>	\$33,763	0
<b>Czech*</b>	\$30,445	0
<b>Slovenia*</b>	\$29,917	0
<b>Portugal</b>	\$28,326	1.31
<b>Slovakia*</b>	\$27,585	0
<b>Estonia*</b>	\$26,355	0
<b>Greece</b>	\$25,667	0

<sup>1</sup>Independant since 1804<sup>2</sup>Independant except between  
1936 and 1945<sup>3</sup>Independant since 1847**Table 328 : GDP PPP per capita by region/country**

<b>Region/Country</b>	<b>GDP PPP per capita</b>
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	\$6,041
<b>Haiti<sup>1</sup></b>	\$3,042
<b>Ethiopia<sup>2</sup></b>	\$2,755
<b>Liberia<sup>3</sup></b>	\$1,617
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	\$30,875
<b>Jamaica</b>	\$12,597

Haiti is as impoverished, if not more, as the African continent 209 years after gaining independence from France in 1804. On the island of Hispaniola, Haiti is the smaller of the two nations.

Despite sharing an island with Haiti, the Dominican Republic does not have a majority of Africans. The Caribbean island nation of Jamaica, which is racially African, was ruled by the United Kingdom until 1962.

Ethiopia escaped European domination, with the exception of Mussolini's Italy between 1936 and 1942. 290,000 Ethiopians, or 1.6% of the country's 17.7 million inhabitants, perished in the war with Italy and the British liberation of Ethiopia.

In contrast, during World War 2, the USSR lost 16%, Romania 3.1%, Poland 17%, Italy 1.00%, France 1.4%, the United Kingdom 0.9%, Japan 4.1%, Germany 10.46%, and Yugoslavia 8.8% of their populations.

It would demonstrate a profound lack of understanding of other nations' histories to attribute Ethiopia's present economic problems to the aftermath of that conflict seventy-two years later.

In terms of the percentage of the population that was European, the duration of official and effective European rule, and the economic effects of European intervention, South Africa was by far the most "colonized" nation in Africa. Black South Africans should be particularly impoverished if colonization causes poverty among the colonized people, but that is not the case at all:

**Table 329 : Household income by race in South Africa**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Annual household income (2011)</b>
<b>South Africa total</b>	\$9,971
<b>South African Whites</b>	\$35,278
<b>South African Blacks</b>	\$5,856

We can estimate the GDP PPP per capita of South African Blacks to be around \$9,390, higher than the Sub-Saharan average due to them earning around 52% of the average income and the GDP PPP per capita of South Africa being \$15,989.

Despite being by far the "most colonized," South African blacks are far above the average for blacks in Africa.

In summary:

White colonizing nations had no greater wealth than non-colonizing, non-communist white nations. The white colonizing nations were all non-communist.

According to the "colonial exploiter" narrative, these nations ought to be richer than non-colonial white, non-communist nations.

Black nations that managed to avoid colonization completely (Haiti) or nearly entirely (Ethiopia) did not fare any better than the rest of Africa.

Black people in South Africa, the most colonized African nation, have higher wealth than black people in less colonized African nations.


***Colonialism did not make Africa poor***

There were 230 million people living on the African continent, including North Africa, in 1950.

That figure rose to 1,166 million (1.166 billion) in 2015.


The population has been quintupled. Is that directly the fault of Europe? Did Africans get paid to overbreed? There is just no mention of this, the most significant contributor to the standard of living in Africa.

first, lets just look at purchasing power parity per capita in Africa by year and see if colonization corresponded to any big shifts:




Given this, it appears that the answer is no. Nothing particularly stands out to you. In contrast to both accounts, colonialism appears to have had no beneficial effects. Additionally, after decolonization, Africa didn't actually become any poorer overall. The following graph contrasts Africa with China, India, and Japan during the same time period:






I initially intended to adjust the scale and simply highlight the distinctions between China, India, and Africa. However, I appreciate the viewpoint this provides. The differences between former colonies after 1960 are another factor that raises doubts about the effects of colonialism. Let's start by examining South Korea, Zimbabwe, and Botswana's nominal GDP per capita (not PPP) from 1960 to 1975:



Everyone is severely impoverished. Naturally, Korea was not a colony of Europe, but it's crucial to remember that East Asia, including China (as seen above), was just as impoverished in 1960 as Africa. The trajectory shifted after 1975. Although Zimbabwe's statistics are a few years old, I believe we can still piece them together:



So, is colonialism to blame for Zimbabwe's poverty but not for Botswana's, which began to experience significant economic growth around 1985 after gaining independence in 1966?

Furthermore, it's not as if the decision to colonize Africa by Europeans was made before all of this. The fact that Africa was impoverished and therefore simple to conquer (to say "conquer" would be an exaggeration of what Europe had to do) and that Europe was still willing to do so were the causes of it. For instance, about 200 Europeans founded the Congo Free State.

Should I also mention that 3% of Botswana's population consists of whites when only 0.16% of Zimbabwe's population is white ? As expected, the whiter the country is, the richer it is.

By breaking this down by nation, we can also inquire as to whether more colonized nations have become richer or poorer. Whether colonization is measured by the number of Europeans who arrived or the duration of a colony, the conclusion is that more colonized countries became wealthier ([Easterly and Levine, 2012](#); [Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2006](#)).

**Table 330 : Does the degree of European settlement predict per capita income today ?**

<b>Table 3b: Does the degree of European settlement explain per capita income today?</b>						
The sample is countries with <i>Euro share</i> values of less than 0.125. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005. Euro share is proportion of Europeans in the colonial population. Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country's laws are based on the United Kingdom's legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. Independence is the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government accountability and effectiveness. Ethnicity is a measure of a country's ethnic diversity. All specifications are estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coefficients on all the explanatory variables equal zero. P values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. More detailed variable definitions and sources are provided in Table B and the Data Appendix.						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income
Euro Share	8.378*** (0.00)	8.401*** (0.00)	-0.904 (0.69)	10.65*** (0.00)	3.612 (0.14)	9.846*** (0.00)
British Legal Origin		-0.0365 (0.88)				
Education			0.0326*** (0.00)			
Independence				0.822* (0.05)		
Government Quality					0.427*** (0.00)	
Ethnicity						-1.212*** (0.00)
Observations	110	110	108	78	110	98
R-squared	0.047	0.047	0.6	0.182	0.361	0.244
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
F test:	12.72	6.328	95.92	14.68	27.53	36.09

Table 331 : Outcomes regressed on years of colonization

<b>Outcomes Regressed on Years of Colonization</b>								
We regress Log GDP per capita and infant mortality on the number of years the island spent as a colony of a European power. Columns (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7) are OLS. Columns (3), (5) and (8) are two stage least squares where we instrument for centuries of colonial rule or the first year as a colony using the 12 month average and standard deviation of the east-west wind speed for each island.								
	(1) Log GDP Capita	(2) Log GDP Capita	(3) Log GDP Capita - IV	(4) Log GDP Capita	(5) Log GDP Capita- IV	(6) Infant Mortality Per 1000	(7) Infant Mortality Per 1000	(8) Infant Mortality Per 1000 - IV
Number of Centuries a Colony	0.413 (0.065)**	0.450 (0.083)**	0.441 (0.157)**			-2.801 (1.156)*	-2.611 (1.259)*	-10.244 (4.344)*
First Year a Colony				-0.396 (0.101)**	-0.545 (0.232)*			
Final Year A Colony				0.014 (0.014)	0.007 (0.017)			
Remained A Colony in 2000				0.800 (0.149)**	0.732 (0.206)**			
Abs(Latitude)		0.048 (0.011)**	0.048 (0.011)**	0.039 (0.011)**	0.042 (0.013)**		-0.763 (0.211)**	-0.771 (0.221)**
Area in millions of sq km		-21.046 (3.937)**	-20.984 (3.961)**	-20.429 (4.707)**	-23.791 (6.169)**		263.524 (149.986)+	321.185 (143.722)*
Island is in Pacific		0.779 (0.457)+	0.767 (0.522)	0.747 (0.470)	0.944 (0.569)		-7.427 (9.498)	-18.724 (13.608)
Island is in Atlantic		0.615 (0.400)	0.622 (0.410)	0.427 (0.367)	0.298 (0.403)		-7.349 (8.581)	-1.117 (8.555)
Constant	7.524 (0.166)**	6.172 (0.526)**	6.192 (0.659)**	13.673 (1.942)**	16.356 (4.173)**	24.771 (3.677)**	41.579 (10.898)**	60.751 (18.551)**
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
R-squared	0.320	0.578	0.578	0.642	0.630	0.080	0.353	0.082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. We cluster at the island group level since several of the islands (e.g. the Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia) are used as separate observations from a cluster of politically related yet geographically distinct islands.

+ significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

You could argue that this is all because more Europeans visited and stayed in wealthier African countries. You can make that claim, but you'll need proof. Furthermore, that evidence must consider the fact that the degree of European colonization of a region is not predicted by the amount of precious metals present in that region (Easterly and Levine 2012, Table 2).

The fact that the degree of colonization also predicts the future quality of government and education in an area, and that these factors moderate the relationship between

colonization and modern wealth, further supports the pro-colonialism argument (Easterly and Levine 2012).

Systematic evidence that colonialism caused poverty in Africa is rare to nonexistent.

***Whites did not benefit from slavery***

The idea that white people profited from slavery and that slavery is the reason why white people are as wealthy as they are is one that I frequently hear. This claim can take many different forms, with some people making more claims than others. Clearly, cotton, tobacco, and indigo are no longer the mainstays of the American economy. The argument is not that black people actually built the infrastructure, that is obviously untrue given that the majority of railroads were in the north and almost all railroad workers were white during slavery, but rather that the industrial expansion was financed by the profits from their labor.

According to the data we have on the South, [26%](#), or 30.8%, of all slave states—including those that did not secede—were black. This argument depends on the South providing funding for the Northern economy, since the Southern economy was obviously a dead end.

The question at hand is whether or not slavery at the time benefited white people as a whole.

And this has two facets:

The first is the claim that the South is financing US industrialization.

The second is direct labor expropriation: how much did white people receive from black slaves directly as opposed to what they would have received from other sources?

The North accounted for [54 percent of all improved farmland in the United States in 1860](#). Northern free states also accounted for 67 percent of the total cash value of

all farms. Not only that, but Northern farms also produced 70% of wheat, 81% of rye, 81% of oats, 75% of wool, 89% of Irish potatoes.

However, there are grounds for doubting this. The [total values of agricultural products produced](#) in 1860 are one reason:

**Table 332 : Total values of agricultural products produced**

<b>Product</b>	<b>Total value in 1860 (millions)</b>
<b>Cereals</b>	\$558.3
<b>Cotton</b>	\$211.5
<b>Hay</b>	\$152.7
<b>Potatoes</b>	\$44.5
<b>Tobacco</b>	\$21.7

"King cotton" is challenged by the combined production of potatoes and hay. Cereals, however, were the true value of US agricultural output in 1860. Although I'm not sure what proportion of farms in the North and South produced cereals, I do know that the former were more focused on producing cereals (such as corn, barley, and oats) than the latter.

According to Peter Lindert's analysis of farm prices in the paper "[Long-Run Trends in American Farmland Values](#)," we also know that farmland in the North costs more per acre:

**Table 333 : Cost of farm**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Farm Price / Acre in 1860 (in 1960 dollars)</b>	<b>Side in Civil War</b>
<b>Mid-Atlantic</b>	\$98.61	Union
<b>East North Central</b>	\$92.66	Union
<b>East South Central (Mississippi Valley)</b>	\$58.65	Confederacy
<b>New England</b>	\$46.22	Union

<b>West North Central</b>	\$31.67	Union
<b>South Atlantic</b>	\$29.28	Confederacy
<b>West South Central</b>	\$26.89	Confederacy

I'm not saying that higher yield was the only factor contributing to the higher cost of land in the North; there are many other factors as well. The notion that Southern agriculture was, overall, more valuable than Northern agriculture, however, seems improbable given that it did cost more. or at least demonstrates that there isn't any clear evidence that it would be worth more.

Therefore, why wasn't land in slave states worth more if slavery was such a lucrative form of exploitation?

### **The tariff was disproportionately paid by the North**

[A table](#) from Robert Greenhalgh's "The Rise of the New York Port" examined the proportion of imports that the states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York paid.

**Table 334 : % of imports paid by states**

	<b>1821-1830</b>	<b>1831-1840</b>	<b>1841-1850</b>	<b>1851-1860</b>
<b>New York</b>	46.3	57.8	60	64.4
<b>Massachusetts</b>	18.9	13.8	18.6	14.2
<b>Pennsylvania</b>	14.5	8.6	6.8	5.5
<b>The 3 States</b>	79.7	80.2	80.6	87.1


Now, just because these states handle more than 80% of all imports annually does not imply that they are also paying more than 80% of the tariffs. However, it most likely does. Additionally, the [port of New York paid about 76.67% of all US tariffs in 1859](#). Therefore, for that one year, the imports and tariffs paid are roughly equal, and there is no reason to believe that, with the exception of slight variations from year to year, the percentage of all imports that pass through a state will be roughly equal to the percentage of tariffs paid by that state.



Andy Hall listed some of the tariff revenues for different ports after examining the highest tariff revenues of a few chosen U.S. ports in FY 1859:

**Table 335 : Tariff revenues by port**

<b>Port</b>	<b>Tariff Revenues</b>
<b>New York</b>	\$35.155m
<b>Boston</b>	\$5.133m
<b>Philadelphia</b>	\$2.262m
<b>New Orleans</b>	\$2.120m
<b>San Francisco</b>	\$1.352m
<b>Baltimore</b>	\$1.011m



This seems to be consistent with our knowledge of the percentage of goods imported through the ports of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.

The attentive observer will now recognize that these are port-paid tariffs. It's possible that these goods arrived in northern ports, where the tariff was paid, and that the cost was then passed on to southern farmers, so this doesn't necessarily mean that the north paid the "real cost" of the tariff.

I brought up the fact that Northern agriculture was larger than Southern agriculture for this reason. Additionally, the National Parks Service reports that the North possessed 78.79% of all agricultural machinery, or twice as much machinery per acre, as the South. The North would still pay a disproportionate amount because they purchased the majority of the farm equipment, even if we assume that farmers were the ones who were most negatively impacted by the tariff because it raised the price of farm equipment.

Therefore, the North was using slightly less than 80% of all agricultural machinery and paying slightly more than 80% of the tariff directly.

About 80% of the tariff's direct and indirect costs were being covered by the North.

Slave labor produced maybe one-third of what the South was paying, based on population, and the South was not paying the tariff.

### **The South didn't need slaves to grow cotton**

Thus, it is evident that the US was not built by the South. Furthermore, the idea that black people in the South paid for the development of the United States through their labor is essentially impossible because the argument for a BIG white benefit from slavery demands that the South pay for it.

Then, how much did white people gain from owning black slaves rather than negotiating a wage? The return on investment for slaves in comparison to railroads and short-term (90- to 180-day) loans is hard to predict, but we do have some ballpark figures. In comparison to "the rest of the economy," this provides us with a ballpark estimate of how profitable slaves were:

["The Economics of American Negro Slavery,"](#) Table 14, Page 208, Table 25, Page 220, Profitability by Investment

**Table 336 : Profit rate by investment**

<b>Investment</b>	<b>Average Profit Rate</b>
<b>Boston Rails (1845-1860)</b>	8.6
<b>Southern Rails (1850-1860)</b>	8.5
<b>Slaves (1830-1860)</b>	12.61
<b>Short-Term Money (1830-1860)</b>	9.60
<b>All Rail (1846-1860)</b>	7.16
<b>Rail Bonds (1857-1860)</b>	7.6

The Civil War, which raged from 1861 to 1865, caused a collapse in cotton production. It's difficult to pinpoint now because of yearly variations, but it appears that cotton production peaked around 1871 and then continued to rise. Slave labor was therefore not necessary to produce cotton. Given that the majority of white people in the South were farmers and that the majority of American farmers at the time were also white, it shouldn't be too difficult to accept that there was a net food surplus.

### **Opportunity denied**

Slaves made up 12.67% of the US population in 1860. While some white people profited from the 12.61% profit from his slaves, the average return on investment in the overall economy was only about 8.5%. Those who invested in slaves made between 4 and 5 percent more money than they would have if they had made their investment elsewhere

This is exactly what some white people received as a result of slavery.

However, as a result of these large profits, some investments that could have been put into shoe factories, railroads, or other worthwhile projects were instead used to expand the number of slave plantations. This led to two things:

It redirected Southern investments away from the long-term gains of industry and toward the immediate profits of slavery.

Let's say you build a shoe factory with a number of machines to work with leather, buckles, and other materials. This machinery requires skilled workers. It needs steel, iron, and lubricants. In essence, you have a machine-tools industry now. After you start producing them, machine tools in general become more affordable for other uses, opening up opportunities for investments in textiles, metal kettles and teapots, coaches, and steam engines.

To oversimplify, the North exploded while the South stagnated because plantations do not have these expansion effects. I'm not pointing the finger at the black slaves because they were powerless to do anything, but it's just to say that without slaves, white people would have undoubtedly moved more toward industry. I'm not the only one who thinks that if Rome hadn't had slaves, it would have become more industrialized.

It diverted Southern investments toward projects that "employed" black slaves rather than projects that employed white workers. Because money was diverted from, say, railroads, where he could work, to slaves, any white person who did not own slaves was made poorer by the fact that other white people did.

I'm not sure if the short-term extra profit (roughly 4-5%) that some white people made from slaves instead of other investments is worth the immediate impact of denying the white working class in the South better employment opportunities and the long-term consequences of leading the South to become an agricultural resource economy.

I have a gut feeling that it made white people's situation worse. It undoubtedly made white working-class people less wealthy, and it might have even been worse for the wealthy class, who might have made more money in the long run if they had invested in factories.

*Slaves in America would've been slaves anyways*

### The Population of West and Central Africa 1500 to 1800

[Population Data](#) on Central and West Africa

**Table 337 : Population of Africa**

Region	Year	Population	WAF proportion of CAF
West Africa	1907	33.385 million	2.606
Central Africa	1907	12.81 million	
West Africa	1950	70.54 million	2.674
Central Africa	1950	26.38 million	

[Population Estimates](#) for West Africa Based on the trend from 1907 to 1950, the population of Central Africa was estimated as a percentage of the West African population:

**Table 338 : African population 1500-1800**

Region	Year	Population	WAF proportion of CAF (estimate)
West Africa	1500	20 million	2.361
Central Africa	1500	8.47 million	
West Africa	1800	25 million	2.453
Central Africa	1800	10.19 million	

Some other population estimates that will be used later based on the above extrapolations:

**Table 339 : Population estimates**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>WAF proportion to CAF (estimate)</b>
West Africa	1525	20.42 million	2.369
Central Africa	1525	8.62 million	
West Africa	1866	30.17 million	2.547
Central Africa	1866	11.85 million	
West Africa	1675	22.92 million	2.414
Central Africa	1675	9.49 million	
West Africa	1775	24.58 million	2.445
Central Africa	1775	10.05 million	
West Africa	1805	25.08 million	2.455
Central Africa	1805	10.22 million	

Therefore, between 1500 and 1800, the average population of West and Central Africa was 31.83 million.

### **The Proportion of Slaves in West and Central Africa**

Encyclopedia Britannica's claims for the proportion of slaves in various African states

**Table 340 : Proportion of slaves by region**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Approximate Modern Location</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Proportion slave</b>
<b>Sokoto</b>	Nigeria, Cameroon	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
<b>Fulani Jihad States</b>	All West Africa North of Coast	1750-1900	"One half"
<b>Ghana</b>	Ghana	1076-1600	"One third"
<b>Mali</b>	Mali	1200-1500	"One third"
<b>Segou</b>	Mali	1720-1861	"One third"
<b>Songhai</b>	Mali, Niger	1464-1720	"One third"
<b>Ouidah</b>	Benin	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
<b>Kanem-Boru</b>	Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Cameroon, Sudan, Central African Republic, Algeria	1580-1890	"One third" , "40 percent"
<b>Berber-Tuareg</b>	Sahel region	"Until 1975"	"15 percent... to perhaps 75 percent"
<b>Senegambia</b>	Senegal, Gambia	1300-1900	"One third"

<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Sierra Leone	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One half”
<b>Yoruba</b>	Benin, Togo	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One third”
<b>Ashanti</b>	Ghana	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One third”
<b>Duala</b>	Cameroon	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One half”
<b>Ibo</b>	Niger	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One half”
<b>Kongo</b>	Congo	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One half”
<b>Chokwe</b>	Angola	“19 <sup>th</sup> century” (1800-1899)	“One half”

The average percentage of the population that is a slave, if the estimates are accurate, is 41.61%.

If these figures seem high, keep in mind that Athens was reportedly around one-third slave. Additionally, roughly one-third of the Confederate States of America were slaves; these figures are not out of the ordinary for slave societies.

As a result, we have a solid idea of how many people lived in West and Central Africa, and we have reliable subjective estimates of the percentage of slaves. How many people lived in West and Central Africa between 1500 and 1800 is the next question.

In African nations today, the average age at which a child is born is approximately 27. Therefore, we have a generation time of 25 years if we assume that the average age of motherhood was 25 in the 1500s and 1800s.

There were approximately 190.98 million people living in West and Central Africa between 1500 and 1800 if the average life expectancy was 50 years. Between 1500 and 1800, there would have been 79.45 million slaves in West and Central Africa if 41.61% of the population was enslaved.

Between 1525 and 1866, about 12.5 million slaves left Africa for the Americas. Between 1525 and 1866, 100.82 million of the 242.32 million people who should have lived in Africa during that time would have been slaves.

Thus, at the time, the Atlantic Slave Trade accounted for roughly **5.84%** of the entire slave trade in West and Central Africa.

### The Inelasticity of Supply

Simply put, "does quantity supplied increase in response to an increase in demand?" is what is meant by the term "elasticity of supply." If the supply of slaves is "elastic," it implies that if demand increases, the slave suppliers can readily provide more slaves. If it is "inelastic," it means that even if more people want to purchase slaves, the suppliers will find it difficult to obtain more.

Any increase in demand will only cause the price of slaves to rise if the supply is inelastic. For instance, new buyers would simply bid out some of the previous buyers for whom slaves are now too expensive if the supply of slaves was completely fixed and could not be increased.

The price of slaves in Africa, the quantity of slaves transported to the Americas over the last 25 years (roughly the generation time), the price of slaves in Africa, and the Atlantic Slave Trade as a percentage of the total slave trade in Central and West Africa can all be compared here.

The Atlantic Slave Trade as a percentage of the total slave trade in West and Central Africa by year, the cost of slaves in Africa, the number of slaves transported to the Americas, and the estimated number of slaves in West and Central Africa

Year	<u>Price of Slave IN AFRICA</u>	<u>Number of slaves shipped to the Americas in prior 25 years</u>	<u>Estimated number of slaves in West and Central Africa</u>	<u>Atlantic Slave Trade as proportion of overall slave trade in West and Central Africa</u>
1675	3.33 pounds	0.488 million	13.486 million	3.492%
1775	18.43 pounds	1.925 million	14.410 million	11.785%
1805	26.86 pounds	2.009 million	14.688 million	12.032%

Africans couldn't simply increase the supply of slaves, as evidenced by the Atlantic Slave Trade's drastic price increase in response to a very slight increase in quantity demanded. In other words, there was little to no "excess supply" to give to



the Europeans. They would therefore have to decide whether to sell some of the slaves they already had or to arm themselves and attempt to enslave some peoples who had so far been able to fend off slavery.

The rise in demand during those years isn't always the only factor contributing to price increases. It is impossible to pinpoint the exact cause of the price increases. With an 8.293% increase in relative quantity demanded corresponding to a 453.453% price increase and a 0.247% increase in relative quantity demanded corresponding to a 45.741% price increase, the overall trend is one of extreme PRICE inelasticity.

Once more, there are numerous potential contributing factors that I am unaware of. However, the scant information that is available indicates that there is extreme price inelasticity, which is evidence of inelasticity of quantity supplied. One way to put this is that "it appears that the Africans were unable to increase the number of slaves, that the supply was fixed, and as a result, when new buyers came along, the price just shot through the roof."

A number of these African societies employed slaves to work in industries like gold mining and the production of peanuts, coconuts (palm oil), sesame, and millet for the market after the transatlantic slave trade was curbed and eventually abolished, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica article.

Naturally, the idea that fewer black slaves were produced as a result of the Atlantic Slave Trade's termination is purely subjective and not data. They simply remained in Africa.

Furthermore, it is easy to imagine that the supply of slaves was likely quite inelastic when about 40% of the population is enslaved and people violently oppose being enslaved.

### **Our Hands are Clean**

Undoubtedly, a slave's life in the Americas was superior to one in Africa. Although the average African who was not a slave might have had a better life than the average slave in the Americas, that is not the point of the comparison.

Assuming, even if we include the middle passage, which future generations would not have to go through anyhow, the Atlantic Slave Trade did not create a single slave but rather transported slaves from Africa to the Americas, where they ultimately had a better life and a higher chance of surviving.

In that case, would we say that the Europeans committed a wicked act? Think about how those slaves would still be in Africa, where they would have had a higher chance of dying and a worse quality of life, if the Europeans had not committed this act. In this instance, compared to slavery in Africa, the Atlantic Slave Trade improved their quality of life.

Therefore, the elasticity of supply determines whether or not the Atlantic Slave Trade was immoral. Was there a relatively constant supply of slaves that were merely transported out of Africa, or did the Atlantic Slave Trade cause the supply of slaves to grow?

Furthermore, all evidence suggests that the number of Africans who were slaves did not rise. And even if the number of Black people in slavery increased slightly, it was still less than the 12.5 million who left Africa. Those 12.5 million had a higher chance of surviving, and their descendants undoubtedly led far better lives than those who stayed in Africa.

It was not our responsibility to purchase their freedom, nor did we instigate their enslavement. If Europeans did not purchase a single slave from Africa, no one would be cursing them. However, those Africans would have suffered more if Europeans had not purchased a single slave. However, Europeans are condemned as though we were

responsible for their enslavement because we took a step that improved their situation as opposed to doing nothing.

Long before we arrived, the Africans were slaves to themselves. Better conditions and their eventual freedom in the Americas were the only things we caused.

### ***Conclusion***

Colonization and slavery didn't benefit White people as much as we thought. Rather, they were a "positive" period for Africans. I left out the fact that Arabs enslaved Africans and other people more than Europeans did because this chapter focuses on White privilege.

## 6.2 — White privilege in justice

Black people are arrested more frequently than white people, as most people are aware. This is often interpreted as indicating that Black people are more likely than White people to commit crimes. However, a lot of other people think that the high arrest rates of Black people are a sign of the criminal justice system's bias against them. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. The percentage of Black people behind bars closely mirrors the percentage of victims who say they were the victims of a Black person's crime. Additionally, according to government data, Black students are disciplined for breaking school rules far more frequently than white students, which can be viewed as a juvenile equivalent of crime. When it comes to drug crime, some people think there is a strong case against the legal system. However, as we'll see, these arguments rely on self-report data and ignore racial disparities in honesty and drug use patterns between Black and White individuals. The claim that Black people are being killed by police at disproportionately high rates will then be discussed. Lastly, we'll see that Black people receive the same penalties as White people for committing the same crime once the appropriate controls are put in place.

### *Arrest Rates and Victimization Reports*

The degree to which official arrest rates match victimization reports is one of the most compelling arguments in support of their validity. More specifically, there is a noticeable correlation between the Uniform Crime Report and the National Crime Victimization Survey.

Every year, the Department of Justice conducts the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), which asks 160,000 people and a random sample of about 90,000 households about their experiences with crime during the previous six months. In the past six months, participants are asked if they have been the victim of a violent crime. If they have, they are questioned on a number of topics concerning the crime and its perpetrator.

The FBI receives an annual compilation of data from police stations across the nation, known as the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The UCR is able to obtain information for police stations that have jurisdiction over 277 million Americans (approximately 94% of the total population), even though not all police stations submit this data. The demographics of those arrested each year are among the data that the FBI gathers (Crime in the United States 2014, [The Nation's Two Crime Measures](#)).

[According to the two metrics shown below](#), Black people are essentially responsible for the same amount of violent crime:

**Table 341 : Proportion of certain crimes committed by Blacks, NCVS & UCR**

The Proportion of Rapes, Robberies, and Assaults, Committed by Blacks between 2000 and 2008, as estimated by the Uniform Crime Report and the National Victimization Survey					
<b>Rape</b>		<b>Robbery</b>		<b>Assault</b>	
<b>UCR</b>	<b>NCVS</b>	<b>UCR</b>	<b>NCVS</b>	<b>UCR</b>	<b>NCVS</b>
34%	34%	56%	61%	33%	27%

Another indicator that arrests are not discriminatory is that Whites [get cleared more](#) than Blacks in homicide cases, indicating a higher proportion of homicide arrests among Whites being wrong than among Blacks.

### ***Black Misbehavior at School***

The fact that Black students are in trouble at school considerably more frequently than White students adds credence to the argument that Black people actually commit more crimes than White people. Take a look at these statistics:

Black preschoolers have a higher than normal suspension rate, according to a 2014 Department of Education report. This was particularly noticeable among repeat offenders: while making up only 18% of preschools, Black children account for nearly 50% of those who have received several suspensions ([The Associated Press 2014](#)).

According to a US Department of Education document cited by [Vega \(2014\)](#), in 2011 and 2012, black girls were responsible for 12% of primary school suspensions, while white girls were only responsible for 2%. (The majority of those suspended were male.)

According to a [Department of Education analysis published in 2012](#), which examined data from more than 72,000 schools, Black kids accounted for 18% of the student body, but 35% of those who had received a single suspension, 45% of those who had received several suspensions, and 39% of those who had been expelled.

Even after adjusting for socioeconomic status, Black middle school students had a higher suspension rate than White middle school students, according to research by [Skiba et al. \(2002\)](#).

Therefore, it is acceptable to say that Black people are more prone than White people to have problems in school.

Some will argue that this is because teachers share racial biases with law enforcement. There is evidence to the contrary, though. In particular, [Wright et al. \(2014\)](#) discovered that Blacks and Whites had an identical chance of being suspended if they have an equivalent number of prior behavioral issues. Furthermore, after being sent to the principal's office, Blacks and Whites had an identical chance of being suspended, according to research by [Skiba et al. \(2002\)](#).

Therefore, the argument that Black people do not commit more crimes than white people would now have to embrace the perspective that police, teachers, and victims of crime all happen to share the same prejudices against Black people. That seems a bit unrealistic.

### ***Drug crime***

While some may contend that police officers are not generally biased toward Black people, they are when it comes to narcotics. Surveys demonstrating that Black people

are either not more likely than White people to use drugs, or, as many of these studies indicate, that White people are more likely than Black people to use drugs, will be used to support this assertion. This argument has two issues: first, it disregards racial variations in honesty; second, it fails to consider pertinent distinctions between drug users who are Black and those who are White.

Although this may sound harsh, the fact that Black people are more prone than White people to lie about using narcotics must be addressed first. How are we aware? In order to determine what drugs a person has recently taken, criminologists may perform studies in which they perform biological tests on their hair, blood, urine, etc., and compare the results to the substances the subject claims to have just taken. According to numerous research ([Page et al. 2009](#), [Falk et al. 1992](#), [Feucht, Stephens, and Walker, 1994](#), [Fedrich and Johnson 2005](#)), Black people are more prone than white people to lie and say they have never used a drug. The majority of research based on self-reported criminal history actually indicates that Black people are not more likely than white people to commit crimes in general, according to Ellis, Beaver, and Wright's Handbook of Crime Correlates. And that is untrue, as we have already seen.

Table 342 : B-W comparison of self-reported illegal drug use &amp; overall offences

TABLE 2.3.2c Black-White Comparisons of Self-Reported Criminal/Delinquent Behavior.		
Nature of the relationship	Self-reported offenses	
	Overall offenses	Illegal drugs
Blacks higher	<b>EUROPE Britain:</b> Newcombe et al. 1995:334 <b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Baughman & Dahlstrom 1968; Williams & Gold 1972; Berger & Simon 1974:151; Fors & Rojek 1983:216; Elliott et al. 1986:486; Sampson 1986:881; Elliott et al. 1989; Elliott 1994:6; Marshall & Webb 1994:332; Ross 1995; Farrington et al. 1996:509; Kelley et al. 1997:6	<b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Brunswick 1969; Murray et al. 1987; Flewelling et al. 1994; Marshall & Webb 1994:337
Not signif.	<b>EUROPE Britain:</b> Bowling et al. 1994:55; Graham & Bowling 1996 <b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Lively et al. 1962; Gold, 1966; Epps 1967; Gould 1969:330; Chambliss & Nagasawa 1969; Gould 1969; Williams & Gold 1972; Elliott & Voss 1974; Gold & Reimer 1974; Elliott & Ageton 1980:104; Gold & Petronio 1980; Petronio 1980; Harris 1992:92; Peeples & Loeber 1994; Dembo et al. 1995b:271; Weber et al. 1995; Heimer 1997:814; Manolakes 1997:245	<b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Brook et al. 1977; Fors & Rojek 1983:213; Oetting & Beauvais 1990; Wallace & Bachman 1991:341; Gottfredson & Koper 1996; Johanson et al. 1996:526; Friedman & Ali 1997; Gottfredson & Koper 1997; Neumark & Anthony 1997:195
Whites higher	<b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Walberg et al. 1974; Mazur 1995:280; Evans et al. 1996:55; Felson & Staff 2006	<b>EUROPE Britain:</b> Leitner et al. 1993:28 <b>NORTH AMERICA United States:</b> Globetti & Windham 1967; Preston 1968; Bloom et al. 1974; Prendergast 1974; Kandel et al. 1976b; Nyberg & McIntosh 1979; Harrell & Cisin 1980; Fors & Rojek 1983; Zucker & Harford 1983; Harford 1985; Harford 1986; Maddahian et al. 1986:76; Newcomb et al. 1987:424; Welte & Barnes 1987; Austin 1988; Mensch & Kandel 1988a; Palmer & Ringwalt 1988; Austin & Gilbert 1989; Prendergast et al. 1989; Oetting & Beauvais 1990; Anthony & Helzer 1991; Bachman et al. 1991a; Blum et al. 1992; Wallace & Bachman 1991:350; Bass & Kane-Williams 1993; Johnston et al. 1995:137; Mazur 1995:280; O'Donnell et al. 1995; Parker et al. 1995; Mieczkowski 1996:365; Farley 1997:90; Whitmore et al. 1997:93

These arguments also overlook significant distinctions between Black and White drug users, as was previously mentioned. What kinds of distinctions exist? "African Americans are nearly twice as likely to buy outdoors (0.31 versus 0.14), three times more likely to buy from a stranger (0.30 versus 0.09), and significantly more likely to buy away from their homes (0.61 versus 0.48)," according to a study that compared drug use among Black and White people, [Pacula, Iguchi, and Ramchand MY \(2006\)](#). In a similar way, a Justice Department report discovered that Black drug users are more likely to use drugs in high-crime neighborhoods, use drugs more frequently than White drug users, and use more dangerous drugs than White drug users ([Lagan 1995](#)).



Black drug users are more likely than White drug users to be arrested due to all six of these disparities. Considering all of this, there is no solid evidence to support the idea that racism is reflected in Black drug arrest rates. They are much more likely to represent the dishonesty and careless drug-using behavior of Black people.

Surveys support the "White Privilege" theory that black people are more likely than white people to be imprisoned for drug use. On surveys, however, people lie, and black people may lie more.

Black people accounted for 30.7% of all [ER visits for illegal drug](#) overdoses in 2011 and 31.7% of all [drug arrests](#).

This alone most likely demonstrates that arrests for illegal drug use are grounded in actual drug use. The arrests most likely reflect the overall volume of drug use, even if it does not represent the number of people of each race who have ever used drugs.

### ***Police brutality***


The assertion that Black people are frequently unfairly killed by police has gained a lot of popularity recently. Treyvon Martin, George Floyd, Michael Brown, and Freddie Gray are just a few of the alleged cases of this phenomenon that have received a great deal of media attention.

It is no surprise that there is a fascination with colorful (and frequently dishonest) anecdotes. The myth of the police war on Black people is quickly debunked by a cursory examination of the pertinent statistics. As we saw above, Black people make up more than half of robbery offenders and approximately one-third of rape and assault offenders, according to both NVCS and UCR data. According to UCR data, approximately half of murder offenders, 38% of violent offenders, and 29% of all arrested individuals are Black ([2014, Crime in the United States, Table 43](#)). Furthermore, [37% of those who have killed a police officer](#) between 2010 and 2019 were Black. Given this, if police force were just and only killed criminals who constituted a significant threat to society, and if police killed

criminals of both races equally frequently, we would anticipate that between 29% and 38% of police fatalities would be Black.

Numerous sources exist regarding police killings. There is debate over which is the best. However, since they all essentially depict the same thing, it isn't really important. First, according to an analysis of UCR data by Harvard economist Sendhil Mullainathan, 32% of people killed by police were Black ([Mullainathan 2015](#)). Similarly, data from Killedbypolice.net, which bills itself as “The most accurate, most comprehensive and always up-to-date list of people killed by U.S. law enforcement officers,” was examined by sociologist [Peter Moskos](#). The website essentially compiles every news article about a police officer killing someone in the nation. The website is meant to provide a thorough substitute for the government's sloppily produced and biased statistics. Moskos used this data set to determine that Black people made up 30% of police-killed victims between 2013 and 2015 (Moskos 2015). The CDC's Compressed Mortality Database is a third resource that we can utilize. The causes of American deaths are the main focus of this database, not crime. Nonetheless, one such cause, apart from legal execution, is being killed by law enforcement. This information shows that, according to the [CDC's estimates](#) of the Compressed Mortality Database, Black people made up 27% of those killed by police between 1999 and 2014. Therefore, we find that, if anything, Black people make up a smaller percentage of those killed by police than we would anticipate given their crime rates across a number of data sources.

Proportion of Blacks among arrests and victims of police



Furthermore if police officers shot Black more and had a race bias, we would expect them to hesitate less to shoot a Black man than a White man when presented the same threat. But this is not the case, when presented the same scenario of threat, cops hesitate longer to shoot a Black person than a White person.

Table 343 : Reaction time to shoot by suspect race

**Table 2** Reaction time to shoot after a threat was presented, in seconds, for each predictor variable (standard deviations in parentheses)

Predictor variable		Mean (SD)
Suspect race	Hispanic	0.88 (0.27)
	White	1.37 (0.09)
	Black	1.61 (0.15)*
Scenario difficulty	Naive	0.59 (0.09)
	Intermediate	1.78 (0.15)**
	Journeyman	1.33 (0.27)**

\* $p < .05$ \*\* $p < .001$ 

The fact that Hispanic suspects have the shortest delay indicates that police officers feel most at ease shooting Hispanics, followed by white people, and least at ease shooting Black people.

### *Unfair Sentencing*

The fact that Black people receive lengthier sentences than white people for the same offenses is another prevalent claim that the legal system is racist. This is accurate, but there are other, more comprehensive explanations for this.

There are more important considerations than the crime a criminal has just committed when determining his sentence. Other factors also come into play, like his courtroom demeanor and the probability that he will commit another crime in the future. Blacks and Whites receive the same sentences for the same crimes if these factors remain constant.

This was [Beaver et al. \(2013\)](#)'s conclusion. After adjusting for verbal IQ and self-reported violent history, researchers compared the length of time that criminals were sentenced. They discovered that the racial cap on sentencing was totally removed when these factors were held constant.

[Ferguson \(2024\)](#) found no evidence for racial disparities in most sentencing for crimes, using more than 50 studies for its meta-analysis. All the effect sizes  $r$  were below for the threshold of statistical significance (0.054 for Black vs. White defendants namely). The authors also found that higher-quality studies (better controls for variables like prior record, attorney type, and victim cooperation) were less likely to find disparities, which is an interesting fact.

### *Court bias*

Maybe it's court bias rather than police bias. Black people make up a larger percentage of the prison population than their overall crime rate, as evidenced by the fact that they account [for 40.1% of all prison inmates](#) but [only 26.6% of all arrests](#).

Although they only make up 54.18% of the prison population, Whites and Hispanics account for 69.4% of all arrests.

Data on arrests does not differentiate between whites and Hispanics, but data on the prison population does. In 2009, white people made up 33.1% of the prison population in the United States, while Hispanic people made up 21.1%.

Black people, however, [receive lengthier sentences](#). In fact, the racial disparity in the prison population virtually disappears when sentence length is taken into account.


This indicates that sentence length accounts for nearly all of the racial disparity in the prison population. I can't be arsed, but the residual might be caused by the fact that, on average, Black people are arrested for more serious offenses. The prison population is what you would anticipate from arrest rates, which, as mentioned above, most likely reflect actual criminal activity, once sentence length is taken into account.

**Table 344 : Arrests and prison pop. by race**

Race	% of 2009 arrests	% of 2009 prison pop.	% ever gone to prison
<b>Black</b>	28.3	40.1	29.0
<b>White+Hisp</b>	68.9	54.2	65.4
<b>White</b>	N/A	33.1	47.5
<b>Hisp.</b>	N/A	21.1	29.0

The percentage of people who have ever been incarcerated is calculated by taking the total number of inmates and adjusting for racial differences in sentence length, which is shown in the following section.

Additionally, whites and non-whites [have the same declination rates](#):



These represent the proportion of cases in which the defendant is exonerated and the prosecution drops the case.

Therefore, police officers arrest people in roughly the same racial proportion as those who are accused of crimes, and judges convict people in roughly the same racial proportion as the police officers arrest them.

Overall, it seems to be equal between the races, though juries of all Black people may be more likely to convict a white person and vice versa.

These two pieces of evidence clearly indicate that racial differences in conviction rates are negligible. If there is data on conviction rates by race, that would be great, but I am unable to locate it.

### ***Conclusion***

First, we observed that racism is most likely not the reason why Black people are arrested more frequently than White people. The correlation between victimization surveys, arrest records, and school misbehavior rates demonstrated this. Subsequently, we observed that Black drug arrest rates can be explained by the higher dishonesty of Black drug users on drug-related surveys as well as the behavioral differences between Black and White drug users that increase the likelihood of arrest for Black drug users. After that, we examined police killings and demonstrated that, given their prevalence among criminals generally, Black people are killed by police at a rate that is about what one might anticipate. Lastly, we observed that Black people receive lengthier sentences than white people for reasons that have nothing to do with racism. Therefore, it can be concluded that, in general, the American criminal justice system does not discriminate against Black people, and that Black people do commit crimes at the rate indicated by arrest statistics.

[Robertson \(2019\)](#) conducted a ground-breaking study to determine whether prosecutorial charging decisions in the US criminal justice system are influenced by racial and socioeconomic biases. This study uses a blinded, randomized controlled experiment to separate the effects of race and class on prosecutors' decisions, in contrast to previous observational studies that frequently struggle with confounding variables. This provides strong evidence that these factors do not significantly affect charging outcomes.

467 prosecutors from all around the United States participated in a controlled experiment that the researchers designed. They tested the effects of defendants'

socioeconomic class and race using case vignettes that were altered under five different experimental conditions. In order to test the effectiveness of blinding reforms and provide a baseline measure of bias, the conditions included a control group in which information about race and class was excluded. In a between-subjects design, the other conditions changed the defendant's race (e.g., Black or White) and class (e.g., low or high socioeconomic status). Whether prosecutors filed a felony charge, sought fines or jail time, and the severity of these sanctions (such as the amount of fines or length of incarceration) were the main outcome variables.

The study's randomized design, which reduces confounding variables like case severity or evidentiary strength—problems that frequently arise in observational research—is its strongest point. The experiment isolates the causal impact of the manipulated race and class variables by giving all participants the same case facts. In order to account for potential influences on decision-making, the researchers also gathered information on prosecutor and jurisdiction characteristics, including years of experience (average 12.7 years), gender (65.2% male, 24% female), and jurisdiction size.

Prosecutors only suggested a felony charge in 15.8% of cases under all circumstances, with no discernible difference depending on the defendant's race or class. Regression analyses (Tables 2-4) comparing the blinded condition (no race or class information) to conditions where race or class was specified revealed no statistically significant differences in felony charging rates.

With an average fine of \$2,427.50, about 41.5% of prosecutors suggested monetary penalties. Race and class did not significantly affect the likelihood of receiving a fine or the amount of the fine, according to regression models (Tables 5–6). After controlling for prosecutor and jurisdictional characteristics, the coefficients from these models did not exhibit statistical significance at the 0.05 level or lower.



A minimum confinement period of 21.4 days was recommended by roughly 27% of prosecutors. The decision to recommend confinement or the length of confinement was not significantly impacted by race or class, according to regression analyses (Tables 7–8). With no coefficients achieving statistical significance, odds ratios from scalar outcome analyses (Figure 2) and binary outcome models (Figure 3) further confirmed the lack of bias.

There were no consistent patterns of bias across race or class conditions in the forest plots (Figures 2 and 3) that summarized pooled analyses of scalar (fine amounts, confinement days) and binary outcomes (whether a felony was charged). These plots support the null findings and are based on regression models that control for prosecutor and jurisdiction characteristics.


The sample is contextualized by the descriptive statistics of the study (Table 1): The majority of prosecutors (43.53%) worked in jurisdictions with populations under 100,000, with 90.14% of prosecutors being White and 4.1% being Black or African American. The lack of bias in charging decisions, in spite of this demographic homogeneity, indicates that the facts of the case, not the traits of the defendant, influenced the prosecutors' choices.

This randomized experiment offers compelling evidence that the socioeconomic status and race of the defendants have no discernible impact on the charging decisions of prosecutors. With a rigorous experimental design and 467 prosecutors, the study's null findings on bias cast doubt on presumptions based on observational data and highlight the value of controlled experiments in comprehending the results of criminal justice. According to these findings, policies like blinding could strengthen the impartiality of prosecutors' decisions, while initiatives to lessen disparities should concentrate on other phases of the legal system or systemic causes.


### *Medias*

We hear many times from leftists that medias are racist and put forward Black crime etc. But is this true ?

[Lehman \(2022\)](#) analyzed how homicide coverage downplays the race of minority offenders. The most interesting figures are as follow :



Medias almost immediately mention the race of the murderer if he's white, but they wait until the end of the article if he's Black.



The race of the murderer was also mentioned at a 4 times higher rate if the criminal was white than if he was Black.

### 6.3 — White privilege in economy & employment


#### *Loans*

Sometimes, racial disparities in loan availability are cited as proof of White privilege. According to some theories, these discrepancies cause racial differences in home ownership and entrepreneurship, which have a number of long-term social and economic repercussions. Despite being told frequently, this story is not supported by the pertinent empirical data.

Asians are just [as able to obtain loans](#) as Whites, which contradicts the notion that Whites have an advantage due to due to White privilege.

#### **Despite recent improvements, blacks and Hispanics still have harder time getting mortgages**

##### *Denial rates*



Note: Data based on applications for conventional loans for one-to-four-family home purchases, including manufactured homes. Data on Asians were not broken out separately until 2004. Hispanics may be of any race.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data

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Given this trend, racial disparities in income are the most evident factor influencing loan approval. [Critics](#) have noted, however, that when comparing individuals with equal incomes, Whites have a higher chance of having their loans approved than Blacks.

Although this may seem convincing, equal-income Blacks and Whites do not spend in the same ways. After adjusting for factors like income, age, family size, education, and marital status, [Borgo \(2013\)](#) examined data on 25,820 American households and discovered that Black households had lower saving rates than White households. Therefore, it makes sense for lenders to favor White borrowers over Black ones, even when their incomes are equal.

Blacks and Whites with equal incomes have different credit scores, which can be explained by these disparities in spending patterns. The [Washington Post reported](#):

*The study found that whites earning less than \$25,000 had better credit records as a group than African Americans earning between \$65,000 and \$75,000. Overall, 48 percent of blacks and 27 percent of whites had bad credit ratings, as defined by Freddie Mac in this study.*

[A survey](#) asking lenders to justify their denials of a large sample of loan applications highlights the pivotal role credit scores play in racial loan disparities. According to this study, the most common reason non-Black applicants were turned down for loans was their debt-to-income ratio, while Black applicants most commonly gave their credit history.

Table 345 : Reasons for turning down a mortgage

### Why different groups are turned down for mortgages

*Most frequently cited reasons, 2015*

#### **White:**

Debt to income ratio	25%
Credit history	21
Collateral	18

#### **Black:**

Credit history	31
Debt to income ratio	25
Collateral	13

#### **Hispanic:**

Debt-to-income ratio	26
Credit history	21
Collateral	15

#### **Asian:**

Debt to income ratio	29
Collateral	15
Credit application incomplete	12

Even after controlling for variations in credit scores, [some research](#) indicates that racial disparities in loan acceptance still exist. This is accurate, but it's also true that Blacks and Whites don't benefit equally from the credit scoring system. The [Federal Reserve's report](#) to Congress on the predictive power of credit scores for loan performance states:

*Consistently, across all three credit scores and all five performance measures, blacks, single individuals, individuals residing in lower-income or predominantly minority census tracts show consistently higher incidences of bad performance than would be predicted by the credit scores. Similarly, Asians, married individuals,*

*foreign-born (particularly, recent immigrants), and those residing in higher-income census tracts consistently perform better than predicted by their credit scores*

To put it another way, you have a better chance of receiving your money back from the White if you lend it to a Black and a White with identical credit scores.

It was found that people with low credit scores were most affected by this bias, while people with high credit scores were significantly less affected. Blacks with low credit scores are much riskier to lend money to than Whites with low credit scores, but there is little difference in the riskiness of lending money to Blacks and Whites with good credit scores.

Given this, it should come as no surprise that a [Chicago Federal Reserve study](#) revealed a significant bias in favor of white people among those with poor credit scores, but no racial bias in loan approval rates among those with good credit. If loan agencies were economically rational, they would be acting exactly as we would expect.

[A study](#) of several thousand banks revealed that Black-owned banks discriminated against Blacks much more severely than White-owned banks, which may be the best proof that racism is not the reason for variations in loan approval rates.

In particular, it was discovered that a Black person at a bank owned by white people had a 78% higher chance of being denied a loan than a White person. This percentage increased by 101% to 179% at a bank owned by Black people.

**Table 346 : Acceptance rate by applicant's race, and bank owner's race**

	White-Owned Banks		Black-Owned Banks	
	Acceptances	Rejections	Acceptances	Rejections
White applicants	90.59% (1984)	9.41% (206)	86.22% (169)	13.78% (27)
Black applicants	83.26% (179)	16.74% (36)	61.56% (458)	38.44% (286)
Total applicants	89.94% (2163)	10.06% (242)	66.70% (627)	33.30% (313)
Disparity ratio <sup>a</sup>		1.78		2.79

Black people have a harder time getting loans than white people, which can be explained by racial differences in loan riskiness. However, the relevant empirical evidence does not support the idea that racism on the part of lenders is a significant factor.

### ***Race and Wealth Inheritance***

A paper discussing racial disparities in inheritance and wealth was published by [the Federal Reserve](#). Here are some intriguing statistics that are pertinent to claims of "white privilege."

**Table 347 : Inheritance data by race**

Race / Ethnicity	% w/ inheritance	Median Value of Inheritance	Average of Median Inheritance Per Person
White	22.9	\$55,207	\$12,642
Black	10.6	\$49,441	\$5,271
Hispanic	5.5	\$28,708	\$1,579

This can be conceptualized in terms of the 8-hour workdays required to earn \$20 per hour. The median white inheritance would require 79 days of work for those who receive no inheritance, which includes 77.1% of white people. It's also important to remember that if you receive any inheritance, it's more than the 77.1% of white people who receive it.



However, white people end up accumulating far more wealth even when they do not receive an inheritance:

**Table 348 : Wealth by race among those with no inheritance**

<b>Race / Ethnicity</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mean</b>
<b>Black</b>	\$33,969	\$185,702
<b>Hispanic</b>	\$38,125	\$196,541
<b>White</b>	\$183,050	\$742,627

Therefore, white people generally accumulate far more wealth than black and Hispanic people, even among those who receive no inheritance.


However, remember affirmative action. Being Black or Hispanic is a huge advantage when it comes to obtaining credentials. Now for the question: would you prefer to receive an additional SAT score of 250 or \$10,000? Those of you who are smart will take the 250 SAT points, which is about what black people receive for being black in affirmative action.

However, the white privilege folks will respond with a few points. They will argue that discrimination in hiring negates the benefits of affirmative action, that whites have an advantage in "connections" for jobs, and that whites have an easier time affording degrees in the first place.

### ***Student Debt and Working Through School***

One possible argument is that while Blacks and Hispanics must endure the hardship of working through school, white people are allowed to simply attend classes. In fact, white people are more likely to work through high school and college:

### Percentage of Youth (Ages 16-24) Who are Employed, by Race/Hispanic Origin and School Enrollment<sup>1</sup>: 2015




<sup>1</sup> Includes a small number of persons enrolled in grades below high school.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor. College enrollment and work activity of 2015 high school graduates.

<http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/hsqec.pdf>

A very funny thing is that, when presented this data, leftists will always go and say that this proves black discrimination. For example, if black minors are working more than white minors, it's because they are forced to by some oppressive system, whereas white minors are allowed to grow up without having to work. However, employers are discriminating against Black minors if white minors work more than black minors. Therefore, regardless of the situation, brown people are oppressed and should receive compensation from white people.


Nevertheless, after graduation, white college graduates owe roughly the same amount as black and Hispanic college graduates:



This may appear to go against other data that indicates that the average amount of student loans taken out by Black and Hispanic individuals is higher. This is accurate. By graduation, however, they are about the same.

The point is that, despite having a higher likelihood of working during their college years, white people graduate with about the same amount of student debt as black and Hispanic people. Or the men do, anyway.

Furthermore, there were no appreciable differences in the percentage of Hispanic, Black, and White students who had their parents pay for their college education:



However, what about institutional funding and grants? Perhaps white people receive a lot more funding for their education. The answer to that is a definitive "no."

**Table 349 : Distribution of grants and scholarships by race**

Total Grants All Grants	Percentage Receiving Grants	Average Grant Amount Received	Total Grant Funding	Number of Grant Recipients	Percentage of Grant Recipients	Percentage of Total Grant Funding	Percentage of Student Population
Race							
<b>Total</b>	51.7%	\$4,864	\$52,646 million	10,822,900	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>White</b>	48.2%	\$5,008	\$31,230 million	6,235,700	57.6%	59.3%	61.8%
<b>All Minority Students</b>	57.4%	\$4,672	\$21,287 million	4,556,300	42.1%	40.4%	38.0%
<b>Black or African-American</b>	63.5%	\$4,372	\$8,113 million	1,855,800	17.1%	15.4%	14.0%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	58.1%	\$4,314	\$7,425 million	1,720,900	15.9%	14.1%	14.1%
<b>Asian</b>	43.1%	\$6,444	\$3,430 million	532,200	4.9%	6.5%	5.9%
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	60.4%	\$4,327	\$461 million	106,600	1.0%	0.9%	0.8%
<b>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander</b>	49.3%	\$4,097	\$305 million	74,500	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%
<b>More Than One Race</b>	53.8%	\$5,831	\$1,553 million	266,300	2.5%	2.9%	2.4%

We can determine how much each racial group typically receives for college by simply multiplying the average grant amount by the percentage of grants received from the above chart:

**Table 350 : Average grant received by race**

<b>Race / Ethnicity</b>	<b>Average Grant Received</b>
<b>Mixed Race</b>	\$3,127
<b>“Asian”</b>	\$2,777
<b>Black</b>	\$2,776
<b>Amerindian</b>	\$2,614
<b>Hispanics</b>	\$2,506
<b>Whites</b>	\$2,414
<b>Pacific Islander</b>	\$2,020

Very slight racial differences once more. Therefore, it is untrue to say that white people have a significant financial advantage in college.

### ***Employer discrimination***

Now, as has been stated elsewhere, employers have every right to discriminate against Black and Hispanic candidates with the same qualifications because of affirmative action. This is because it is simpler for Black and Hispanic individuals to earn a degree from a prestigious university and then gain the kind of work experience that an entry-level Harvard graduate receives. Additionally, it makes sense because Black people are less skilled at their jobs.

Nevertheless, proponents of white privilege will counter that non-white applicants face discrimination and receive fewer callbacks. Additionally, they will broadcast [anecdotes](#) demonstrating similarly severe outcomes, such as a woman who changed her name to sound more white and received TEN times as many callbacks.

Given identical applications, the white callback rates range from 0.946 to 1.506 times the black callback rate in the actual experimental data, which is a little more banal:

**Table 351 : White vs Black callback rate for identical resumes**

<b>Study</b>	<b>White Callback Rate as Multiple of Black Callback Rate for Otherwise Identical Resumes</b>
<a href="#"><u>Jacquemet-Yannelis 2011</u></a>	1.456
<a href="#"><u>Deming-Katz 2016</u></a>	0.946
<a href="#"><u>Bertrand-Mullainathan 2004</u></a>	1.506
<a href="#"><u>Agan-Starr 2016</u></a>	1.212

Not as thrilling.

As for the reports that a name change to a more white-sounding name led to a ten-fold increase in callbacks, well, that might have actually happened. There are outliers. Or it might have been entirely fictitious.

Assume that white people have a 1.5-fold higher chance than black people of receiving a callback for a job application. But what does that actually mean in real life? In other words, a Black person must submit 15 applications in order to receive the same outcome as a white person who submits 10 applications. When you break it down and consider what it means practically, a "50% higher callback rate" doesn't seem like a huge deal. A few more applications will result from it.

However, I would like to know if you would rather have a sociology degree from Georgia Tech or Yale, but have to submit 15 applications to receive the same outcome as a white person with a Yale sociology degree sending out 10 applications.

In plainer terms, the cost of being accepted to Yale when you are actually only qualified to attend Georgia Tech is that you must submit five more job applications than a white person with the same degree and university. Yale does not admit a white person with a SAT score of 1400.

In other words, it is completely unimportant. Two more hours of work, perhaps. I might be trivializing the callback disparity, according to some. I am, of course, since it is insignificant.

However, the story doesn't end here. According to the Agan-Starr study, racial disparities were almost eliminated if employers were aware of an applicant's criminal history:

**Table 352 : Callback rates by race and criminal activity, for identical resumes**

Race	No Crime	Any Crime	Property Crime	Drug Crime
White	14%	8.3%	7.7%	8.9%
Black	13.1%	8.6%	9.1%	8.1%

As an aside, the paper makes the case that employers should be prohibited from using "the box," or the right to request criminal records, because it makes it harder for ex-offenders to find employment. However, it turns out that requesting criminal records completely closes the racial gap for non-criminals. The cops and courts are biased against Blacks and Hispanics, which is the obvious "white privilege" response.

However, when I heard this, I was reminded of this well-known/infamous cartoon about "white privilege" that went viral online. And this was one of the panels:



I managed to find [the study](#) on which this is based. According to a [2003 study](#), white people with criminal records had a 5% higher chance of getting hired than black people without such records. They did not, however, account for credentials or resume quality. In other words, the resumes of the white applicants were probably superior overall.

As demonstrated above, Blacks and whites are hired at the same rates when they have the same resume credentials and the same criminal or non-criminal records.

### ***More about the callback myth***

#### **Employee competence by race and credential**

Black people receive fewer callbacks than white people for the same credentials, according to the "White Privilege" theory. Although it is assumed that this is simply outright "racism" on the part of the employers, keep in mind that a particular credential may have less value for a Black person than for a white person.

On page 36 of the 2002 [National Adult Literacy Survey \(test\)](#), there is an intriguing chart that displays math, prose (writing), and document reading scores for each educational level.

We can examine the outcome for document reading proficiency:



**Table 353 : Document reading ability by education and race**

<b>Education</b>	<b>0-8 Years</b>	<b>9-12 Years</b>	<b>GED</b>	<b>HS diploma</b>	<b>Some college</b>	<b>2-year Degree</b>	<b>4-year degree</b>	<b>Post- Grad</b>
<b>White</b>	191	238	272	271	297	305	320	330
<b>Black</b>	151	207	235	235	261	263	279	285
<b>Hisp.</b>	131	197	236	242	263	288	285	298
<b>Asian+Pacific Isl.</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	214	261	N/A	275	298

Therefore, a white college dropout will typically have an easier time understanding documents than a black person with some post-graduate degree in terms of reading and comprehension. Additionally, a white man with a GED will be significantly better than a black post-grad.

We can then examine prose (writing) proficiency:

**Table 354 : Prose ability by education and race**

<b>Education</b>	<b>0-8 Years</b>	<b>9-12 Years</b>	<b>GED</b>	<b>HS diploma</b>	<b>Some college</b>	<b>2-year Degree</b>	<b>4-year degree</b>	<b>Post- Grad</b>
<b>White</b>	202	243	276	278	302	313	328	341
<b>Black</b>	159	213	243	242	267	276	288	298
<b>Hisp.</b>	135	200	240	242	265	291	282	312
<b>Asian+Pacific Isl.</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	209	264	N/A	271	301

In a related way, white college dropouts write better than black post-graduates.

We can then examine quantitative aptitude:

**Table 355 : Quantitative ability by education and race**

<b>Education</b>	<b>0-8 Years</b>	<b>9-12 Years</b>	<b>GED</b>	<b>HS diploma</b>	<b>Some college</b>	<b>2-year Degree</b>	<b>4-year degree</b>	<b>Post- Grad</b>
<b>White</b>	195	242	277	279	304	313	329	338
<b>Black</b>	140	197	235	232	258	267	280	285
<b>Hisp.</b>	128	196	240	240	265	286	286	312
<b>Asian+Pacific Isl.</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	227	273	N/A	286	314

Here, white people who never attended college are performing nearly as well as black people who have completed four years of education.

Therefore, if you were an employer, would you prefer a white college dropout or a Black person with a post-graduate degree?

Compared to the black post-graduate, the white college dropout will demand lower compensation and less autonomy despite being more competent. Additionally, if you promote a white employee with inferior "credentials" over a black post-graduate, the latter is more likely to sue you for racial discrimination.

These figures date back to 2002. Sadly, these excellent charts demonstrating competence by race and educational attainment are absent from later reports; however, [this one](#) shows competence by income level and race, suggesting that this is still the case.

### **Callbacks for criminals**

The fact that white male ex-cons have a higher chance of receiving a callback than black males is one of the most prominent "white privilege" facts about employment. "Well, who makes a better employee?" is my reply.

In terms of criminal activity, keep in mind that [29% of black men](#) will serve time in prison.

In the 30 states for which they had data, the [recidivism rate for white people was 39.9%](#), according to a BJS study on the subject. In other words, white ex-offenders had a 39.9% chance of reoffending.

Going forward, the likelihood of a white ex-con being incarcerated remains higher than that of a random black individual. However, the white ex-con's increased criminality might be outweighed by their improved work ethic and increased competence.

White ex-cons aren't necessarily far more criminal than regular black people.

From the perspective of an employer, is a random Black individual or a white ex-con more likely to steal from the company?

Despite being 1.376 times more criminal than the black, the white ex-con most likely has a higher IQ. We know this because black people have an IQ of 85, while [prisoners have an IQ of about 90](#). Therefore, it will be higher even if white ex-offenders only have the same IQ as all of the inmates. Since some group will be compensating for the fact that black inmates undoubtedly have IQs below 85 and significantly below 90, white inmates most likely have average IQs above 90.

Because he is less stupid than the black person, the white ex-con may be less likely to steal from his employer than the random black person, despite the fact that he is more likely to steal in general. Considering that he is only 37.6% more likely to steal in the first place and that he has a higher IQ, it is reasonable to assume that the ex-con has a lower likelihood of stealing from his employer than from any other black man.

In summary, hiring white ex-cons instead of black people is not scandalous. Employers may have made the wrong choice, or they may have made the right one. However, it's not immediately apparent.

### **IQ, work performance and income**

We can then examine income, IQ, and race. You can now hold any beliefs you like regarding IQ and "intelligence." If it makes you feel better, you can think that intelligence and IQ are unrelated. However, IQ (general mental ability, or GMA) is a [very good predictor of work performance](#). Additionally, employers who are looking to hire individuals who can complete tasks effectively should take note of this:

Personnel measures	Validity (r)
GMA tests <sup>a</sup>	.51
Work sample tests <sup>b</sup>	.54
Integrity tests <sup>c</sup>	.41
Conscientiousness tests <sup>d</sup>	.31
Employment interviews (structured) <sup>e</sup>	.51
Employment interviews (unstructured) <sup>f</sup>	.38
Job knowledge tests <sup>g</sup>	.48
Job tryout procedure <sup>h</sup>	.44
Peer ratings <sup>i</sup>	.49
T & E behavioral consistency method <sup>j</sup>	.45
Reference checks <sup>k</sup>	.26
Job experience (years) <sup>l</sup>	.18
Biographical data measures <sup>m</sup>	.35
Assessment centers <sup>n</sup>	.37
T & E point method <sup>o</sup>	.11
Years of education <sup>p</sup>	.10
Interests <sup>q</sup>	.10
Graphology <sup>r</sup>	.02
Age <sup>s</sup>	-.01

Therefore, IQ can essentially be used as a stand-in for performance ability at work. If there are fifty individuals with an IQ of 100 and fifty with an IQ of 85, the individuals with the higher IQ are likely to perform better at work. And that's what blacks and whites are.

Therefore, the pertinent question about "white privilege" is whether or not black people make less money than their IQ would indicate. What does it mean, if it does, is the second question.

[Business Insider reports](#) that the median income for Black people was \$33,321 in 2012, while the median income for White people was \$57,009. As a result, the median income for black people was 58.45% that of white people.

Charles Murray determined the median incomes of people with different IQs in his 1993 book *The Bell Curve*. He discovered that the average income of those with an IQ of 85 is 61.9% that of those with an IQ of 100.

For as long as it has been measured, the median IQ of black people has been 85, while the median IQ of white people is 100. This is intentional; the number 100 represents the white person's test score in absolute terms.

When IQ is taken into account, blacks make 3.5% less than whites, if you take these figures literally. However, keep in mind that we are contrasting data from 1993 with data from 2012. In 1992, a higher IQ might have been worth 3.5% more than in 1993.

The main conclusion, however, is that whites and blacks make about what their IQs would indicate, and any variation from this for the entire population is negligible, if it exists at all.

Once more, you don't need to believe that IQ equates to "intelligence" to understand that it correlates with job performance. Employers appear to be using IQ as a basis for discrimination, navigating the political minefields required to avoid hiring overly credentialed Blacks, which is the true issue, not "White Privilege."

### **On the Studies Showing Obscene Callback Disparities**

Assume for the purposes of comprehension that a resume can be scored into a single value, ranging from 1 to 100. This covers credentials, work history, and references.

Now tell employers that being Black costs five points because of the overcredentialization of Black people.

Let's say you conduct an experiment where you send two resumes to companies that are otherwise identical. How frequently will the company select the white resume over the black resume if being white is worth five points? Well, we would anticipate that they would always choose the white resume over the black one.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise that studies have shown that identical white resumes are nearly always chosen over "equal" black resumes. In actuality, however, resumes that are exactly equal are not in competition with one another. White people only receive callbacks roughly twice as frequently as black people with comparable qualifications, not twenty times as frequently, because there are many instances where no strong white resumes are submitted.

It's true that Black people need more credentials than white people to get jobs, but affirmative action makes it easier for them to obtain those credentials.

I'm definitely against this. Requiring Black people to go through extra steps in order to obtain the same thing is unjust. I support bringing back IQ tests for employment because they are a far better indicator of job performance than "education level," "work experience," or references, and they will save everyone a great deal of time and money.

### ***Job Networks and “Connections”***


Networks would be the final substantive dispute pertaining to employment. For example, hiring people you know through word-of-mouth networks. I believe that the majority of white people would ask, "What the hell are you talking about?" when informed that they gain from this.

The main issue with the "job networks" argument, however, is that it is impossible to quantify its actual impact or determine how much white people gain from it. And I believe that the reason it is used is because it cannot be falsified.

We can, however, examine the earnings of first-generation immigrants to the US, who likely have fewer "connections" than the general population of non-immigrants.

First, we can examine the 2013 [median household income for each racial and ethnic group in the US](#):

Figure 1.  
Real Median Household Income by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1967 to 2013



Note: Median household income data are not available prior to 1967. For more information on recessions, see Appendix A. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see <http://ftp2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/cpsmar14.pdf>.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1968 to 2014 Annual Social and Economic Supplements.

Additionally, we can contrast this with the median household income of first-generation US immigrants:

## Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals

TABLE 3.6

### Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals

Median adjusted family income (in 2013 dollars)

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2007	2013
<b>Mexico</b>	\$26,700	\$27,500	\$26,100	\$30,800	\$32,000	\$31,100
<b>Other Central/South America</b>	\$37,600	\$33,200	\$33,000	\$37,900	\$40,800	\$37,400
<b>Asia</b>	\$41,600	\$39,200	\$41,600	\$51,500	\$55,400	\$46,000
<b>Europe</b>	\$48,900	\$47,600	\$49,800	\$53,400	\$60,000	\$66,600
<b>Caribbean</b>	\$36,200	\$33,300	\$36,200	\$38,700	\$38,000	\$31,100
<b>Africa</b>	\$37,600	\$33,300	\$41,500	\$43,000	\$36,800	\$34,800

Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or survey date. Based on family income in the calendar year preceding the census. Income standardized to a family size of three. For details, see <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/07/appendix-a-data-sources-and-methodology/>.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 2007 and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS)

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Looking at the numbers, it doesn't appear that first-generation immigrants of comparable backgrounds make more money than US-born citizens. These two groups were included in my 2013 Median Household Income list:

**Table 356 : Median household income by ethnic group**

<b>Group in the United States</b>	<b>Median Household Income</b>
<b>US-Born "Asians"</b>	\$67,065
<b>European Immigrants</b>	\$66,600
<b>US-Born Europeans</b>	\$58,270
<b>"Asian" Immigrants</b>	\$46,000
<b>US-Born Hispanics</b>	\$40,963
<b>Central American Immigrants</b>	\$37,400
<b>African Immigrants</b>	\$34,800
<b>US-Born Africans</b>	\$34,598
<b>Caribbean Immigrants</b>	\$31,100
<b>Mexican Immigrants</b>	\$31,100

Thus, it appears that immigration status is not very important. Since "Asian" can mean anything from Burmese to Indonesian to Japanese to Xinjiang, I put it in quotes. Although this does not prove the "work connections" hypothesis, it is also not what one would anticipate if "work connections" were truly significant.

Furthermore, proponents of "work connections" never provide a quantitative justification for their impact on racial disparities; instead, they merely state that "85% of jobs are filled without an advertisement but by word of mouth."

I had firsthand knowledge of two chemical engineers from my time in college. One applied to three companies and received two offers, while the other went to work for a company his dad worked for and was hired because of his connection. Although it's true that there is a huge demand for chemical engineers, the person who had to apply for jobs ended up enjoying his work more and earning more money than the person who was hired through a family connection.

While I'm sure white privilege individuals can cite instances of connections that matter and draw the conclusion that white people benefit from these connections more



frequently than Black and Hispanic people, I can provide examples of connections that don't matter. Of course, a personal experience does not imply that this is generally the case.


***What about the gaps?***

Those who believe in biological equality between races become frustrated when circumstantial explanations for racial differences in anything are disproved. They may ask, "So, why are there these GAPS? Gaps in income, wealth, and health, as well as in the percentage of physicians, scientists, and engineers!?"

What remains, then, after excluding non-genetic explanations?

## 6.4 — White discrimination in college

According to a [Gallup poll](#), the majority of white Americans believe that white and black students will have an equal chance of getting into college if they are equally qualified. White students will have an advantage over equally qualified Black students, according to the majority of Black people.



The majority of Blacks and Whites are mistaken. White people face discrimination in college admissions, as evidenced by numerous lines of evidence.

According to [a survey](#) of 338 American universities, one in four of them freely acknowledge the existence of such policies. Similarly, "membership in an under-represented group" tied with "exceptional talent" as the top choice for what makes a student "fit" their university, according to [a survey](#) of officials from 68 highly selective colleges.

The Princeton sociologist [Thomas Espenshade](#) conducted the best research on this topic in 2004. Data on 124,374 applicants to ten of the nation's most prestigious universities were used in Espenshade's study. He discovered that black applicants had

a 5.2-fold higher chance of being admitted than white applicants, even after adjusting for variations in SAT scores, whether or not applicants had family members who were alumni, and whether or not they participated in collegiate athletics. Asian students had a 0.7-fold higher chance of being admitted than white students, and Hispanic students had a 3.5-fold higher chance.

The Association of American Medical Colleges has released another [report](#). Black students are more than seven times more likely than white students to be admitted to American medical schools, while Hispanic students are 3.7 times more likely to be admitted if they apply with MCAT scores between 26 and 24 (a poor score) and GPAs between 3.2 and 3.39. Once more, Asians face greater barriers to admission than white people.

**Table 357 : Medical school acceptance rate by race and MCAT, GPA**

<b>US Medical School Acceptance Rates (2013 - 2015) by Race/Ethnic Group, for MCAT Scores 24-32 and GPAs 3.2-3.8</b>										<b>Averages for Matriculants by Race/Ethnic Group, 2014</b>	
<b>MCAT</b>	24-26	24-26	24-26	27-29	27-29	27-29	30-32	30-32	30-32	<b>MCAT</b>	<b>GPA</b>
<b>GPA</b>	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79		
Asian	6.5%	10.6%	17.7%	13.9%	<b>20.4%</b>	35.8%	26.8%	41.3%	59.0%	32.8	3.73
White	8.2%	15.1%	22.9%	19.0%	<b>30.6%</b>	45.0%	34.7%	48.9%	64.7%	31.7	3.72
Hispanic	30.9%	39.0%	53.0%	43.7%	<b>61.7%</b>	73.8%	60.5%	78.8%	81.7%	28.1	3.57
Black	58.7%	72.1%	76.8%	75.1%	<b>81.1%</b>	87.6%	83.8%	88.4%	95.1%	27.3	3.46
<b>ALL</b>	18.1%	21.5%	27.4%	23.2%	<b>32.3%</b>	45.0%	35.4%	48.3%	64.1%	<b>31.4</b>	<b>3.69</b>


The process of awarding grants also discriminates against white people.

Take, for example, Mark Kantrowitz's paper "The Distribution of Grants and Scholarships by Race." Non-white students are about 10% more likely than white students to receive a grant, according to Kantrowitz's paper, which examined the percentage of various grant types awarded to a nationally representative sample of 214,000 American college students between 2003 and 2008.

Hopefully, it is unclear that Asians and Whites face discrimination in grant-giving and college admissions (at least for Whites). This discrimination has a straightforward motivation. According to university administrators, all racial groups should have equal representation in universities since they are equally skilled in the classroom.

However, they're not. Whites and Asians are smarter than Hispanics and Blacks. This is the exact cause of the disparities in educational attainment between races. In actuality, Blacks are more likely than Whites to hold a college degree when comparing individuals with similar IQs, which is of course what you would expect given the discriminatory policies of universities :

After controlling for IQ, the probability of graduating from college is about the same for whites and Latinos, higher for blacks



Therefore, you must use criteria for college admission other than intelligence and intelligence proxies like grades if you want campuses to have more Black/Hispanic students and fewer White/Asian students.

Black high school students are now more likely than White high school students to enroll in college as a result of this, according to data from the [Bureau of Labor Statistics](#). The fact that white high school students perform better on [standardized tests](#) and earn [higher grades](#) than black students suggests that this is the result of discrimination rather than Blacks being more qualified than Whites.

Naturally, White people continue to earn [more degrees](#) than Black people because many Black students simply [leave college](#) without earning a degree after accruing an unmanageable amount of student loan debt.

This affirmative action discriminating Whites is even more evident at very top universities [like Harvard](#), where Blacks in the bottom 30% of students have more chances to be accepted than Whites in the 7<sup>th</sup> decile :

## 2. Harvard's Preferences for Underrepresented Minorities

Harvard's admissions data revealed astonishing racial disparities in admission rates among similarly qualified applicants. SFFA's expert testified that applicants with the same "academic index" (a metric created by Harvard based on test scores and GPA) had widely different admission rates by race.

Admit Rates by Race/Ethnicity and Academic Decile

Academic Decile	White	Asian American	African American	Hispanic	All Applicants
10	15.3%	12.7%	56.1%	31.3%	14.6%
9	10.8%	7.6%	54.6%	26.2%	10.4%
8	7.5%	5.1%	44.5%	22.9%	8.2%
7	4.8%	4.0%	41.1%	17.3%	6.6%
6	4.2%	2.5%	29.7%	13.7%	5.6%
5	2.6%	1.9%	22.4%	9.1%	4.4%
4	1.8%	0.9%	12.8%	5.5%	3.3%
3	0.6%	0.6%	5.2%	2.0%	1.7%
2	0.4%	0.2%	1.0%	0.3%	0.5%
1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

App.179-80; JA.6008-09. For example, an Asian American in the fourth-lowest decile has virtually no chance of being admitted to Harvard (0.9%); but an African American in that decile has a higher chance of admission (12.8%) than an Asian American in the *top* decile (12.7%).

Because they are Black or Hispanic, this practice of admitting comparatively dim individuals to colleges has a number of significant societal repercussions.

First, you might anticipate a decline in the relationship between IQ and education if individuals are being admitted to college for non-intellectual reasons. It has, too. The relationship between years of education and IQ has decreased from .56 in the 1970s ([and possibly .7 in the 1950s](#)) to .42 in the present, according to data from the [General Social Survey](#), a sizable and representative survey that has been conducted in the United States for decades.

**Table 358 : Correlation between IQ and educational attainment over time**

<b>Decade</b>	<b>Correlation IQ/educational attainment</b>
<b>1950s</b>	.70
<b>1970s</b>	.56
<b>1980s</b>	.53
<b>1990s</b>	.46
<b>2000s</b>	.42
<b>2010s</b>	.42

Thus, a college degree no longer confers the same level of intelligence as it once did. Given that Black students receive the most affirmative action in higher education, this is most likely the case for them in particular.

This explains how Black people can earn degrees despite not being as intelligent as White people who earn comparable degrees. The [National Survey of Adult Literacy](#) conducted by the Department of Education in 1992 provided evidence of this. A nationally representative sample of almost 14,000 Americans were interviewed by the NSAL, which also assessed their reading comprehension, document comprehension, and math skills in real-world situations. The most illuminating test is the mathematical one. According to the NSAL, Black graduate students' average scores fell somewhere between those of White students who never attended college and those of White

students who attended college but never earned a two-year degree. Whites who never attended college scored the same as Blacks who earned a four-year degree.

A Black person with a degree is likely to be just as intelligent and practically efficient as a White person who has never set foot in a university because of affirmative action.

This has the unintended consequence of making the white person appear to be much more competent than the black person when comparing two people with the same qualifications on paper. This could be the reason why, as liberals frequently like to note, white applicants are typically chosen over black ones when they apply for the same job with identical resumes.

Liberals naturally interpret these "call back" experiments as proof of anti-Black racism rather than as a side effect of anti-White/Asian racism. They then demand more affirmative action, both public and private, that is pro-Black, which is precisely what started this mess.

Another concerning consequence is due to affirmative action in medical schools, as it can be extended to the point that it **kills** people due to the incompetency of those who are positively discriminated.

Tables below show average competencies by race for applicants and matriculates :

**Table 359 : MCAT and GPA for applicants to medical schools by race**

Average MCAT Score and GPAs for Applicants to U.S. Medical Schools by Race/Ethnicity, 2024–2025											
	American Indian or Alaska Native	Asian	Black or African American	Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish Origin	Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	White	Other	Multiple Race/Ethnicity	Unknown Race/Ethnicity	Non-U.S. Citizen and Non- Permanent Resident	Total
MCAT CPBS	123.8	127.3	124.0	124.6	125.4	126.6	126.2	125.9	126.8	126.9	126.3
MCAT CARS	124.4	126.1	123.7	124.1	125.0	126.4	125.2	125.6	126.5	125.3	125.8
MCAT BBLS	124.6	127.3	124.3	125.0	125.9	127.0	126.5	126.2	127.0	127.2	126.6
MCAT PSBB	125.5	128.1	125.5	125.9	127.0	127.8	127.3	127.1	127.9	127.6	127.4
Total MCAT	498.4	508.8	497.4	499.7	503.4	507.8	505.1	504.9	508.1	507.0	506.1
GPA Science	3.26	3.64	3.23	3.35	3.32	3.63	3.54	3.50	3.59	3.62	3.56
GPA Non- Science	3.61	3.83	3.62	3.70	3.61	3.82	3.78	3.76	3.79	3.78	3.79
GPA Total	3.41	3.72	3.40	3.50	3.43	3.71	3.64	3.62	3.68	3.69	3.66

Average MCAT Score and GPAs for Matriculants to U.S. Medical Schools by Race/Ethnicity, 2024–2025											
	American Indian or Alaska Native	Asian	Black or African American	Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish Origin	Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	White	Other	Multiple Race/Ethnicity	Unknown Race/Ethnicity	Non-U.S. Citizen and Non-Permanent Resident	Total
MCAT CPBS	125.0	128.7	126.3	127.2	127.6	127.8	127.9	127.6	128.2	128.6	127.9
MCAT CARS	125.7	127.2	125.5	125.3	125.5	127.3	126.3	126.8	127.4	126.4	126.9
MCAT BBLS	126.0	128.7	126.6	126.7	127.4	128.2	128.2	127.9	128.5	128.7	128.1
MCAT PSBB	126.6	129.4	128.0	127.6	128.5	128.9	128.8	128.7	129.2	129.0	128.9
Total MCAT	503.3	513.9	505.9	508.9	512.2	511.2	511.0	513.3	513.6	512.6	511.8
GPA Science	3.38	3.79	3.49	3.55	3.47	3.75	3.73	3.70	3.77	3.77	3.73
GPA Non- Science	3.63	3.90	3.76	3.79	3.67	3.88	3.87	3.85	3.88	3.85	3.87
GPA Total	3.49	3.84	3.62	3.65	3.54	3.81	3.79	3.76	3.82	3.80	3.79



**Table 360 : MCAT and GPA for matriculants to medical schools by race**

Unfortunately, one cannot simply look at the Cohen's d values from the table because no standard deviations are provided for these measures. These are listed in the [table that follows](#).

**Table 361 : Mean and standard deviations of MCAT scores**

Applicants		2018-2019	2019-2020	2020-2021	2021-2022	2022-2023	2023-2024
MCAT CPBS	Mean	126.3	126.4	126.5	126.3	126.4	126.4
	SD	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0
MCAT CARS	Mean	125.9	125.9	125.9	125.7	125.8	125.8
	SD	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8
MCAT BBLs	Mean	126.6	126.7	126.8	126.7	126.8	126.6
	SD	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.9
MCAT PSBB	Mean	126.8	127.1	127.2	127.3	127.5	127.4
	SD	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8
Total MCAT	Mean	505.6	506.1	506.4	505.9	506.5	506.3
	SD	9.3	9.3	9.2	9.7	9.9	10.0
GPA Science	Mean	3.47	3.48	3.49	3.48	3.52	3.54
	SD	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.44	0.42	0.42
GPA Non-Science	Mean	3.71	3.72	3.74	3.74	3.76	3.78
	SD	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.27
GPA Total	Mean	3.57	3.58	3.6	3.59	3.62	3.64
	SD	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.33
Total Applicants		52,777	53,369	53,030	62,443	55,189	52,577

Since these are for all applicants, not just white applicants, the Cohen's d will be somewhat understated when using them (say, 10 to 15%). The d gaps by race to white are then determined (I used matriculates because they are the most pertinent) and are as follows:


**Table 362 : d gaps to whites**

Measure	Blacks	Hispanics	Whites
MCAT CPBS	-0.63	-0.52	0.30
MCAT CARS	-0.74	-0.74	-0.04
MCAT BBLs	-0.63	-0.44	0.15
MCAT PSBB	-0.52	-0.52	0.19
Total MCAT	-0.73	-0.63	0.16
GPA Science	-0.74	-0.44	0.02
GPA Non-Science	-0.54	-0.36	0.04
GPA Total	-0.71	-0.44	0.03

As a result, we observe that Asian students are marginally more talented academically than white students, while Black and Hispanic students are significantly less talented.

This tends to balance out group gaps among admitted students because less capable students drop out more frequently. Nevertheless, there are still gaps among the graduates because the process is not entirely successful. The [differential drop-out](#) is displayed in the following figure and table:

**Figure 1.**  
Graduation Completion By Race/Ethnicity  
1987, 1992, and 1995 Entering U.S Medical School Students, Combined




**Table 363 : Attrition due to academic reasons, by race****Table 1.**

Attrition Due to Academic Reasons, for Five Race/Ethnicity Groups,  
10 Years after Entering U.S. Medical Schools

Matriculating Class	American Indian/Alaska Native	Asian	Black/African-American	Hispanic/Latino	White
1987 (n=15,469)	3.5% (2 of 58)	1.1% (19 of 1,696)	7.3% (66 of 916)	3.5% (28 of 811)	0.9% (106 of 11,554)
1992 (n=16,013)	6.2% (7 of 113)	0.8% (19 of 2,382)	6.2% (66 of 1,059)	2.3% (22 of 959)	0.7% (77 of 10,655)
1995 (n=15,833)	4.3% (6 of 139)	0.9% (27 of 2,887)	6.7% (83 of 1,231)	3.4% (37 of 1,093)	0.7% (70 of 10,303)

It was more difficult to locate competence data for graduates, but I managed to find [this figure](#):

## Mean MCAT Scores – By Race/Ethnicity 2012 -2014 Grads



Note: mean MCAT scores for graduates

As a result, we observe that graduates also maintain the rank order of scores across races. The graduates' ability to find housing is indicated by the placed/unplaced status.

### *Medical competency*

We can examine different medical school tests and exams (which are, of course, [accurately predicted by the MCAT](#)) in place of depending on the more academically broad MCAT. This is [the first table](#), which relates to a medical school competency exam.





Fig 4.—Observed and adjusted mean scores on the 1988 National Board of Medical Examiners Part I examination for Asian/Pacific Islander (A/Pi), Hispanic, and black men, and A/Pi, Hispanic, black, and white women, all compared with white men.

The explained gaps after adjusting for previous MCAT scores and GPA are referred to as the adjusted score. As is typically the case with [high-stakes tests](#), women perform worse in these older data.

We obtain a similar outcome from a [Michigan report](#) as previously mentioned:

**Figure 6. UMMS USMLE Step 1 Scores**



In medical school, the 25th centile white and Asian students perform roughly as well as the 75th centile black students.

A [comparable report](#) is available for Maryland as well. Also see this [meta-analysis's UK results](#).

### *MCAT et al predict actual medical performance*

This question has been the subject of numerous studies and a few reviews (e.g. [here](#), [here](#)). This is an illustration of a primary study.

- Norcini, J. J., Lipner, R. S., & Kimball, H. R. (2002). [Certifying examination performance and patient outcomes following acute myocardial infarction](#). Medical education, 36(9), 853-859.

*Holding all variables constant, successful examination performance (i.e. certification in internal medicine or cardiology) was associated with a 19% reduction in mortality. Decreased mortality was also correlated with treatment in hospitals located outwith either rural or urban settings and with management by a cardiologist. Shorter stays were not related to examination performance but were associated with treatment by high volume cardiologists who had recently finished training and who cared for their patients in hospitals located outwith rural or urban settings.*

We have extensive meta-analyses of racial differences in work performance generally, so even without the additional data, we would have good reason to conclude that there are racial differences in doctors' job performance:

[Roth et al. \(2003\)](#) and [McKay et al. \(2006\)](#) found mean racial differences in performance favor Whites, with statistically significant results.

### ***Race differences in medical performance***

So, at last, we reach the final section. Regretfully, I haven't come across any research that examined the race of specific doctors in relation to malpractice and other patient harm metrics. However, the racial makeup of medical schools can be used as a stand-in. A study of medical schools revealed that their rates varied consistently, but it didn't look into the relationship with school-level indicators like students' mean MCAT/GPA.

[Waters et al. \(2003\)](#) found :

**Results:** *Medical schools that are outliers for malpractice lawsuits against their graduates in one decade are likely to retain their outlier status in the subsequent decade. In addition, outlier status of a physician's medical school in the decade before his or her graduation is predictive of that physician's malpractice claims experience ( $p < 0.01$ ). All correlations of cohorts were relatively high and all were statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$ . Comparison of outlier and non-outlier schools showed that*

*some differences exist in school ownership ( $p < 0.05$ ), years since established ( $p < 0.05$ ), and mean number of residents and fellows ( $p < 0.01$ ).*

**Conclusions:** *Consistent differences in malpractice experience exist among medical schools. Further research exploring alternative explanations for these differences needs to be conducted.*

Even worse, there are studies that look into how race affects patient outcomes, but they only look at the patient's race and occasionally the patient-doctor relationship, not the doctor's race as a major factor! Here's an illustration:

Cooper-Patrick et al. (1999) found :

**Results** *African American patients rated their visits as significantly less participatory than whites in models adjusting for patient age, gender, education, marital status, health status, and length of the patient-physician relationship (mean [SE] PDM score, 58.0 [1.2] vs 60.6 [3.3];  $P = .03$ ). Ratings of minority and white physicians did not differ with respect to PDM style (adjusted mean [SE] PDM score for African Americans, 59.2 [1.7] vs whites, 61.7 [3.1];  $P = .13$ ). Patients in race-concordant relationships with their physicians rated their visits as significantly more participatory than patients in race-discordant relationships (difference [SE], 2.6 [1.1];  $P = .02$ ). Patients of female physicians had more participatory visits (adjusted mean [SE] PDM score for female, 62.4 [1.3] vs male, 59.5 [3.1];  $P = .03$ ), but gender concordance between physicians and patients was not significantly related to PDM score (unadjusted mean [SE] PDM score, 76.0 [1.0] for concordant vs 74.5 [0.9] for discordant;  $P = .12$ ). Patient satisfaction was highly associated with PDM score within all race/ethnicity groups.*

**Conclusions** *Our data suggest that African American patients rate their visits with physicians as less participatory than whites. However, patients seeing physicians of their own race rate their physicians' decision-making styles as more participatory. Improving cross-cultural communication between primary care physicians and patients and*

*providing patients with access to a diverse group of physicians may lead to more patient involvement in care, higher levels of patient satisfaction, and better health outcomes.*

Oh, and one last thing. Affirmative action likely kills more Black and Hispanic people than any other group, according to public health experts. People prefer to date and befriend people of the same race, and this ethnocentrism extends to the doctors that patients choose. As a result, the majority of the patients treated by the inept Black and Hispanic doctors are Black and Hispanic, who would have benefited more from a white or Asian physician.

Additionally, data from California indicates that, in comparison to white and Asian physicians, Black and Hispanic physicians are more likely to face complaints, investigations, and disciplinary action:

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	California Physicians			
	European	African	Latin	Asian
Physicians with Complaints	28.0%	43.0%	36.5%	24.7%
Physicians with Investigations	6.7%	11.7%	9.7%	5.3%
Physicians Disciplined	1.0%	1.5%	1.9%	0.8%

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Affirmative action is also responsible for the decrease of the cognitive ability of graduates.





Humans vary in their ability to do anything, which is a fundamental fact. This also holds true for the capacity to perform cognitively demanding tasks, for which general intelligence is the primary prerequisite. There is a well-known normal distribution for this trait in the population. Therefore, generally speaking, the more people in a society devote to a particular activity, the lower their average ability—in this case, intelligence—is. This holds true whether we are discussing mechanics, dentists, or different types of students. As a result, the average ability of students who enroll in some level of academic study decreases as the population's percentage increases.


Ignoring this consequence and comparing only educational levels as if they were constant indicators over time leads to a great deal of confusion in the literature. For example, this provides us with headlines like Since 1980, the value of a high school degree has decreased, leading to the following conclusions: Over the previous 40 years, the average income of high school graduates has decreased by 12%.

In contrast, those with advanced degrees have seen an 18% rise in income over the same period.


As low-wage service jobs have increased and manufacturing jobs have decreased, so too has the value of a high school degree.

It is a relatively trivial effect of the declining human capital levels of recent high school graduates. Todd Schoellman and Lutz Hendricks use graphs to illustrate this in a lovely [blog post from 2014](#):





The mean IQs by degree over time are available at [this article](#):




Naturally, the increased enrollment also means that in order for students to maintain their pass rates, the curriculum and related tests need to be continuously made easier. They no longer produce them as frequently as they once did.

Danish data by [Akcigit et al. \(2020\)](#) confirms this :

*How do innovation and education policy affect individual career choice and aggregate productivity? This paper analyzes the various layers that connect R&D subsidies and higher education policy to productivity growth. We put the development of scarce talent and career choice at the center of a new endogenous growth framework with individual-level heterogeneity in talent, frictions, and preferences. We link the model to micro-level data from Denmark and uncover a host of facts about the links between talent, higher education, and innovation. We use these facts to calibrate the model and study counterfactual policy exercises. We find that R&D subsidies, while less effective than standard models, can be strengthened when combined with higher education policy that alleviates financial frictions for talented youth. Education and innovation policies not only alleviate different frictions, but also impact innovation at different time horizons. Education policy is also more effective in societies with high income inequality.*

FIGURE 14: PhD ENROLLMENT AND AVERAGE PhD ENROLLEE IQ (FACT 9)




Source: DST, Note: This figure plots the enrollment (RHS y-axis) and IQ of enrollees with a three-year moving average (LHS y-axis) from 1995-2015.

Authors explain:

*Starting in 2002, the Danish Government required the universities to increase the number of PhD slots, as part of a larger initiative to support education and innovation in Denmark (see Section 2 for further institutional details). Figure 14 shows that as the number of slots for PhDs increases, the average IQ of the enrolling students falls. This indicates that there is heterogeneous quality of enrollees and expanding slots may draw in a marginal researcher less talented than the average researcher from the existing pool. Thus, even though policy can increase the supply of researchers, there is a trade-off between expanding the pool of PhDs and the average talent of PhDs in the economy.*


Other interesting figures from the study:

FIGURE 9: PROBABILITY CHILD OBTAINS A PhD AND FATHER'S INCOME PERCENTILE (FACT 2)



Source: DST, Note: Income percentile is age-adjusted percentile in year 2000.

FIGURE 8: PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING A PhD AND IQ PERCENTILE (FACT 1)



Source: DST, Note: Fraction of individuals with a PhD by IQ percentile bin.

Here, the values on the Y axis are the most important thing to pay attention to. The odds of earning a PhD are roughly 2.2% if your father's income is in the 99th centile, but 6.5% if your IQ is in the 99th centile, which is almost three times the effect size.

## 6.5 — On affirmative action

When it comes to applying to universities, [Stephen Epinshade](#) discovered in 1997 that being Black is worth 230 points on the SAT, being Hispanic is worth 185 points, being Asian costs you 50 points, and being a legacy is worth 160 points.

As far as I'm aware, no comparable analysis of this has been conducted recently. We must therefore draw conclusions from more aggregate data in order to calculate the extent of affirmative action. This is accomplished by examining the [racial distribution of SAT scores](#) as well as the racial makeup of college student bodies. My analysis was restricted to the top 20 universities [based on average SAT scores](#). All SAT data is verbal and math only.

According to SAT selectivity and racial makeup, these are the top 20 universities:

Comparing the percentage of admissions each racial group received in relation to their percentage of the 1478+ SAT scores allows us to see how each group was distributed among the 1478+ SAT scorers:

University	Average SAT	% Black	% Hispanic	% White	% Asian
Cal Tech	1545	1	12	27	45
Yale	1505	7	11	47	17
Harvard	1505	7	10	42	20
Princeton	1500	7	9	43	21
Duke	1500	10	7	45	21
Chicago	1492	5	8	44	17
MIT	1492	5	16	37	24
Washington-St. Louis	1485	5	6	51	17
Vanderbilt	1490	8	8	55	12
Columbia	1480	12	12	35	22
Stanford	1475	6	15	37	20
Franklin Olin	1479	0	4	48	15
Harvey Mudd	1480	2	13	38	20
Dartmouth	1460	7	8	48	15
Rice	1460	6	14	37	24
Pomona	1450	7	15	39	14
Bowdoin	1440	5	12	63	7
Northwestern	1450	6	11	49	17
Pennsylvania	1438	7	10	45	19
Tufts	1438	4	7	57	11
Average (Unweighted)	1478	5.85	10.4	44.35	18.9



Race	% of 18 year old pop.	Mean SAT	Standard Deviation	% of race scored 1478+	% of total 1478+ scorers	% of elite admissions	Multiplier
White	55	1063	196	1.715%	72.46%	44.35%	61.21%
Black	15.5	859	190	0.0564%	0.67%	5.85%	873.13%
Hispanic	21	905	196	0.174%	2.81%	10.4%	370.11%
Asian	4.5	1123	239	6.96%	24.06%	18.9%	78.55%

Therefore, assuming that, on average, whites and blacks with the same SAT score are equal on all other counts, white students "should" make up 72.46% of all admitted students at the top 20 universities. When SAT scores are controlled, the races perform about the same in college, with whites actually performing marginally better for any given SAT score, so this is not an unreasonable assumption.

Furthermore, after controlling for a wide range of variables, Epinshade (1997) discovered that, on average, members of the same racial group were nearly equal for a given SAT score.

Feel free to demonstrate that if you believe that this isn't the case today, that even though whites and Asians perform better in college for any given SAT score than blacks and Hispanics with the same scores, that blacks and Hispanics have some other

characteristics that make them better candidates for any given SAT score, and I'll adjust this article accordingly.

Hispanics should make up 2.81%, Asians should make up 24.06%, Blacks should make up 0.67%, and Whites should make up 72.46%. Due to these deviations, Asian students only receive 78.55% of admission to the top 20 universities, while white students only have 61.21% of the total.

Black students receive a staggering 873.13%, nearly nine times the representation that their SAT scores deserve, while Hispanic students receive 370.11% more students than they should.

However, we can use these figures to determine the average SAT score of the top 20 university attendees by race:

**Table 364 : Estimated race effect on SAT score**

<b>Race</b>	<b>Average percentile within-race of student accepted to top 20 uni</b>	<b>Average SAT of student accepted to top 20 uni</b>	<b>Race effect on SAT score</b>
<b>White</b>	<b>99.508%</b>	<b>1516</b>	<b>-38</b>
<b>Black</b>	<b>98.95%</b>	<b>1350</b>	<b>+128</b>
<b>Hispanic</b>	<b>99.356%</b>	<b>1393</b>	<b>+85</b>
<b>Asian</b>	<b>94.533%</b>	<b>1506</b>	<b>-28</b>

It may surprise you to learn that white people are punished more than Asians in terms of both the point value of discrimination against them and their representation

as a percentage of qualified applicants. Since I am only examining the top 20 universities—not the top 100 or all of them—these findings may not be generalizable to all universities.

### ***“Holistic” Admissions***

The University of California and the California State systems implemented a "holistic review" procedure after Proposition 209, which outlawed the use of racial quotas in school admissions, was passed in California.

Along with SAT, GPA, Honors, and extracurriculars, other factors that were taken into account were the "life challenge index" and "eligibility in the local context," or class rank.

Since class rank enables elite universities to reach predominantly black schools, it is currently a particularly cunning tactic. The issue is that it makes no difference what school you attend.

There is no guarantee that attending a "good school" will improve your SAT or GPA or lead to you learning more. This was well supported by voucher studies, which I'm going to talk about later.

It will only lower your class rank and put you up against more intelligent children.



Furthermore, "life difficulty," to the degree that it is equated with "money," is not a significant determinant of IQ. Indeed, those with lower IQs in the US tend to be poorer, and they also typically have parents with lower IQs who are also poorer.

However, it wasn't working even after accounting for these dubious "controls," which were chosen to increase the number of Black and Hispanic students in the UC system. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, Richard Sander was able to obtain the actual "holistic score" data. He discovered that, despite all of these factors being taken into

consideration (which, in my opinion, are spurious controls anyhow), the UC system STILL provides pure racial preferences:

## PERCENTAGE STUDENTS ADMITTED BY RACE

From 2007 to 2009, UCLA Admissions accepted a higher percentage of black and Latino students with mid-range holistic scores, than white and other races with the same scores.



SOURCE: Richard Sander, UCLA professor of law.  
Graphic reporting by Alexia Boyarsky, Bruin staff.  
Graphic by Stephen Stewart, Bruin reporter.

Thus, they continue to give preference to Blacks even when whites have the same alleged disadvantages as blacks based on the UC holistic admissions score (low income, parents who did not attend college, "bad school," etc.).

They must, of course, since they would be admitting primarily underprivileged white people if they only used different "life challenge" indicators:

Table 365 : SAT scores gap by family income

<b>At All Family Income Levels, There is a Persisting Racial Gap in SAT Scores</b>			
<b>Family Income</b>	<b>Mean Black Score</b>	<b>Mean White Score</b>	<b>Racial Gap</b>
Under \$20,000	798	978	180
\$20,000 to \$40,000	836	995	159
\$40,000 to \$60,000	864	1017	153
\$60,000 to \$80,000	889	1032	143
\$80,000 to \$100,000	908	1052	144
\$100,000 to \$120,000	922	1066	144
\$120,000 to \$140,000	926	1073	147
\$140,000 to \$160,000	942	1087	145
\$160,000 to \$200,000	943	1091	148
More than \$200,000	981	1130	149

*Source: The College Board.*

If universities want to admit very few black students, they must openly discriminate on the basis of race since white students in the bottom 10% perform about as well as black students in the top 10%. They also need to do this for Hispanics, albeit to a lesser degree.

Nevertheless, despite all of this circumstantial evidence, [42% of admissions officers themselves state](#) that their most crucial factor is "membership in an under-represented group," which they believe is more significant than their extraordinary talent:

Table 366 : Most important variables for applicant's institutional fit

<b>Table 7. Which variable is most important in determining an applicant's institutional fit?</b>	
<b>Variable</b>	<b>% of sample finding this variable most important</b>
Membership in an under-represented group	42%
Exceptional talent	42%
Recruited athlete status	7%
Yield likelihood	7%
Development potential	2%

Pushing "white privilege" on whites in the [poorest areas of the nation may be a reaction to](#), or coincidental with, the fact that poor whites perform better than blacks with higher incomes. These poor whites must be outperforming rich blacks for environmental reasons, so it cannot be genetics because racial differences in cognitive abilities linked to genetics are prohibited. Therefore, the "white privilege" must be so pervasive and strong that even these individuals enjoy fantastic institutional privileges.

### ***Racial extremism in universities***


However, it goes beyond that. Jews were listed as a group for the population of prestigious universities in an article from [The American Conservative](#).

Because Jews are grouped with white people, this is significant. However, it's crucial to differentiate between Jewish and non-Jewish representation whenever possible because so few white people are Jewish.

In 2014, non-Jewish whites made up only 23% of the Ivy League schools, with Jews making up 23%, while whites made up only 43.1% of the average population of the top 20 universities by SAT requirement:

**Elite University Undergraduate Enrollments, 2007-2011**

University	Non-Jewish White	Asian	Unknown Race	Jewish
Harvard	18%	16%	12%	26%
Yale	20%	14%	11%	26%
Princeton	37%	16%	5%	13%
Brown	22%	15%	12%	24%
Columbia	15%	16%	10%	25%
Cornell	24%	16%	14%	23%
Dartmouth	42%	14%	6%	11%
Penn	17%	18%	13%	27%
<b>All Ivy League</b>	23%	16%	11%	23%
Caltech	33%	39%	2%	6%
MIT	27%	25%	6%	9%
Stanford	28%	21%	4%	10%
UC Berkeley	21%	40%	7%	10%
UCLA	24%	37%	4%	9%




Source: Appendices C-F


The US Math Olympiad Teams, College Putnam Math Winners, US Physics Olympiad Winners, Science Olympiad Winners, Siemens Science AP Winners, Science Talent Search Finalists, and NMS Semifinalists for any states they could locate were among the other metrics that the American Conservative examined in order to determine merit.

**U.S. Math Olympiad Teams**

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1970s	56%	0%	44%
1980s	54%	9%	37%
1990s	45%	27%	28%
2000s	43%	53%	3%
2010s	28%	72%	0%


**College Putnam Math Winners**

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1938-49	59%	0%	41%
1950s	66%	3%	31%
1960s	76%	2%	22%
1970s	69%	0%	31%
1980s	75%	2%	24%
1990s	44%	24%	31%
2000s	52%	37%	12%
2010s	50%	50%	0%




**U.S. Physics Olympiad Winners**

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1980s	49%	23%	28%
1990s	55%	25%	20%
2000s	46%	46%	9%
2010s	14%	81%	5%

**Science Olympiad Winners**


Competition	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
Computing, 1992–2012	62%	27%	11%
Biology, 2003–2012	25%	68%	8%
Chemistry, 2011–2012	10%	90%	0%

**Siemens Science AP Winners**

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
2002–2011	31%	61%	8%

**Science Talent Search Finalists**


Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1940s	83%	0%	17%
1950s	78%	1%	22%
1960s	76%	1%	23%
1970s	70%	8%	22%
1980s	55%	22%	23%
1990s	54%	29%	17%
2000s	49%	36%	15%
2010s	29%	64%	7%






**Recent NMS Semifinalists for Available States**

State/Years	Total (2011)	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
Alabama/2008, 2010	208	83%	14%	2%
Arizona/2013	342	68%	26%	5%
California/2010, 2012	1,999	37%	58%	4%
Colorado/2012, 2013	256	78%	14%	7%
Florida/2008-13	867	74%	13%	8%
Illinois/2011-2013	693	71%	21%	8%
Indiana/2010, 2012-13	327	75%	18%	5%
Iowa/2011	191	80%	15%	4%
Kansas/2011	159	87%	9%	4%
Louisiana/2013	190	76%	19%	5%
Maryland/2010	327	57%	32%	11%
Michigan/2012, 2013	570	68%	30%	2%
Minnesota/2010, 2011	318	81%	13%	6%
Missouri/2011	344	87%	11%	2%
Nevada/2010, 2011	85	67%	20%	9%
New Mexico/2011	99	76%	11%	6%
New York/2011, 2012	957	45%	34%	21%
Ohio/2012, 2013	642	76%	20%	4%
Oklahoma/2008	187	83%	14%	3%
Pennsylvania/2012	700	72%	20%	9%
Tennessee/2010	279	80%	17%	2%
Texas/2010	1,344	68%	28%	3%
Virginia/2009	411	74%	19%	6%
Washington/2013	344	64%	31%	5%
Wisconsin/2012	324	87%	11%	3%
<b>Eight Largest States</b>	<b>7,772</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>7%</b>
<b>25 State Aggregate</b>	<b>12,163</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>6%</b>
<b>National (estimated)</b>	<b>16,317</b>	<b>65-70%</b>	<b>25-30%</b>	<b>6%</b>



Although there are no Black or Hispanic categories, it is important to note that all of these tables add up to 100%.

The author came to the conclusion that Jews are likely overrepresented at prestigious universities by a factor of roughly three based on this data.



However, this means that Jews, who are overrepresented in comparison to their ability, are given preference through the use of "holistic review," which severely discriminates against white people, with the exception of Jews. While non-Jewish

white people get the shaft, they are a high-performing group that also receives preferences and seems overrepresented for their skill level.

As a result, the already severe discrimination against white people at prestigious universities intensifies when Jews are distinguished from non-Jews.

### ***Post-Graduation Privilege***

Black and Hispanic students' racial privilege extends beyond their ability to be admitted to undergraduate programs.

Black and Hispanic applicants receive significant bonuses on their MCAT and GPA when applying to medical schools:

<b>US Medical School Acceptance Rates (2013 - 2016) by Race/Ethnic Group, for MCAT Scores 24-32 and GPAs 3.2-3.8</b>										<b>Averages for Matriculants by Race/Ethnic Group, 2015-2016</b>	
<b>MCAT</b>	24-26	24-26	24-26	27-29	27-29	27-29	30-32	30-32	30-32	<b>MCAT</b>	<b>GPA</b>
<b>GPA</b>	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79		
Asian	5.9%	10.1%	16.6%	14.4%	20.6%	34.9%	27.3%	40.3%	57.5%	32.8	3.73
White	8.0%	14.0%	22.0%	19.0%	29.0%	43.0%	34.0%	48.0%	63.0%	29.2	3.73
Hispanic	30.5%	38.3%	51.1%	42.8%	59.5%	71.6%	57.0%	75.9%	83.4%	31.8	3.59
Black	56.4%	67.1%	74.9%	75.3%	81.2%	86.6%	82.3%	86.9%	93.7%	27.3	3.48
<b>ALL</b>	16.7%	20.2%	26.5%	23.2%	30.6%	42.7%	34.5%	46.5%	60.9%	<b>31.4</b>	<b>3.70</b>

*Source: Association of American Medical Colleges*

Therefore, one should try to avoid black doctors and instead choose Asian ones.

According to an [analysis of LSAT scores by the Occidental Observer](#), being Black was worth roughly 6 points for the top 14 law schools and 7 points for the top 6.

Given how closely LSAT scores cluster, it makes more sense to think of this in percentiles:

Table 367 : LSAT score required by race for law schools

	Minimum LSAT score for top 14 law school	Percentile of all LSAT takers
Caucasians/Asians	164	93
Blacks	158	77

	Minimum LSAT score for top 6 law school	Percentile of all LSAT test takers
Caucasians/Asians	168	97
Blacks	161	86

Being Black is therefore worth leapfrogging 16% of white students at the top 6 law schools and 11% of white students at the top 14.

*These graduates*

Verbal IQ by Race and Highest Degree Earned 1972-2014			
Highest Degree	White Verbal IQ	Black Verbal IQ	Black/White Verbal IQ Gap
High school Dropout	89	82	7
High school Diploma	98	90	8
Junior College Degree	102	95	7
Bachelors Degree	108	100	8
Graduate Degree	113	102	11

Thus, the verbal IQ of a black person with a master's or doctoral degree will only be marginally higher than that of a white person with only a high school education.

The full-scale IQ of Black people at every educational level is most likely going to be lower than this because, in reality, they perform better on verbal tests than non-verbal ones.

Surveys of adult literacy also reveal this underperformance of Black people by educational attainment. These include reading documents, writing in prose, and using quantitative reasoning:

Estimated IQ by Race and Education			Black/White Gap (SD) by Literacy Type and Education			
Highest Degree	White IQ	Black IQ	Document	Prose	Quantitative	Average
High School Dropout	87	77	.59	.60	.79	.66
High School Graduate	99	90	.59	.57	.73	.63
2 Year Degree	104	94	.69	.60	.73	.67
4 Year Degree	113	103	.67	.65	.78	.70
Graduate Degree	121	110	.74	.70	.84	.76

This implies that a black college graduate will only be marginally more capable than a white high school graduate. Additionally, black people with the highest credentials will typically be marginally less skilled than white people with only a four-year degree.

In a [speech about his book](#) "The Affirmative Action Hoax," Steve Farron noted that only 11% of black college graduates could read a bus schedule and only 18% could sum up a newspaper article. Naturally, this implies that the majority of white people are also unable to perform these tasks.

### ***Conclusion***

It is evident that white people, especially non-Jewish white people, are severely underrepresented in the United States' elite universities compared to their population share because of severe discrimination against them. They should make up 55% of the student body at these universities based on population, and roughly 72% based on merit. However, admissions officers have ensured that only 44.35% of their average student body is white.

When compared to white people with the same SAT scores, people of other races perform marginally worse rather than better than what would be expected. Because low-class whites outperform high-class blacks, anti-white discrimination must be a function of race itself, not just the unequal impact of adjusting for "social" and economic factors.

Furthermore, nothing improves. Black and Hispanic applicants continue to perform worse and receive preferential treatment when applying to law and medical schools. Finally, employers devalue Black and Hispanic degrees because, after obtaining those degrees, Black people are far less intelligent and competent than white people with the same credentials.

However, this shouldn't come as a huge surprise. The admissions officers' unworkable situation stems from their environmental determinist perspective on race, which dates back to the civil rights era and forbids the mention of racial genetic differences. They must then come up with new explanations and defend de facto racial quotes longer, more, and against poor whites as well, because fifty years later, they have made exactly no progress beyond the direct results of affirmative action quotas, which would be lost the moment those quotas were removed.

The environmental effects must be more severe, exotic, and concealed; they are not the typical environmental drawbacks. Although genes readily explain it, they cannot explain it because only racists hold that belief, and since it is racist, it must be incorrect. Furthermore, we at the prestigious universities, which declared in 1965 that everything was influenced by the environment, are aware that "race realism" is just suit-and-tie racism and is therefore wrong. Racist, so wrong.

Like a schizophrenic with delusions, these people are constantly looking for connections and creating "white privilege" to explain why the poorest people in the nation, like whites from Appalachia, continue to outperform their pampered, pumped-up, and coddled rich blacks from tutors and prep schools

*Affirmative action in other fields*

[The Federal Aviation Administration was sued in 2018](#) for allegedly jeopardizing air safety by altering hiring practices to promote "diversity" among "too white" air traffic controllers.

It has been [argued](#) that affirmative action policies have had a negative impact on firefighting.

A [2009 article](#) on affirmative action at the Naval Academy in Annapolis stated criticisms by a professor there, who had sat on the board of admissions. He stated that White applicants must have grades of all As and Bs and test scores of at least 600 on the English and math parts of the SAT, even to qualify for a "slate" of 10 applicants, from which only one will be chosen. However, if African-American, Hispanic, Native American, or Asian, "SAT scores to the mid 500s with quite a few Cs in classes [...] typically produces a vote of 'qualified' [...] with direct admission to Annapolis. They're in and given a pro forma nomination to make it legit. [...] Minority applicants with scores and grades down to the 300s and Cs and Ds also come, though after a year at our taxpayer-supported remedial school, the Naval Academy Preparatory School." The affirmative action midshipmen were stated to be over-represented in "pre-college lower track courses, mandatory tutoring programs and less-challenging majors. Many struggle to master basic concepts."

All aptitude tests that hindered "diversity" were to be [abolished in 2021](#), and military officers were to meet "diversity" targets in terms of who they promoted (or had their own careers negatively impacted). It has previously been noted that increased demands for diversity have weakened the honor code and anti-cheating standards and led to officer schools hiring students with strong athletic credentials but subpar academic records.

The most [persuasive chapters of The Affirmative Action Hoax](#), however, discuss how affirmative action contributed to the decline of law enforcement and the rise in crime since

the 1980s, which is another critique of affirmative action. In 1980, the Washington, DC, police department's acceptance of black people was met with a shocking decline. More criminals were able to roam the streets of many of our increasingly hostile inner cities as the percentage of solved homicide cases fell. It's interesting to note that black police officers frequently lacked functional literacy. As a result, evidence was excluded from court due to numerous crime reports that were either poorly written or incomprehensible.

*When black activist Coleman Young became mayor of Detroit in 1974, He promised to make half of its police force black. The qualifying examination was made easier; and, “Applicants who had difficulty with the qualifying exams were allowed to take them repeatedly until they passed, or were given answers by an instructor.”. . . Even these tricks could get only a handful of blacks promoted to sergeant and lieutenant; so blacks were allotted half the promotions, no matter what their test scores were. The results? “[I]n mid-1978 . . . [f]our inadequately trained young officers shot and killed themselves with their service revolvers. Five others killed or wounded civilians—in several cases because they didn’t like the way someone talked back to them.*

*In 1992, Detroit’s black police chief embezzled \$2.6 million from his city’s police force. Further, in 1998, over twenty Detroit officers were charged with felonies, and at least 100 were under investigation for underworld ties. In Miami in 1985, nearly ninety percent of the police officers convicted of stashing cocaine in cahoots with drug smugglers were affirmative action hires.*



## 6.6 — On cognitive tests and bias

The claim that IQ test results are culturally biased in favor of white people is a common lay defense of these tests. Particularly when combined with some "obviously" biased questions, this has some surface plausibility. However, for very simple reasons, bias is no longer typically taken seriously by intelligence researchers.

### *Views of the field*

Researchers Charles Reeve and Jennifer Charles contacted 99 intelligence "experts" and "non-expert" applied psychologists to get their opinions on a number of questions regarding cognitive abilities tests. The results were published in a 2008 paper titled "Survey of opinions on the primacy of g and social consequences of ability testing: A comparison of expert and non-expert views."

**Table 368 : Expert views on the bias of cognitive tests**

<b>Subjects</b>	<b>Not Biased</b>	<b>Biased</b>
<b>“Experts”</b>	73.3%	13.3%
<b>“Non Experts”</b>	51%	29.2%

According to their findings, 73.3% of "experts" and 51% of "non-experts" thought that IQ tests were free of racial bias, while 6.7% of "experts" and 29.2% of "non-experts" thought the testing was biased.

An investigation into bias in mental testing was carried out as early as 1982 by a panel from the National Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences, which came to the conclusion that cultural bias accounted for almost none of the racial variance in IQ scores.

"Considered as predictors of future performance, the tests do not seem to be biased against African Americans," according to the 1996 publication "Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns," which was the product of a panel assembled by the American Psychological Association.

52 intelligence researchers wrote a paper titled "[Mainstream Science on Intelligence](#)" in 1994, after *The Bell Curve* was published. In it, they outlined 25 postulates that they felt reflected mainstream intelligence research.

"There is no cultural bias against American Blacks or other native-born, English-speaking peoples in the United States in intelligence tests," was the fifth postulate. Instead, regardless of social class or race, IQ scores predict outcomes for all such Americans with equal accuracy. A nonverbal test or one in their mother tongue can be administered to people who struggle with English comprehension.

While none of this proves that IQ tests aren't culturally biased, it should raise suspicions when university representatives claim that something that everyone wants to be racially biased isn't.

### ***East Asians***

East Asians are a natural experiment on the "cultural bias" of IQ tests. In fact, East Asians perform better than Europeans and European Americans in a variety of settings.

The idea that this is due to genetics is supported by the prevalence of certain genes linked to intelligence and by rates of nearsightedness, which is linked to nonverbal IQ and has a heritability of 0.42. This is evident in many studies conducted worldwide where East Asians reside in countries with a majority of Europeans. These studies include adoption studies, a variety of IQ test data and IQ test proxies in the United States, and international IQ tests and international test scores.

### ***Subjective Analysis of “Cultural Bias”***

Gathering a group of "experts" in different fields, showing them questions, asking them to rate which ones they believe to be more or less biased, and then comparing their evaluations to the actual results is a simple method of analyzing test bias.

That was documented in a [1987 paper](#) by Frank McGurk and Arthur Jensen, who explained their approach as follows:

*“A panel of 78 judges, including professors of psychology and sociology, educators, professional workers in counseling and guidance, and graduate students in these fields, were asked to classify each of the 226 test items into one of three categories: I, least cultural; II, neutral; III, most cultural.”*

According to the findings, the difference in scores between the black and white test was significantly greater for the least culturally charged questions and the smallest for the most culturally charged ones.

### ***Predictive Validity***

This is a "pinch test" to determine whether these tests are valid; do they reveal higher white scores that are out of proportion to life outcomes? In fact, the SAT scores slightly overpredicted black and Hispanic SAT scores compared to whites, according to [data collected by the College Board](#), which administers the test, and college GPA.

In a [similar way](#), Jeffrey Cucina discovered that high school IQ tests marginally overpredicted black and Hispanic GPAs in comparison to whites in his paper "Role of mental abilities and mental tests in explaining high-school grades."

However, there were not many differences between the two situations.

### ***Rank-order difficulty***

The aforementioned [McGuirk study](#) also examined the questions that both groups answered incorrectly. They discovered that the order of the hardest to least difficult questions was exactly the same for both black and white students.

Furthermore, as a function of total score, there was a 0.95 correlation between the frequency of incorrect answers by whites and blacks.

Scores in earlier research from the 1970s ranged from .94 to .99.

The questions that black people and white people find most challenging are nearly identical. You would anticipate that Black people would find the questions far more difficult than White people if they were biased against them. However, we don't see this.

### ***Conclusion***

IQ tests aren't culturally biased, according to compelling evidences. They are strong predictors of future achievements, even better predictors for Blacks. They are also related to a bunch of social & mental indicators related to intelligence (see **Part I**).

## 6.7 — School quality

Racial IQ gaps can be explained by a variety of environmental factors, one of which is that some races attend "good schools" more frequently than others, while other races attend "bad schools" more frequently than others. Four arguments support the idea that racial disparities are unaffected by school quality:

The outcomes of studies using vouchers

The black-white IQ gap already exists BEFORE school

These are extreme, professional interventions that no typical family or school actually implements in practice, and early intervention programs (also known as "super schools") yield, at most, two IQ points.

The concept of "good schools" and "bad schools" is called into question by voucher studies.

Voucher programs are a natural experiment on the quality of schools. These programs have to select which students receive the vouchers because more students apply for them than are granted them.

Initially, they determined eligibility based on the criteria each program selected. The students who received the vouchers were then chosen at random from among the eligible students.

The students who applied for vouchers and were granted them, as well as those who did not, were then monitored. These included the [Washington, DC](#), [Cleveland](#), and [Milwaukee](#) programs.

**Table 369 : Voucher results of the Milwaukee program**

<b>Grade / Subject</b>	<b>Voucher 06</b>	<b>Non-Voucher 06</b>	<b>Voucher 10</b>	<b>Non-Voucher 10</b>
<b>7 – Reading</b>	432.2	435.3	492.2	485.4
<b>8 – Reading</b>	446.5	436.9	505.1	486.1
<b>10 – Reading</b>	458	472.9	493.5	492
<b>7 – Math</b>	388.2	395.7	501.6	500
<b>8 – Math</b>	426.3	424.4	504.2	493.3
<b>10 – Math</b>	462.9	478.7	515.5	524.2

**Table 370 : Voucher results of the Cleveland program**

<b>Grade</b>	<b>Voucher</b>	<b>No Voucher</b>	<b>Non-Applicant</b>
<b>1</b>	555	546	548
<b>2</b>	587	577	580
<b>3</b>	615	605	607
<b>4</b>	632	620	624
<b>5</b>	643	636	636
<b>6</b>	654	639	638

**Table 371 : Voucher results of the Washington program**

	<b>Math</b>	<b>Reading</b>
<b>Voucher</b>	641	645.92
<b>Applicant</b>	643.36	645.24

These three programs demonstrate that there seems to be little impact from the difference in school quality, if there is any, between the schools that voucher students selected and those that voucher applicants who were denied vouchers were forced to attend. The Cleveland program is the only one with a steady impact. At that low grade, the Milwaukee program did, however, also demonstrate the beneficial impact of vouchers.

***Black-white IQ exists at age 3***

By the age of three, the black-white IQ gap is completely developed. These were the averages of [48 studies](#) of black 3-year-olds, starting in 1939 and ending in 2003, that Jason Malloy of Humanvarieties.org examined:

**Table 372 : IQ of 3 years old Black children**

<b>Decade</b>	<b>Studies</b>	<b>Mean</b>
<b>1960s and Prior</b>	12	85.57
<b>1970s</b>	12	88.35
<b>1980s</b>	11	85.26
<b>1990s and beyond</b>	13	86.67

Furthermore, the average IQ difference was 0.958 standard deviations across the 24 studies that included a white group for comparison.

This means that by the age of three, the black-white IQ gap seems to be nearly complete, which is comparable to the adult racial IQ gap. Stated differently, the gap is present in almost its entirety prior to the start of classes. Furthermore, the small discrepancy might simply be the consequence of age-group differences in performance.

"IQ at age 3 doesn't mean anything" is a clear refutation of this.

First of all, there isn't any solid evidence to support this. We are aware that a child's IQ at [age four is a more accurate indicator](#) of their adult IQ than their parents' IQ.

Beyond that, though, it doesn't really matter if you believe it "means anything" because we are discussing whether or not educational disparities are to blame for the later IQ gap. Furthermore, since school doesn't begin until later and the IQ gap is fully developed by age 3, a difference in school quality seems like a very improbable explanation for the adult IQ gap.

Particularly because these voucher studies compare the effects of "good schools" and "bad schools" directly, while in reality some black students attend "good schools" and

some white students attend "bad schools." As a result, the gap in educational quality between black and white students is likely to be smaller than the differences in school quality in these voucher studies, which are likely to be zero anyhow.

***Early intervention ("super school") has no lasting effect on IQ***

John Protzko examined 34 early intervention trials (as well as five on vitamin supplementation during pregnancy) in a meta-analysis titled "[The environment in raising early intelligence: A meta-analysis of the fadeout effect](#)" that was published in May 2015.

With the help of studies like the Perry Preschool Project and the Abecedarian Project, which started with very young children, intelligence researchers were able to fully explore all of their environmental theories regarding the development of intelligence and how to foster it.

The researchers were able to increase the participants' IQs by about 7 points using these, the most drastic types of intervention; however, 5 years after the intervention ended, the increase decreased to about 2 points. The writer writes:

*Interventions that started earlier in a child's life were no more effective than those which started later in a child's life, nor did they affect how long the effects lasted (both ps N .15) and as such were dropped from the model. Duration played no appreciable role in explaining the fadeout effect and was also removed from the model.*

A consistent seven-point improvement is significant, but this type of early intervention is unrealistic and extreme; it can be thought of as a sort of "super-school." The IQ difference between blacks and whites is 15 points.

However, keep in mind that this disparity starts at age three, continues throughout school, and lasts into adulthood. Since most people don't lift weights, genetics accounts for the majority of the variation in muscle between people. This seems to be




similar to the effects of muscle exercise in that once you stop, your muscles return to their "normal" level.

And in terms of long-term effects, these drastic early interventions—which are far more than any \*real\* family can offer—produce at most two points, and most likely not even that. There is no solid evidence that the disparities between the average schools attended by whites and blacks even remotely resemble the activities carried out in these early intervention programs.

The reader may point M. Danish Shakeel's "[meta-analysis](#)" by the Foundation of Economic Education. According to this "meta-analysis," vouchers generally result in a 0.15 standard deviation improvement in math and a 0.25 standard deviation improvement in reading.

The issue here is that research from Colombia and India accounted for 65.94% of the reading score weight and 51.63% of the math score weight, with the remaining percentage coming from US scores:



The second issue is that one study from New York City accounted for 55.77% of the weight for the US analysis, which is why I put "meta-analysis" in quotes. [This program](#) started in the second grade, and a [follow-up study](#) was conducted to examine the students' high school graduation scores. You can find those results here:

**Table 373 : Scores of vouchers**

	All Students		
	Control	Treatment	p-value
Math Score (Percentile)	17.1	17.1	0.90
Reading Score (Percentile)	24.6	22.9	0.22
No Baseline Test Scores	30%	29%	0.53

As it turned out, the vouchers seemed to have helped students at younger ages, but by senior year, they had either no effect at all or a negative one on test scores. Thus, more than half of the research is refuted. By the end of high school, there was no benefit, even if there had been one in fifth grade, which negates more than half of the paper's purported impact.

However, I am aware of other studies that Shakeel used. Shakeel, for instance, asserts a significant positive impact from the Milwaukee voucher study, which is unquestionably false if you have even the most basic score data, look above for the table.

They also cited research on the Washington Opportunity Scholarship Program, which they said demonstrated a significant positive causal effect for vouchers. Again, though, if you are aware of the scores, you are aware that the vouchers were useless.

I am aware of the Charlotte study, which was another study that Shakeel used. There was no control group in this North Carolina study. Applicants who received vouchers and those who did not were not compared. No, they took the voucher

recipients and, after adjusting for SES and gender, formed a "comparison group" of those who did not apply for the vouchers. In other words, they lacked a control group.

For those who already believe that factors like SES (such as differences in alleged school quality) are important, "control for SES" means nothing!

Notably, the comparison group was only 6% white, whereas the voucher group was 12% white. Therefore, they didn't even account for race.

The authors themselves acknowledge the study's lack of value, stating,

*Though analysis found significant differences between the CSF-C scholarship students and comparison group, this does not mean that participation in CSF-C caused those differences. Other factors, such as parent participation in education, may have been the cause of the differences in outcomes.*

That represents four of Shakeel's six studies. He most likely also miscalculated the other two, which account for 11.74% of the US weighting.

Therefore, we're not examining the 0.27 and 0.15 standard deviation gains in math and reading that vouchers in the US have produced. For both, we're looking at about zero.